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‘In the city, the streets are nicely laid out. And you drive on the right 
and you have traffic lights, etc. There are rules. When you leave the 
city, there are still roads, but no traffic lights. And when you get far off 
there are no roads, no lights, no rules, nothing to guide you. It’s all 
woods. And when you return to the city you may feel that the rules are 
wrong, that there should be no rules, etc.’ 
- Ludwig Wittgenstein 
 
 
‘Nothing is built on stone; all is built on sand, but we must build as if 
the sand were stone.’ 











From the earliest works of political theory dealing with the constitution of 
legislative and executive powers to more recent theories of revolutionary 
change, there has always been an urgency among political thinkers to theorise 
moments of radical transformation. The central claim of this thesis is that 
narratives of radical political transformation necessarily pass through a moment 
of opacity or circularity. Moreover, I propose that narrative opacity can be 
theorised while maintaining a rigorously materialist ontology. 
The first chapter reads Søren Kierkegaard’s ‘moment’ as describing a change 
which is irreducible to its prior conditions. Rather than requiring a theological 
paradigm, I claim the moment can be read as indicating a fractured materialism 
in which ontological incompleteness has a temporal character. Throughout the 
second, third, and fourth chapters, I show how speculative and theoretical 
accounts of political change necessarily encounter moments of narrative 
opacity. In contractarian accounts of political origins we find an unavoidable 
narrative distortion characterising the founding moment in which, as Rousseau 
openly states, an effect must serve as its own cause. The authority of the God-
like sovereign of Carl Schmitt’s Political Theology is shown to be reflexively 
determined through the recognition of a political subject, while reflexive 
determination itself produces irresolvable narrative distortions. The same 
dislocated chronology that shows up in Hobbes and Rousseau can also be 
located in Badiou’s concept of the event. The event cannot be construed as a 
single, indivisible unit; instead, it contains a split between the sheer occurrence 
and the intervention or nomination that registers the occurrence as an event. As 
in Rousseau, an effect must serve as its own cause, albeit at the cost of narrative 
intelligibility. The final chapter ties the preceding arguments together through 










Contents .................................................................................................................. 5 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................. 7 
Introduction ........................................................................................................... 9 
Chapter One .......................................................................................................... 25 
Kierkegaard’s Øieblikk ...................................................................................... 25 
Qualitative Leaps and Passive Decisions ..................................................... 34 
Service to the Idea ........................................................................................ 44 
Wild beasts and plunging eagles .................................................................. 50 
Necessity, Possibility, Actuality ................................................................... 60 
Chapter Two.......................................................................................................... 65 
Hobbes, Rousseau, and the Unsquared Circle of Political Foundations ......... 65 
Hobbes and the Aporetic Genesis of Political Obligation ............................ 71 
Felix Culpa .................................................................................................... 81 
Hobbes via Kierkegaard: Continuity in Reverse........................................... 91 
Rousseau, the Lawgiver, and the Openness of the Political ....................... 104 
The Temporality of Rousseau’s Social Contract ......................................... 114 
Chapter Three ..................................................................................................... 132 
Reflexive Determination in Kelsen and Schmitt ............................................ 132 
The Autonomy of the Political .................................................................... 135 
Sovereignty and Exceptional Decisions ...................................................... 146 
Presupposing the Grundnorm .................................................................... 155 
The Democratic a priori and Quasi-Transcendental Foundations ............ 178 
Chapter Four ....................................................................................................... 191 
Alain Badiou’s Divided Event ......................................................................... 191 
Set Theoretic Ontology ................................................................................ 198 
The Event and the Intervention ................................................................. 209 
Indiscernability ........................................................................................... 218 
The Subject and its Nomination ................................................................. 227 
Laclau, Badiou, and the Intra-/Post-Evental Subject ............................... 242 
Chapter Five ........................................................................................................ 251 
Transcendental Materialism in Žižek and Johnston ...................................... 251 
The (Im)material Subject ............................................................................ 255 
6 
 
Ent-Scheidung ............................................................................................ 261 
A Transcendental Materialist Reappraisal of the Social Contract ............. 266 
The Act and its Vissitudes .......................................................................... 272 
Vanishing Mediators and Posited Presuppositions ................................... 278 
Death Drive, or, the Entangled Freedom of a Proto-Subject ..................... 293 
The Uncanny Subject .................................................................................. 297 
Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 310 











I am grateful to the Economic and Social Research Council for having funded 
my research between 2012 and 2015. 
The conversations, debates, and experiences that led me to write this thesis are 
too numerous to mention here. I would, however, like to thank a few close 
friends whose input and support has been utterly invaluable to me. 
Conversations with Emily de Villiers and Rosie Ledger throughout my 
childhood and adolescence were formative in the strongest possible sense. 
Simply put, I would not be the person I am today had it not been for their 
companionship. Dave Boldrin and Saraid McIlvride were enormously 
supportive during a difficult period of my life and I will always be grateful. Tom 
Bienias and Murray Curnow provided comic relief and a welcome distraction 
from academic work. Frequent bouts of verbal sparring throughout 2012-2013 
with my then flatmates Rory Kirkwood and Rachel Mulvena helped awaken me 
from two years of intellectual hibernation. I was able to clarify and refine my 
ideas during a crucial stage in the writing of this thesis only with the help of 
Veronika Pehe. Ingvild Lohne Frøyen encouraged my original masters 
application in 2008, and has always been one of my most trusted, supportive, 
and loyal friends. The unexpectedly difficult task of arriving at a final title for 
the thesis was accomplished only with the help of Alice Olsson. She is both a 
valued friend and a formidable interlocutor. 
I would like to thank my students for making my job as a teacher so enjoyable 
and for mercilessly subjecting my esoteric interpretations to the cold light of 
their critical scrutiny. I am also grateful to Andreas Kalyvas, Wolfhart 
Totsching, and two anonymous reviewers for providing illuminating feedback 
on an earlier iteration of the argument comprising the third chapter of this 
thesis. 
I feel extraordinarily lucky to have benefited from the supervision of two of 
UCL’s most gifted academics. There is no doubt that without the help and 
support I received from Kevin Inston and Tim Beasley-Murray this project 
would not have been possible. For three years, Kevin has been one of my most 
attentive and thoughtful readers—if there is any semblance of a sustained 
argument among these pages, I have him to thank. As for Tim, it would be no 
exaggeration to say that, over the past decade, his guidance and mentorship has 
had a profound and formative influence on my academic trajectory. I first met 
8 
 
Tim as an undergraduate student on The History of European Political Ideas (a 
course I would later go on to teach between 2014 and 2016) where he 
introduced me to many of the thinkers and ideas that gave shape and impetus to 
the direction of my postgraduate study. Sometime during the first year of my 
PhD, Tim made a comment that has stuck with me ever since: the thesis is not 
simply about an arbitrary topic or idea that one happens to have taken up an 
interest in; rather, the idea serves as a proxy for one’s own self-exploration. This 
means that, ultimately, the thesis is always about its author. The topics, 
concepts, and ideas that the author encounters are so many strands woven 
together in the fabric of a metaphor for the author’s ownmost inexhaustible 
thought. I am grateful to Tim for all his help and guidance over the years. It is a 
privilege to have been his student. 
My interest in politics and my ability to write (more or less) coherently is a 
result of my parent’s utter dedication to my education. My entire family have 
been incredibly supportive throughout the writing of this thesis and I owe them 









In his essay, ‘Interpreting Revolution within the French Revolution’ Claude Lefort 
notes the ‘opacity’ which arises as ‘the effect of the dissimulation of something 
that has entered the register of the thinkable for the first time’.1 It is a statement 
that neatly expresses the central thread around which the chapters of this thesis 
are woven—the idea that, when faced with the task of describing the radical 
political events of the modern era, opacity is not incidental, but essential. 
Historical analysis meets with certain limitations as soon as it begins to grapple 
with events in their symbolic dimension—not so much as a stable picture to be 
exhaustively examined and described, but as a field of representation in which 
the perceiving subject is unavoidably implicated. Our interest is in the politico-
philosophical consequences of these limits of the ‘register of the thinkable’ and 
the opacity they indicate. More specifically, this thesis explores the theorisation 
of political opacity’s temporal extension and narrative articulation. If we are 
dealing with, as Lefort puts it, ‘something that has entered the register of the 
thinkable’, we are dealing with a point of entry which should occupy an 
identifiable moment in time. But to describe this point in terms of opacity and 
dissimulation is to signal that the site does not reveal itself fully to us, that 
                                                   
1 Claude Lefort, Democracy and Political Theory, trans. by David Macey (Oxford: Polity Press, 
1988), p. 93. 
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something is withheld, displaced, or concealed. The effacement of the 
contingency of a founding political gesture persists as a narrative distortion that 
derails both empirico-historical and speculative renderings. 
If we are to admit the inscrutability of certain moments of political change, 
we are also thereby bound to explain how this inscrutability comes about, to 
demarcate its parameters, and to deploy new concepts in the service of greater 
understanding. I follow in the methodological footsteps of Kierkegaard whose 
technique of ‘circumnavigation’ involves, as James Berger argues, the “[mapping] 
of an unknown area by circling around it”.2 To that end, I identify the opacity 
associated with the political event as a temporal phenomenon, arising from 
certain unavoidable structural constraints encountered in the narrativisation of 
moments of political change. The Hobbesian covenant, the Rousseauian social 
contract, the Schmittian decision, Badiou’s event, and Žižek’s Act each attempt to 
suppress, delineate, or expose a paradox which is fundamental and essential 
rather than incidental. Moreover, the paradox we can detect in each thinkers 
work has implications for our understanding of the temporality of political 
change that are only properly unfurled in Rousseau and Žižek. To paraphrase 
Quentin Meillassoux, the contingency that marks a founding political act is 
necessary; one cannot have a political foundation without the persistence of some 
trace of contingency, even if its status is that of a gap or breach.3 
There is a rich tradition of scholarship which seeks to conceptualise 
revolutionary events in terms of their temporal heterogeneity and, in light of the 
depth and breadth of that tradition, this project cannot hope to provide anything 
                                                   
2 James Berger, After the End: Representations of Post-Apocalypse (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1999), pp. 3–4. 
3 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, trans. by Ray 
Brassier (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2010). 
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like an exhaustive analysis.4 Having said this, our approach will be to articulate a 
specific position vis-à-vis the problems associated with political temporality via a 
series of engagements with key thinkers from the tradition of political philosophy. 
But if this is to be our approach, we also need to provide a rationale for the 
selection of thinkers to be included in this study, and perhaps more importantly, 
justify the absence of others. The first point to make is that I have selected for 
analysis those thinkers whose work pertains directly to the genesis or transfer of 
authority. This is ultimately what is at stake in Hobbes, Rousseau, Schmitt, and 
Hans Kelsen. There are no doubt a vast number of other theorists who are 
interested in the same phenomenon, however, the key dimensions of the issue I 
wish to draw attention to can be set out through reference to the aforementioned 
thinkers. Nonetheless, there are also theorists whose omission might seem to be 
an oversight. The two clearest examples are Hegel and Heidegger, each of whom 
have had a deep and enduring influence on many of the theorists considered in 
the final chapters of the thesis. In the case of Hegel, I have opted to investigate 
two contemporary interpreters of Hegelian philosophy (Žižek and Adrian 
Johnston) whose joint philosophical project I believe to be worthy of attention for 
its own sake rather than merely as a heterodox reading of Hegelian philosophy. 
Likewise, Heidegger has no doubt exerted an enormous influence on thinkers 
                                                   
4 There are already several important works focusing on this tradition. See, for example: Koral 
Ward, Augenblick: The Concept of the ‘Decisive Moment’ in 19th- and 20th-Century Western 
Philosophy (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008); The Moment: Time and Rupture in 
Modern Thought, ed. by Heidrun Friese (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2001); Andrew 
Gibson, Intermittency: The Concept of Historical Reason in Recent French Philosophy 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012). Other valuable studies which make a significant 
contribution to the secondary literature on temporal heterogeneity albeit without necessarily 
making it their primary focus include the following: Adrian Johnston, Badiou, Žižek, and 
Political Transformations: The Cadence of Change (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 2009); Adrian Johnston, Žižek’s Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theory of 
Subjectivity, ed. by Anthony J. Steinbock (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2008); 
Bonnie Honig, Emergency Politics: Paradox, Law, Democracy (Oxford: Princeton University 
Press, 2009); Oliver Marchart, Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in 
Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau (London: Edinburgh University Press, 2007). 
12 
 
such as Claude Lefort, Jacques Derrida, and Ernesto Laclau, however, my 
position is that each of these theorists are sufficiently distinctive to warrant 
analysis on their own terms rather than merely as exponents of a Heideggerian 
political ontology. In addition, there is already existing scholarship exploring the 
impact of Heideggerian thought on political philosophy.5  
It is worth clarifying some of the terms mentioned above before we 
proceed. For the purposes of this study, ‘radical political events’, ‘founding acts’, 
and ‘political transformations’ are taken to be rough synonyms, indicating a 
change in the locus of authority, but crucially, one that does not occur through 
pre-existing legal mechanisms. For a transfer of authority to be radical, it cannot 
appeal to law as its ground, but must instead appeal to a more fundamental 
power, to a more basic ground. In the case of Hobbes and Rousseau, the covenant 
or social contract is a radical political event by virtue of the fact that it occurs in a 
legal, and indeed normative, vacuum. With respect to subsequent political events, 
‘radicality’ indicates overt recourse to exceptional (which is to say, extra-legal) 
political measures and, usually, an appeal to a higher authority than law. To 
clarify by way of example, both the French Revolution and the American 
Declaration of Independence would qualify as radical political events. In both 
cases, there were no pre-existing legal frameworks which could authorise the acts 
and declarations of the political actors involved. The narratives of political origins 
described in the social contract tradition also constitute radical political events 
insofar as they describe the investiture, concentration, or transfer of authority in 
a particular body—the sovereign. In contrast, an event which remains within 
existing legal parameters and follows normal protocols is not a radical political 
                                                   
5 See, for example: Marchart, Post-Foundational Political Thought. 
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event. For example, an election result, no matter how unexpected, cannot be 
considered ‘radical’ in the sense intended here. Even if an election result has been 
swung by illegal means, this cannot constitute a radical political event since there 
has not been an overt appeal to a higher authority than the usual democratic 
procedural norms despite the fact that those norms have been flouted in practice. 
Furthermore, the various actions taken by the National Socialist government in 
Germany in 1933 (including the curtailment of constitutional rights, freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and so forth) are not technically extra-legal. 
All these actions were ultimately carried out within a pre-defined legal space set 
out in Article 48 of the Weimar constitution and can, in principle at least, appeal 
to that constitution as their authorising ground. 
A further clarification concerning the status of radical political events as 
historical or speculative also needs to be briefly addressed. Below, I will make the 
case that radical political events present themselves as opaque regardless of 
whether we are dealing with those which are supposed to have occurred 
historically (the American Declaration of Independence or the French 
Revolution) or those which are the subject of speculative or theoretical 
expositions (the Hobbesian covenant or the Rousseauian social contract, for 
example). Nonetheless, this thesis consistently opts to probe existing 
theorisations of radical political events rather than focusing on empirical 
examples. This is a decision which needs to be justified at the outset. The first 
point to make is that I do not discount the value of historical analysis and that I 
recognise the need for further research in this direction. Having said this, the 
argument made in this thesis could not be properly supported if I were to limit 
my analysis to empirical examples. Given that we are concerned with identifying 
limitations to the narrative exposition of certain historical events, empirical data 
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will not yield much insight. This is because, insofar as we have historical data 
which can be successfully narrativised without remainder, we are still working 
within the very boundaries I wish to identify and delineate. The more productive 
approach for my purposes is to attend to the logical problems encountered when 
thinking through a radical political change since these logical problems will help 
identify the limit of narrativisation. The exploration of these boundaries must 
therefore take place through theoretical and conceptual, as opposed to empirical, 
analysis. 
Through the close reading of selected passages from a range of different 
texts, I hope to construct a dialogue between thinkers who might be more often 
read in isolation. The unconventional juxtaposition of Søren Kierkegaard and 
Thomas Hobbes, may seem jarring to some readers, however, the merit of such 
an approach is that it provides a richer and more fertile terrain within which novel 
interpretations might germinate. The methodological approach of this thesis can 
therefore be seen to take a Lefortian line. Interpretation is not the careful 
elucidation of an objective and immutable meaning which is to be preserved 
through different historical periods and gradually nourished by ever deeper 
exegetical excavations. While the reconstruction of the text’s meaning within the 
context of its own historical moment may well be a worthy enterprise, this in no 
sense exhausts the meaning of the text; on the contrary, the text’s meaning is not 
something which could be permanently stabilised or protected from the 
onslaught of subsequent interpretative activity. The only stable position with 
regard to, for example, Hobbes’ Leviathan, is one that recognises the text’s 
continued openness to interpretation and the incommensurability of these 
interpretations with respect to one another. I am interested in pursuing an 
approach that explores earlier texts in the light of current philosophical 
15 
 
questions. The meaning of the work for its own period may still be of marginal 
interest but this should not derail the more urgent task of bringing the work to 
bear on new situations and new problems. Such an approach is accompanied by 
an awareness that the work of interpretation is bi-directional, involving both an 
absorption and a projection which cannot be disentangled from one another. 
Before asserting the permanence of certain kinds of paradox marking the 
political, we should be clear in advance about what we mean by a political paradox 
and what might enable us to confidently assume its permanence. Ricoeur’s Time 
and Narrative may be of some use here. To recount the central thesis presented 
in Time and Narrative, Ricoeur argues that temporality is, ‘the structure of 
existence that reaches language in narrativity’ while narrativity itself is ‘the 
language structure that has temporality as its ultimate referent’.6 While they are 
not equivalents, time and narrative are in a relationship of mutual implication; it 
is only insofar as a collection of occurrences can be narrativised that their 
temporal dimension becomes apparent to us. Moreover, in the very act of 
narrativisation (or what Ricoeur calls ‘emplotment’) we deploy a universal 
experience of temporality since it is this common experience which transforms 
events into a coherent narrative. Now, for the purposes of this enquiry, the co-
implication of time and narrative is of vital importance. In short, if we are unable 
to successfully represent certain kinds of political events in narrative terms, if 
emplotment fails to produce coherence and intelligibility, then we can confidently 
assert that these political events fall outside the universal experience of 
temporality, or, at the very least, we are forced to refer to a highly peculiar notion 
of temporality in order to articulate such events in narrative terms. When, in the 
                                                   
6 Paul Ricoeur, ‘Narrative Time’, Critical Inquiry, 7.1 (1980), p. 169. 
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chapters that follow, I refer to disjointed, distorted, or heterogeneous 
temporalities, it is because Ricoeur has enabled us to grasp the way in which 
atypical temporal modalities are implied by the encounter with insurmountable 
resistances to emplotment. 
One could argue that an unwarranted leap between the possibility of 
emplotment and the human experience of temporality is being made here. This 
might be the case if we were only interested in the emplotment of historical 
narratives or fictional narratives. With respect to the former, we may be unable 
to successfully narrativise a set of events due to insufficient information about 
actors’ intentions or due to our inability to properly include or discount the 
impact of a chance occurrence. Alternatively, Ricoeur has noted that fictional 
narratives may employ temporal modalities which are far more complex than 
those marked by temporal succession and which readers/viewers are nonetheless 
sensitive to.7 Having said this, we nonetheless do need to admit that an event 
presenting itself as a sudden break with the past (or, stranger still, retroactively 
caused by subsequent events), insofar as it cannot be read in terms of a linear, 
unidirectional causal succession, is unintelligible according to the logical 
grammar of time. As to this logical grammar of time, Jonathan Culler provides a 
neat summary:  
narratological analysis of a text requires one to treat the discourse as a 
representation of events which are conceived of as independent of any particular 
narrative perspective or presentation and which are thought of as having the 
properties of real events. Thus a novel may not identify the temporal relations 
between two events it presents, but the analyst must assume there is a real or proper 
temporal order, that the events in fact occurred either simultaneously or 
successively.8 
                                                   
7 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, trans. by Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer 
(London: University of Chicago Press, 1985), II, p. 25. 
8 Jonathan Culler, The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1981), p. 171. 
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When the term ‘unintelligibility’ is used below, it simply indicates the 
impossibility of applying the assumptions that would hold if we were dealing with 
‘real events’ in the sense Culler uses here. Radical political events are clearly not 
entirely beyond comprehension, but our comprehension needs to operate at a 
further remove. For example, in confronting the contracting moment described 
in Hobbes and Rousseau, the task for comprehension involves the delineation of 
a certain field of narrative unintelligibility. We can no longer simply apply a 
logical grammar of time; instead, we must show how and why the effort to apply 
it fails and understand the implications of this failure. 
As a corollary to my central argument concerning the temporal paradoxes 
associated with radical political events, the following chapters will also advance a 
radical materialist ontology. As will be shown, only a rejuvenated, non-positivistic 
materialism can avoid the twin-pitfalls of determinism and dualism. The former 
is unacceptable insofar as it relegates human freedom to the status of an 
epiphenomenal impression while political action becomes nothing more than the 
second-order unfolding of higher, autonomous quasi-natural forces. The latter 
would simply comprise a displacement of the problem in the guise of a solution, 
relying on a spiritual realm beyond the reach of worldly human endeavours while 
the boundary between the mundane and the divine itself remains untheorised.9 
Only an unflinching materialist ontology which avoids vulgar positivism can serve 
as the ground for meaningful political action. 
                                                   
9 Of course, presented in these terms we have nothing more than ‘straw man’ dualism. There are 
few theorists who would seriously contend that revolutionary events are divinely inspired. 
Having said this, the danger is that as Watkin identifies, political philosophy outwardly avows 
its atheism while remaining parasitic on theistic models. Christopher Watkin, Difficult Atheism: 
Post-Theological Thinking in Alain Badiou, Jean-Luc Nancy and Quentin Meillassoux 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), pp. 95–99. The issues emerging from the 




Advancing a radical materialist position will also mean engaging with a 
commonly invoked paradigm of revolutionary activity: the revolution as miracle. 
While I am aware that the metaphorical use of the term ‘miracle’ to describe a 
revolutionary act does not necessarily entail a latent politico-theological 
orientation, it is important to clarify what is meant by ‘miracle’. Traditional 
theological thought on the idea of the miraculous has taken the miracle to be an 
intervention in worldly affairs by an external force. The miracle is an event which 
cannot be reconciled with our common understanding of the world and its laws. 
As St Augustine puts it, ‘When […] things happen in a continuous kind of river of 
ever-flowing succession, passing by a regular and beaten track, then they are 
called natural; when, for the admonition of men they are thrust in by an unusual 
changeableness, then they are called miracles’.10  Conceived in this way, the 
miracle is interruptive; it breaks the continuity of the natural world and exerts 
independent causal force upon it. Theologically speaking, when God intervenes 
directly in the world, the incommensurability of God’s act with our everyday 
experience gives rise to a sense of the miraculous. Aquinas, in turn, holds to a 
notion of the miracle that retains the broad strokes of Augustine’s position whilst 
introducing additional consideration of what today we might call the distinction 
between the epistemological and the ontological. In short, Aquinas recognises 
that there is a difference between an event labelled as a miracle due to our 
inability to understand its causes, and alternatively, a miracle whose cause is not 
natural, but divine.11 The former is only apparently miraculous (i.e. it appears that 
way from our limited perspective) whereas the latter is miraculous in its essence. 
                                                   
10 Augustine, ‘De Trinitate’, in Patriologiae Latinae, ed. by J. P. Migne (Paris, 1861). Cited in J. 
Houston, Reported Miracles: A Critique of Hume (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994), p. 9. 
11 Houston, p. 21. 
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Crucially, for both Aquinas and Augustine, the miracle does not result from any 
natural process nor from human agency; it is the result of God’s will.12Alternative 
ways of understanding the miraculous have departed from this notion of 
‘intervention’ and have sought to advance a notion of the miracle which is not an 
objective event, emanating from a transcendental beyond, but is to be understood 
as requiring some form of pre-existing faith or receptivity on the part of the 
witness. One exponent of this conception of the miracle is Franz Rosenzweig 
whose argument in The Star of Redemption takes human freedom as 
fundamental and goes on to show how traditional conceptions of the miracle 
would undermine this freedom.13 The tradition of thought on the miracle positing 
it as an intervention would hold that miracles can produce new believers (if an 
atheist becomes convinced that God has performed a miracle, then by definition 
they have ceased to be an atheist) whereas the tradition of thought requiring 
receptivity might hold instead that miracles do not produce new believers so 
much as awaken an already-existing (albeit perhaps latent) faithful disposition.14 
Likewise, for Rosenzweig, the miracle is a sign whose status and meaning 
depends on its apprehension by human subjects. In either case, insofar as a 
                                                   
12 A related distinction which could be considered relevant to this thesis is that of chronos and 
kairos. Chronos stands for gradual, linear, regular time while kairos is the fleeting moment of an 
opportunity for change. The kairotic instant is one in which a significant change occurs, perhaps 
a change that seemed implausible, or even impossible, prior to the moment. As such, there is 
clearly some connection between the kairotic moment and the concept of the moment I am 
interested in here. Nonetheless, it is not evident that kairos describes the kind of change I am 
interested in. A moment of opportunity is not necessarily one that resists narrativisation. Even if 
it appears to be qualitatively distinct from chronos in its suggestion of discontinuity, it does not 
necessarily point to a change that impedes narrativisation. 
13 Franz Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, trans. by Barbara E. Galli (Madison, WI: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2005). My understanding of Rosenzweig’s notion of the miracle 
relies on the account provided in Honig, Emergency Politics: Paradox, Law, Democracy, pp. 
87–112. 
14 In fact, the situation is more complex than this. As we will see with Kierkegaard, latency gives 
too much weight to pre-existence whereas in reality this latency can only be conceived as a kind 
of openness, or, as Kierkegaard might put it, the possibility of possibility. Other more recent 
interpretations have suggested that latency is itself a retroactive effect of the miracle. See, for 
example: Michael O’Neill Burns, Kierkegaard and the Matter of Philosophy: A Fractured 
Dialectic (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), pp. 43–50. 
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miracle requires some degree of receptivity on the part of the perceiving subject, 
it is no longer clear that miracles are the pure product of divine intervention. To 
be sure, it is possible to hold that the miracle requires both subjective receptivity 
and divine intervention, but the crucial point is that if this intervention is no 
longer the sole independent cause of the miracle, the boundary between the 
divine and the mundane becomes blurred.15 This is why, for Kierkegaard, God is 
absolute otherness and belief in him is ‘absurd’. There is no way to locate the 
boundary between the transcendent and the worldly because we can never be sure 
that a miracle, conversion, or revelation is in fact divinely inspired. It is precisely 
this ‘uncertainty’ which constantly surfaces in Kierkegaard’s thought that marks 
the beginning of the possibility of a transcendental materialist ontology—that is, 
an uncompromising materialism (but one that nonetheless contains a blind spot) 
which is equipped to work through the aporias of political theology.  
The argument set out below is divided into five chapters. The first of these 
deals with Kierkegaard’s notion of the instant which, as I will demonstrate, is a 
concept that can be repurposed for a radical materialist politics. If traditional 
readings of Kierkegaard have restricted themselves to discussions of the 
theological and existential themes in his writing, contemporary readings (most 
notably by David J. Kangas and Michael O’Neill Burns) have shown how a secular 
formal model of change can be isolated in Kierkegaard’s work.16 My own 
                                                   
15 This blurring is at its most radical in Rosenzweig who refers to a kabbalist myth: ‘God speaks: 
If you do not bear witness to me, then I am not.’ God’s existence is left radically undecidable, 
subordinated to the ‘testimony of man’. Franz Rosenzweig, ‘Atheistic Theology’, in Philosophical 
and Theological Writings, ed. & trans. by Paul W. Franks and Michael L. Morgan (Indianapolis, 
IN: Hackett, 2000), pp. 23–24. Cited in Honig, Emergency Politics: Paradox, Law, Democracy, 
p. 146, n. 27. 
16 David J. Kangas, Kierkegaard’s Instant: On Beginnings (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 2007); Burns, Kierkegaard and the Matter of Philosophy: A Fractured Dialectic. 
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interpretation takes up the task of exploring this model of change with a mind to 
unpacking its political import in subsequent chapters. 
The second chapter takes two central figures of the social contract 
tradition, Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in order to develop the 
argument that radical political change (the foundation of political life through a 
contract would be an example of such change) cannot be successfully rendered as 
an intelligible, linear narrative. In reading Hobbes and Rousseau, two alternative 
strategies for dealing with the aporetic moment of political origins emerge. 
Hobbes deploys a rhetorical strategy designed to suppress the moment of origin, 
passing directly from the preconditions of political life to the moment of 
accomplished agreement between citizens. Rousseau, in contrast, is fully aware 
of the paradox of the founding act and openly states the circularity that emerges 
in our attempt to narrativise the origin. In both cases, our interest is not in simply 
criticizing Hobbes or Rousseau for some lapse or short-coming; rather, we should 
note instead how the speculative encounter with the political origin arrives at an 
insoluble moment of narrative opacity. The moment of the contract’s signing 
contains a paradox which is both an irreducible and essential, as opposed to an 
incidental, feature of a particular account. 
If the first and second chapters focus on narrative opacity in relation to 
origins, the third chapter makes the argument that opacity, or more specifically, 
retroactivity, characterises political transformations as much as political origins. 
Carl Schmitt and Hans Kelsen are read together in such a way that enables a 
radical democratic reading of both thinkers and challenges Schmitt’s idea of the 
contamination of theological and political conceptual schemata. The central 
thrust of the argument is that the paradigm of the miracle must be abandoned in 
favour of a reading of the ‘sovereign decision’ as reflexively determined. The 
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decision necessarily relies on a moment of recognition by a non-sovereign entity 
and, as such, contains a previously unacknowledged radical democratic potential. 
In the final third of this chapter, I briefly look at the way these topics have been 
taken up in the works of Jacques Derrida and Ernesto Laclau, each of whom draw 
attention to the retroaction and opacity that characterises radical political 
change. 
The fourth chapter addresses Badiou’s contribution to a theory of radical 
political events, or, as Badiou might put it, the emergence of the new.17 I set out 
the ontology that supports Badiou’s theory of the event before exploring the non-
linearity and narrative opacity that mark the relationship between event and 
subject. Essentially, I begin by taking the uncontroversial position that for 
Badiou, as for thinkers considered in previous chapters, the event resists its full 
exposition and that a zero-level opacity is the positive condition of an evental 
occurrence. From this starting point, I then develop the argument that the 
temporal circularity we have noted in Hobbes, Rousseau, and Schmitt also 
persists in Badiou’s ambivalence concerning the relationship between 
‘intervention’, ‘event’, and ‘subject’. It is not only the ‘event’ itself that is 
indiscernible; the ordering of the various concepts Badiou deploys in order to 
describe the emergence of the event requires the abandonment of linearity in 
favour of a paradigm that recognises an effect’s serving as the possibility 
condition of its own cause.  
The final chapter looks at the recent contributions to a theory of radical 
political change from Slavoj Žižek and, to a lesser extent, Adrian Johnston. I 
                                                   
17 It will be noted that in my analysis of Badiou I focus almost exclusively on Being and Event. 
This is partly for reasons of space, but also because the point I wished to make regarding 
Badiou’s notion of radical change seemed to be articulated most clearly in this text. I do not 
doubt that a more wide-ranging study of Badiou’s works would be able to make a more thorough 
and comprehensive argument concerning the relation between subject and event. 
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explore the notions of the political subject, of retroactivity, and the political 
gesture Žižek calls the ‘Act’ in order to locate these concepts in a broader 
philosophical position that Adrian Johnston has termed ‘transcendental 
materialism’.18 Both Žižek and Johnston turn out to be thinkers of the constitutive 
distortion—when it comes to radical political acts, the ‘truth’ of the act is not its 
meaning but rather its openness to meaning. The risk and promise of political 
action resides in this openness. Transcendental materialism provides a repertoire 
of concepts enabling the development of a more nuanced position on political 
transformations, one that avoids both the dualism implied by a hard 
transcendentalism as well as positivism in its various guises. Moreover, it is a 
materialism which is compatible with the way humans experience history, both 
as a process in which their actions ‘count’ and have an impact on outcomes, but 
also as an escalating crisis which continually escapes them. Crucially, when 
viewed from a transcendental materialist perspective, the possibility for radical 
change inspired by human agents acting in concert is preserved albeit with the 
vital caveat that humans inevitably misrecognise the scope of their own agentic 
activity. I conclude this chapter by turning the insights of Žižek and Johnston’s 
transcendental materialism back upon Kierkegaard in order to set out a final 
characterisation of the decisive moment. 
In his Archaeologies of the Future Fredric Jameson makes the following 
remark: ‘Here as elsewhere in narrative analysis what is most revealing is not 
what is said, but what cannot be said, what does not register on the narrative 
apparatus’.19 As will become clear throughout the chapters of this thesis, that 
                                                   
18 Adrian Johnston, Adventures in Transcendental Materialism: Dialogues with Contemporary 
Thinkers (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), p. 1. 
19 Fredric Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science 
Fictions (London: Verso Books, 2007), p. xiii. 
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which ‘does not register’ in various accounts of political foundation and 
transformation, that which resists narrative inscription, is the possibility of 
collective praxis. If in Rousseauian, Badiouian, and Žižekian accounts we find 
collective action again occupying centre stage, we should also recognise that 
asserting authentic free action (not epiphenomenal pseudo-autonomy) means 
accepting the impossibility of narrative closure. As Johnston reminds us ‘the price 
we have to pay for situating ourselves normally in reality is that something should 
be foreclosed from it’.20 And it is for this reason that Johnston’s transcendental 
materialism (which he describes as a contemporary extension of historical and 
dialectical materialisms21) can serve a prism through which the most basic 
paradoxes of political philosophy can be elucidated.
                                                   
20 Johnston, Žižek’s Ontology, p. 42. 






‘Three cheers for the flight of thought, three cheers for the perils 
of life in service to the idea, three cheers for the hardships of 
battle, three cheers for the festive jubilation of victory, three 
cheers for dance in the vortex of the infinite, three cheers for the 
cresting waves that hide me in the abyss, three cheers for the 
cresting waves that fling me above the stars!’ 
 




The dominant tendency within the scholarly literature on Kierkegaard is for 
commentators to centre on his contribution to Christian theology and 
existentialist philosophy.1 While this effort has been productive, for the purposes 
of this chapter these aspects of his thought will need to be bracketed in order to 
focus on the concept of the instant, found in Kierkegaard’s earlier works and often 
neglected by the critical commentary.2 In so doing, I situate my approach 
alongside Michael O’Neill Burns who has suggested that a ‘political reading of 
Kierkegaard needs to strategically “forget” the 20th century (which focused on the 
                                                   
1 This is the direction taken in much of the introductory work on Kierkegaard such as C. Stephen 
Evans, Kierkegaard: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). More 
substantial studies which have also been limited to the existential and religious aspects of 
Kierkegaard’s thought include: Louis P. Pojman, The Logic of Subjectivity: Kierkegaard’s 
Philosophy of Religion (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1984); Merigala Gabriel, 
Subjectivity and Religious Truth in the Philosophy of Soren Kierkegaard (Macon, GA: Mercer 
University Press, 2010). 
2 It may be useful to mention here that, for the sake of convenience, I will be imputing to 
Kierkegaard various views and positions which were published pseudonymously. Whether or 
not this is legitimate will not be a central concern here since the overriding task is to deal with a 
set of ideas which, pseudonymously published or not, were in fact conceived by the individual 
Kierkegaard, were written by him, and are, to a greater or lesser extent, associated with him 
today. In attributing these ideas to Kierkegaard, I do not intend to make any broader 
assumptions about his commitment to them, nor would I wish to present them as capable of 
being slotted neatly into Kierkegaard’s corpus. 
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existential and ethical interpretation of his work) and re-commence by placing 
his ontology in a properly 19th century context’.3 Strategic forgetfulness in the 
manner suggested by Burns need not constitute a direct attack on pre-existing 
positions on Kierkegaard; rather, it seeks to draw the implications of 
Kierkegaard’s works for our current philosophical epoch. The instant is worthy of 
analysis insofar as it can shed light on certain problems in political philosophy. 
As a concept, the instant has an interesting pedigree. Not only does it 
emerge as a response to, and engagement with, the German Idealist tradition, but 
it also establishes a new conceptual space concerned with thinking the 
exceptional as opposed to the normal, the intensive as opposed to the extensive, 
within which theorists such as Carl Schmitt would later begin to work.4 The 
central contention presented in this chapter is that Kierkegaard’s instant can 
provide a conceptual springboard for new insights when applied to our 
conceptualization of time and change in political philosophy. 
At its most elementary, the instant is a concept which describes the temporal 
discontinuity which accompanies a qualitative transformation. It mediates, 
without stabilizing, the passage between two discrete states. As such, the concept 
of the instant need not be limited to the evental genesis of faith (as was 
Kierkegaard’s intention) but can contribute to a deeper understanding of 
qualitative transformations in other areas of human life. This analysis of 
Kierkegaard’s works on the instant will demonstrate their utility as a conceptual 
resource for thinking about forms of political change. To give an idea of the kind 
                                                   
3 Michael O’Neill Burns, ‘A Fractured Dialectic: Kierkegaard and Political Ontology After Žižek’, 
in Kierkegaard and the Political, ed. by Alison Assiter and Margherita Tonon (Newcastle upon 
Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012), p. 120. 
4 The resonance between Kierkegaard’s works and those of the philosophers of the German 
Idealist tradition are noted in Kangas, p. 167. The influence of Kierkegaard on Carl Schmitt is 
most evident in Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, 
trans. by George Schwab (London: University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 15. 
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of political change under consideration, it is worth noting at this stage that the 
transformations described in Hobbes’s Leviathan and Rousseau’s The Social 
Contract can be thought of as ‘qualitative’. Each involves the genesis of law and 
authority, as well as corresponding notions of obligation, obedience and duty on 
the part of the political subject. Likewise, the change implied in Carl Schmitt’s 
sovereign decision, in Alain Badiou’s Event, and in Slavoj Žižek’s Act can also be 
understood as qualitative in this sense. Below, I argue that the condensed, 
aporetic time of the instant can be shown to illuminate the temporal structure of 
moments of subjective transformation in such a way that allows us to avoid 
models dependant on a decisionist logic (in which transformations are merely 
imposed by a unilateral decider) whilst also moving beyond deterministic and 
dualistic philosophical positions. To put this another way, I read Kierkegaard’s 
instant as accomplishing something very specific: the instant expresses a kind of 
change which is not the pure result of a subjective decision, divine intervention, 
or the result of circumstances. Nor can the moment be a combination or balance 
between these factors. Nonetheless, the price to be paid for this neither/nor 
character of the instant is an ontological undecidability which expresses itself as 
a narrative blind spot.5 As soon as we attempt to include the instant in our 
retrospective narrative of a transformation, we encounter certain unresolvable 
paradoxes which themselves testify to a certain zero-level opacity or 
                                                   
5 There is a well-documented tension within the scholarship on Kierkegaard as to the 
voluntarist/non-voluntarist character of Kierkegaardian faith. Alongside M. Jamie Ferreira and 
Steven M. Emmanuel, I will attempt to outflank this dispute by reading the relationship between 
grace and will as essentially undecidable. Kierkegaardian faith is neither reducible to a 
subjective decision, but nor does it require God’s grace as its prerequisite. See: Jamie M. 
Ferreira, Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in Kierkegaardian Faith (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991); Steven M. Emmanuel, Kierkegaard and the Concept of Revelation 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996). 
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unintelligibility. Kierkegaard’s work on the concept of the instant serves us 
insofar as it represents a philosophical exploration in this direction. 
Kierkegaard’s instant and the associated concept of the ‘leap’ are invoked in 
the course of reflections on the possibility of a subjective transformation, but also 
in the context of discussion dealing with the question of origins. It is vital to bear 
in mind that these questions imply one another. To refer to a political 
transformation is also to reignite a whole raft of philosophical problems 
concerning origins. In hunting the illusive origin, one cannot find a proper 
conclusion since, as Kevin Inston notes, ‘the origin always presupposes an 
anterior moment which negates it’.6 The circularity one encounters when 
approaching the origin of legitimate authority is itself indicative of its qualitative 
status. This chapter will establish a reading of Kierkegaard’s concept of the 
instant that will subsequently enable more explicitly political investigations in 
later chapters. 
Reading Kierkegaard as a political thinker may appear to be an 
unconventional strategy. Equally, treating Kierkegaard’s instant as if it were 
applicable to secular transformations as opposed to being limited to Christian 
conversion goes against the grain of Kierkegaard’s own statements as well as 
against the tide of the academic literature.7 Against these charges, the position 
presented here can be justified if we accept the premise that the instant is, first 
and foremost, a philosophical concept, albeit a philosophical concept that 
throughout Kierkegaard’s corpus has also been used to describe certain kinds of 
religious experience. The concept of the instant does not restrict us to a particular 
                                                   
6 Kevin Inston, Rousseau and Radical Democracy (London: Continuum, 2010), p. 19. 
7 There are two notable exceptions here. The first is Kangas’s Kierkegaard’s Instant. The second 




content, be it religious or secular; instead, it implies a formal structure, a certain 
kind of transformation with specific features. Following this premise, my enquiry 
will carry out a two-fold task. Firstly, it will isolate the philosophical 
characteristics of the instant as they appear in Kierkegaard’s texts. The analysis 
of these characteristics will subsequently inform our reading of theories of 
political change in later chapters. Rather than a secularisation of Kierkegaard’s 
thought (the question of political theology will be dealt with in the third chapter 
of this thesis) I will seek to read Kierkegaard as a philosopher whose thought, 
while predominantly oriented toward religious tasks, can nonetheless be 
redeployed in alternative ways so as to generate new insights. 
It is worth noting at the outset that Kierkegaard constantly shifts position 
with respect to the idea of the instant. One cannot speak of a single understanding 
of the instant in Kierkegaard’s work that is gradually unfolded; instead, we are 
obliged to conceive it as comprising several distinct facets. It represents a way of 
thinking beginnings insofar as it enables us to break out of the circularity of 
origins through the idea of a sudden ‘leap’.8 Subsequent transformations can then 
be thought of as referring back to this original groundlessness. Thus the instant 
implies an elementary possibility that always remains open to reactivation.9 Even 
the way we relate to the present itself, as the imperceptible slice of time between 
past and future, can for some scholars, be seen through the idea of the instant.10 
                                                   
8 See Kangas, pp. 160–180; Ward, pp. 1–35. 
9 Søren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments/Johannes Climacus, ed. by Howard V. Hong and 
Edna H. Hong, trans. by Edna H. Hong and Howard V. Hong (Chichester: Princeton University 
Press, 1985), p. 86. 
10 For an account of Kierkegaard’s moment as the unique and irreducible ‘now’ time expressed 
through the glance, see: Heidrun Friese, ‘Augen-Blicke’, in The Moment: Time and Rupture in 
Modern Thought (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2001), pp. 73–90. This would also be 
closer to the classical notion of the instant as a vanishing moment of transition: ‘The instant 
seems to signify something such that changing occurs from it to each of two states. For a thing 
doesn’t change from rest while rest continues, or from motion while motion continues. Rather, 
this queer creature, the instant, lurks between motion and rest – being in no time at all – and to 
it and from it the moving thing changes to resting and the resting thing changes to moving’. 
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It is, however, a notion that concerns our understanding of subjectivity as well as 
temporality. Kierkegaard’s broader project, as will be demonstrated, is to stake 
out a space in which free subjective commitment is possible as well as a notion of 
human freedom that is not simply a matter of a free choice between alternatives. 
This is necessarily accompanied by, to follow Kosch’s reading, ‘a principled 
scepticism about the possibility of causal explanations of action’, which is itself 
grounded in a specific ontological position.11 Although it will prove beyond the 
scope of this chapter to tie together all the disparate elements of Kierkegaard’s 
concept, it may be possible to bring into focus those aspects of the instant which 
can be most productively applied to political theory. 
The particular dimension of the instant I wish to draw attention to is that of 
a temporal break or hiatus through which newness can emerge and, crucially, the 
subjective experience of this break as a revelatory encounter with truth. As I will 
show below, the instant has import for political theory insofar as it stands for an 
intermediary event between two incommensurable states.12 The instant itself can 
appear both as the moment of origin through which representation, freedom, and 
subjectivity become possible, or alternatively, as a moment in time (which is 
better thought of as a moment falling between or overlaying periods of 
chronological time) which precipitates an unforeseeable transformation.13 
Kierkegaard writes about the instant in both senses, however, the reading 
                                                   
Plato, Parmenides, trans. by Mary Louise Gill and Paul Ryan (Cambridge: Hackett, 1996), p. 
156, d–e. 
11 Michelle Kosch, Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2006), p. 179. 
12 This point finds support in Kierkegaard’s comments concerning the, ‘incommensurability 
between a historical truth and an eternal decision’. Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, 
Kierkegaard’s Writings (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), I, p. 98. 
13 We find the former incarnation of the instant receiving treatment The Concept of Anxiety 
while the latter is expressed in Philosophical Fragments, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 
and The Moment and Late Writings. 
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proposed here holds that these versions are structurally compatible, describing 
two features of the same notion. Indeed, the instant, the moment, and the leap all 
seek to describe characteristics of the particular kind of transformation in which 
Kierkegaard is interested. Understanding these concepts in Kierkegaard’s work is 
then a case of conceiving the moment of origin which establishes consciousness 
and representation while reading subsequent ‘events’, that is, subsequent 
moments of transformation, as traumatic intrusions of this original 
groundlessness. If the instant is often read in a limited way, as referring solely to 
an individual’s religious awakening or even to the daily choices made by 
individuals, a broader treatment will attempt to address the ontology implied by 
the instant as a category of subjective experience.14 
The relationship between the three terms (instant, moment, and leap) 
requires some clarification before we proceed. While ‘moment’ and ‘instant’ are 
two alternative translations of the Danish term Øieblikk and refer to the event of 
transformation itself, the term ‘leap’ is a translation of Spring and indicates 
additional emphasis on the subjective dimension of the event. That is to say, ‘leap’ 
suggests a greater degree of agency than ‘instant’. The question of agency will be 
looked at later on, but for now we must simply note that the three terms which 
can be found in the secondary literature are in fact derived from two terms 
(Øieblikk and Spring) in the original Danish. The decision to gloss Øieblikk as 
‘instant’ or ‘moment’ could well be arbitrary in some cases given that the two 
terms are more or less synonymous. When the two options for translation are 
distinguished from one another intentionally, as we find in Kangas, it is in order 
                                                   
14 For an example of this kind of reading, see: James Giles, ‘Kierkegaard’s Leap: Anxiety and 
Freedom’, in Kierkegaard and Freedom (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000). Giles’s 
reading will be dealt with below. 
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to draw attention to a specific reading. Kangas states, ‘I prefer “the instant” in 
order to underscore the central conceptual meaning of the term: it points to a 
discontinuity, a suddenness. The term “moment” more suggests continuity and 
duration, a span of time. An instant passes before one even knows it as there; a 
moment, though ephemeral, lasts’.15 As will become clear in the argument that 
follows, the qualities of Øieblikket Kangas wishes to emphasise (suddenness and 
discontinuity) are also the central points for investigation here. Nonetheless, the 
distinction between ‘instant’ and ‘moment’ drawn by Kangas will not be observed 
and both terms will be used synonymously. This decision is taken simply to avoid 
confusion when switching between the more frequently used gloss (‘moment’) 
and Kangas’s less conventional ‘instant’. In contrast, the term ‘leap’ is a different, 
but related, concept derived from the Danish Spring. The relationship between 
the moment and the leap remains unclear in Kierkegaard’s texts, however, there 
are several passages seeming to encourage a reading which holds the two 
concepts to be closely connected. The key passage occurs in Philosophical 
Fragments: ‘Does it not have to be taken into account, this diminutive moment, 
however brief it is – it does not have to be long, because it is a leap. However 
diminutive this moment, even if it is this very instant, this very instant must be 
taken into account’.16 Even though direct references to the connection between 
the moment and the leap are rare, the connection established in Philosophical 
Fragments is taken to be strong enough to support an interpretation that holds 
the two concepts to be aspects of the same event.17 As noted above, Kierkegaard’s 
use of the term leap suggests a movement which is accomplished by a subject, it 
                                                   
15 Kangas, p. 200, n. 14. 
16 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, p. 43. 
17 To add weight to this connection, it seems significant that Kierkegaard uses the same 
metaphor to refer to both the moment and the leap. In different works, we find both leap and 
moment described as the flight of a ‘plunging eagle’ or the leap of a ‘wild beast’. 
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is a subject that decides to leap, a subject who does the leaping, whereas in 
contrast the moment indicates a more complex category which cannot easily be 
read as the result of a subjective decision. To put this another way, for now it is 
enough to say that the moment is the aspect of the event which is perceived by a 
subject as simply happening, while the leap is the gesture through which the 
subject appropriates and accepts the consequences of the event. The challenge is 
to think the two concepts together without succumbing to the temptation to think 
them in terms of a linear chronology. 
34 
 
Qualitative Leaps and Passive Decisions 
One encounters this idea of the moment as an absolute beginning in The Concept 
of Anxiety in which Kierkegaard presents the birth of subjectivity in relation to 
sin.18 His decision to frame this aspect of his thought in terms of sin, while serving 
to indicate the ethical dimension of Kierkegaard’s inquiry, should not distract us 
from his central concern which is the transcendental problem of genesis.19 Sin is 
introduced in the moment that subjectivity emerges, distinguishing itself from 
the totality of being.20 Sin is therefore best understood as a sudden delimitation 
whereby subjectivity becomes aware of itself as a distinct agency with a capacity 
for free action. In contrast, the preceding stage characterised by innocence is here 
conceived as absolute possibility, a pure, indeterminate ‘being able’ which has not 
yet been resolved in any direction. How, then, is the movement from innocence 
to sin accomplished? Kierkegaard’s solution relies on the concept of anxiety: ‘In 
this state [innocence] there is peace and repose, but there is simultaneously 
something else that is not contention and strife, for there is indeed nothing 
against which to strive. What is it? Nothing. What effect does it have? It begets 
anxiety’.21 Kierkegaard invokes the sense of vertigo, the sheer openness of 
absolute possibility which condenses as anxiety: 
Anxiety may be compared with dizziness. He whose eye happens to look down into 
the yawning abyss becomes dizzy. But what is the reason for this? It is just as much 
in his own eye as in the abyss, for suppose he had not looked down. Hence anxiety is 
the dizziness of freedom, which emerges when the spirit wants to posit the synthesis 
and freedom looks down into its own possibility, laying hold of finiteness to support 
itself. Freedom succumbs in this dizziness. Further than this, psychology cannot and 
will not go. In that very moment everything is changed, and freedom, when it again 
                                                   
18 Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation 
on the Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin, ed. & trans. by Reidar Thomte (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1980), VIII. 
19 The most sophisticated account of Kierkegaard as a thinker of beginnings is provided by 
Kangas, p. 161. 
20 Here my account draws support from the reading of The Concept of Anxiety presented in 
Burns, Kierkegaard and the Matter of Philosophy: A Fractured Dialectic, pp. 38–50. 
21 Kierkegaard, VIII, p. 41. 
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rises, sees that it is guilty. Between these two moments is the leap, which no science 
has explained and which no science can explain.22 
Prior to this ‘leap’ between two moments, freedom exists as a suspended 
potentiality; innocence is lost in the transformation of this potential, not into 
something determinate, but into awareness of the fact of potentiality. Since this 
awareness itself is sinful (insofar as it presupposes the Fall), subjectivity must be 
considered coextensive with sin. The contraction of sheer possibility into a self-
conscious willing ego, singling out one possibility from the horizon of 
possibilities, occurs through the sudden awareness of anxiety, induced in the 
moment of ‘looking down’, that is, through the realisation of the extent to which, 
beneath all determinations and supposed foundations, we are free.  This abyssal 
notion of possibility should be understood in a precise way. It is, as Kangas 
maintains, an absolute possibility that exists prior to the isolation of a single 
definable possibility: ‘This possibility, it will turn out, is the “weightiest of all 
categories”. It cannot adequately be thought as determinate potential awaiting 
its actualization. The possibility of possibility is possibility beyond a horizon of 
realization, a beginning in excess to any telos (thus an anarchic beginning).’23 As 
such, in the ‘instant’ Kierkegaard offers us a notion which accomplishes the 
genesis of self-conscious subjectivity while suspending any question of the 
conditions which exist prior to the instant. This emphasis on the possibility which 
characterises origins comprises the core of Kierkegaard’s challenge to Danish 
Hegelians for whom a given moment of change is always already inscribed in an 
overarching necessity.24 Likewise, prioritising possibility over necessity also 
                                                   
22 Kierkegaard, VIII, p. 61. 
23 Kangas, p. 167. 
24 For a passage containing some of Kierkegaard’s criticisms of the Danish Hegelian position on 
history and reason, see his ‘Interlude’ in Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, pp. 89–110. 
Also see: Jon Stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), p. 364. 
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provides the key to understanding Kierkegaard’s prohibition on thinking 
innocence and guilt in terms of a linear chronology: 
Innocence, unlike immediacy, is not something that must be annulled, something 
whose quality is to be annulled, something that properly does not exist, but rather, 
when it is annulled, and as a result of being annulled, it for the first time comes into 
existence as that which it was before being annulled and which now is annulled.25 
If innocence is only thinkable retrospectively, from the position of one who has 
fallen into sin, it cannot represent a lost state; on the contrary, the loss itself is 
primary since it is only through the loss that a relation to lost innocence becomes 
possible. The ‘prior condition’ of innocence is not simply irrecuperable but is 
better thought of as a virtual or projected state, one that was never occupied since 
it designates the non-distinction of self and other. Thought cannot recapture or 
imagine innocence; insofar as every thought is necessarily the thought of an 
individual self, thinking re-establishes the original separation through which 
guilt came about. The Fall is thus to be held as an event which stands at the limit 
of recoverable human history, or, as Eagleton states, ‘Sin has no place or source, 
lying as it does under the sign of contradiction. To sin is to have always already 
have been able to do so’.26 For a conscious subject it is no longer possible to 
conceive of a period prior to consciousness because thought necessarily entails a 
posited subject or object. 
In thinking origins according to a sudden instant of separation, Kierkegaard 
places himself in dialogue with Schelling whose ‘abyssal decision’ has much in 
common with Kierkegaard’s ‘qualitative leap’.27 The congruity between their 
respective positions is evident in the following quotation from Schelling’s 
Philosophical Investigations:  
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26 Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), p. 178. 
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But precisely this inner necessity is itself freedom; the essence of man is 
fundamentally his own act [...] Man is in the initial creation, as shown, an undecided 
being – (which may be portrayed mythically as a condition of innocence that 
precedes this life and as an initial blessedness) - only man himself can decide. But 
this decision cannot occur within time; it occurs outside of all time and, hence, 
together with the first creation (though as a deed distinct from creation) [...] The act, 
whereby his life is determined in time, does not itself belong to time but rather to 
eternity.28 
The initial moment of origin, the moment through which an original act is 
performed, occurs outside time. In both Kierkegaard and Schelling the 
interpenetration of the eternal and the temporal is necessary if the subject is to 
be established as an entity which exists in time. The point at which Schelling and 
Kierkegaard diverge can be located by focusing on the source of the 
transformation from undifferentiated being to self and other, to subject and 
object. For Kierkegaard, the transformation comes about through a ‘foreign 
power [anxiety], that laid hold’ and provoked the realisation of self-hood and self-
determinacy.29 Selfhood cannot be awoken purely through God’s prohibition 
since God’s ‘Thou shalt not’ must be directed at an individual, one who has the 
ability to choose whether to obey or transgress. In the following quotation 
Kierkegaard brings this aporia into view: 
When it is stated in Genesis that God said to Adam, ‘Only from the tree of the 
knowledge of good and evil you must not eat,’ it follows as a matter of course that 
Adam really has not understood this word, for how could he understand the 
difference between good and evil when this distinction would follow as a 
consequence of the enjoyment of the fruit? / When it is assumed that prohibition 
awakens the desire, one acquires knowledge instead of ignorance, and in that case 
Adam must have had the knowledge of freedom, because the desire was to use it. The 
explanation is therefore subsequent.30 
 
Kierkegaard’s Adam cannot be in a position to receive God’s prohibition since for 
him to be capable of doing so would imply a pre-existing understanding of himself 
as a distinct entity with all the properties and capacities this would entail. The 
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29 Kierkegaard, VIII, p. 43. 
30 Kierkegaard, VIII, p. 44. 
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prohibition narrative presupposes that which it sets out to explain, namely, how 
humans emerge as autonomous agents with the capacity to do good or evil. To 
put this in other words, the event of the Fall effectively presupposes itself in 
Kierkegaard’s account. In order for God’s prohibition to be valid and just, its 
addressee, Adam, must be capable of understanding its meaning, but if Adam 
already has this capacity then the Fall must already have taken place. In contrast 
to Schelling’s quasi-volitional model of subjective autogenesis, Kierkegaard 
recognises that the origin cannot be the result of a volitional act but that it 
demands a new concept of decision. Kierkegaard’s instant expresses the 
circularity encountered in an origin which presupposes itself.  
It is vital to give due emphasis to the property of the instant Kierkegaard is 
suggesting here. God, through his prohibition, effectively already treats Adam as 
a free individual capable of judging the rightness of his actions for himself, and 
yet it is this very capacity which the genesis narrative sets out to explain. Adam is 
thus in the peculiar position of being both absent and present at the moment of 
genesis: he must be present in order to receive and understand God’s prohibition, 
but equally he must be absent (qua reflecting, acting subject) since the 
prohibition precedes the emergence of human subjectivity which occurs through 
the Fall.31 The difficulty in interpreting the genesis myth noted by Kierkegaard is 
that it requires us to view the original moment in terms of a superposition of 
mutually exclusive states.32 This is in fact the stance taken by Eagleton who 
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succinctly sets out the paradoxical kernel of Kierkegaard’s thought with respect 
to origins, ‘The paradox of this project is that the self both does and does not exist 
prior to this revolutionary crisis of self-choosing: for the ‘choice’ to have meaning 
the self must somehow pre-exist that moment, but it is equally true that it 
emerges into being only through this act of decision’.33 Kierkegaard’s concept of 
the instant aims precisely to delineate the contours of this paradox. The most 
challenging passages in The Concept of Anxiety seek to account for the way in 
which Adam freely accomplishes the very gesture which is supposed to generate 
his capacity for freedom and, crucially, the distinction that we are forced to 
recognise between this originary, groundless freedom, and the subsequent 
freedom of choice. Kierkegaard is seeking to articulate a form of freedom that is 
not experienced directly as a free choice, but that is definitively lost to experience 
such that, retrospectively, it is not possible to make any assessment about choices 
or realised potentials. 
It may be illuminating to consider the influence of Kierkegaard’s instant 
(and the form of freedom it drives us towards) upon the thinking of Jacques 
Derrida. In Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, Derrida presents us with the 
following imperative: ‘What must be thought here, then, is this inconceivable and 
unknowable thing, a freedom that would no longer be the power of a subject, a 
freedom without autonomy, a heteronomy without servitude, in short, something 
like a passive decision’.34 The incalculability of this kind of decision would 
preclude in advance the possibility of a thorough exposition or narrativisation; it 
should rather be understood as an automism, an urgency that proceeds without 
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reference to a pre-existing schema of value. An autonomous decision would 
recognise in advance an array of options so as to weigh up the relative benefits of 
each. But the very possibility of this decision must be conditioned in advance by 
a more fundamental decision through which outcomes are posited as desirable or 
undesirable, possible or impossible. It is this decision which condenses the very 
field of options such that these options become intelligible and organized within 
a schema of value. And it is precisely because this ‘passive decision’ establishes 
the parameters of the knowable that it cannot be ‘founded on or justified by any 
knowledge as such’.35 
The ‘qualitative leap’ cannot be a discrete object of reflection because it is 
already the very event whose occurrence provides the conditions for reflection. 
Kierkegaard refrains from providing an account of the characteristics of the 
qualitative leap (aside from his claim that it is an ‘intermediate term’ which is 
accompanied by anxiety) since this would seem to lend support to the idea that 
the leap is reducible to a set of objective phenomena: 
The possibility is to be able. In a logical system, it is convenient to say that possibility 
passes over into actuality. However, in actuality it is not so convenient, and an 
intermediate term is required. The intermediate term is anxiety, but it no more 
explains the qualitative leap than it can justify it ethically. Anxiety is neither a 
category of necessity nor a category of freedom; it is entangled freedom, where 
freedom is not free in itself but entangled, not by necessity, but in itself. If sin has 
come into the world by necessity (which is a contradiction), there can be no anxiety. 
Nor can there be anxiety if sin came into the world by an act of abstract liberum 
arbitrium.36 
The qualitative leap is thus an event through which a new relation is posited; it is 
neither reducible to preconditions nor the consequence of a free choice.37 The 
phenomenological correlate of the qualitative leap is anxiety, indicating freedom 
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37 Kierkegaard remains quite consistent here. In his Philosophical Fragments he writes, ‘faith is 
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in a latent, entangled state. My appraisal of the instant here differs from that of 
Burns (notwithstanding the broad areas of agreement between our respective 
positions) in whose assessment of the moment we find an overemphasis on the 
subject’s free will. Burns states: ‘we must reiterate that faith is in no way a 
synthetic act that resolves a contradiction for spirit but rather a holding together 
of the contradiction in a willed act’.38 Such comments risk a reductive 
understanding of the instant as pure subjective volition. If we are dealing with a 
free act, it is to be understood an instance of ‘entangled freedom’, a form of 
freedom that undercuts our intuitive, commonplace understanding of the 
concept. The task that follows the recognition of this difference is to trace the 
form of freedom’s entanglement. It is this approach which leads to the paradox 
that Kierkegaard constantly draws our attention to as well as allowing us to 
understand why he repeatedly forbids a thorough, sequential elaboration of the 
transformation. Kierkegaard’s point is that the qualitative leap is necessarily 
irreducible to a series of temporal events.39 
As mentioned above, the terms ‘instant’ (Øieblikket) and the ‘qualitative 
leap’ (kvalitativt spring) are not identical. Both refer to the radical and decisive 
commitment made by an individual in the face of uncertainty. Nonetheless, the 
term ‘instant’ refers to the temporality of the event as a pause or break in time 
whereas ‘leap’ emphasises the subject’s own engagement, the passionate intensity 
of the gesture through which a qualitative transformation is achieved and 
sustained. If the leap were to be mapped across a period of time which had 
duration and which could be retrospectively plotted, we would no longer be 
dealing with a leap in the Kierkegaardian sense. It is intrinsic to the leap that its 
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emergence is experienced as sudden. There can be no awareness of the arrival of 
the moment, but only of the fact that it has already occurred. In a comprehensive 
study on the concept of the leap in Kierkegaard’s work, Arnold B. Come 
encourages a reading which focuses on this suddenness: ‘a new quality can never 
arise out of a continuous quantitative determination, rather, it “appears with the 
suddenness of the enigmatic”’.40 It is this focus on suddenness which gives the 
event its utterly fleeting, transitory character, however, equally important is the 
subjective dimension of the event which always requires, ‘a choice, a passion, a 
resolve’.41 Given that both the leap and the instant can refer to the same event, 
the distinction between them can, at times, seem negligible, however, it should 
be borne in mind that the choice of terminology when referring to the 
instant/leap has implications for the dimension of the event that is being 
emphasised. The distinction will also become significant when we look at the 
changes in Kierkegaard’s own thinking concerning the instant/leap between, for 
example, Philosophical Fragments and Sickness unto Death. While these 
changes will be dealt with below, it is useful to know at the outset that it is 
Kierkegaard’s approach to the subject’s involvement, choice, or decision which 
undergoes a shift in relation to the opposition between possibility and necessity. 
In Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments Kierkegaard 
tells us unambiguously that ‘the leap is the category of decision’, immediately 
elevating the subjective dimension, the obligation upon the subject to commit to 
a single possibility.42 But in Kierkegaard’s later works, while the leap still requires 
a subjective decision, the status of the decision has changed such that it is now 
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43 
 
seems to constitute a necessary step: ‘freedom really is freedom only when, in the 
same moment, the same second, it is (freedom-of-choice), it rushes with infinite 
speed to bind itself unconditionally by the choice of attachment, the choice whose 
truth is that there can be no question of any choice’.43 To redeploy Derrida’s term, 
it seems that we are dealing with a ‘passive decision’, that is to say, a decision that 
is experienced as having already been made, or a decision to follow through with 
what is necessary.44 
                                                   
43 Søren Kierkegaard, Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, ed. & trans. by Howard V. 
Hong and Edna H. Hong, F-K (London: Indiana University Press, 1970), II, p. 68. 
44 Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, p. 152. 
44 
 
Service to the Idea 
Having established the qualitative leap as marking an originary act of separation 
or differentiation, the task will now be to show how the re-intrusion of this 
groundlessness in the lives of freely acting individuals comes about and the effect 
it has. As will be shown, the human capacity to commit to action (which is entirely 
distinct from a commonplace understanding of the freedom to choose among 
several options) relies on a reading of origins characterised by the spontaneous 
emergence of subjectivity: ‘By a qualitative leap sin entered into the world, and it 
continually enters into the world in that way’.45 The qualitative leap is not to be 
thought of as a once-and-for-all act; it is the gesture through which a commitment 
is made, or to put this another way, subjective commitment has particular 
qualities which only become comprehensible through Kierkegaard’s leap/instant 
and related concepts. Kierkegaard writes:  
Here again we have the Moment, around which everything indeed revolves. Let us 
recapitulate. If we do not assume the moment, then we go back to Socrates, and it 
was precisely from him that we wanted to take leave in order to discover something. 
If the moment is posited, the paradox is there, for in its most abbreviated form the 
paradox can be called the moment.46 
Without the moment, Kierkegaard argues, we return to the Socratic world of 
persistent ironic distance; a departure from Socrates marks the possibility of 
faith, of commitment to a position which cannot be undermined through this kind 
of distancing. This would not be a gesture that cancels all ironizing. Irony marks 
the very form of commitment since every position is already subverted from 
within.47 It is thus precisely our profound uncertainty with regard to any 
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particular position that necessitates, and makes possible, an excessive, 
unreasoned commitment. 
In the leap a notion of the good is posited, this being the content of the 
subject’s commitment, however, anxiety nonetheless persists in the individual’s 
relation to this concretely posited content. Kierkegaard’s message is that 
commitment does not free one from anxiety; it always emerges from anxiety 
since, ‘humanly speaking, consequences built upon a paradox are built upon the 
abyss’.48 Anxiety can therefore be understood in part as the subjective response 
to the awareness of continuing possibility and openness which characterises 
every situation.49 If the instant accomplishes the passage between two states with 
each state representing a presupposed grounding faith or commitment, anxiety 
is the constant suspicion that each state will ultimately prove to be a transitory 
‘unwarranted actuality’.50 This is why Kierkegaard also finds objectionable the 
naturalization of faith as an element of the social, as fully assimilated into a 
functioning social whole. Faith is persistently obtuse, as Eagleton puts it, ‘Faith 
is kairos rather than custom, fear and trembling rather than cultural ideology, [it 
is resistant to] the purposes of political hegemony’.51 Nonetheless, anxiety also 
enables commitment insofar as commitment without anxiety would be 
transformed into certainty. Kierkegaard is determined to show that uncertainty 
is not an obstacle to commitment but is rather its positive condition. 
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The form of freedom encountered in the instant has a precise status. As we 
saw above, it refers to a subjective event which is neither dependant on, nor fully 
independent of, the activity of the subject. Put simply, what we have in the instant 
is a sudden, destabilizing recognition of the scope of possibility and the 
incalculability of these possibilities, accompanied by the experience of anxiety. It 
is worth noting at this stage that there remains a lack of consensus within the 
scholarship on this topic and, for this reason, the possible objections to the 
position taken above will need to be dealt with. One objection to the reading of 
the instant offered here is presented by James Giles whose article, ‘Kierkegaard’s 
Leap: Anxiety and Freedom’ seeks to show how the notion of the leap merely 
reflects Kierkegaard’s understanding of human choice:  
Now although Kierkegaard often refers to the leap in relation to sin and, for the most 
part, is not particularly concerned about choices that might lack ethical or religious 
significance, it is clear that such a leap is supposed to lie behind all of our free choices, 
not just the sinful or evil ones.52 
There are several problems with the position given in this statement. The 
distinction implied by Giles is between ‘all our free choices’, on the one hand, and 
‘the sinful and evil ones’ on the other, and yet this relies on a commonplace notion 
of sin that Kierkegaard does not adhere to. Throughout The Concept of Anxiety 
Kierkegaard uses the term sin to cover the very fact that humans are capable of 
making their own free judgements while human freedom is the ability to act on 
those judgements. A Kierkegaardian notion of sin captures the sense in which the 
‘choice’ that establishes the possibility of choice cannot itself be conceived as a 
choice in the traditional sense of the term—it is ‘entangled freedom’, a freedom 
that is anxious, hesitating on the brink of its own actualization.53 As Kierkegaard 
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states, ‘Anxiety is neither a category of necessity nor a category of freedom [...] 
nor can there be any anxiety if sin came into the world by an act of abstract 
liberum arbitrium’.54 Kierkegaard’s other main usage of the notion of the leap (in 
distinction to the leap as the transition from sinlessness to sinfulness) is the leap 
by which man becomes faithful. This, again, is not simply a ‘free choice’ in the 
manner indicated by Giles, it is an act that reworks the entire schema of value 
according to which all other choices are made. 
Kierkegaard’s position with respect to freedom and the question of choice 
are developed at length throughout his various journals and other writings.55 The 
notion of ‘entangled freedom’ seems to unfurl itself somewhat in the following 
passage: 
Furthermore, Christianity can say to a man: You shall choose the one thing needful, 
but in such a way that there must be no question of any choice—that is, if you fool 
around a long time, then you are not really choosing the one thing needful; like the 
kingdom of God, it must be chosen first. […] Consequently, the very fact that there 
is no choice expresses the tremendous passion or intensity with which one chooses. 
Can there be a more accurate expression for the fact that freedom of choice is only a 
formal condition of freedom and that emphasizing freedom of choice as such means 
the sure loss of freedom? The content of freedom is decisive for freedom to such an 
extent that the very truth of freedom of choice is: there must be no choice, even 
though there is a choice.56 
Kierkegaard here anticipates an insight that today is often associated with the 
work of Alain Badiou, namely, that our awareness of an array of choices from 
which we are required to simply make a selection is a sure indication that our 
choice will not be free in any valuable sense.57 Freedom, when we exercise it, is 
not experienced as freedom of choice, nor is it experienced as volition or willing; 
on the contrary, it is precisely in our moments of greatest freedom that we feel 
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54 Kierkegaard, VIII, p. 49. 
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ourselves to be bound to a single, immutable course of action. To explore what 
this means in practice, let us take two examples. The obvious example for 
Kierkegaard would be conversion. When an individual converts to Christianity 
(or assumes their true responsibilities as a Christian as opposed to merely 
observing out of habit) this is clearly an act which must in some sense be 
considered to be free. A person can be forced to behave in accordance with 
religious doctrine, but no one can be forced to believe in the truth of that doctrine 
(although they may well be forced to falsely attest to that belief). And yet at the 
same time, it would be nonsense to expect someone to simply ‘choose’ to convert 
to Christianity. Conversion cannot be achieved through decision conceived in the 
standard way. 
To take a second example, favoured by Badiou, when a person has fallen 
in love, the experience is akin to revelation in sense that is neither something that 
can be forced or performed voluntarily. And as with conversion, one is not fully 
present as a reflecting, conscious subject at the moment of the event itself; 
instead, one simply becomes aware that the love-event has already taken place. 
Once it has taken place, there is no possibility of opting out; an individual can 
refuse to follow through with the consequences of the event, but they cannot 
voluntarily shed their sense of obligation or rather, they cannot choose not to feel 
the new obligations as compelling. Refusal would be a choice, but it is a choice 
made possible within the new horizon of choices established by the event. In a 
similar vein, Kierkegaard argues, ‘a person has the most lively sense of freedom 
when with completely decisive determination he impresses upon his action the 
inner necessity which excludes the thought of another possibility’.58 So there is 
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freedom of choice in Kierkegaard’s thought, but this form of freedom is secondary 
to a freedom experienced as the sudden issuing of an absolute imperative. As soon 
as freedom of choice is asserted as the highest choice, the possibility of 
experiencing a higher freedom is foreclosed. 
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Wild beasts and plunging eagles 
An important passage dealing with the points raised thus far can be found in The 
Moment and Late Writings: ‘No, something decisive is introduced differently 
from anything else. Like the leap of a wild beast upon its prey, like the strike of 
the plunging eagle, something decisive is introduced – suddenly and 
concentrated in one sortie (intensively)’.59 The change brought about by the 
instant does not occur in time but is to be read as a kind of dissonance through 
which a subject’s internal self-relation is abruptly reorganised. This is why the 
instant is a subjective phenomenon: the new recognition or insight which occurs 
in the instant is not merely something passively appropriated by a subject, nor is 
it a straight forward decision on the part of the subject. Ferreira refers to this as 
the ‘non-standard character of the decision’, stating, ‘Climacus describes it by 
using both the idiom of a wonder which “happened” and the idiom of a “decision”, 
implying that both are equally appropriate’.60 Kierkegaard’s idiosyncratic 
formulation requires us to view the instant as a borderline concept which resists 
reduction to subjective (voluntarist) or objective (deterministic) explanations. It 
is concentrated as opposed to diffuse, intensive as opposed to incremental. There 
is no temporal moment which can be confidently held up as the moment of 
change since it is not something witnessed—its apparent suddenness is a 
consequence of its atemporality, that is to say, the moment appears as sudden 
because it is a pure disturbance of time which cannot be located in time. In a 
manner similar to Ferreira, I would like to suggest that the subjective act 
Kierkegaard often describes as a decision is in fact far closer to a moment of 
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recognition, or at least that any decision is necessarily conditioned by a prior 
recognition. Ferreira explains her position as follows: 
The decision (or decisive movement) which occurs in virtue of the oscillation of our 
attention is not subject to “will-force” in the way in which the effort of attention 
preliminary to that decision may be. We cannot will to recognize something in the 
same way that we can will to focus on what may help us to recognize it.61 
Understanding the genesis of faith in terms of recognition as opposed to decision 
provides the key to Kierkegaard’s oblique turn of phrase: ‘When existence gives 
movement time and I reproduce this, then the leap appears in just the way a leap 
can appear: it must come or it has been’.62 The leap is timeless insofar as it does 
not occupy an identifiable moment in chronological time; instead, it exists as a 
name for a discontinuity which is suddenly inscribed in time. Put another way, 
the proto-believer is not fully present in the moment of recognition; it is only after 
the moment of recognition has taken place that the possibility of willing 
emerges—either I can wilfully take up the consequences of the truth I have 
recognised, or I can repress this truth and neglect its consequences. Nonetheless, 
just as in the former case it is still possible to be unsuccessful, in the latter case, 
the repression of the recognition is also its obliteration. As such, the status of the 
instant is undecidable. It cannot be confidently held up as an event in itself, but 
only as a gap or opening which serves as the precondition for transformation. 
Kangas is thus correct to note, ‘The instant of inception takes no time: it gives 
time. The initial opening of time could never itself become a moment within time. 
It would therefore be, precisely, a departure that would always already have 
ceased prior to, and as the condition of, the present.’63 We should conclude, with 
Kangas and Ferreira, that there is no possibility of witnessing Kierkegaard’s 
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instant: the subjective experience of the instant is the sense of realisation that 
previous convictions have collapsed, a certain unavoidable truth has emerged and 
it will no longer be possible to relate to the world in the same way.64 
As briefly mentioned above, Kierkegaard’s instant is able to accomplish two 
quite different procedures. Not only does it enable us to think through the initial 
gesture of subjectivity through which a self-other relation is established (this 
reading is drawn from Kangas for whom the discussion of the instant is first and 
foremost a discussion of origins), the instant also stands for the moment of 
insight, the sudden shift in the subject’s relation to an objective situation.65 
Writing under the pseudonym Haufniensis, Kierkegaard states: ‘Only when the 
eternal strikes the stream of time and forms the synthesis of time and eternity 
does the particular moment gain significance’.66 It is a moment in which the truth 
of a situation (a truth concerning the horizon of a situation’s possibility which 
ultimately refers back to the origin of subjectivity as a groundless act of self-
positing), formerly unavailable, becomes suddenly apparent, forcing the subject 
to relate to herself in a different way. For Kierkegaard, this new understanding 
must be thought of in terms of the production of religious faith which is brought 
about by a fleeting exposure to the eternal, by the intrusion of the eternal in 
historical time. It is ‘absurd’ for Kierkegaard, insofar as it is the historical 
emergence of an eternal truth. Only by holding fast to this paradox in its very 
absurdity does faith become possible for the individual. The revelation of 
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religious faith is unique insofar as it cannot be deduced, as Kierkegaard 
repeatedly points out, from the standpoint of ‘worldly sagacity’, which ‘stares and 
stares at events and circumstances, calculates and calculates, thinking that it 
should be able to distil the moment out of the circumstance’.67 Or alternatively, 
as Kierkegaard tells us in his Concluding Unscientific Postscript: 
Inasmuch as the absurd contains the element of coming into existence, the road of 
approximation will also be that which confuses the absurd fact of coming into 
existence, which is the object of faith, with a simple historical fact, and then seeks 
historical certainty for that which is absurd precisely because it contains the 
contradiction that something that can become historical only in direct opposition to 
all human understanding has become historical. This contradiction is the absurd, 
which can only be believed. If a historical certainty is obtained, one obtains merely 
the certainty that what is certain is not what is the point in question.68 
There is nothing which exists within the historical capable of providing a sure 
foundation religious commitment. Faith is instead one’s willingness to recognise 
a new commitment as absolutely binding even in the absence of any grounding 
rationale. Uncertainty is the condition for such a commitment since, if it were 
possible to be certain, no commitment would be necessary; everything would 
instead be immediately known and understood. 
The experience of the moment is one that resists narrative recuperation. It 
is for this reason that Kangas described the moment in terms of trauma: ‘trauma 
is less an experience than a quasi-experience, for what defines trauma is a tear in 
the fabric of presence itself [...] The effect of the traumatic event is a dephasing of 
consciousness from its own temporality: the temporal ‘now’ is no longer lived as 
an integral moment relating to past-present and future-present, but placed out of 
time and out of being.’69 The experience of the instant is traumatic insofar as it 
indicates a discontinuity within the fabric of being itself. This leads Kangas to 
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assert the impossibility of naming the moment, ‘except through some kind of 
rupture.’70 Likewise, John Milbank argues that from the concept of the moment 
it follows that, ‘subjective consciousness arises as a kind of special permutation 
of material motion.’71 The instant is unrepresentable since it designates a break 
within the ontological field. And insofar as the instant is a concept that marks the 
genesis of subjectivity, in both Kangas and Milbank we see a connection made 
between ontological non-closure and subjectivity. ‘Subject’, it seems, is not the 
result of a divine gift, not something added to raw materiality; rather it emerges 
immanently from the inner torsion (or as Kierkegaard would say, from the 
‘paradox’) internal to the empirico-historical. Further support for this 
interpretation can be found in Kierkegaard’s work on irony: ‘But the outstanding 
feature of irony in these and similar instances is the subjective freedom which at 
every moment has within its power the possibility of a beginning and is not 
generated from previous conditions’.72 Irony stands for the non-coincidence of 
being with itself. It is the enduring subjective capacity to distance oneself from all 
determinations, to render every determination as transient. Scheifler is therefore 
correct to note that, ‘the emptiness of irony, the nothingness (silence) it expresses 
can be conceived as infinite possibility’.73 This is also why the subjective truth 
which is revealed through the instant is not available to reason but appears to the 
passionate individual.74 Reason, utilized by ‘worldly sagacity’ and science, is 
appropriate to the analysis of objective phenomena, not the subjective world of 
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faith and commitment. Elsewhere the passionate individual is referred to by 
Kierkegaard as, ‘the right man [...] the man of the moment’, in contrast to the gaze 
of worldly sagacity for whom the instant never comes.75 Likewise Kierkegaard 
excludes the ‘Socratic point of view’ from properly witnessing the moment: ‘From 
the Socratic point of view, the moment is not to be seen or to be distinguished; it 
does not exist, it will not have been, and will not come’.76 Revelation in this sense 
is not merely a subjective reaction to a changed situation; it is better understood 
as a moment in which subjectivity is suddenly thrown off kilter, finding itself 
taken up by a new commitment through exposure to an ontological break. 
For ‘worldly sagacity’ to distil the moment from the circumstances would 
imply that the moment were reducible to that which preceded it, that it could be, 
in principle, foreseeable given a sufficiently thorough analysis of a situation. 
Kierkegaard’s rebuke against ‘worldly sagacity’ is that it seeks to treat the moment 
as an event in time as opposed to being a synthesis between the temporal and the 
eternal. If the moment simply described a given segment of normal time it would 
have a finite, positive, knowable content. It would not, on this reading, be a ‘new 
thing’, but would be a necessary element of the whole of which it is a part. Put 
another way, a moment of time is available for narrative representation if we are 
able to describe its prior conditions and its consequences, and to thereby 
establish its place within a broader narrative. Kierkegaard’s moment, in contrast, 
is that which cannot be assimilated into narrative since it occupies an interstitial 
position with respect to two radically heterogeneous periods. As a synthesis of the 
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temporal and the eternal, the moment stands as a hard boundary, impervious to 
narrativisation and irreducible to knowledge. As Kierkegaard states, 
Faith is above reason. By reason [Leibniz] understands, as he says in many places, a 
linking together of truths, a conclusion from causes. Faith therefore cannot be 
proved, demonstrated, comprehended, for the link which makes a linking together 
possible is missing, and what else does this say than that it is a paradox. This, 
precisely, is the irregularity in the paradox, continuity is lacking, or at any rate it has 
continuity only in reverse, that is, at the beginning it does not manifest itself as 
continuity.77 
The paradoxical gesture which breaks continuity and makes a faithful 
commitment possible is necessarily experienced as a sudden occurrence even if 
this suddenness is invisible retrospectively. It is important not to read the above 
quotation as outlining a characteristic of human psychology which prevents 
subjects from perceiving an underlying continuity, which nonetheless remains 
operative, until after the event. The discontinuity which marks the beginning of 
faith runs, so to speak, all the way down. It is not merely a subject’s 
epistemologically limited mode of relating to being which gives the impression of 
discontinuity; on the contrary, each event bears witness to the fractured ontology 
Kierkegaard’s moment suggests.78 Why must this be the case? Principally because 
even if there is, as Kierkegaard states, ‘continuity in reverse’, the fact that this 
continuity is not present at the beginning indicates an unsublatable break 
between the perspective that characterizes the beginning (marked by possibility 
and openness) and that which marks the perspective of finality (apparent closure, 
continuity). This insight will inform the subsequent discussion of Kierkegaard’s 
contribution to contemporary political theory, particularly post-foundational 
(Ernesto Laclau and Jacques Derrida) and transcendental materialist (Slavoj 
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Žižek and Adrian Johnston) theories of political transformation which locate 
discontinuity precisely at the level of ontology as opposed to epistemology. 
There is a possible objection that needs to be dealt with at this stage. 
Although we have sought to read the moment in Kierkegaard as an ontological 
rather than epistemological concept (as primordial and constitutive as opposed 
to a second-order perspectival distortion) does Kierkegaard not often affirm the 
point of view of finality as one in which all contingency is eradicated? Are we not 
left with a variant of philosophical dualism in which the transcendent is preserved 
as well as the God’s-eye view to which the historical appears as a single unbroken 
whole? Steven Shakespeare, Edward Mooney, and Michael O’Neill Burns are to 
be commended for enabling us to move beyond this position. In his recent 
volume, Kierkegaard and the Refusal of Transcendence, Shakespeare 
convincingly argues against the finality and completion suggested by 
Kierkegaard’s invocation of the ‘God’s-eye view’: ‘[In the Postscript, Kierkegaard] 
states that existence is a system for God, but by its own logic, there is no valid 
standpoint from within existence from which such an assertion could validly be 
made. It assumes the God’s eye view it seeks to establish’.79 Likewise, in Burns’ 
and Mooney’s respective accounts, the notion of God as ‘divine personality’ is 
jettisoned in favour of a reading that repositions God as the possibility condition 
for radical change. Mooney describes Kierkegaard’s God as ‘the power that 
grounds our agency as selves […] the ultimate field of possibility’.80 The divine is 
thus nothing other than ‘absolute freedom’.81 Repositioning the transcendent in 
this way, as emerging from within immanence, becomes possible so long as we 
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preserve a distinction between Kierkegaard’s references to the God of biblical 
narrative (the God who makes commands and prohibitions) and God as a way of 
designating a limit or absolute otherness. From this position, it becomes clear 
that there can no longer be a firm boundary between the transcendental and the 
immanent. As Shakespeare puts it, we should assert ‘the identity of the 
transcendent and the immanent’ and seek to frame Kierkegaard’s paradox not as 
the interruption of the immanent by the transcendental, but rather as the 
(internally generated) complication of immanence.82 
The status of the moment as emerging from the discontinuity implied by 
existence is vital to grasp since Kierkegaard’s overriding aim is to construct the 
moment in such a way that allows it to generate a kind of newness which could 
not be reabsorbed back into a rigid system. If the moment were solely a 
consequence of objective phenomena, or if it were logically determined from the 
beginning, we would remain at the level of necessity with each apparently new 
occurrence being itself derived from the circumstances or premises.  Likewise, if 
the moment originated purely from the willed activity of the subject, we would 
have a commonplace voluntarist account in which the subject is at liberty to act 
as they wish. Finally, to retain a conception of the moment based on divine 
intervention would also rob the acting subject of the contingency and risk 
required for genuine commitment since the moment would be fully subsumed 
within the historical for God. The crucial manoeuvre that takes place within the 
most recent literature on Kierkegaard is one that obliterates the opposition 
between transcendence and immanence so as to reposition the transcendental as 
the immanent torsion that provides the condition for subjective freedom.  
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What kind of freedom does this ‘transcendence within immanence’ then 
leave us with?  It would be the freedom to experience oneself as taken up by an 
absolute duty, a duty that one cannot be ‘reasoned out of’ or dissuaded from 
observing. To take Kierkegaard’s own example, once Abraham recognised the 
meaning of God’s command, there was no way in which he could avoid 
experiencing it as an absolute imperative. His only choice was to act in full 
knowledge of the absurdity of his predicament.83 Part of the message of Fear and 
Trembling is therefore that, at the level of subjective experience, the origin of a 
faithful disposition through the moment is experience as the opening up of the 
temporal such that an absolute (eternal) duty can become effective. This is the 
sense in which we should interpret Kierkegaard’s telling phrase, ‘The moment is 
precisely this (which is not due to circumstances), the new thing, the woof of 
eternity’.84 The moment provides scope for subjective freedom in a very specific 
sense—it allows for a free act which exceeds the established parameters of an 
individual’s character and the situation’s objective possibilities; rather, it is an 
event through which those very parameters are revealed as contingent and a new 
disposition, faith, or commitment becomes possible. 
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Necessity, Possibility, Actuality 
In his Philosophical Fragments Kierkegaard tells us that each historical moment 
is characterised by possibility.85 Moreover, possibility, by passing into actuality, 
does not thereby become necessary. Although it is clear that the past is 
unchangeable, it does not follow from its permanence that the past did not also 
contain other unactualized possibilities.86 Instead, ‘the past is not necessary, 
inasmuch as it came into existence (a contradiction), and it becomes even less 
necessary through any apprehension of it’.87 Kierkegaard is not being entirely 
serious when he argues that the past can become ‘even less necessary’. The point 
to be appreciated here is that the notion of historical necessity is being 
problematized through a counter-argument that in any given situation there are 
numerous possible outcomes and that even though only one outcome can be 
actualised, this does not allow us to conclude that this outcome was necessary in 
advance of its actualization. The appearance of historical necessity is not due to 
an inherent characteristic of history, but to the position of the observer who when 
confronted with the apparent immutability of the past, misreads this 
immutability as necessity: ‘The contemporary does not see the necessity of that 
which comes into existence, but when centuries lie between the coming into 
existence and the viewer – then he sees the necessity’.88 This passage reintroduces 
two possible interpretations. The first interpretation would maintain the 
possibility of retrospective access to past events in their necessity while accepting 
that contemporary actors embedded in the process of history’s unfolding have 
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their view distorted by their partial, curtailed perspective. As suggested above, 
the alternative approach taken here views both forward and backward views to be 
victims of a perspectival distortion, which amounts to saying that the distortion 
is essential as opposed to incidental. As Shakespeare puts it, ‘existence simply is 
not the kind of thing that could be ‘seen-as-a-whole’ without converting its 
contingency into necessity, and therefore negating it’.89 Kierkegaard is not 
proposing an underlying necessity which secretly orchestrates historical events, 
only becoming perceptible after the passage of centuries; on the contrary, it is in 
fact the passage of centuries which creates a kind of perspectival illusion, erasing 
unactualized possibilities in favour of a single, causal trajectory. 
Kierkegaard’s central objection to the Danish reading of the Hegelian 
teleological vision of history is that it leaves no space for human freedom; 
freedom is instead simply assimilated without remainder.90 Historical necessity 
presents us with a version of events which leads inexorably to a pre-given 
outcome. The role of human subjects would not be to actively decide upon certain 
outcomes, the very notion of decision would no longer be meaningful: 
If the past had become necessary, then it would not belong to freedom any more – 
that is, belong to that in which it came into existence. Freedom would then be in dire 
straits, something to laugh about and weep over, since it would bear responsibility 
for what did not belong to it, would bring forth what necessity would devour, and 
freedom itself would be an illusion and coming into existence no less an illusion.91 
A human decision would be reduced to a hollow act of validating an outcome 
which itself has the status of a foregone conclusion. The appearance of freedom 
                                                   
89 Shakespeare, p. 4. 
90 It should be emphasised here that the version of Hegelian historical necessity Kierkegaard 
attacks is not one that would be recognised by many contemporary scholars of Hegel. It is a 
version which Kierkegaard received through his contact with Danish Hegelians such as Hans 
Lassen Martensen and Ludvig Heiberg but which no longer stands as a dominant interpretation 
of Hegelian thought. In fact, Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel can even be regarded as compatible 
with contemporary approaches to Hegel which seek to prioritise the role of contingency in his 
thought. For an account of Kierkegaard’s reaction to Hegelianism, see: Hannay, p. 386. 
91 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, pp. 77–8. 
62 
 
would be the result of an epistemological limitation, the subject’s incomplete 
knowledge of a given situation, whereas at an ontological level the subject’s 
decision would be already determined in advance. A position holding that 
historical events occur by necessity must also rule out newness regardless of 
whether this newness is thought to be generated by a free act or to emerge 
spontaneously by other means. In a system governed by necessity there cannot 
be any newness, at least not in the sense Kierkegaard intends, since every 
outcome is in principle given in advance and available from the outset. 
The passages from Philosophical Fragments quoted above bring us closer 
to Kierkegaard’s ontology. As is already clear at this stage, with Kierkegaard we 
are dealing with a vision of reality which includes rifts and gaps, breaches and 
breaks. Come offers an instructive account of Kierkegaard’s position: 
[B]oth in Fragments and in Postscript, the eternal necessary laws, discerned by 
human rational analysis of both the structures of nature and the macro movements 
of the world-historical process, do not annul or set aside or swallow up [...] that 
peculiar event that is dialectical in respect to time in that, on the one hand, it is an 
observable fact of history and yet, on the other, it hides within it an unobservable 
pause before a breach which cannot be bridged by either logical or physical force but 
only by the leap of freedom which is enable by the courage to believe against all 
evidence to the contrary.92 
Kierkegaard begins with an idea of subjectivity as an entity in a state of becoming, 
without a pre-determined final goal, and from this position develops a compatible 
ontology, one that does not threaten the characteristics of subjectivity he views as 
most valuable. Necessity, as understood by Danish Hegelians such as Hans 
Lassen Martensen and Ludvig Heiberg (who were the main source of 
Kierkegaard’s encounter with Hegelian philosophy), would render human 
freedom impossible since all action would be absorbed by pre-existing conditions, 
temporality would be abolished under a system in which everything is given in 
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advance, and the individual subject would no longer exist as a ‘freely acting 
cause’.93 For human history to include humans themselves as active participants, 
as agents in the process, we need a theory of the decision which is not the 
validation of a pre-determined outcome, but is instead a groundless, anarchic act 
which consistently subverts explanatory paradigms. Such an act is not 
determined, but nor is it a random activation of a single possibility. Nonetheless, 
we must not mistake this freedom as mere freedom of choice—as Come is aware, 
it must be a form of freedom that is incalculable and perhaps even experienced 
as necessity. The moment can then be considered as a kind of pure occurrence, 
the indivisible particle that remains after all efforts at explanation have been 
exhausted. 
 This brings us to an unexpected conclusion with regard to Kierkegaard’s 
ontology. If Kierkegaard is proposing a non-totalizing, incomplete ontology, we 
need to decide where this incompleteness is located.94 It is Kierkegaard’s 
statements concerning the self’s status as a synthesis which provide the clue here. 
Thought of as a synthesis, the subject expresses both the incommensurability and 
the paradoxical unity of opposites. The subject, at a specific, unique moment in 
time, is able to bridge the chasm between the temporal and the eternal, or to put 
this another way, the human subject is able to elevate a single moment in such a 
way that it inaugurates an eternal commitment. The moment as ‘missing link’ is 
coextensive with, or expressed by, this sudden gesture or movement which is 
nothing but the phenomenological trace of an ontological discontinuity. Our 
reading of Kierkegaard’s moment as a ‘missing link’ needs to be kept in mind 
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throughout subsequent chapters as we attempt to discern a temporal aporetic in 
the works of political thinkers from Hobbes and Rousseau to Alain Badiou and 
Slavoj Žižek by way of Carl Schmitt and Ernesto Laclau.
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Chapter Two  
 
Hobbes, Rousseau, and the Unsquared Circle of 
Political Foundations 
‘For the hypothesis of a state of nature implies the existence of a 
beginning that is separated from everything following it as 
though by an unbridgeable chasm’. 
 




The previous chapter established the basic contours of Kierkegaard’s concept of 
the moment. Our task will now be to set out and discuss the conceptual links 
between the moment as a particular kind of transformation that resists reduction 
to pre-existing conditions, and the transition from a pre-political state of nature 
to political life in Hobbes and Rousseau. While the correspondence between these 
two types of transformation may initially appear tenuous, there are important 
reasons for pursuing the comparison suggested here. Foremost of these is the fact 
that neither Hobbes nor Rousseau give us an incremental narrative of the exit 
from the state of nature; instead, the precise chronology of the transformation is 
opaque in both accounts. Far from attempting to derive a complete, fully 
articulated chronological account from these theorists, I propose that the 
temporal distortion afflicting the contractarian narratives of Rousseau and 
Hobbes must be positively asserted as such. In line with the overarching claim of 
this thesis, temporal dislocation in Leviathan and The Social Contract is an 
irreducible feature of narratives of political origins and radical political change. 
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There is no entelechial movement from the natural to the political in either 
Hobbes or Rousseau; instead, we find the sudden break of a contingent event. I 
will introduce two terms in order to aid our understanding of political 
foundations in Hobbes and Rousseau: superposition and hiatus.1 The former 
applies to situations in which counterfactual scenarios must be simultaneously 
asserted within the same narrative (i.e. they must be ‘superposited’) despite the 
resulting contradiction. The latter serves to capture the perspective of the subject 
undergoing the change; the passage from one order to the next is not seamless, 
but entails a moment of openness or ‘in-between’ time. 
Temporal opacity is the narrative correlate of the qualitative change 
contracting individuals are required to accomplish with respect to their 
psychological disposition and their social relations.2 In Hobbes and Rousseau, 
the founding moment of political life bears a structural affinity to Kierkegaard’s 
notion of the instant but the suddenness of the transformation does not simply 
imply an unexpected event of short duration. Instead, the suddenness of the 
contract’s institution relates to a certain circularity or groundlessness which 
continues to persist beneath the appearance of a consolidated political order and 
which reappears in narratives that attempt to delineate the political order’s 
founding moment. Just as for Kierkegaard groundlessness and absurdity 
represent the positive condition of faithful subjectivity, the unbridgeable gap that 
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conceptual resources required to generate the necessary change in individual subjective 
dispositions. A. P. Martinich, Hobbes (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 78–79. 
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separates political life from the state of nature does not prove to be an obstacle to 
politics, but is in fact that which animates political discourse and prevents 
ossification.3 The difficulties encountered by Kierkegaard in his account of the 
genesis of subjectivity can be detected in the emergence of a political subject. In 
both cases, one must account for the mediatory dynamic that can effectuate the 
transformation. Our overarching concern is to trace the contours of this dynamic 
without losing sight of the discontinuity and paradox it designates. Placing 
Kierkegaard, Hobbes and Rousseau in dialogue will allow us to establish the 
political dimension of Kierkegaard’s moment as well as delineating an 
ineradicable moment of temporal complexity in both Hobbes and Rousseau’s 
account of political origins.  
In confronting either Kierkegaard’s moment or the moment of political 
origins, we are dealing with an event that cannot be explained according to the 
principle of sufficient reason. That is to say, the set of conditions preceding the 
event cannot exhaustively account for the resultant change.4 Kierkegaard’s 
moment, particularly the version of the moment offered in The Moment and Late 
Writings, is a concept that can be mobilised to understand transformations that 
are irreducible to pre-existing conditions. Kangas is therefore to be supported in 
his assessment of Kierkegaard’s moment as radically spontaneous: 
The specific nature of an event is that it presupposes itself. That is to say, an event 
becomes possible only in the moment it becomes actual; its possibility for happening 
arrives only in the very moment of its happening. An event is always and essentially 
‘the sudden’. It breaks discontinuously upon the present as an interruption. An event 
is not in the present or an unfolding of possibilities coiled up in the present, but the 
qualification of the present in terms of its actuality and possibility. As an event or 
leap, sin becomes possible only in the moment it is actual—not ‘before’.5 
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While for Kierkegaard the moment is bound up either with the emergence of 
subjectivity (The Concept of Anxiety) or with the experience of revelation (The 
Moment and Late Writings, Philosophical Fragments), we can nonetheless risk 
the hypothesis that a comparison between the structure of these events can yield 
insight when applied to political events. Just as the revelatory event comes into 
being in a single movement, becoming possible in the same moment it becomes 
actual, so must the social contract come about suddenly, as a definitive cut with 
the past. Spontaneity is nonetheless a deeply problematic notion for social 
scientists and political theorists alike. There is a tendency amongst scholarship 
on Hobbes to view spontaneity as indicating an inner incoherence or paradox.6 
As I propose above, the position taken here is that the paradoxes associated with 
political origins do not necessarily entail a theoretical impasse. Indeed, we will 
discover that these paradoxes should not be suppressed in our narratives of 
political change (be they speculative or empirico-historical) but should provide 
impetus for further conceptual work. By mobilising Kierkegaard’s moment as 
capable of illuminating paradoxes in both the Hobbesian and Rousseauian social 
contracts, it will be possible to make a valuable contribution to contemporary 
debates concerning political origins and to demonstrate that a political reading of 
Kierkegaard’s moment can be both plausible and compelling. 
This contribution will propose that placing Kierkegaard in dialogue with 
Hobbes and Rousseau produces a two-fold insight concerning the temporality of 
free action. Firstly, when we consider the position of an involved subject in an 
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69 
 
evental, transformative situation, we are forced to recognise the situations 
profound undecidability. This undecidability does not imply that any decision is 
possible, nor that a certain decision will improve the likelihood of a given 
outcome, but that the status of any decision is necessarily open and can only be 
fixed retroactively. The stability of a given event’s meaning is conditioned, but not 
determined, by a decision. For an acting individual, the decisive moment (the 
moment at which we are suddenly forced to choose) is not experienced as a 
seamless linear progression, but rather as a hiatus between separate and distinct 
natural, social or political systems.7 Nonetheless, this experience of hiatus is lost 
to the retrospective view, which aims at narrative consistency. Fixing the meaning 
of an event depends on such a procedure—hindsight reduces the moment of 
indeterminacy to a vanishing point such that the contingency of the event is 
sublated into a teleological historical vector. 
A final point should be raised before turning to Hobbes and Rousseau’s 
versions of the social contract. Scholars who defend the social contract tradition 
as a valuable theoretical resource do so not on the basis that the contract 
represents a real, historical event marking the origin of politics and law among 
humans.8 Instead, the social contract is to be viewed as a speculative 
anthropological discussion of how the origin of political authority can be regarded 
as legitimate as opposed to an act of usurpation or imposition.9 The social 
                                                   
7 The term ‘hiatus’ is here borrowed from Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (London: Penguin 
Books, 1990), p. 205. 
8 Hobbes himself suggests he is sceptical as to whether the condition of war ever existed to the 
extent he describes in Leviathan. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. by Richard Tuck (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 89. Also see: David Gauthier, ‘The Social Contract as 
Ideology’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 6.2 (1977), 130–64 (p. 135). B. T. Trainor, ‘The Politics of 
Peace: The Role of the Political Covenant in Hobbes’s Leviathan’, in Thomas Hobbes: Critical 
Assessments, ed. by Preston King (London: Routledge, 1993), VOL. III, POLITICS AND LAW, pp. 
616–625; Howard Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory of Obligation 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 240–242. 
9 For a useful discussion of these alternative views of the social contract, see W. R. Lund who 
also claims that Hobbes consciously distinguishes between historical and hypothetical 
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contract narrative serves to illuminate certain aspects of our current situation by 
revealing the kind of origin that our political configuration presupposes. It can 
therefore be held, as Leyden says, to retain ‘logical force and to have no special 
reference to a particular historical period’.10 In the discussion that follows, 
debates about the historical accuracy of various incarnations of the social contract 
narrative will be set aside in order to engage with the contract as a quasi-mythical 
occurrence. Underpinning this engagement is the proposition that at some point 
in our distant past political relations did actually emerge and came to be 
considered, to a greater or lesser extent, as legitimate. The discussion offered 
below is not an attempt to dismantle the social contract as an empirical event; the 
task is rather to highlight the temporal complexity one discovers when faced with 
narratives concerning political origins and to show how these complexities can be 
elucidated through careful analysis. 
                                                   
understandings of the covenant: ‘The Historical and “Political” Origins of Civil Society: Hobbes 
on Presumption and Certainty’, in Thomas Hobbes: Critical Assessments, ed. by Preston King 
(London: Routledge, 1993), VOL. III, POLITICS AND LAW, pp. 727–738. 
10 Wolfgang von Leyden, Hobbes and Locke: The Politics of Freedom and Obligation (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 1982), p. 67. 
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Hobbes and the Aporetic Genesis of Political Obligation 
In Leviathan, Hobbes describes the natural condition of mankind as anarchic and 
characterised by war and suffering: ‘Hereby it is manifest, that during the time 
men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that 
condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against 
every man’.11 The absence of a common Power entails the absence of property 
since the possession of goods is only guaranteed by the possessor’s use of force. 
Likewise, there can be no sense of justice in the state of war since each individual 
has unlimited right.12 Justice is based on law, which in turn relies on the presence 
of a common power.13 Given the approximate equality of strength and intelligence 
between men, there will be an inevitable tendency towards conflict where two or 
more men desire a thing that cannot be enjoyed by both.14 For Hobbes, the 
resulting situation is one in which men will always be inclined to suspect each 
other of aggression and take pre-emptive steps to secure greater power. Power 
itself is defined as a ‘present means to obtain some future apparent Good’.15 It 
follows from this formulation that men will seek to guarantee, through all means 
necessary, the satisfaction of both their immediate and their future desires. This 
unlimited striving for greater power, unchecked by a sovereign, generates scarcity 
and thereby contributes to the misery and suffering men experience in the state 
of nature. 
Against the backdrop of the state of war described in Leviathan, Hobbes 
presents us with a series of laws of nature immediately after a brief commentary 
                                                   
11 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 88. 
12 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 90. 
13 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 90. 
14 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 87. 
15 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 62. 
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on natural liberty, with the former apparently necessitating the voluntary 
limitation of the latter and leading to man’s exit from the state of nature. The 
precise status of these laws is a point of contention within the literature on 
Hobbes.16 Hobbes is quite clear that the state of nature is one of unlimited liberty, 
and yet we nonetheless find this claim alongside arguments which posit the laws 
of nature as forbidding man from doing, ‘that which is destructive of his life, or 
taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit that by which he 
thinks it may be best preserved’.17 Law, as Hobbes tells us, ‘is a Precept, or 
generall Rule’ which obliges man to engage in, or refrain from engaging in, certain 
behaviours. It is, however, difficult to see how obligation can exist in the state of 
nature described by Hobbes given that there is no higher power to compel men 
to act in any particular way.18 To be sure, it is possible to find passages in which 
the normative force of the laws of nature seems to be muted—for example, 
Hobbes notes that ‘These dictates of Reason, men use to call by the name of 
Lawes, but improperly: for they are but Conclusions, or Theoremes concerning 
what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves’.19 Nonetheless, 
the dominant tendency in Hobbes’s Leviathan is to formulate the laws as 
imperatives.20 
                                                   
16 For a comprehensive survey of the positions taken on this issue, see the various contributions 
to Critical Assessments, ed. by Preston King (London: Routledge, 1993), VOL. II, POLITICS AND 
LAW. For a more recent account of the debate, see: Brian Tierney, ‘Natural Law and Natural 
Rights: Old Problems and Recent Approaches’, The Review of Politics, 64.03 (2002), 389–406 
(pp. 389–406). 
17 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 91. 
18 An additional difficulty encountered in any discussion of the laws of nature concerns the 
variation in Hobbes’s own position. In Leviathan (p. 91), Hobbes unambiguously describes the 
laws of nature as forbidding certain behaviours. Elsewhere, Hobbes distinguishes the laws of 
nature from a stricter notion of law, which, ‘is the speech of him who by right commands 
somewhat to others to be done or omitted’. Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen, ed. by Richard Tuck 
and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 56. 
19 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 111. 
20 Here I agree with A. E. Taylor who correctly reads the laws of nature as forbidding and 
prescribing certain actions, not merely describing the way men behave. See: A. E. Taylor, ‘The 
Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes’, in Thomas Hobbes: Critical Assessments, ed. by Preston King 
(London: Routledge, 1993), VOL. II, ETHICS, p. 26. For this reason, I also reject J. F. Wilson’s 
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The position developed in Leviathan according to which the Laws of Nature 
are to be seen as imperatives produces an inconsistency since, as Hobbes states, 
there can be ‘no obligation on any man, which ariseth not from some Act of his 
own’.21 Elsewhere Hobbes writes,  
when a man hath [...] abandoned, or granted away his Right; then is he said to be 
OBLIGED, or BOUND, not to hinder those, to whom such Right is granted, or 
abandoned, from the benefit of it: and that he Ought, and it is his DUTY, not to make 
voyd that voluntary act of his own: and that such hindrance is INJUSTICE.22 
All obligation is ultimately rooted in an original act of submission through which 
every man except the sovereign relinquishes his natural right. For this reason, 
obligation cannot precede the covenant; it emerges exclusively through the 
covenant. There are, as Oakeshott points out, no commands that can be 
inherently or self-evidently binding.23 The contradiction is also noted by Berns 
who states, ‘[N]atural rights and traditional natural law are, to put it simply, yet 
altogether accurately, incompatible; to espouse one teaching is to make it 
impossible to reasonably espouse the other’.24 Likewise, Newey frames the issue 
as follows: 
If everyone has a right to everything, that seems to imply that there can be no natural 
obligations or duties. For suppose that there were such a natural duty, which applied 
to some individual – say, to do or refrain from doing something. But then I do not 
                                                   
approach, which reads Hobbes’s notion of obligation as dependent on the presence external 
impediments, with the implication that the laws of nature do not oblige because they do not 
present external impediments to human action. The problem here is that we would be left with a 
weak notion of obligation after the political covenant since obligation would only exist as direct 
physical force. Moreover, given this form of obligation, it remains unclear why obligation 
emerges from an act of submission. If physical force obliges, it does so regardless of whether the 
obliged party submits. See: J. F. Wilson, ‘Reason and Obligation in Leviathan’, in Thomas 
Hobbes: Critical Assessments (London: Routledge, 1993), VOL. II, ETHICS, p. 373. 
21 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 150. 
22 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 92. 
23 Michael Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975), p. 96. 
24 Walter Berns, ‘The Constitution as Bill of Rights’, in How Does the Constitution Secure 
Rights?, ed. by R. A. Goldwin and W. A. Schambra (Washington, WA: AEI, 1985), p. 55. Berns’s 
use of the term right does not easily map onto Hobbes’s notion of the right of nature since the 
latter is already curtailed to the extent that it provides only that man, ‘use his own power, as he 
will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life’. Hobbes, 
Leviathan, p. 91. Liberty in the state of nature is a more expansive concept and entails a more 
stark contradiction with the law of nature insofar as it describes, ‘the absence of externall 
Impediments’. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 91. 
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have a right not to do that thing (or not to refrain from doing it). So I do not have a 
right to everything, and so not everyone has a right to everything.25 
For Hobbes’s account to be consistent, either the laws of nature must be positive 
(in the sense of positing a fact, i.e. not normative), describing as opposed to 
obliging behaviour, or alternatively, Hobbes’s notions of authority and obligation 
as derived from an act of submission must be revised. To pursue the latter 
strategy would be deeply problematic since Hobbes’s entire theoretical edifice 
relies on the idea that obligation stems from an act of submission—this is why the 
origin of the civitas must take the form of a covenant. Introducing any ambiguity 
concerning the possibility of uncovenanted obligation would risk undermining 
the central argument of Leviathan; if uncovenanted obligation were possible, 
Hobbes’s arguments about man’s intolerable condition in the state of nature 
would lose their logical force. If humans are already obliged to behave in certain 
ways in the state of nature, such that certain forms of agreement become possible, 
we might then reasonably question the necessity of the covenant itself. At the very 
least, for humans to be obliged to act in a just manner (as Hobbes at times seems 
to suggest) in the state of nature would significantly diminishes the need for the 
instauration of an all-powerful sovereign to control them.26 
Despite the concerns raised above relating to the possibility of 
uncovenanted obligation, there is a significant and well-established body of 
scholarship holding reading Hobbes’s laws of nature as already obligating in 
advance of the political covenant. A. E. Taylor’s “The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes” 
seeks to establish the reasonable pursuit of interest and the avoidance of 
                                                   
25 Glen Newey, Hobbes and Leviathan (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 88. 
26 This issue is raised by Jean Hampton who makes the point that the individuals existing in the 
state of nature need to be irrational enough to require a sovereign (rather than simply make and 
enforce agreements among themselves) and yet also be rational enough to be able to institute 
the sovereign. Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 85. 
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contradiction as the foundation of Hobbes’s ethical position. Although I have 
briefly presented some compelling reasons for rejecting this approach above, it is 
nonetheless worth running through Taylor’s arguments to see if they hold under 
closer scrutiny. The central statement of Taylor’s thesis sets out the problem in 
the following terms: 
There are really two distinct questions before Hobbes, the question why I ought to 
behave as a good citizen, and the question what inducement can be given me to do 
so if my knowledge of the obligation to do so is not in itself sufficiently effective. 
According to his repeated declarations, it is a certain fact of psychology that I shall 
violate the law and break the peace if I believe that I stand to gain by doing so. Hence 
the importance for him of arguing that I never really stand to gain by such conduct, 
since the recurrence of the state of “war of every man against every man” is a 
disadvantage to me which cannot be offset by any compensating advantage. But the 
Hobbesian answer to the other question, why I ought, or am obliged, to be a good 
citizen is quite different; it is, quite explicitly that I have, expressly or tacitly, pledged 
my word to be one, and to violate my word, to refuse to “perform my covenant as 
made,” is iniquity, malum in se.27 
Taylor’s central claim is that Hobbes’s theory of obligation relies on logical 
consistency. If I agree to perform a task, I clearly will that task to be done. If, then, 
I subsequently choose not to perform as promised, I have placed myself in 
contradiction by both willing and not willing the same thing. To be clear on my 
position here, I do not dispute Taylor’s point that Hobbes presents the laws of 
nature in normative terms; Hobbes consistently speaks of the laws as imperatives 
that oblige action, not merely as descriptive statements about human behaviour. 
The problematic step in Taylor’s argument resides in his assertion of the laws of 
nature as obligatory insofar as they prescribe reasonable action. Taylor is quick 
to point to Hobbes’s description of the laws of nature as ‘dictates of reason’ in 
support of his argument, however, to my mind this is illegitimate. What we find 
in Taylor’s account is in fact two distinct forms of obligation collapsed into a 
single imperative. On the one hand, we have the obligation to keep promises 
made, but this obligation only holds if we are already obligated to accept the 
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dictates of reason as a normative paradigm for our actions. There is only one clear 
mechanism for founding an obligation in Hobbes and it is the transferral of one’s 
right onto another person.28 If I promise to perform, my promise is binding only 
if I already experience myself as obligated in a more fundamental way to obey the 
laws of nature. Moreover, even if I experience the laws of nature as binding upon 
me, there is no reason why I could not simply release myself from this obligation 
and the obligations that follow from it. As Hobbes himself tells us, it is not 
possible for an individual to be obligated to themselves:  
Nor can one be obligated to oneself; for since the obligated and the obligating party 
would be the same, and the obligating party may release the obligated, obligation to 
oneself would be meaningless, because he can release himself at his own discretion, 
and anyone who can do this is in fact free.29 
In practice, while an individual might be persuaded of the binding force of the 
laws of nature, the restrictions flowing from the observance of the laws are self-
imposed. There is nothing to prevent an individual from releasing himself from 
his obligation to obey the laws of nature given a certain set of circumstances, and 
indeed, based on Hobbes’s description of the state of nature, we have good 
reasons to expect this sort of discretionary observance of the laws of nature to be 
pervasive. 
An additional problem in Taylor’s account presents itself in the 
understanding of duty. Taylor argues, ‘It is my personal interest that the miseries 
of anarchy should be prevented; by disobeying the civil law in any particular, I 
am, so far, contributing to the recurrence of anarchy; ergo, it is always to my 
interest to conform to the law. And to say that this is to my interest is equivalent 
to saying that it is my duty; my duty, in fact, means my personal interest, calmly 
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understood’.30 We shall see below why this alignment between interest and duty 
does not dissolve the difficulties associated with the exit from the state of nature 
in Hobbes. For now, it is enough to note that such an impoverished notion of duty 
fails to account for the kinds of behaviours humans actually perform in the name 
of duty. Duty, commonly understood, is precisely the commitment that sustains 
actions which put one’s personal interests in jeopardy. When the state calls upon 
young men to go to war, they oblige out of duty, not because upon reflection they 
decide that fighting on the battlefield is in their interests. Of course, it can be 
objected that the preservation of the state may simply be in the individual’s 
highest interest regardless of whether they survive the war, but this line of 
thinking soon results in a conceptual morass in which any given set of actions, no 
matter how risky or self-destructive, can be retrospectively rationalised as having 
been compatible with the individual’s dominant interest. 
It would seem that there are two distinct notions of reasonable action at play 
in Taylor’s account. First, we have reasonable action directed at self-preservation. 
Second, actions may be described as in accordance with reason insofar as they are 
not based on a contradiction. In the first case, an individual may make promises 
and intend to keep them, but if this is motivated by self-interest, then it is possible 
the individual will renege should circumstances change. In the second case, the 
individual experiences their promises as binding. To break a promise would be to 
contradict oneself since the very making of a promise implies one is aware of the 
ought implied by the statement ‘I promise’. However, in this case, as we have 
noted above, humans in the state of nature are already equipped with a capacity 
                                                   
30 Taylor, VOL. II, ETHICS, p. 23. 
78 
 
to make and keep promises, and the need for an all-powerful sovereign is no 
longer evident. 
A further variation on the role of the laws of nature is offered by Carole 
Pateman. Pateman concedes that, strictly speaking, there can be no obligation in 
the state of nature.31 If the laws of nature are to be understood as dictating 
reasonable behaviour for men, there can still be no sense in understanding an 
individual’s performance in accordance with the laws of nature as obligatory. 
Having affirmed this, Pateman goes on to argue that the laws of nature are 
‘principles of reason that enable men to live peacefully or socially’.32 Once a pre-
given end is accepted (an end to the state of war) we may be in a better position 
to accept the laws of nature as the reasonable means to achieving that end. This 
solution would be convincing, except for the fact that we nonetheless remain in 
the peculiar situation whereby we need to project into the state of nature a final 
destination (peaceful, social life) which pre-political human activity is organised 
towards. Pateman’s solution cannot be properly applied to the state of nature in-
itself; rather, the laws of nature are only nameable as principles guiding action in 
the state of nature as it appears for us, as social beings who have accomplished 
the exit from the state of nature and for whom the means to peaceful, social life 
are more evident. Once one adopts the perspective of an individual actually 
existing in the state of nature, the laws of nature become nonsensical. Indeed, the 
laws themselves are quite inappropriate guidance for an individual whose life is 
essentially organised around self-defence and pre-emptive attacks against 
potential competitors. Put another way, if we posit a distinction between natural 
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(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), p. 43. 
32 Pateman, p. 48. 
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man’s short-to-medium term goals (the satisfaction of his immediate and future 
desires) and his long-term goal (peaceful, social life) we still have yet to explain 
how this long-term goal arises in the imagination of natural man and why he 
would set aside his immediate interests in order to pursue it, particularly when 
this would render him vulnerable to his numerous enemies. Pateman thus 
remains unable to fully disentangle temporal complexity in the Hobbesian 
narrative of origins insofar as her model of the state of nature relies on natural 
man’s having obtained insights (regarding the rational means to achieving his 
long-term goals and the inclination to pursue these goals over his immediate 
interests) that would only be available to him after the covenant has been made. 
An additional alternative reading has been presented by Oakeshott, and 
later, in an article defending Oakshott’s reading, by D. Krook. This reading 
abandons wholesale any aspiration to read Hobbes’s Leviathan as a speculative 
anthropology of the origins of man and instead proposes to read the text as a 
logical structure. Krook clarifies the position as follows: ‘There is neither a 
sequence of events in time nor even an hypothetical sequence in hypothetical 
time, but only premises and deductions, antecedents and consequents, 
definitions and the meanings of definitions’.33 The question of the chronological 
ordering of events in Leviathan thus no longer applies; instead, we simply have a 
set of elementary propositions with a raft of deductions and inferences that follow 
logically from them. There is no need to pose the question of the emergence of 
obligation because obligation now emerges by way of necessity from the 
collection of presuppositions and accompanying successive logical deductions set 
out in the text. The advantages and disadvantages of such an approach are beyond 
                                                   
33 D. Krook, ‘Mr. Browns Note Annotated’, in Thomas Hobbes: Critical Assessments, ed. by 
Preston King, Vol. II, Ethics (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 90. 
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the scope of our discussion here, however, the very fact that some scholars are 
driven to read Hobbes’s Leviathan in this way (as a logical structure as opposed 
to a speculative narrative of origins) is of interest insofar as it betrays the utter 
intractability of the problem of temporality in the text. For Oakeshott and Krook, 
it is easier to abandon chronology wholesale than to attempt to unpick the 
paradoxes that ensue from attempts at chronological ordering. My argument, as 
will by now be clear, is that one can arrive at a novel reading of Hobbes precisely 
by focusing on the narrative distortions that emerge from a diachronic reading. 
A Hobbesian account of political origins can be understood in terms of 
superposition since, prior to the making of the covenant, obligation must be 
supposed to exist and to not exist. Put another way, if we hold obligation to 
emerge with the political covenant, the covenant itself becomes impossible; if we 
hold obligation to exist in the state of nature (i.e. if we understand the laws of 
nature to prescribe rather than simply describe behaviour) the covenant becomes 
unnecessary. Given that we are examining a work of speculative anthropology as 
opposed to an historical account, the superposition of mutually exclusive states 
in Hobbes does not equate to a claim about how things ‘really were’ prior to 
political life. Instead, our claim is that the attempt to reconstruct the passage from 





In Chapter 16 of Leviathan Hobbes makes some pertinent remarks on his 
understanding of representation and authority. Concerning representation, 
Hobbes makes the following observation:  
A PERSON, is he, whose words or actions are considered, either as his own, or as 
representing the words or actions of an other man, or any other thing to whom they 
are attributed, whether Truly or by Fiction. When they are considered as his owne, 
then is he called a Naturall Person: and when they are considered as representing 
the words or actions of an other, then is he a Feigned or Artificiall person.34 
The distinction between ‘natural persons’ and ‘artificial persons’ is clear. Each 
individual has her own words and actions. When an individual’s words and 
actions are their own (deriving from their own thoughts, wishes, and intentions), 
they are a ‘natural person’. When an individual behaves as a proxy for the actions 
and words or another, they can be said to be a representative or an ‘artificial 
person’. The individuals comprising the proto-political multitude are natural 
persons while the sovereign is an artificial person authorised by the multitude to 
act as their representative. In light of this distinction, we need to pay attention to 
the difference between the natural person of the sovereign and the function of the 
sovereign as an office which is generated through the covenant and occupied by 
(but not identical with) a flesh-and-blood individual. As Hobbes puts it, ‘A 
multitude of men are made one person when they are by one man, or one person, 
represented […] For it is the unity of the representer or representative, not the 
unity of the represented, that maketh the person one.’ Moreover, and crucially for 
Hobbes’s argument, the multitude are not capable of representing themselves 
except through a sovereign. If the multitude were able to act in a unified way, this 
would undermine the sovereign’s power since it would introduce another locus of 
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authority and thereby diminish the power of the sovereign. Martinich outlines 
Hobbes’s position as follows: 
Hobbes would not want the sovereign to be the creation of the commonwealth 
because if the sovereign were, then the sovereign would directly represent the 
commonwealth, not each individual subject. The danger, as far as Hobbes is 
concerned, is that the authority of the sovereign would be mediated by the authority 
of the commonwealth, and this would open the door to some theorist to argue that 
the sovereign may fail to represent the commonwealth correctly and that the 
constituents of the commonwealth, the subjects, could make this judgment.35 
 
The commonwealth can therefore not act as a single entity except when it is 
represented by the sovereign. To put this in other words, Hobbes wishes to shore 
up constituted power by showing how it is prior to, or more essential than, 
constitutive power. On Hobbes’s reading, constitutive power can only be held by 
individuals, not by groups. 
The problem here is that the original political act seems to imply, if not 
require, a political group (one resembling a commonwealth) and not a disparate 
multitude of individuals. The negotiation and coordination that would 
necessarily precede the covenant indicate that the fundamental shift made by the 
multitude to something resembling a commonwealth has already occurred. The 
multitude, in coordinating the contracting moment, and in recognising 
themselves as collectively belonging to the group who are to be represented by 
the sovereign, must be thought of as existing prior to the sovereign. And insofar 
as they act in concert when carrying through the inaugural political gesture, they 
are capable of representing themselves. 
The difficulty of arriving at notions of duty, obligation, and legitimacy in 
the way Hobbes suggests is compounded by additional features of the covenant. 
As we have already seen, Hobbes presents us with a state of nature containing 
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men who fear death and wish to preserve their lives, but who nonetheless live in 
a condition of war generated by their desire for power (specifically, the power to 
satisfy future desires). Even if we accept, with Hobbes, that a primordial 
multitude could recognise their situation is intolerable and that it is in their 
collective interest to relinquish their natural right and institute a common power, 
there nonetheless remains an additional hurdle outlined by Sreedhar: ‘Distrust 
invalidates a covenant, because the parties do not accept each other’s declaration 
of will (or intention to perform). In the state of nature, such accepting of intention 
will be rare because the first performer will not be able to form the belief that the 
second performer has the relevant intention to perform’.36 Oakeshott frames the 
problem in even starker terms: ‘the risk that he whose part it is to be the second 
performer will not keep his promise [...] must always be great enough to make it 
unreasonable for any man to consent to be a first performer’.37 Hobbes himself 
seems to recognise the seriousness of this problem in his comments on the first 
performance of covenants: ‘For he that performeth first, has no assurance the 
other will performe after […] And therefore he which performeth first, does but 
betray himselfe to his enemy; contrary to the Right (he can never abandon) of 
defending his life, and means of living’.38 Of course, although Hobbes is 
describing covenants made in the state of nature, the political covenant itself 
must also be considered to have been made in the state of nature. The event which 
Hobbes’s entire argument is geared towards would seem to be rendered 
impossible so long as self-interest is taken to be man’s dominant, if not exclusive, 
motivation. 
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This aspect of covenant making is touched upon by Carl Schmitt in his study 
of Hobbes’s Leviathan: ‘The terror of the state of nature drives anguished 
individuals to come together; their fear rises to an extreme; a spark of reason 
(ratio) flashes, and suddenly there stands in front of them a new God.’39 The 
ambivalence of this passage is striking. Even though Schmitt refers to the ‘spark 
of reason’, the tone of the writing implies a spontaneous transformation, a 
revelatory shift in perspective—from one moment to the next humans are 
suddenly equipped with the new ability to reason their way out of the state of 
nature an into political life. If we are to accept Schmitt’s reading, we still need an 
account of how this sudden spark of reason arises. Hobbes emphasised that the 
only precedents upon which the first performer could base their decision are 
failed covenants since there can be no examples of successful covenants made 
under conditions of war.40 But if this is true than the ‘spark of reason’ seems 
insufficient. 
Schmitt’s account of Hobbes is relevant here in a further way. In addressing 
the problem of the priority of sovereign (constituted) power and multitude 
(constitutive) power, Schmitt makes the following comment: ‘If this construct 
were viewed from its result, for the perspective of the state, what it would reveal 
is that the state is something more than and something different from a covenant 
concluded by individuals. […] Even though a consensus of all with all has been 
achieved, this agreement is only an anarchico-social, not a state, covenant.’41 
Clearly, the reason Schmitt takes up this interpretation of Hobbes is because he 
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a Symbol, trans. by George Schwab and Erna Hilfstein (London: Greenwood Press, 1996), p. 31. 
40 Hobbes holds covenants formed under the conditions of the state of nature to be void: 
‘Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all’. 
Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 117. 
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regards the sovereign as the fundamental, transcendent power. The sovereign 
cannot be derived from any other power; its power cannot hinge on the consent 
of the multitude. Nonetheless, in advocating this position vis-à-vis the covenant, 
Schmitt must rely on a position that Hobbes explicitly rejects, namely, the idea 
that covenants can be made in the state of nature. As soon as the possibility of 
‘anarchico-social’ covenants is accepted, the need for the sovereign is diminished 
and Hobbes’s assertions concerning the terror and brutality of the state of nature 
are undermined.  
Even if Schmitt’s two-fold (anarchico-social, then political) covenant is 
accepted, further questions immediately surface apropos the issue of actual 
obedience. While Hobbes has set out the various motivations which prompt 
natural man to leave the state of nature, motivations which appeal primarily to 
man’s rationality, there nonetheless remains a requirement for a moment of 
profound irrationality which must be passed through in order to actually exit the 
state of nature. Despite having made the covenant and surrendered their rights 
to the new sovereign, there can be no real guarantee for any man that the other 
signatories really intend to relinquish their rights in practice. The obligation to 
obey the sovereign, which stems from his authorisation by the newly founded 
body politic, exists formally as soon as the covenant is made but only exists 
actually when members of the civitas recognise the efficacy of the covenant and 
the authority of the new sovereign through their obedience. The separation 
between the formal agreement and actual obedience introduces an uncertainty 
that threatens to undermine the covenant. This is because, for the first performer, 
the decision to obey must be a deeply irrational, unprecedented gesture. The 
central point here is not that it is impossible to exit the state of nature, but rather 
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that a satisfactory etiological account cannot be arrived at. The exit cannot be 
accomplished through reason alone. 
The first performer’s act is also philosophically interesting in a further way. 
Up until this act, humans have a kind of freedom specific to the state of nature, 
that is, the freedom to do as they like and to pursue their interests. The 
impediments to their free choices can only come from their interactions with their 
environment. The act of the first performer is free in a qualitatively distinctive 
way. It is not the spontaneous, pre-reflective pursuit of impulse, but the decision 
to perform an action that goes against these impulses. From the perspective of 
those belonging to the state of nature, and indeed from the perspective of the first 
performer, this can only appear as a senseless act of self-sabotage. Nonetheless, 
as act which breaks away from the eudaemonistic pursuit of interests, this first 
performance can be understood as the original act of human autonomy. Such a 
reading brings us unexpectedly close to Kierkegaard who presents us with his own 
account of the first performer problem, insisting that an individual’s ‘willing the 
good’ must pass through a ‘break’ in order to be actualised: 
There is a halt, a leap. […] abstractly thought, there is no break, but no transition 
either, because viewed abstractly everything is. However, when existence gives 
movement time and I reproduce this, then the leap appears in just the way a leap can 
appear: it must come or it has been. Let us take an example from the ethical. It has 
been said often enough that the good has its reward in itself, and thus it is not only 
the most proper but also the most sagacious thing to will the good. A sagacious 
eudaemonist is able to perceive this very well; thinking in the form of possibility, he 
can come as close to the good as is possible, because in possibility as in abstraction 
the transition is only an appearance. But when the transition is supposed to become 
actual, all sagacity expires in scruples. Actual time separates the good and the reward 
for him so much, so eternally, that sagacity cannot join them again, and the 
eudaemonist declines with thanks. […] The transition is clear enough as a break, 
indeed, as a suffering.42 
It is worth scrutinising this passage for a moment. The phrase ‘viewed abstractly’ 
is Kierkegaard’s way of saying – ‘viewed from the perspective of an outsider, as 
                                                   
42 Kierkegaard, The Essential Kierkegaard, p. 225. 
87 
 
someone who is not themselves embedded in the process’. From such an abstract 
perspective, the first performance is a rational act because it brings about a 
situation that is favourable to the actor involved. The perspective of the performer 
herself is something else entirely. For her, there are no guarantees, no objective 
guidelines to follow—the decision to act is made from a position of radical 
undecidability. This is why Kierkegaard’s eudaemonist is incapable of 
accomplishing this kind of transition. He is able to see the benefits of 
performance, but ‘actual time separates the good and the reward’. The good that 
his performance might bring about cannot motivate him to risk the ‘suffering’ 
that the transition requires. While the first performer’s act gives rise to the new 
political order and even the very possibility of ethical action, it is important to 
retain a perspective that recognises the blind wager of the first performance. 
The temporality of the first performance can be understood according to the 
concept of hiatus introduced above. Recall that a hiatus marks the brief moment 
separating natural, social, and political orders. Insofar as an individual belongs 
to the state of nature, her conduct follows the principles of Hobbesian ego 
psychology—attraction to those things that are pleasurable and aversion from 
those that are painful.43 Likewise, after the covenant has been established and 
proven effective, new kinds of conduct become possible since they now produce 
predictable, stable outcomes. In both the state of nature and the civitas humans 
use their capacity to reason to guide their behaviour, however, when one 
considers the position of the first performer it becomes clear that the transition 
from one order to the next is not seamless—at least one individual must occupy 
an in-between period which she cannot reason herself out of. This would then be 
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the Arendtian hiatus found, ‘between the end of the old order and the beginning 
of the new’ with our first performer occupying the position of the Arendtian 
‘beginner’: 
It is in the very nature of beginning to carry with itself a measure of complete 
arbitrariness. Not only is it not bound into a reliable chain of cause and effect, a chain 
in which each effect immediately turns into the cause for future developments, the 
beginning has, as it were, nothing whatsoever to hold onto; it is as though it came 
out of nowhere in either time or space. For a moment, the moment of beginning, it 
is as thought the beginner had abolished the sequence of temporality itself, or as 
though actors were thrown out of the temporal order and its continuity.44 
Hiatus is, for Hobbesian first performers and Arendtian beginners, the interim or 
gap through which a new beginning can emerge. Human action that occurs in this 
interim gains a new quality. The agent, finding herself out of place, can commit a 
deed which is ‘free’ in the sense that it is distinct from the activity that occurs 
either in the state of nature or in the civitas; insofar as it takes place in a temporal 
hiatus, human action cannot be guided by reasoning. Any act that does occur will 
be presuppositionless in the moment of its accomplishment. It is not arbitrary 
insofar as it is an unconsidered act; rather, it is arbitrary because no amount of 
consideration can produce firm expectations about a likely outcome. 
Arbitrariness is thus one way of describing the act’s inherent undecidability. 
The paradoxical origins of law, obligation, and the new political community 
also appear in Oakeshott’s account of the political subject’s disposition as the 
essential counterpart to the sovereign’s authority. As Oakeshott argues,  
The covenant by itself is not a sufficient cause of a civitas; it gives authority, but it 
merely promises power. The necessary and sufficient cause of a sovereign possessed 
of the authority and the power required to establish a condition of ‘peace’ is a 
covenant of this sort combined with a sufficiently widespread disposition (displayed 
in overt acts) to observe its terms; for the sovereign’s power is only the counterpart 
of his subject’s disposition to obey.45 
This quotation points to a further weakness with the linear reading of the 
formation of the civitas. One cannot arrive at a sequentially consistent account of 
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the making of the covenant because both the sovereign’s authority and the 
subjective inclination to obey presuppose each other. Without authority, 
obedience is meaningless just as without the subjective inclination to obey, 
authority is ineffectual. If we accept that neither effective authority nor actual 
obedience can be generated without already presupposing its counterpart, our 
narrative of origins must include an instant in which both come into being 
spontaneously.46 Narrative must pass in a single manoeuvre from a moment in 
which the conditions are in place to a subsequent moment in which political life 
has been established in its entirety. This characteristic of the social contract 
narrative is identified by Bonnie Honig who isolates the paradox of foundations 
as concerning the perspectival deficit that characterises the pre-political 
multitude: 
In the paradoxical moment of founding, however, no member of the community can 
yet be said to possess the needed perspective, which can only come post hoc, to form 
the rules or identify or advocate for a collective good by which the people need to 
already have been acculturated in order to be not a ‘blind multitude’ but a ‘people’ 
capable of the autonomous exercise of popular sovereignty.47 
In line with Honig’s reading, we should see how the impossibility of proposing a 
consistent and plausible chronological reading of the original contract does not 
indicate a deficit to be remedied; rather, it indicates an inherent deadlock 
pertaining to the narrativisation of moments of radical political change.  
One can isolate the very moment in Hobbes’s Leviathan at which the people 
emerge as a political entity. Having affirmed the necessity of a Common Power, 
Hobbes describes the covenant as,  
more than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same 
person, made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such a manner, as if every 
man should say to every man, I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my 
Selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up 
thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like manner. This done, the 
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Multitude so united in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine 
CIVITAS.48 
In these lines, one of the critical moments of Leviathan is passed over in silence. 
The formal agreement to relinquish rights clearly fails to provide sufficient 
conditions for actual authority to be bestowed on a specific individual or 
assembly. The phrase, ‘this done’ serves to cut short any questions concerning the 
performance of the citizens by conflating the promise to obey with actual 
obedience.49 One can only view this passage as a hasty attempt to elide the real 
paradox that surfaces as narrative approaches the moment of origin. Such a 
manoeuver is necessary if one wishes to protect the coherence of the narrative as 
a whole, and yet for our purposes it is precisely the moment of narrative 
incoherence that must be isolated and analysed. If Hobbes’s task is to render the 
exit from the condition of war as a necessary event, condensing the moment of 
transformation into a single sentence is a rhetorical strategy that effaces the 
contingency of the moment, closing off the undesirable possibility of non-
obedience. 
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Hobbes via Kierkegaard: Continuity in Reverse 
Hobbes’s reluctance to create a narrative of the transition from natural man to 
citizen as a purely contingent, spontaneous act leads to certain fundamental, and 
I argue irresolvable, paradoxes. The position taken here is that these paradoxes 
can be elucidated given an appropriate conceptual repertoire. As will be 
demonstrated, one of Kierkegaard’s key achievements was to provide a way of 
understanding the spontaneity that characterises certain events without 
subsuming spontaneity under a broader necessity. At this point it is worth 
recalling Kangas’s comments concerning Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety: 
‘The specific nature of an event is that it presupposes itself [...] an event becomes 
possible only in the moment it becomes actual; its possibility for happening 
arrives only in the very moment of its happening. An event is always essentially 
“the sudden”. It breaks discontinuously upon the present as an interruption’.50 
The Hobbesian ‘event’, the making of the covenant, thought of now through 
Kierkegaard’s concept of the instant, is precisely an event that must presuppose 
itself. The making of the covenant and the corresponding change in subjective 
disposition occur, as Kierkegaard would say, ‘suddenly and concentrated in one 
sortie, (intensively)’.51 In Hobbes, the ‘interruption’ of the covenant remains 
sudden despite his effort to ground it in features of the pre-existing situation (i.e. 
the ego psychology of natural man and the Laws of Nature). The merit of 
Kierkegaard’s position is that the instant no longer requires this conditioning; 
instead, the momentary appearance of paradox signals a break in continuity, 
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which makes a qualitative change possible. This break is Kierkegaard’s ‘missing 
link’, which he outlines in relation to faith:  
Faith cannot therefore be proved, demonstrated, comprehended, for the link which 
makes a linking together possible is missing, and what else does this say than that it 
is a paradox. This, precisely, is the irregularity in the paradox, continuity is lacking, 
or at any rate it has continuity only in reverse, that is, at the beginning it does not 
manifest itself as continuity.52 
The appearance of continuity after the event is the result of an effort to render 
visible the moment at which a series of quantitative, empirical determinants 
suddenly gave rise to a qualitative outcome. The above quotation indicates that 
the change in disposition presupposed by the social contract finds its structural 
parallel in the moment of religious conversion in Kierkegaard. Neither change 
can be reduced to a series of stages, nor can they be explained via linear, causal 
models. Hinting at the possibility of ‘continuity only in reverse’ is to be seen as 
Kierkegaard’s way of drawing attention to the disparity between the engaged, 
faithful subject who experiences the beginning of faith and the retrospective view 
which seeks to explain faith in terms of continuity. 
 The radical nature of the qualitative change as well as its suddenness can 
only be accounted for by fully asserting the paradox of origins. If it becomes 
possible to account for the subjective event through a series of incremental 
quantitative changes, with each change being fully reducible to the situation it 
emerged from, this is the surest sign that one is either misperceiving the quality 
of the event, or alternatively, superimposing an artificially coherent narrative on 
the change in question. The resonance between Hobbes’s covenant and 
Kierkegaard’s moment reaches its apogee in the latter’s comments on decision 
and duty:  
The transition from eudæmonism to the concept of duty is a leap, or, assisted by a 
more and more developed understanding of what is most prudent, is one finally 
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supposed to go directly over to virtue? No, there is a pain of decision which the 
sensuous (the eudæmonistic), the finite (the eudæmonistic) cannot endure. Man is 
not led to do his duty by merely reflecting that it is the most prudent thing to do; in 
the moment of decision reason lets go, and he either turns back to eudæmonism or 
he chooses the good by a leap.53 
In a telling passage, which could almost be addressed to Hobbes, Kierkegaard 
insists that ‘duty’ emerges from the ‘pain of decision’ as opposed to mere 
reflections on a prudent course of action. Passing from the state of nature to the 
civitas cannot be represented as a linear sequence; there is an inevitable detour 
in which prudence is found to be insufficient and ‘reason lets go’. What enables 
man to commit fully to the good, rather than merely doing his duty insofar as he 
considers it prudent (and as has been demonstrated above, this would be an 
impoverished notion of duty), is precisely the passionate excess of the ‘moment 
of decision’. The ego psychology of natural man cannot generate duty.54 There is 
a gap that separates the self-interested, sensuous man of the state of nature from 
the duty-bound citizen, one that is strictly irreducible. Heinecken successfully 
conveys this image of the Kierkegaardian moment qua gap: 
To such absolute purity of heart a man does not attain by quantitative increments 
and gradual approaches. A man must be born anew in each moment of decision to 
attain such purity of heart in which he wills only one thing. To such a purity of heart 
he does not unfold naturally when the conditions are right. Here there must be a 
qualitative break. There must be a real leap which leaves a gap, the gap of qualitative 
transition, which cannot be bridged by a series of quantitative changes however 
minute you make them.55 
Kierkegaard’s contention, as Heinecken correctly identifies, is that this gap 
signals the subjective moment of change in which man becomes ‘a new creature’ 
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through a qualitative shift.56 The Hobbesian covenant is tailored in order to 
appear as the natural consequence of tendencies that pre-exist it; in contrast, for 
Kierkegaard, ‘the quantitative is confined within its limits’ with each qualitative 
change requiring ‘Thought [...] whose task it is to cut the thread [...] every time 
the quantitative attempts to create a new quality’.57 The ‘gaze of worldly sagacity’, 
which can perhaps here be cautiously identified with a Hobbesian perspective, 
fails to perceive the subjective dimension of the moment of transformation and, 
in limiting itself to the field of objectively verifiable phenomena, fails to take 
account of Kierkegaard’s most basic lesson: that truth is subjectivity.58 
Kierkegaard’s argument should not be seen as an attempt to undermine or 
devalue objective, ‘quantitative’ knowledge in general; his position is rather that 
approaching faith or duty with a focus on this kind of knowledge misperceives 
these concepts in their vital dimension. This dimension remains opaque when 
faith and duty are scrutinized by ‘worldly sagacity’ which ‘stares and stares at 
events and circumstances, calculates and calculates, thinking that it should be 
able to distil the moment out of the circumstance’.59 ‘Worldly sagacity’ here 
stands for the attempt to impose a narrative that views a subjective 
transformation as conditioned as opposed to spontaneous. Kierkegaard writes, 
The moment is precisely this (which is not due to circumstances), the new thing, the 
woof of eternity – but at the same instant it manages the circumstances to such a 
degree that it illusively (calculated to make a fool of worldly sagacity and mediocrity) 
looks as if the moment emerged from the circumstances. There is nothing for which 
worldly sagacity is so feverishly eager as the moment; what would it not give to be 
able to calculate correctly! Yet there is nothing more certain of being excluded from 
ever seizing the moment than worldly sagacity.60 
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In contrast to Hobbes, who attempts to build full and internally coherent 
explanations of events and their origins, Kierkegaard’s emphasis lies on the 
contingency suggested by a moment of beginning which exceeds linear 
explanations. The inability to render the event intelligible is not a consequence of 
a failure on the part of the interpreting subject; instead, it is better thought of as 
an incommensurability inherent to the event itself. If, subsequently, an event 
begins to appear as if it were in fact already inscribed in a pre-existing logic, for 
Kierkegaard, this appearance is itself actually the product of our limited, 
historically bounded perspective. The retrospective view of worldly sagacity 
condenses evental openness, recasting it as the logical conclusion of a preceding 
situation. In this way, the fleeting hiatus that characterises the notion of the 
instant developed by Kierkegaard is concealed under the guise of a linear 
narrative involving stable progression. 
A corollary of this position is Kierkegaard’s insistence that objective 
uncertainty, far from proving an obstacle to faith, is actually the positive 
condition of faithful subjectivity.61 If it were possible to arrive at faith through a 
sober analysis of a given situation, the notion of faith itself would be weakened 
since the value of faith, and indeed any kind of subjective commitment, is that it 
is a response to a situation which is characterised by opacity and therefore in 
principle undecidable. This is the reason faith is to be considered distinct from 
knowledge. Heinecken provides a demonstration by applying Kierkegaard’s 
notion of faith to romantic love: 
If [a man] will act only after he has the evidence reasonably on his side [...] he is like 
the man who places all the ladies of his acquaintance in a row and figures out 
prudently which one will make him the best wife, cook, bed-partner, child-bearer, 
drawing-room companion, tennis-partner, and so on, before he will commit himself 
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in ‘love.’ All such ‘objective’ guarantees are an evasion of the immediate 
commitment.62 
Here, Heinecken brings to light an interesting dimension of Kierkegaard’s 
containing a clear anticipation of the position developed by Alain Badiou. The 
latter includes love in the four conditions he holds to be capable of generating 
truths (the other conditions being art, science and politics) and argues that such 
truths are always in principle indiscernible.63 To put this in other words, the 
quality that enables love between humans is not located on the level of being and 
cannot be anchored in any objective characteristics of either person; on the 
contrary, it signals a momentary rupture in being. Fidelity to an event (in this 
case, falling in love) represents a commitment that withstands the event’s 
undecidability. Badiou writes:  
Ethics, I said, comes down to the following imperative: ‘Decide from the standpoint 
of the undecidable.’ [...] Given that undecidability is a rational attribute of the event, 
and the salvatory guarantee of its non-being, there is no other vigilance than that of 
becoming, as much through the anxiety of hesitation as through the courage of the 
outside-place, both the feather, which ‘hovers about the gulf’, and the star, ‘up high 
perhaps’.64 
Several motifs in this passage echo Kierkegaard’s position on truth, commitment, 
and undecidability. The ‘anxiety of hesitation’ and ‘the courage of the outside-
place’ are both reminiscent of Abraham’s terrifying ordeal described in Fear and 
Trembling.65 At a rhetorical level, both Kierkegaard and Badiou include 
metaphorical tropes that signal the vertiginous experience of an evental moment. 
Kierkegaard’s ‘yawning chasm’ finds its parallel in Badiou’s feather, which, 
‘hovers about the gulf’.66 Badiou’s ethical position proves compatible with 
Kierkegaard’s insofar as it is not rooted in any concrete set of presuppositions 
                                                   
62 Heinecken, p. 267. 
63 Alain Badiou, Infinite Thought, ed. & trans. by Oliver Feltham and Justin Clemens (London: 
Continuum, 2005), p. 62. 
64 Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. by Oliver Feltham (London: Continuum, 2007), pp. 
197–198. 
65 Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, trans. by Alastair Hannay (London: Penguin, 2003). 
66 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, p. 123. 
97 
 
concerning the good, but is characterised by an absence of grounds, by a 
fundamental undecidability. As we saw in the previous chapter, the 
undecidability that underpins Kierkegaard’s notion of paradox provides the 
condition upon which faith becomes possible. The existence of God is 
indemonstrable and, as such, can only be an object of faith, not knowledge. God’s 
indemonstrability is asserted in Kierkegaard for the same reason that the event’s 
indiscernibility is crucial for Badiou—in both cases it is necessary to conceptualise 
the Abgrund so as to secure the possibility of human freedom. This is a topic we 
will return to in the fourth chapter of this thesis. 
The covenant demonstrates the possibility of an exit from the state of nature 
not as the untainted product of rational deliberation, but as a sudden, 
unprecedented shift in perspective. It is not enough for pre-political individuals 
to behave as if covenants are possible; for the proposed covenant to be successful, 
individuals must unanimously behave as if an effective, binding covenant were 
already in place. The paradoxes one comes up against in analyses of the 
Hobbesian covenant are not symptoms of an incomplete argument which can be 
gradually muted or resolved through more sophisticated explanations; on the 
contrary, paradox is inherent to the object of analysis itself.67 An analysis that 
attempts to grasp the moment of exit must begin with this insight and proceed to 
think through an exit in terms of a heterogeneous temporality which resists 
assimilation into chronological time. 
In order to test whether the positions stated above can be considered 
theoretically robust, it is worth taking into account the counter arguments from 
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those who defend Hobbes according to a gradualist logic of incremental change 
and progress through experience, and who would therefore not recognise the 
similarities between Kierkegaardian and Hobbesian accounts of transformation. 
One such approach is offered by Claude Ake.68 Ake argues that the possibility of 
a transition from the state of nature to political community is already present in 
Hobbes, whose account of human psychology allows for changes over time, 
eventually producing an individual capable of making covenants, which are 
recognised as binding. The key psychological property here is that of imagination, 
or the train of imagination, which Hobbes refers to as ‘Mentall Discourse’.69 
Hobbes goes on to identify two types of mental discourse: ‘One, when of an effect 
imagined, wee seek the causes, or means that produce it: and this is common to 
Man and Beast. The other is, when imagining any thing whatsoever, wee seek all 
the possible effects, that can by it be produced; that is to say, we imagine what we 
can do with it, when wee have it’.70 From this position follows a further 
observation concerning man’s prudence, that is, his understanding of past and 
future events:  
A Signe, is the Event Antecedent, of the Consequent; and contrarily, the Consequent 
of the Antecedent, when the like Consequences have been observed, before: And the 
oftner they have been observed, the lesse uncertain is the Signe. And therefore he 
that has most experience in any kind of businesse, has most Signes, whereby to guess 
at the Future time; and consequently is the most prudent: And so much more 
prudent than he that is new in that kind of business’.71 
Prudence is a kind of knowledge one can acquire in the state of nature concerning 
events that have occurred and their relationship to other events in a linear chain 
of events. While one cannot be certain of an event’s occurrence without observing 
it directly, one can infer likely scenarios which may have led to, or which may 
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result from, an observed event.72 Understanding the Hobbesian notion of 
prudence is important here because, for Ake, there is no requirement that natural 
man act rationally in order to exit the state of nature, only that he act prudently.73 
Prudence mitigates the factors which characterise the state of nature (appetite, 
diffidence, equality and vainglory) since prudent men are less likely to conduct 
themselves in ways which risk injury. The increase in prudence (which, as we have 
noted, is simply a consequence of experience) does not change human nature, but 
does modify human behaviour.74 Ake notes that the state of nature, if occupied by 
prudent men, would increasingly resemble the kind of civitas that the covenant 
is supposed to produce. Moreover, if we accept Ake’s account, the exit from the 
state of nature becomes a certainty because, ‘the development of man into a 
prudent being is virtually inevitable’.75 
Having established how prudence arises inevitably in the state of nature and 
how it would modify the behaviours of natural man, Ake goes on to claim that we 
are now dealing with a state of nature in which, ‘some degree of social cooperation 
[is] possible’.76 This marks the point at which Ake’s interpretation becomes 
untenable. Throughout Leviathan Hobbes is at pains to demonstrate how 
antagonism is inherent to the state of nature, and moreover, how it is precisely 
this ongoing antagonism that is the defining characteristic of the state of nature. 
This is made clear through remarks in which Hobbes characterises the state of 
nature as a state of ‘Warre’:  
Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep 
them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, 
as is of every man, against every man. For Warre, consisteth not in Battell onely, or 
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in the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is 
sufficiently known.77 
On the page following the above quotation, Hobbes delivers his famous passage 
concerning the various human social practices that are impossible in the state of 
nature given that cooperation as such is impossible. To be clear, it is not 
impossible to imagine a version of the state of nature in which cooperation occurs, 
but rather, it is impossible to see how cooperation can occur in the specific version 
of the state of nature Hobbes envisages. Thus men live only with, ‘what their own 
strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall’.78 The fact that 
prudence emerges as a guide for action in the state of nature does not necessarily 
foster cooperation, rather, prudence can be thought to exacerbate the condition 
of war insofar as men who are constantly under threat of attack, and, at least 
occasionally, actually attacked, will be inclined to attack others pre-emptively. 
Pre-emptive attacks on others may well be the most prudent course of action in 
the state of nature. Moreover, following Hobbes’s argument that contracts are 
impossible in the state of nature, prudence will never dictate obedience to a 
contract in situations where obedience would be against one’s own interests. 
Although men might obey contracts when it is expedient for them to do so, this is 
not a politically useful notion of obedience since it would not provide the 
foundation of an enduring contract. 
We have seen above how Kierkegaard’s moment allows us to think through 
the emergence of a new resolve or commitment in the human subject. It is by 
virtue of the uncertainty that pertains to a situation that a decisive commitment 
can be generated. If, on the contrary, a decisive commitment could be generated 
through empirical observation, we would no longer be dealing with a valuable 
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notion of commitment since this kind of commitment could not outlast the 
conditions that gave rise to it. The individual citizen needs to feel sufficiently 
duty-bound such that they will continue to obey even in situations where 
obedience exposes them to danger. So, to take the example of a new citizen of a 
Hobbesian state, the commitment to obey the new sovereign expressed through 
the signing of the covenant, would be unreliable if it could not withstand changes 
in circumstances. Hobbes admits as much when he points out that citizens always 
retain the right to defend themselves if their life is in danger even against the 
sovereign.79 What makes Kierkegaard’s notion of commitment politically useful 
is that it is framed in such a way that makes it independent of empirical 
circumstances. As Come argues, ‘Kierkegaard insists that the element of a resolve 
or a commitment is something other than being plausible or reasonable. Indeed 
[...] a resolve is the only thing that can bring the rational process of reflection to 
a halt, because it is a qualitatively different kind of mental state or event from 
being plausible or reasonable’.80 It is this kind of disposition we must assign to 
the first performer. Given that, as has been demonstrated above, the first 
performer will never be able to draw sufficient motivation to obey the sovereign 
from an empirical analysis of the situation, he must be seen to be resolved 
already, before the good reasons for obedience become apparent. Again, Come’s 
account of Kierkegaard’s notion of resolve applies here:  
Seeing what is the one thing needful, what is demanded, in this situation by one’s 
inner sense of the absolute unconditional good, places one in and at that unique 
moment of possibility that can and will never be repeated, namely, the moment of 
resolve to enact that one and only possibility here and now, ‘at once’, in spite of all 
one’s ‘repented’ (admitted and accepted) fallibilities, weaknesses, failures, and in the 
face of irresolvable uncertainty of the outcome (aggravated by others’ criticism and 
opposition)’.81 
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The crucial point is that even in a situation such as that of the first performer 
where exiting the state of nature really is in his (and everyone else’s) interest, the 
perspective from which these interests would be apparent only once the exit has 
taken place. Commitment, conceived in this way, will be important in subsequent 
chapters as we turn to Badiou’s notion of fidelity. 
A further link can be made between Kierkegaard and Hobbes by 
considering the former’s The Book on Adler. In this text, Kierkegaard makes the 
following remarks on the individual’s relation to the established order: 
When the single individual only reproduces the established order in his life […], then 
he relates himself to the established order as the normal individual, the ordinary 
individual; he unfolds the life of the established order in his existence. […] As soon, 
however, as the single individual lets his reflection move him so deeply that he wants 
to reflect on the basic presuppositions of the established order, he is at the point of 
being inclined to wanting to be a special individual. and as long as he relfects in this 
way he is rejecting the impressa vestigia of the established order, is extra ordinem 
on his own responsibility.82  
It is clear that Kierkegaard’s account of the ‘single individual’ has a bearing on 
our discussion of the first performer. In reflecting on the basic presupposition of 
the established order, the single individual is able to uncover its truth, that is, she 
is able to see how the established order is contingent and mutable. If one can take 
up a position outside the established order, that means that one is not fully 
determined by it and this non-determination by the established order is precisely 
what allows us to conceive of an individual capable of being a first performer in 
the Hobbesian state of nature. Rather than reproductively renewing the life of the 
established order, this individual is able to bring, ‘a new point of departure in 
relation to the basic presupposition of the established order’.83 
Having considered some of the ways in which Kierkegaard’s works can be 
mobilised in order to aid our understanding of the Hobbesian covenant, the focus 
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will now turn to an alternative version of the social contract elaborated by 
Rousseau. As with Hobbes, Kierkegaard’s instant provides us with a means of 
rendering visible the paradoxical transformation of natural relations into political 
relations suggested by the making of the social contract, however, there are 
several features specific to Rousseau’s formulation that warrant additional 
scrutiny. As will be shown, many of the inconsistencies that Hobbes attempted to 
obfuscate or suppress in Leviathan are explicitly asserted in Rousseau’s The 
Social Contract. More specifically, where Hobbes attempts to erase the moment 
of contingency that characterises the contract’s institution, for Rousseau, the 
status of the contract as a contingent decision is openly presented as such. 
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Rousseau, the Lawgiver, and the Openness of the Political 
In The Social Contract, Rousseau sets out his task in the clearest possible terms: 
‘I want to inquire whether in the civil order there can be some legitimate and sure 
rule of administration, taking men as they are, and the laws as they might be’.84 
As with Hobbes, Rousseau seeks to demonstrate how sovereignty can be 
legitimised through an act of authorisation.85 Although for both thinkers power 
can only be legitimate if it is authorised, Rousseau immediately distances himself 
from Hobbes in arguing, ‘There can be no possible compensation for someone 
who renounces everything. Such a renunciation is incompatible with the nature 
of man, and to deprive one’s will of all freedom is to deprive one’s actions of all 
morality’.86 For Rousseau, contra Hobbes, we are no longer dealing with an act 
involving the total surrender of rights but the mutual surrender of rights which, 
because of its mutuality, is no longer a real loss: ‘each, by giving himself to all, 
gives himself to no one, and since there is no associate over whom one does not 
acquire the same right as one grants him over oneself, one gains the equivalent of 
all one loses, and more force to preserve what one has’.87 The Hobbesian citizen 
gives up his unlimited natural right while the sovereign retains it. The sovereign’s 
right over other individuals thus remains unlimited as it was in the state of nature, 
except that now all other individuals have become his subjects by renouncing 
their right to impede him.88 In contrast, Rousseau’s mutual surrender of rights 
                                                   
84 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings, ed. & trans. 
by Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 41. 
85 Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 44. 
86 Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 45. 
87 Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 50. 
88 This is a slight over-simplification of Hobbes’s position. While Hobbes certainly does conceive 
of the covenant as a surrender of rights, elsewhere in Leviathan Hobbes also writes about the 
sovereign as the newly created embodiment of the will of citizens: ‘this is more than consent, or 
concord; it is a real unity of them all, in one and the same person’. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 120. It 
is therefore not the case that one simply surrenders one’s capacity to pursue one’s interests to 
105 
 
occurs between each individual and the newly founded collective, or, ‘the total 
alienation of each associate with all of his rights to the whole community’.89 
Law acquires force when it is one’s duty to obey in all circumstances, not 
merely when it is expedient to do so. Put another way, it is not enough to rely on 
individuals obeying the law because they recognise that it is in their interest, they 
must view this obedience as right in itself. If they view obedience in this way, they 
do not obey as rational egotists but citizens with a duty to the civitas. Duty is itself 
derived from a contract between equal and mutually consenting individuals—as 
Rousseau claims, ‘the commitments which bind us to the social body are 
obligatory only because they are mutual’.90 Mutuality therefore anchors 
Rousseau’s notion of legitimacy. 
The version of the social contract described by Rousseau can be seen as 
logically antecedent to the Hobbesian covenant. Early in The Social Contract, 
Rousseau makes a few brief remarks on Grotius that could be applied equally to 
Hobbes, ‘A people, says Grotius, can give itself to a king. So that according to 
Grotius a people is a people before giving itself to a king. That very gift is a civil 
act, it presupposes a public deliberation […] this act, being necessarily prior to 
the other, is the true foundation of society’.91  The corresponding problem in 
Hobbes, as has been mentioned above, concerns the way in which, in order to 
surrender rights to a single member of their group, Hobbesian individuals are 
already required to engage in the kinds of behaviours (discussion, bargaining, 
promising, and so forth) which are supposed to be made possible by the covenant. 
Rousseau is thus able to suggest that Grotius (and by extension, Hobbes) is 
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dealing with a surrender of rights which is possible (despite being illogical and 
undesirable from Rousseau’s point of view) only after another more basic act has 
taken place—that of the constitution of the people as such, or, as Rousseau puts 
it, ‘the act by which a people is a people’.92 For Rousseau, this act must occur prior 
to any discussion of law or systems of government since the latter ‘presupposes a 
public deliberation’.93 
The transformation of the multitude into a people is accompanied by a series 
of changes in individual’s dispositions and attributes. As Rousseau writes, 
This transition from the state of nature to the civil state produces a most remarkable 
change in man by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and endowing his 
actions with the morality they previously lacked. Only then, when the voice of duty 
succeeds physical impulsion and right succeeds appetite, does man, who until then 
had looked only to himself, see himself forced to act on other principles, and to 
consult his reason before listening to his inclinations.94 
It is important to grasp Rousseau’s position here. It is, as he states, the passage 
from the state of nature to the civil state itself that produces the change in man. 
The impediments to successfully exiting the state of nature therefore remain 
present until the moment of unification as ‘the people’ whereupon they suddenly 
disappear. This would be one possible account of the creation of laws that would 
regulate conduct within the new state. Nonetheless, Rousseau introduces an 
additional figure whose task is to ensure the newly constituted people create 
appropriate laws as well as bringing about the change in disposition that would 
make them capable of living under these laws. The ‘remarkable change’, which 
apparently occurred purely as a consequence of the exit from the state of nature, 
is subsequently shown to be supplemented by the activity of the lawgiver whose 
task it is one of ‘changing human nature; of transforming each individual who by 
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himself is a perfect and solitary whole into part of a larger whole from which that 
individual would as it were receive his life and being’.95 
In the passage immediately preceding the chapter on the lawgiver, Rousseau 
outlines the problems associated with entering civil society: 
The People subject to the laws ought to be their author; only those who are 
associating may regulate the conditions of the society; but how will they regulate 
them? Will it be by common agreement, by sudden inspiration? Has the body politic 
an organ to state its wills? Who will give it the foresight necessary to form its acts 
and to publish them in advance, or how will it declare them in time of need? How 
will a blind multitude, which often does not know what it wills because it rarely 
knows what is good for it, carry out an undertaking as great, as difficult as a system 
of legislation?96 
The issue, as discussed above in relation to Hobbesian natural man, concerns 
the way in which the agreement between individuals of the state of nature 
presupposes a disposition which is itself only generated through the contract. 
We should follow Inston in reading this as an obstacle to a linear reading of the 
founding moment: ‘The foundation and what it founds refuse chronological 
schematization; they mutually presuppose one another’.97 To argue that the 
‘blind multitude’ are capable of recognising that their interests lie in forging a 
political community is to presuppose a multitude who already possess some 
degree of insight as to why community is preferable to natural independence. 
Likewise, even if we assume the multitude is able to recognise the possibility of 
certain advantages to community life, we are still unable to account for the 
commitment to the new political project, which is the necessary precursor of 
obedience to law. In other words, as in Hobbes, we are left in a position in which 
men may recognise the potential benefits of the political community but retain 
an atomised, individualistic perspective appropriate to the state of nature such 
that, when called upon by the community to act in a way contrary to their own 
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interests, they invariably neglect their duty. The problem is outlined by Cohen 
as follows:  
Thus, as parties to the social contract, individuals regard themselves as free agents. 
From this standpoint, they see an allegiance to the common good as simply one 
possible allegiance among others. Should they choose to work in service to the 
common good, they will see themselves as volunteers in that service. Therefore 
persons who regard themselves as contractors cannot have the kind of supreme 
attachment to the common good that is required on Rousseau’s conception of the 
general will. Thus from the free contractor’s point of view, the contract does not 
justify allegiance to the general will.98 
The individual-as-contractor is something quite distinct from the individual-as-
citizen. A contractor’s commitment to a political organisation is anchored in 
their private interests whereas the citizen’s commitment to the civitas must 
exceed these interests. Again, it is not that a political commitment is simply the 
highest among a range of private interests; rather, as Cohen observes, it 
represents a ‘supreme attachment’—not one interest among many but an 
attachment that restructures the schema of value according to which an 
individual’s private interests are organised. The issue becomes more acute when 
we consider that it is not possible for an observer to decide whether an 
individual’s obedience is due to a commitment to the civitas or simply a prudent 
course of action that is only temporarily aligned with the interests of the 
community. Since political commitment, if it exists, is only apparent from the 
inward perspective of the subject, the status of the political community (its 
reliability and potential durability) remains empirically undecidable until a 
situation arises which tests the subject’s resolve. 
There are, however, important distinctions to be drawn between man’s pre-
political disposition in Hobbes and Rousseau.99 For Hobbes, the absence of a 
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sovereign leads men to act on their passions and creates conflict, Rousseau 
points out that this argument involves a misattribution of social qualities to pre-
social individuals: ‘[Hobbes] improperly included in Savage man’s care for his 
preservation the need to satisfy a multitude of passions that are the product of 
Society’.100 Vanity and diffidence are characteristics of a Hobbesian vision of pre-
social man that lead to violence and chaos in the state of nature. Conceiving the 
state of nature as a violent place is important for Hobbes since this constitutes 
the main motivation for creating the covenant. Recall that according to Hobbes, 
natural law requires that men do that which is conducive to their survival.101 It 
is the state of nature conceived as a state of war, as a violent and hostile 
environment, which compels its inhabitants to make the covenant. In contrast, 
for Rousseau any violence that occurs in the state of nature is a consequence of 
natural man’s ‘self-love’, which may prompt him to use force in his pursuit of 
some advantage. Rousseau’s natural man cannot be offended and therefore will 
not seek vengeance because it, ‘[originates] in comparisons he is not capable of 
making’.102 Offence becomes possible once man has developed the cognitively 
advanced and socially conditioned ability to compare himself with others. This 
is an ability that would only emerge once man belonged to a community since 
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only sociability will produce an understanding of his position in relation to other 
members of the community. 
An additional distinction between Hobbes and Rousseau involves natural 
man’s propensity towards acquisitive behaviour. For Hobbes, natural man is 
interested in accumulating goods not only in order to satisfy his immediate 
desires, but also in order to satisfy his anticipated future desires.103 This 
intensifies the hostility described by Hobbes insofar as it creates scarcity and 
increases the likelihood of conflicts over desirable goods. Against this, Rousseau 
argues that the acquisitive behaviour we see in pre-political man cannot be read 
back into natural man; instead, it is rooted in man’s concern for his relative 
advantage, a characteristic that can only develop through social living. In the 
state of nature, man’s desires correspond to his needs and men are, to a greater 
or lesser extent, equal in their ability to satisfy their needs. It is amour propre 
which, emerging under conditions of inequality, inflates man’s desires so that he 
now pursues his relative advantage in a manner akin to Hobbesian natural man. 
Once again, the essence of the Rousseauian challenge to Hobbes is that the latter 
has misperceived as natural a series of qualities and attributes which, while 
derived from broader natural characteristics (such as amour de soi), lead to 
behaviours which are dependent on context.104 Amour propre is not a natural 
quality of man because it does not emerge regardless of context. Instead, it is 
better to say that man is potentiated towards amour propre, or, alternatively, 
that amour propre is the distorted form of amour de soi, which comes about 
through man’s exit from the state of nature and his participation in social and 
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political activity. This is conveyed through Rousseau’s remarks concerning 
Emile:  
This [when Emile perceives himself in relation to others around him] is the point 
where love of self turns into amour propre and where begin to arise all the passions 
which depend on this one. But to decide whether among these passions the dominant 
ones in his character will be humane and gentle or cruel and malignant, whether they 
will be passions of beneficence and commiseration or of envy and covetousness, we 
must know what position he will feel he has among men.105 
Amour propre is dependent on interactions with others—it is a formally neutral 
property which acquires a definite moral profile as an individual progresses 
through his unique pattern of social development.  
Rousseau’s alternative vision of pre-social man has important implications 
with regard to his motivations for forming a political community. The Hobbesian 
inhabitant of the state of nature is said to decide in favour of the covenant 
because he recognises that submission to a sovereign power will improve his 
chances of survival.106 As argued above, Hobbes’s account of the state of nature 
includes a mechanism which will eventually necessitate an exit—natural man is 
able to recognise the conditions which will be conducive to his survival (i.e. 
submission to a sovereign), but he is also obliged by natural law to decide in 
favour of these conditions and actually form the covenant once he has recognised 
that it is in his interest to do so.107 In describing the covenant as the culmination 
of various processes, Hobbes advocates a strategy that Kierkegaard dismissively 
refers to as, ‘quantifying oneself into a qualitative decision’.108 In contrast, there 
is no mechanism in the Rousseauian account which could necessitate the 
passage from natural to social or political life; the exit either depends on the 
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arbitrary gesture of a particular individual or on the activity of the legislator who 
is himself forbidden from forcibly bringing the exit about.109 The first case, which 
involves the transition from man’s independent, isolated existence to social 
relations, can be found in The Second Discourse in which Rousseau describes an 
individual who decides to enclose a piece of land, declaring – ‘this is mine’.110 
Private property is a hallmark of the social insofar as it involves a notion of right 
(an individual may now have a right to use an area of land exclusively). The 
extent of the relationship that emerges with private property is not simply 
between people and things, but between the owner and the rest of mankind 
concerning the exclusive use or consumption of certain things. This is why 
property ownership is a social relation involving other people rather than a 
relationship between an individual and an object. Having said that, although 
private property indicates a social relation, we are not dealing with a political 
arrangement until there is some entity to guarantee that rights to land, livestock, 
and other goods are respected. The key point for our purposes is that the genesis 
of political life is a contingent event—it cannot be accounted for by the logic of 
the situation from which it emerges.111 There is nothing in Rousseau’s account 
that would prevent man from continuing to live in the state of nature 
indefinitely. As such, if the contract is made, it is not the result of a decision that 
is necessitated by private interest, but one in favour of the new form of freedom 
made possible by political life.112 Indeed, the Hobbesian proto-citizen, whose 
task is mere survival as opposed to the realisation of a new form of freedom, 
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resembles a member of the patriarchal model of political community described 
by Rousseau in which, ‘the chief is the image of the father, the people are the 
image of the children, and all, being born equal and free, alienate their freedom 
only for the sake of their utility’.113 Although both Hobbes and Rousseau aim to 
generate a notion of duty that would be capable of sustaining political life, for 
Hobbes, the purpose is simply to promote conditions favourable for human 
survival. In contrast, a Rousseauian citizen is duty-bound to the civitas because 
it guarantees a more substantial freedom than their pre-political 
independence.114 Having said this, it is vital to note the difference between the 
Hobbesian covenant which is irrevocable and the Rousseauian contract which 
can itself be undone by way of a sovereign act. These distinctions between 
Rousseau and Hobbes will prove instructive for our discussion of political origins 
as involving an irreducibly contingent ‘decisive moment’. 
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The Temporality of Rousseau’s Social Contract 
The arguments raised against Hobbes’s covenant initially seem to apply equally 
to the Rousseauian contract; there can be no effective legal system without first 
bridging the gap between formal agreement and actual obedience based on a 
genuine inward commitment. Yet while Hobbes attempts to suppress this gap 
through rhetorical sleight of hand, Rousseau openly admits the scale of the task 
and the fundamental transformation that is at stake: 
Anyone who dares to institute a people must feel capable of, so to speak, changing 
human nature; of transforming each individual who by himself is a perfect and 
solitary whole into part of a larger whole from which that individual would as it were 
receive his life and his being.115 
The lawgiver’s task is to instigate and oversee the substantial, subterranean shift 
in each man’s character, thereby rendering them receptive to the notion of 
political organisation and instilling an enduring (but not irrevocably binding) 
commitment to the body politic. Rousseau recognises that the contract itself exists 
at a purely formal level; it provides no steadfast guarantees as to whether the unity 
of the people will be lasting. It is only the performance of individuals in 
accordance with their promises that will eventually promote the effectiveness and 
durability of the contract. As in Hobbes, we are faced with a disconcerting 
openness between the formal agreement which generates ‘the people’, (the 
equivalent moment in Hobbes is the formal inauguration of the sovereign) and 
actual performance.116 In this moment of contingency both the success and failure 
of the contract are equally possible outcomes. The situation is open in the sense 
that neither obedience nor defection can be successfully predicted from the initial 
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act of contract signing, of promising to obey. The success of the contract, if it has 
been successful, is at this stage only registered (as Kierkegaard might say) 
inwardly, as a change in subjective disposition. 
As we have already noted, in stark contrast to Hobbes, Rousseau holds the 
contract itself to be revocable: ‘there is not, nor can there be, any kind of 
fundamental law that is obligatory for the body of the people, not even the social 
contract’.117 At any point, the citizens of the new state can decide to dissolve the 
contract and return to the state of nature.118 Of course, as Rousseau points out, 
this would not be a pure state of nature, but one that is contaminated by the 
memory of political life.119 When political life breaks down, ‘everything reverts to 
the sole Law of the stronger and consequently to a new State of Nature, different 
from that with which we began in that the first was the state of Nature in its purity, 
whereas this last is the fruit of an excess of corruption’.120 The implication here is 
that citizens could agree amongst themselves that the contract between them can 
no longer stand and, by mutual consent, reclaim their natural freedom. Their 
experience of political life would nonetheless condition any subsequent attempts 
to create a new contract. Indeed, it could be argued that the state of nature 
resulting from a breakdown of political life would begin to resemble a Hobbesian 
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state of nature. In such a situation we can consider man ‘corrupted’ in the sense 
that he has experienced social life and is moved by amour propre, and yet he has 
also experienced the failure of the political and may reason, on this basis, that 
human nature inevitably tends towards anarchy and violence. 
We have seen above how Hobbes goes about presenting the exit from the 
state of nature in terms of necessity. Various scholars have sought to show how 
this is accomplished by building a pre-contractual notion of obligation into the 
state of nature, which prevents man from failing to act in such a way that preserves 
his life.121 Man is forbidden from failing to do, ‘that by which he thinks [his life] 
may be best preserved’. 122  Therefore, if in the state of nature man is able to 
recognise the covenant as entailing a reduced threat to his life, he is obliged by the 
law of nature to accept its terms. Within the terms of Hobbes’s argument, this is 
a paradoxical position. If, as has been argued above, the obligation to obey the 
laws of nature necessitates the act of signing the covenant, we are no longer 
witnessing a radical origin, but a transition that follows a pre-existing unbroken 
trajectory from the state of nature to the civitas. In this case, the covenant itself 
becomes redundant since the laws of nature are already experienced as binding 
by men in the state of nature. The merit of Rousseau’s formulation is that it lacks 
a similar pre-contractual mechanism that would necessitate the transition from 
the state of nature to political community. 
The short-circuit structure of the contract, which is for our purposes the 
most interesting feature of Rousseau’s account, is made explicit in the following 
quotation: 
For a nascent people to be capable of appreciating sound maxims of politics and of 
following the fundamental rules of reason of State, the effect would have to become 
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the cause, the social spirit which is to be the work of the institution would have to 
preside over the institution itself, and men would have to be prior to laws what they 
ought to become by means of them.123 
Rousseau recognises, and draws attention to, the paradox of political origins 
discussed above in relation to Hobbes. The making of the contract and the 
willingness to obey even in circumstances where obedience is contrary to one’s 
private interest, or more precisely, to be motivated by duty as opposed to one’s 
interests, both presuppose a subjective constitution typical of citizens as opposed 
to pre-political humans. Highlighting the paradox concerning political origins in 
Rousseau, Inston argues that the purpose of the legislator is to represent the 
possibility of the people’s constitutive power during the process of their actual 
constitution: ‘the multitude comes to understand itself as a “people” in the form 
of an idea or representation not as a thing in itself. The lawgiver aims to supply 
that representation, supplementing the people in writing the legislation of the 
state’.124 What natural man lacks is a social identity that would reorient his will 
rendering it compatible with the common good and not merely his own private 
good. By offering a representation of the people as already constituted (one that 
prefigures the contract), the legislator is able to effect the change in individual 
dispositions providing social ballast and increasing the likelihood of the contract’s 
durability. Inston is correct to view this in terms of an absence of ground, which 
in turn provides impetus for further political activity.125 As has been argued above, 
the task of detecting the grounds of legitimate authority necessarily ends in 
circularity and paradox since it is precisely a spontaneous and therefore 
irrecuperable gesture that constitutes the founding moment.126 Contra Hobbes, 
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Rousseau presents us with a contingent origin that cannot be dissolved into a 
series of sequential stages. Such a reading indicates the Kierkegaardian structure 
of contract-making in Rousseau since it is Kierkegaard’s moment which allows us 
to conceptualise a concentrated temporal paradox, a groundlessness which itself 
functions as a ground, albeit one that remains vulnerable to subsequent 
transformative moments.127 Such a position includes those moments in which we 
experience, as Kangas puts it, ‘the sudden failure of the structure of temporal 
representation’.128 If it is unthinkable that a disparate multitude of individuals 
would spontaneously and simultaneously perceive themselves as belonging to a 
single, cohesive political body, the legislator is required as a mediatory narrative 
element whose inclusion gives body to the temporal paradox associated with 
origins without recasting the exit as a linear progression. 
The guarantee offered by the contract is ultimately only effective so long as 
members of the new community perceive it as binding.129 The implication for 
Inston is that every formally constituted political community presupposes a 
moment of ‘temporal dislocation’ providing impetus for the continued elaboration 
of the democratic project.130 The key distinction between the account provided by 
Inston and the position taken here concerns the status of this openness. For 
Inston, this openness corresponds to the impossibility of any totalising notion of 
the people and the absence of any objective guarantee that could secure a single 
political configuration in perpetuity.131 Openness is then, on the one hand, an 
obstacle that has the potential to derail political projects, whilst also representing 
the positive condition of the continuation of the democratic model. Although I do 
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not propose any major revisions to Inston’s argument, I would nonetheless like to 
suggest added emphasis to the figure of the lawgiver as a corporalization of the 
temporal discontinuity arising in narratives of radical political transformation. It 
is a discontinuity, marked by a moment of paradox, that separates the pre-
political multitude and the constitution of the political community. In Rousseau’s 
account of the origin we find a requirement for the incorporation of a narrative 
element that will either obfuscate (as in Hobbes) or embody (as in Rousseau) the 
moment of temporal dislocation. In Hobbes, the possibility of an exit is 
introduced through the existence of pre-political forms of obligation as described 
in his account of the laws of nature. The covenant is necessitated by the existence 
of the laws of nature since humans are obliged to act in ways conducive to their 
survival. In Rousseau’s account, the idea of pre-contractual obligation is explicitly 
ruled out.132 There are no laws of nature for Rousseau; the only locus of legitimate 
authority is the sovereign assembly. Self-love does not have the status of a law; it 
is simply a term that describes man’s general tendency towards self-preservation. 
Indeed, as Gildin notes, natural law is seen by Rousseau to be a contradiction in 
terms since:  
In order to be called a law, natural law must be addressed to a rational being capable 
of obeying and disobeying it (only reason can apprehend universal prescriptions), 
while in order to deserve to be called natural, natural law must speak with the voice 
of nature. Now since, according to Rousseau, the development of reason stifles the 
voice of nature, there is no place strictly speaking in his doctrine for natural law. As 
he himself delineates it, natural law is a square circle.133 
As we have seen above, there is no consensus as to whether natural law can be 
seen as obliging rather than describing behaviour in Hobbes’s Leviathan, 
however, it is at least possible to set out a reading in which natural law does indeed 
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compel certain behaviours. A Rousseauian pre-political human, in contrast, is not 
compelled to behave in accordance with any principle; instead, he simply exhibits 
a strong tendency to behave in certain ways. So, for example, just because a 
Rousseauian natural man tends to be concerned with his self-preservation, this 
does not demonstrate the existence of natural law. 
In the absence of laws of nature, Rousseau’s lawgiver serves to make the 
transition to political life possible, installing civic qualities, which will make 
natural individuals capable of life as citizens. The paradox is not missed by Gildin 
who sets out the problem as follows:  
In order to acquire the force of law, the suggestions of the legislator must be enacted 
by the general will. Before it can enact any laws properly, however, the citizen body 
must already be possessed of the public-spiritedness and the basic political 
arrangements that are supposed to first result from obedience to the laws devised by 
the legislator. The social contract, it would appear, would have to exist already, in 
order to first begin to be. [...] [The legislator] must persuade the people to adopt his 
views. Under the assumption that governed Rousseau’s first discussion of the 
formation of political society, and that he never explicitly repudiated, the legislator 
must do this at the very dawn of political life [...] Yet for the legislator to do this at 
the inception of political life does not appear possible.134 
The legislator’s task is to change human nature, to foster the social spirit that will 
enable man to recognise his own good as aligned with that of the community. Such 
a task would require the legislator to emerge prior to the contract since his task is 
to recreate individuals and cultivate in them the civic spirit which is the contract’s 
prerequisite. It is nonetheless equally clear that the legislator cannot pre-exist the 
contract since his characteristics and attributes are precisely those of a thoroughly 
socialised and educated citizen. For Gildin, this represents a weakness in 
Rousseau’s argument, one that is compounded by additional ambiguities 
concerning the moment of the legislator’s arrival: 
Rousseau explicitly distinguishes between two kinds of founders. First come those 
founders who create everything out of nothing (the phrase is Rousseau’s). They make 
a nation proud of its distinctiveness and courageous. They are differentiated from 
legislators who can only appear later and whose job it is to provide political codes. 
[…] The recognition that two legislators are needed rather than one and that the first 
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must not make the work of the second impossible is tantamount to an admission that 
a sound political order cannot be brought into being in a single moment.135 
Gildin notes Rousseau’s description of the legislator as both the ‘founder’ who is 
therefore, by implication, already present at the moment of ‘founding’, as well as 
a figure who helps to write the laws and conventions of an already existing 
political association. While such a reading finds some support in Rousseau’s text, 
this should not lead immediately to the conclusion that we are dealing with two 
legislators, but rather that the legislator’s activity cannot be properly anchored in 
a single agent. In both Hobbesian and Rousseauian accounts, the transition from 
a natural disposition (prudent self-preservation) to a political disposition (duty) 
is achieved by including in the state of nature an element which can only logically 
emerge with or after the contract but which must nonetheless be present before. 
The legislator’s role is thus to complete the circuit, to reveal to pre-political man 
what can be achieved through the contract and what will be required of him in 
order to achieve it. If standard, positivistic conceptions of historical temporality 
run forward in a causal-linear fashion, the legislator is a figure who acts as a 
narrative conduit for the retroactive power of the future upon the past. Inston is 
thus to be supported in his assessment of the legislator’s momentary appearance 
which, ‘deconstructs the binary oppositions of cause/effect, 
autonomy/heteronomy, homogeneity, represented/representative and 
fiction/reality’.136 Such a deconstruction does not lead directly to a backwards-
linear ‘reverse causality’; instead, Inston invites us to consider, ‘the contractual 
process […] in terms of temporal dislocation’, not so much the inversion of the 
causal process, but rather ‘the impossibility of establishing antecedence’.137 How 
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can this impossibility be grasped? Simon Critchley offers one option, suggesting 
that the legislator is a quasi-external figure who “belongs neither to the realm of 
politics nor nature, but who exists in a ‘no-place’”.138 Although Critchley’s position 
is to be accepted, it is surely equally possible to argue that the legislator is present 
both before and after the constituting moment. We can supplement Critchley’s 
account by providing an additional nuance which will halt the oscillation between 
‘neither’/‘nor’ and ‘both’/‘and’. As we have suggested, the impossibility of 
establishing antecedence is, for our purposes, to be understood as the 
superposition of alternatives one encounters when attempting to narrativise the 
sudden moment of origin or the transformative event. In contrast to Gildin, the 
position taken here is that the resistance to narrativisation we find in both 
Rousseauian and Hobbesian versions in fact brings us closer to a proper 
understanding of the specific status of political origins and the suddenness of their 
emergence. However, the original political event would be perceived in a different 
way from the perspective of an individual caught up in the process. For a 
contracting individual, the emergence of the legislator would indeed appear as a 
miraculous intrusion from some radically external ‘no-place’. This appearance 
cannot be read in terms of superposition but as a moment of hiatus. Superposition 
requires us to adopt a post-contract perspective, one based on the knowledge that 
the contract did in fact come into existence. Alternatively, for a contemporary (the 
individual we have referred to above as the ‘first performer’) this moment is one 
of hiatus, neither nature nor politics but rather the unintelligible interlude that 
separates them. The fact that this openness appears to collapse when we attempt 
to include it in a narrative of political origins reinforces the conclusion we have 
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been working towards—a qualitative transformation is not merely an event of 
brief duration; it is one that cannot be thought chronologically since it includes, 
as its preconditions, elements which are only thinkable as its consequences. 
 An alternative view is proposed by Honig in her ‘Between Decision and 
Declaration’.139 Honig argues that both the identity of the legislator and the 
content of the general will are undecidable, as is the status of the people as 
multitude or constituted collective: ‘The people, still and always also a multitude, 
never so fully formed that they are uninhabited by anarchic waywardness, must 
nonetheless discern and decide the difference between the legitimate lawgiver and 
the pretender’.140 The lawgiver does not solve the problem of generating the 
general will, but rather, ‘shifts it to a new register’. While I am sympathetic to 
Honig’s account, I am not ready to endorse it unequivocally without certain 
caveats. The term undecidability, seems to suggest an ongoing uncertainty as to 
the identity of the legislator, the content of the general will, and the status of the 
people. Now, undecidability may simply imply the impossibility of a decision 
resulting in ongoing discussion and contestation. Alternatively, it might imply the 
provisional status of all decisions. Finally, it may indicate the impossibility of a 
once-and-for-all decision, one that would usher in an end-of-history stasis 
marked by the totalitarian closure of the political. Against these three 
connotations, the only notion of undecidability I could endorse would be one in 
which all decisions are taken to be, or appear as, final by those whom they apply 
to while nonetheless in fact remaining provisional. Even if, as a citizen of a 
Rousseauian political community, I accept the undecidability of the foundation 
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and the ongoing openness of the political situation, my obedience to the law 
attests to the fact that I do not treat the foundation as provisional. If my 
knowledge of the provisionality of the foundation and the laws it grounds were to 
determine my actions, I would be unlikely to feel a duty to obey; instead, I would 
only obey the law to the extent that its dictates could be made compatible with my 
interests. Likewise, as will become clear in the fourth chapter, there is nothing 
about a Badiouian event that could preclude the possibility of its own undoing by 
a subsequent event, however, this does not mean that the commitment generated 
in the subject of the event is diminished. For the subject, the event is both utterly 
indiscernible and absolutely true. It may eventually prove to have been 
provisional, but this provisionality is not apparent from the perspective of the 
subject (and for Badiou, the subject’s perspective is the only one which counts). 
Thinking the contract as a moment of superposition allows us to elucidate 
the idea of an evental suddenness. The Rousseauian description of the passage 
from the state of nature to ‘the people’ must include a moment at which the people 
are both constituted, since the making of the contract presupposes this 
constitution, and diffuse, since the role of the contract is to generate ‘the people’ 
as a single entity. Along with Inston, we should regard Rousseau’s key innovation 
as his suggestion that the people qua constituted community can appear as a 
virtual point of reference by virtue of the lawgiver’s ability to represent a 
previously unthinkable future outcome.141 This allows the people to acquire the 
capacity to authorise their own constitution. We find ourselves occupying the 
theoretical space set out by Kierkegaard as soon as the moment of origin appears 
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to mark a certain condensation or overlapping of ‘before’ and ‘after’.142 This 
overlapping is hinted at by Kierkegaard’s phrase, ‘the fullness of time’.143 In the 
account of the fall of Adam provided by Kierkegaard in his The Concept of Anxiety, 
we find a similar point of overlap. The prohibition that God places on Adam 
presupposes that Adam already has the ability to judge for himself and thus 
addresses him as if he were a free subject.144 This kind of origin correlates to that 
of Rousseau’s ‘people’ who must be present, albeit in a virtual sense, at the 
moment of their constitution in order for the contract to be legitimate. 
Alternatively, to take the example of Kierkegaard’s notion of conversion, a subject 
can accomplish the passage to faith only by making the ‘leap’, that is to say, by 
pre-emptively adopting the perspective of a religious subject prior to their actual 
conversion. Linear, sequential narratives fail precisely because they cannot 
accommodate the moment of co-existence of distinct alternatives nor the 
discontinuity implied by an original contract or ‘leap’. 
The idea of a figure who serves as a corporalization of a radical, groundless 
change is also elaborated by Gibson in his Intermittency: The Concept of 
Historical Reason in Recent French Philosophy. Here, the figure is referred to as 
the ‘historical genius’ and represents, ‘the force that produces the work of art as 
an “unexpected, new, unprecedented form”, one for which we have no prior 
measure or place’.145 Such a figure is directly identified with a ‘pure experience of 
liberty […] not the freedom of the dogmatists or empiricists, freedom of choice or 
a reasoned freedom’.146 At first glance, it is clearly possible to interpret this 
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‘historical genius’ as a Rousseauian legislator, one who possesses the God-like 
power to initiate, who ‘does not take its measure from a prior history but rather 
gives a measure to it’.147 We have already described the legislator as an individual 
who emerges in the pre-political state (prior to the contract) without being 
determined or limited by this pre-contractual situation. Likewise, Gibson’s 
‘historical genius’ is able to build, through imaginative force, the mirage of a future 
community which will prove the condition of that community’s realisation.148 
Nonetheless, is it not equally possible to venture an alternative interpretation, one 
that recognises in the ‘historical genius’ the characteristics associated with the 
Hobbesian first performer? It is the first performer who belongs to the state of 
nature but whose act can inaugurate a new time, or alternatively, interrupt the 
supposedly necessary relation between a present cause and a future effect. Gibson 
also provides us with a lucid account of the temporal character of the historical 
genius’s act which bears a strong resemblance to that of the first performer: ‘This 
time is no more linear, progressive or cumulative […] but rather loops back on 
itself, is composed of ‘interlacings’ (entrelacs) and ‘arabesques’. […] In the 
intersection of lines, a second event ‘duplicates’ or coincides with the first’.149 For 
Gibson, the performance of a genuinely free act always entails a heterogeneous 
conception of time. A homogenous, linear-progressive notion of time can only 
accommodate historical events on the condition that they are connected in a 
causal relation. In contrast, Gibson’s ‘loops’, ‘interlacings’, and ‘arabesques’ serve 
to gloss the phenomena we have designated as superposition. It is a ‘looping’ or 
‘interlacing’ in the sense that a future effect retroactively generates its cause. The 
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first performer is a conduit for precisely this kind of looping since it is through 
their groundless commitment to the new that the future can exert causal pressure 
on the present. By committing prematurely to a virtual outcome, an outcome that 
is thinkable but not possible from the performer’s perspective, the first performer 
allows this future to produce concrete acts in the present that will widen the scope 
of possibility. 
Gibson’s notion of human action as intermittent and unpredictable, as 
opposed to linear-progressive, is pertinent to this enquiry in a further way. As 
noted briefly above, the occurrence of intermittent events, these free acts human 
subjects periodically accomplish, force us to revise our view of history as an 
internally coherent, homogenous totality. Instead, Gibson convincingly argues for 
a dualistic perspective in which the superficially homogenous tracts of empty 
historical time are periodically punctured by metahistorical interruptions. This is 
captured succinctly in Gibson’s call for a, ‘melancholic-ecstatic conception of 
history and an anti-schematics of historical reason’.150 Uneventful tracts of time 
are designated as periods of inertia and make up the melancholic interim between 
ecstatic events.151 The use of the term inertia is particularly apt since it describes 
humanity’s predicament in the state of nature, that is, the sense in which the state 
of nature appears to present an impasse. An escape from the state of nature cannot 
be achieved through rational deliberation; it requires a creative act, an apparently 
mad wager that the insurmountable persistence of a period of stasis does not 
preclude a metahistorical event.152 But while inertia is an appropriate term for the 
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state of nature, it is a no less appropriate term for the periods of political 
stagnation between intermittent bursts of revolutionary enthusiasm. As will be 
shown in subsequent chapters, the force required to break the inertia that 
characterises the state of nature is analogous to a revolutionary act, which insofar 
as it is necessarily premature, borrows from an imagined future in order to 
reorient the present. 
In framing the metahistorical interruption as based on a subjective wager, 
Gibson encroaches on a theoretical terrain that is, for our purposes, thoroughly 
Kierkegaardian: ‘Politics must always take place on the basis of a wager, not of 
knowledge, or science’.153 Returning to Kierkegaard’s position can prove 
instructive for our understanding of this kind of act. In his Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard states: 
Here is such a definition of truth: An objective uncertainty, held fast through 
appropriation with the most passionate inwardness, is the truth, the highest truth 
there is for an existing person. At the point where the road swings off (and where 
that is cannot be stated objectively, since it is precisely subjectivity), objective 
knowledge is suspended.154 
A subject’s resolution to act always emerges from a situation that is objectively 
undecidable, ‘an objective uncertainty’, which precisely because there is no 
readily available strategy for action, must involve a subjective decision. Through 
such a decision ‘the road swings off’, a departure occurs and a new historical 
trajectory is established, and yet the moment of decision cannot be located in 
hindsight, not merely when one attempts to recount the history of the decision, 
but it remains elusive even when one approaches it through a narrative 
reconstruction. Such a decision appears impossible from the perspective of the 
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situation, however, it is this ability to take an unprecedented step, to achieve an 
apparently impossible transformation, with which Gibson and Kierkegaard are 
both fundamentally interested. The gesture Kierkegaard calls the ‘infinite 
decision’, the ‘decision of passion’, and elsewhere, the ‘leap of faith’, correlates 
perfectly to Gibson’s metahistorical event.155 Indeed, there are identifiable 
reasons for this correlation. In the same way that Kierkegaard’s concept of the 
moment can be considered as a response to a Hegelian philosophy of historical 
reason’s gradual unfolding, Gibson’s collection of philosophical sources point 
towards the articulation of a concept of historical reason which does not dissolve 
the subject as one of its internal moments, but instead retains a concept of the 
subject as a non-sublatable source of impetus. 
This chapter has sought to illuminate certain ambiguities pertaining to the 
moment of political origin in Rousseauian and Hobbesian social contract theory 
and to demonstrate the ways in which Kierkegaard’s concept of the 
instant/moment and the qualitative leap can yield insight when applied to the 
problem of political origins. Building upon our assessment of the transformative 
power of Kierkegaard’s concept of the instant in the previous chapter, our 
discussion above has enabled us to enhance our understanding of certain 
properties of narratives of political change. It is clear that individuals belonging 
to the state of nature cannot simply will themselves into a political community so 
long as we retain a standard notion of agency (as a reasoned choice between 
various possible options). Conceived in this way, agency would in fact be 
indistinguishable from determinism since humans would only have the power to 
choose their preferred option from the options available, a choice that would in 
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fact be no choice at all since it would be determined in advance by factors 
belonging to the situation. Rather than the pseudo-choice between possible 
alternatives based on a pre-given situation, what if individuals also possess a 
capacity to ‘choose’ the factors they experience as determining?156 What if 
individuals existing in the state of nature were able to somehow loosen themselves 
from their slavery to natural inclination (which is the ultimate impetus of action 
in the state of nature) and experience themselves as determined by a new 
imperative? Come’s account is instructive here: 
It is of prime importance to establish unequivocally that what Kierkegaard (in 
Sickness) means by the self’s necessity (as well as the self’s possibility) is not a quality 
of the self’s extrinsic finitude and its involvement in the accidental and contingent, 
but is a quality that is operative in the inward domain of the self’s coherent gestalt of 
attitudes, predispositions, etc. […] [Kierkegaard] makes the pregnant comment that 
this ‘negative form of the self exercises a loosening power as well as a binding 
power’.157 
Such a ‘loosening’ power should be understood as the subject’s capacity to loosen 
themselves from a given configuration of possibilities, enabling them to 
experience their situation as radically indeterminate, as requiring a groundless, 
and therefore properly free, decision. This ‘loosening’ is also the precondition for 
a Kierkegaardian understanding of resolution. When a subject decides to commit 
to an entirely new task, to shirk their private interests in favour of this task, at this 
moment their gesture involves a ‘positing of presuppositions’ so that instead of 
understanding their behaviour as determined by private interest, they experience 
the urgency of a nascent commitment to the civitas. This notion of freedom has a 
bearing on our discussion of Rousseau and Hobbes. It is a retroactive power since, 
in re-positing my presuppositions about what may or may not be possible, I 
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extract from an ‘impossible’ future a disposition that reconfigures my inward 
relation to the past and present so that this impossible future now becomes 
possible.  Superposition thus appears as the narrative correlate of an irreducibly 
contingent subjective act of positing. It is the non-sublatable kernel of history, 
which cannot be integrated into a retrospective narrative, but persists as a 
minimal incoherence that undermines the completeness of each attempt at 
narrativisation. In subsequent chapters, I will link the problems associated with 
the narrativisation of radical transformations (such as the genesis of authority) to 
the more basic problem of the human experience of time. The status of the 
political subject and its implication in transformative moments will be the topic 





Reflexive Determination in Kelsen and Schmitt 
‘Wherever revelation does not awaken faith, it must awaken 
rebellion.’ 
 




Having established the points of correspondence between Kierkegaard’s 
transformative moment, the Hobbesian covenant, and the Rousseauian social 
contract, a pressing question still remains.  This question concerns the extent to 
which our presentation of temporal complexity in narratives of political change 
necessarily entails a conception of the political contaminated by, or genealogically 
derived from, a theological conceptual apparatus. Given that Kierkegaard was first 
and foremost a religious thinker, it would seem to follow that our effort to 
construct the political implications of his concept of the moment adds impetus to 
the theological drift of political theory.1 Put another way, does our enquiry into 
the temporality of political change inevitably draw upon on the religious well-
spring that informed Kierkegaard’s understanding of temporality, or will we be in 
a position to decouple the political from the theological in favour of a materialist 
position? The importance of this task becomes more apparent when we consider 
                                                   
1 For contemporary debates on the relationship between theology and the political; see Roberto 
Esposito, Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy, trans. by Timothy Campbell (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2008); Graham Hammill, The Mosaic Constitution: Political 
Theology and Imagination from Machiavelli to Milton (London: University of Chicago Press, 
2012); Claude Lefort, ‘The Permanence of the Theologico-Political?’, in Democracy and Political 
Theory, trans. by David Macey (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988); Watkin. 
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that several of the theorists whose works are to be discussed in subsequent 
chapters either explicitly engage with theology as a resource for political thought 
(Slavoj Žižek), or define their philosophy as an extended effort to purge the 
political of its theological roots (Alain Badiou). Moreover, even though we have 
attempted to bracket the theological in Kierkegaard in order to sketch out the 
philosophical foundations of a political reading of his notion of the moment, the 
concept of the moment is nonetheless found embedded in a theological project. If 
it is possible to show that the concept of the moment can help elucidate 
transformative political events, it may be because these events also carry, as 
Roberto Esposito identifies, ‘a residue of transcendence that immanence cannot 
reabsorb’.2 Not only is this residue detectable in Hobbes (who describes the 
sovereign as an ‘Immortal God’3) but the Rousseauian legislator is also described 
in terms that reference theology, as an individual who possesses God-like abilities 
and divine vision. A preliminary task for this chapter will therefore be to assess 
whether this invocation of theological tropes suggests an insoluble link between 
theology and political theory. 
Our attempt to decouple the theological from the political is intended to 
enable a political philosophy whose features can be thought in terms of 
immanence. In the discussion that follows, we will seek both to divest political 
notions of their theological stock, but also to reassert materiality as the exclusive 
ground of the political. The impetus is twofold. In the first instance, I will show 
that there are practical and logical problems entailed by a politico-theological 
position. Schmitt’s sovereign, for example, cannot serve to ground the political 
since the sovereign decision is split from within, requiring recognition from a non-
                                                   
2 Esposito, p. 63. 
3 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 120. 
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sovereign actor. I will argue that if we remain sensitive to the temporality of the 
moment of decision, we will find ourselves obliged to conclude that the sovereign 
deed cannot be conceived in terms of a unilateral brute assertion of power, but 
must involve a moment of reflexive determination insofar as its very status as a 
decision relies on its recognition by a non-sovereign actor. As such, the additional 
motivation for political philosophy’s de-spiritualization is that only a radically 
materialist conception of the political can rejuvenate the constituent power of the 
people as the highest, underived power. In short, a theologically inflected political 
philosophy serves to encourage an acceptance of uncontestable concentrations of 
political power and serves to obfuscate the inalienable constituent power of the 
multitude. Radical materialism recognises the primacy of constituent power, even 
if the telos of this power is always to constitute, i.e. to produce sovereign 
concentrations. The vital caveat which will be explored in more detail below (and 
which is the more pressing concern of this thesis as a whole) is that this 
constituent power is itself unthinkable as a unified, self-identical force; instead, 
the multitude’s political agency is always fractured, incomplete, delayed, or 
abbreviated. The form of the constituent power’s actualization is therefore not 




The Autonomy of the Political 
The difficulty in handling the question of political theology can be framed in the 
following way. As has been shown in the previous chapter, in order to narrativise 
founding moments in politics, political theory must posit an exterior or 
remainder which cannot itself be properly included as a narrative element (i.e. 
the effort to include it subverts chronological ordering and results in a paradox).4 
With respect to Hobbes, this exterior is condensed in the figure of the first 
performer who belongs to the state of nature but who can nonetheless take up an 
external position, behaving as if the new political grouping were already fully 
constituted in advance of its actual constitution.5 Alternatively, in Rousseau, the 
exterior appears in the figure of the legislator who oversees the process of 
founding but whose emergence cannot be fixed chronologically. The pertinent 
question here concerns the way we formulate this exterior and our understanding 
of its connection to theological thought. It could be that as soon as a figure takes 
on the function of an exterior or transmundane guarantee for authority, this 
figure is necessarily imbued with the traces of theological thinking insofar as 
theology provides guiding paradigm for all models of authority. This would then 
mean that since every claim to, or recognition of, authority relies on theological 
                                                   
4 Incidentally, theologico-political tensions can also be detected in Hannah Arendt’s works on 
history, freedom, and revolution. Arendt is, on the one hand, seeking to show how the circularity 
of origins can be theorised without slipping into an explicitly theological register, whilst on the 
other hand we find Arendt often referring to the miraculous status of human freedom. 
Distancing her approach from Hobbes and Rousseau, Arendt argues that an act of foundation 
need not rely on, ‘an Immortal Legislator or self-evident truth or any other transcendent, 
transmundane source’, but that this search for an absolute ground overlooks the status of the act 
of beginning as absolute. Arendt, p. 204. 
5 Of course, the first performer does not appear in Hobbes’s own account of the founding 
moment of the political covenant, however, as soon as one imagines the genesis of a political 
community as taking the form of a covenant, a first performer is logically required. Hobbes 
himself admits that the first performer problem exists with respects to covenants in general so it 
is not unreasonable to conclude that the problem would also apply to the political covenant. 
Leviathan, p. 96. 
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modes of thinking, theology persists as an archetype which always-already 
determines the parameters for political thought. Schmitt’s key claim in Political 
Theology is that the relation between theology and politics is based on 
genealogical linkage as opposed to metaphorical or analogical reference.6 Against 
this, an alternative position would need to show that conceiving of political 
concepts as always derived from theological ones rests on an all-too-hasty 
prioritisation of the ontic over the ontological. In other words, if political theory 
dispenses with the theological by conceptualising humans themselves as a quasi-
transcendental source for founding acts, do we remain obliged to view these acts 
as bearing a theological structure?7 Moreover, if humans are to be viewed as 
capable of creating their own political foundations, would these foundations 
themselves not be open to challenge and contestation? Would every political 
configuration not ultimately be vulnerable to new attempts to start again, to 
create a new founding principle which can more directly realise notions of liberty, 
justice, and equality? Our position will be that there is no reason to suppose every 
political concept expresses an originally theological notion. The alternative 
strategy of presenting politics and theology as ontic expressions of an ontological 
impasse, could be a more plausible route. God would then simply be one figure 
who can occupy the place of an exterior, while exteriority is not itself necessarily 
                                                   
6 Hans Blumenberg deals with this issue in a critique which targets Schmitt’s appropriation of 
theological metaphors in service of an argument concerning the real powers of a sovereign. In a 
similar vein, Graham Hammill argues that, ‘Schmitt’s crisis-driven rhetoric also literalizes 
[theological] metaphors in the very real person who oversees the executive branch of 
government [and thereby] justifies the expansion of executive authority’. See: Hammill, p. 10. 
7 The idea of a quasi-transcendental source will be fleshed out below, however, by way of 
preliminary introduction, it is worth noting at this stage that my use of the term draws upon 
Sine Kramer’s Derridean understanding of the ‘constriction […] of the empirical into the 
transcendental’ with the implication that one can no longer posit an absolute boundary between 
the empirical and the transcendental, that they are henceforth to be viewed as ‘mutually 
contaminated and contaminating’. See: Sine Kramer, ‘Constitutive Exclusion and the Work of 
Political Unintelligibility’ (College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences Theses and Dissertations, 
2011), pp. 94–95, Paper 94 <http://via.library.depaul.edu/etd/94/> [accessed 16 July 2014]. 
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theological but is rather to be held as an unavoidable structural feature of any 
founding gesture. 
As indicated above, this chapter will work towards a radical materialist 
theory of the political subject which seeks to uproot the political from theological 
thought in service of a conception of political praxis arising immanently from 
human activity as opposed to a theological ‘beyond’.8 A comparable position is 
taken by Claude Lefort in his essay, ‘The Permanence of the Theological-Political’: 
Every religion states in its own way that human society can only open on to itself by 
being held in an opening it did not create. Philosophy says the same thing, but 
religion said it first, albeit in terms that philosophy cannot accept […] what 
philosophy discovers in religion is a mode of portraying or dramatizing the relations 
that human beings establish with something that goes beyond empirical time and 
the space within which they establish relations with each other.9 
The use of theological concepts for political purposes does not inevitably entail 
the contamination of the political by the theological; on the contrary, as will be 
shown, insofar as both theological and political thought aims at conceiving 
human relations as an internally consistent totality, each must posit an exterior 
or surplus element which allows the totality of relations to be bounded. Rather 
than viewing political theory as somehow indebted to, or parasitic on theology, 
our task here will be to show how the structural or metaphorical parallels between 
concepts in theology and political theory are themselves traceable to a specific 
conception of subjectivity and temporality. 
This chapter will develop a model of revolutionary change drawing on the 
works of Schmitt, Derrida, and Laclau with a mind to freeing political theory from 
its theological jesses. In the case of Schmitt, I will attempt to demonstrate how 
the decision on the exception cannot be produced ex nihilo, but must logically 
                                                   
8 The term ‘radical materialism’ will be discussed at greater length in subsequent chapters. For 
now, it is enough to describe a radical materialist position as one that is thoroughly atheistic 
whilst resisting the deterministic conclusions following from vulgar materialism. 
9 Lefort, ‘The Permanence of the Theologico-Political?’, p. 223. 
138 
 
contain a moment of reflexive determination.10 Reflexive determination will then 
be shown to suggest a transmundane property of subjectivity and a non-linear 
conception of temporality. Rather than requiring a transcendent source for power 
and authority, human subjects are able to engage in kinds of activity which, 
despite being their own work, are nonetheless necessarily not recoverable as such. 
Temporal complexity emerges as a feature of narratives which seek to probe 
founding political moments. In the second section I will show how this particular 
quality of founding activity has been the focus of some of Derrida’s more explicitly 
political writings such as his ‘Declarations of Independence’.11 Likewise, I will 
argue that Laclau offers a refined and comprehensive articulation of the secular 
political ontology that can be identified in the work of Schmitt as well as 
developing the notion of quasi-transcendental status of the constituting act. Our 
intention is not to surgically deconstruct, for example, the miracle, as a 
metaphorical gloss for the material activity of constitution building; on the 
contrary, the cross-contamination of religious and philosophical lexicons points 
to a structural limit, a category of event that metaphysics cannot assimilate but 
which should not, for this reason, simply be surrendered to religious discourse. 
Equally, we must also be careful not to retreat to a philosophical cul-de-sac, 
immersed in a religious vocabulary which serves to cut off further thought and to 
curtail in advance possibilities for emancipatory political praxis. Rather than 
simply pointing to the miraculous quality of transformative political action, the 
more pressing task is to ask why the concept of the miracle is an appropriate 
descriptor for a founding political deed. While the use of theological concepts 
                                                   
10 This is, of course, a notion adapted from Marx’s famous Reflexionsbestimmungen by virtue of 
which a king is a king. See Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume 1, trans. 
by Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin Books, 1990), p. 149. 
11 Derrida, ‘Declarations of Independence’, p. 10. 
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certainly suggests a resistance encountered by philosophical thought, we should 
not find ourselves forced to conclude that no further progress can be made in this 
direction. Even once it is conceded that there is a central, persistent aporia 
pertaining to moments of political transformation, this does not mean that we 
cannot thoroughly delineate its contours and unpack its implications for our 
conception of the human, political subject. Instead, I will show that conceiving 
founding political acts as comprising a quasi-transcendental gesture can allow us 
to successfully navigate the uncertain terrain of decisionistic arbitrariness and 
theologically derived transcendentalism. Religious thought is valuable for politics 
not because it provides useful or comforting explanations, but because it reveals 
the co-ordinates of philosophy’s terra incognita.  
The position we arrive at concerning the relationship between theological 
and political thinking will feed into a broader argument concerning narratives of 
founding events. The radical materialist gesture, insofar as it no longer allows for 
the possibility of a transcendental ‘beyond’ which could guarantee political 
foundations and authorise revolutionary transformations, results in a 
reformulation of the exterior such that, as Samuel Weber puts it, ‘the otherness 
that is no longer allowed to remain transcendent therefore reappears this side of 
the horizon, represented as a “cataract”, abyss, or fall’.12 It is not the theological 
that persists, but rather, in reconceiving authority as emerging immanently from 
earthly human activity as opposed to guaranteed by a transcendental entity, the 
unknowable exterior now resurfaces in the world of human affairs, either as a 
disconcerting hiatus (the momentary absence of authority which intervenes in 
the passage from one political structure to another) or as a paradoxical narrative 
                                                   
12 Samuel Weber, ‘Taking Exception to Decision: Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt’, Diacritics, 
22.3/4 (1992), 5–18 (p. 14). 
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surplus (a legislator who is present both before and after the moment of 
contractual agreement). 
In Political Theology (1922), Carl Schmitt provides a dense and aphoristic 
argument concerning the theological origins of political concepts and the 
implications for our understanding of sovereignty. In an often-quoted passage, 
Schmitt makes the following claim:  
All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological 
concepts not only because of their historical development – in which they were 
transferred from theology to the theory of the state, whereby, for example, the 
omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver – but also because of their 
systematic structure, the recognition of which is necessary for a sociological 
consideration of these concepts. The exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the 
miracle in theology. Only by being aware of this analogy can we appreciate the 
manner in which the philosophical ideas of state developed in the last centuries.13 
There are at least two ways of reading Schmitt’s position here: either one can 
focus on the suggested transferral between theology and politics, or alternatively, 
one can read Schmitt’s key claim as positing an analogical relationship between 
theological and political concepts. In the first instance we are dealing with 
genealogy. Theology provides an archetypal justificatory discourse for social 
distributions of power and authority which we have been forced to retain despite 
the transition to a post-theological era, albeit under the guise of modern theories 
of the state and sovereignty. This is the reading advanced by Karl Löwith for 
whom Schmitt’s political theology aims to, ‘show that all juridical concepts that 
are the expression of a sovereign decision, power, and dominance are secularized 
ones which do not simply make linguistic reference to theological notions but are 
also substantively developed from out of such notions’.14 From this perspective, 
it is not merely that political concepts resemble those of theology, but rather that, 
                                                   
13 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 36. 
14 Karl Löwith, ‘The Occasional Decisionism of Carl Schmitt’, in Martin Heidegger and 




following Schmitt’s example, the notion of the omnipotent lawgiver has directly 
inherited a series of structural features from the omnipotent God of theology.15 
There are several passages in Political Theology that seem to support a 
genealogical reading. For example, Schmitt states, ‘A continuous thread runs 
through the metaphysical, political, and sociological conceptions that postulate 
the sovereign as a personal unit and primeval creator.’16 Other passages seem to 
place emphasis on the analogical relationship between theology and politics 
without necessarily conceding that this relationship is a product of a genealogical 
lineage.17 Schmitt does not provide steadfast indications in either direction. 
Instead, he suggests both that political concepts are secularized theological 
concepts and that they continue to relate to the latter by way of analogy.18 
Although analogical and genealogical interpretations both have currency in 
contemporary debates, Hans Blumenberg has convincingly argued that Schmitt 
cannot sustain both positions simultaneously since, ‘Analogies, after all, are 
precisely not transformations.’19 Moreover, it is worth noting that Schmitt himself 
retreated from his original position, arguing that his earlier remarks relate to a 
systematic structural affinity as opposed to genealogical derivation. In his 
Political Theology II: The Myth of the Closure of any Political Theology, a text 
which can be viewed as a response to Blumenberg’s challenge, Schmitt refers to 
the ‘structural identity of theological and juridical concepts’ and characterises his 
earlier work as ‘the statements of a jurist on the obvious theoretical and practical 
                                                   
15 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 38. 
16 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 37. 
17 Schmitt, Political Theology, pp. 36–37. 
18 Schmitt, Political Theology, pp. 36–37. 
19 Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, trans. by Robert M. Wallace (London: 
MIT Press, 1985), p. 93. 
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legal structural resemblance between theological and juridical concepts.20  This 
has led Marc de Wilde to conclude that ‘Schmitt no longer defends his original, 
genealogical claim that political concepts are secularized theological concepts but 
focuses on the structural claim instead.’21 However, as will be demonstrated 
below, even this analogical claim proves untenable when one looks closely at the 
moment of sovereign decision-making. 
The distinction between these two approaches to Schmitt’s political 
theology has important implications. If political concepts are genealogically 
derived from theological ones, this invites a stronger claim about their theological 
status, one that could in turn lead to a problematic position whereby a 
purportedly secular political theory draws support from a theological structure it 
nonetheless disavows. This would leave us in the uncomfortable position outlined 
by Watkin whereby, ‘post-theological conceptions of politics implicitly require 
the persistence, in the theological notions they appropriate, of theological 
assumptions they explicitly reject’.22 If, however, we argue that the political is 
structurally reminiscent of the theological, this enables us to regard the political 
and the theological as two separate spheres and opens the possibility of a radical 
materialist position. Such a position would avoid, on the one hand, presupposing 
a God who would serve as the guarantor for the ethical character of a political 
community and the authority of its law-making institutions, while on the other 
hand also avoiding the determinism and ethical vacuity of a vulgar materialist 
position.23 Of course, the two positions Schmitt refers to above are not mutually 
                                                   
20 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology II: The Myth of the Closure of Any Political Theology, trans. 
by Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward (London: Polity Press, 2008), pp. 42, 148. 
21 Marc de Wilde, ‘Meeting Opposites: The Political Theologies of Walter Benjamin and Carl 
Schmitt’, Philosophy & Rhetoric, 44.4 (2011), 363–81 (p. 368). 
22 Watkin, p. 170. 
23 Positivistic materialism would be the clearest example of the form of materialism to be 
avoided. Throughout the argument that follows, I will seek to distance my position from any 
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exclusive insofar as genealogical connections may well positively imply structural 
similarities. Having said this, it is only by placing emphasis on structural affinity 
as opposed to genealogical connection that we are able to view the political as, at 
least potentially, autonomous from the theological. György Geréby is exemplary 
in this respect. Rather than asserting the reliance of the political on theological 
concepts and categories, Geréby points out how Schmitt’s argument cannot rule 
out an interpretation that gives primacy to the political:  
Schmitt has elaborated a “theology” of the secular world conceiving of politics as an 
immanentist theology in its own right. His argument, however, can cut two ways: 
from the idea that politics is a consequence of the immanentist theology of the 
secular, immanent political order, it follows that it might not be theology that 
changes into politics but politics that forms theology and makes it conform to its own 
shape.24 
Schmitt appears to advocate a reading of the political as subordinate to theology 
in the sense that politics is necessarily structured in accordance with a theological 
model. The very title of the text, Political Theology, implies a theology with a 
political character thereby relegating political theory to one possible mode of 
thinking that remains essentially theological. Geréby’s point is that Schmitt does 
not provide any compelling reason to view the relationship between theology and 
politics in this way. In proposing that politics ‘forms theology and makes it 
conform to its own shape,’ Geréby notes that theological notions may well have 
originally emerged as part of an effort to grapple with political problems. Instead, 
Schmitt provides us with a series of structural associations between theological 
and political concepts in order to move to a claim about the way in which power 
and authority literally function.25 A reader who holds this metaphorical 
                                                   
approach which takes material reality to be a homogenous, continuous substratum governed by 
a set of consistent physical laws. The task for a radical materialism, in contrast, would be to see 
how a political subject with a capacity for spontaneous action can emerge from a non-dualistic 
ontology of immanence. 
24 György Geréby, ‘Political Theology versus Theological Politics: Erik Peterson versus Carl 
Schmitt’, New German Critique, 35.3 (2008), 7–33 (p. 12). 
25 See: Blumenberg, pp. 100–101. 
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association to be rooted in genealogical connections will be more inclined to 
follow Schmitt’s argument that sovereign power extends itself in a God-like way. 
Hans Blumenberg also takes a position on this aspect of Schmitt’s work, 
arguing that it is remarkable that Schmitt 
finds any value at all in the secularization nexus since […] it would have been more 
natural, in view of the intention of this “political theology,” for it to establish the 
reverse relation of derivation by interpreting the apparent theological derivation of 
political concepts as a consequence of the absolute quality of political realities.26 
While it is essential to recognise the ambiguity Geréby notes in Schmitt’s 
formulation of the theological-political, one can go further here. Instead of 
following the urge to allocate primacy to either the theological or the political, or 
recognising that primacy could never be definitively allocated, an alternative 
position would view both the theological and the political as responses to a 
metaphysical impasse of an origin or ground that cannot itself be grounded. It 
would be this impasse that Eric Santner refers to when he notes, ‘an ultimate lack 
of foundation […] that seems to push thinking in the direction of theology’.27 My 
amendment to Santner’s formulation would be that this lack of foundation 
ultimately pushes thinking beyond theology, and that politics, when thought 
through to its limit, encounters certain constitutive aporias.28 
Investigating Schmitt’s use of theology is the necessary starting point for 
the argument I develop below. Citing genealogical links between theology and 
politics provides Schmitt with a stronger position from which to advance an 
analogical claim, and this claim, in turn, endows his sovereign with specific 
powers and attributes. The most striking of these powers is that of beginning via 
                                                   
26 Blumenberg, p. 92. 
27 Eric Santner, The Royal Remains: The People’s Two Bodies and the Endgames of 
Sovereignty (London: Chicago University Press, 2011), p. 5. 
28 My position here finds support in Andrew Norris, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Political Metaphysics: On 
the Secularization of the “Outermost Sphere”’, Theory and Event, 4.1 (2000), pp. 21–22. 
145 
 
a decision: ‘Sovereign decision is an absolute beginning, and the beginning […] is 
no other thing than sovereign decision’.29 However, if the genealogical connection 
cannot be sustained, the analogical links Schmitt suggests may be little more than 
a rhetorical edifice serving only to obfuscate sovereignty’s true operation. Below, 
we will see how political beginnings (or any transfer of political authority through 
extra-legal means) cannot be accomplished by a unilateral decider, but perforce 
imply the involvement of the demos. In order to present this as a plausible 
interpretation of Schmitt’s Political Theology, it will be necessary to probe the 
metaphysical deadlock mentioned above via a discussion of the problematic 
status of juridico-political foundations. 
                                                   
29 Carl Schmitt, Über Die Drei Arten Des Rechtswissensschaftlichen Denkens (Hamburg: 
Hanseatische Verlag, 1934), p. 28. Cited in Renato Cristi, Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian 
Liberalism: Strong State, Free Economy (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1998), p. 97. 
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Sovereignty and Exceptional Decisions 
For Schmitt, the question of legal foundations is of utmost importance. His most 
significant works tend to consist of a sustained interrogation of a political concept 
with a view to determining its final, irreducible basis, or that to which the concept 
refers once all extraneous considerations have been stripped away. It is through 
such a procedure that the reader is led to a Schmittian definition of sovereignty: 
‘Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.’30 Note here how the formulation 
Schmitt provides in his Political Theology departs from the position he takes in 
his Dictatorship.31 In Dictatorship Schmitt distinguishes between commissarial 
and sovereign forms of dictatorship. The former is a circumscribed capacity to act 
in order to preserve the constitution and is inspired by the Roman practice of 
nominating an individual to resolve a specific task within a given time frame.32 
The nominated individual will decide on the expedient course of action and will 
face no legal obstacles. The state of exception thus emerges from two decisions. 
First, there is a decision on whose duty it will be to resolve the crisis, and 
subsequently, there is a decision as to the actions that must be taken. Both these 
decisions are made by an appropriate, legally recognized entity. Finally, although 
the nominated dictator is free of legal impediments that might prevent him from 
completing his task, he is nonetheless obliged to reinstitute the regular legal order 
once this has been accomplished. Sovereign dictatorship, in contrast to 
                                                   
30 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 5. 
31 Carl Schmitt, Dictatorship: From the Origin of the Modern Concept of Sovereignty to 
Proletarian Class Struggle, trans. by Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2014). For more on the distinctions between Schmitt’s Dictatorship and his Political 
Theology, see: John P. McCormick, Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism: Against Politics as 
Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 133–141; Andreas Kalyvas, 
Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary: Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and Hannah 
Arendt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 89–91. 
32 Schmitt, Dictatorship, pp. 1–9. 
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commissarial dictatorship, appeals to a constitution which is to come, one that 
does ‘not yet exist.’33 This is not to be conceived as sheer power but as a power 
that is foundational and as such cannot be subsumed or negated by any actually 
existing constitution.34 
In Political Theology, the salient feature of sovereign power is to be viewed 
in terms of competence.35 It is not a status to be designated and possessed 
independently of changing circumstances; on the contrary, Schmitt is concerned 
with a notion of sovereignty that is responsive to circumstances, and, in 
particular, the unique set of circumstances presenting an existential threat to the 
state. The preservation of the state is considered the highest priority since it is the 
security it provides that serves as a precondition for the survival of individual 
citizens.36 If the state is faced with an existential threat that cannot be dealt with 
through available legal structures, there must be an individual or group who can 
recognize that such a threat exists and use extra-legal means to counter it. Or, to 
offer another formulation, if we agree with Schmitt that the legal system serves to 
preserve order within the state and that the state itself functions as the guarantor 
of this legal system insofar as the legal system would cease to exist without the 
state, we cannot avoid the conclusion that the state (or, more precisely, the 
sovereign entity that embodies the state) can unilaterally revoke its guarantee and 
suspend the law. The existence of the legal order relies on the state, not the other 
way around. David Dyzenhaus makes this point, arguing, ‘once one sees the 
foundational role of decision, one will also see that, in the state of exception, while 
                                                   
33 Schmitt, Dictatorship, p. 119. 
34 Schmitt, Dictatorship, p. 119. 
35 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 31. 
36 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 12. 
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law retreats the state stays.’37 The decisionistic power of the sovereign is the 
practical consequence of the state’s existential primacy. This is why a sovereign 
call for a state of exception entails an absolute break from previous legal 
structures. 
The sovereign decision is also a capacity that must exist in order to deal 
with an unprecedented threat. The key to sovereignty does not reside only in the 
fact that the state is under threat; it also arises from the unprecedented nature of 
this threat, in that there are no pre-existing legal means for dealing with it. It is 
an exception insofar as it ‘is not codified in the existing legal order.’38 The 
deviation from Schmitt’s earlier position is thus to be found in the conflation 
between the individual who decides on the state of exception and the concrete 
actions that must be taken to resolve the crisis.39 If a threat to the state is truly 
novel, the institutional separation of powers will no longer suffice. This feature of 
Schmitt’s account in Political Theology is also noted by Samuel Weber:  
[S]overeignty is constituted as the power to decide upon or about the state of 
exception and thus in turn includes two moments: first, a decision that a state of 
exception exists, and second, the effective suspension of the state of law previously 
in force so that the state may meet and surmount the challenge of the exception.40 
Crucially, and in contrast to the account of commissarial dictatorship provided in 
Dictatorship, both decisions now emanate from the same source, occurring in a 
single, self-sufficient gesture. This is necessitated by Schmitt’s insistence that an 
exceptional case is impossible to anticipate by definition:  
The precise details of an emergency cannot be anticipated, nor can one spell out what 
may take place in such a case, especially when it is truly a matter of an extreme 
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38 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 6. 
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emergency and how it is to be eliminated. The preconditions as well as the content 
of a jurisdictional competence in such a case must be necessarily unlimited.41 
Commissarial dictatorship remains within the horizon of constitutionalism 
insofar as it requires that all individuals and groups in the state behave in 
accordance with the parameters of the constitution. The nominated dictator may 
have a broad scope for action, but there are still legal limitations on his action. As 
Kalyvas argues, the dictator may occupy a ‘normless vacuum,’ but the parameters 
of that vacuum are pre-given from within constituted legal space.42 The legal 
system is thus to be seen as complete and self-contained, existing as a 
homogenous, positive order in which the ‘frictionless functioning’ of the legal idea 
occurs without any requirement for a truly extra-legal sovereign entity.43 
The distinction between the forms of dictatorship described in 
Dictatorship and the notion of sovereignty presented in Political Theology is 
pertinent to our discussion here since it is only in the latter that we are presented 
with a political entity endowed with God-like powers.44 The sovereign of Political 
Theology seems to inherit characteristics of both commissarial and sovereign 
conceptions of dictatorship. The sovereign decision is aligned with commissarial 
dictatorship insofar as it comprises a response to a specific threat to the state. 
Nonetheless, it is also framed as an underived power, one that is not subject to 
legal limitations and, as such, can be aligned with the notion of sovereign 
dictatorship. Political Theology moves beyond both commissarial and sovereign 
forms of dictatorship since, rather than grounding the highest, underived power 
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in the pouvoir constituant, Schmitt draws theological parallels to support his 
argument that sovereignty asserts itself in a God-like way. With a sovereign 
dictatorship we are told that the dictator’s power is not constitutionally 
established but is associated with the constitution insofar as it serves as its 
foundation. There is no theological analogy to be made with respect to either 
commissarial or sovereign forms of dictatorship. As Schmitt states: 
It has been argued that dictatorship is a miracle on the grounds that its suspension 
of state laws is comparable to the suspension of natural laws in miracles. In reality 
dictatorship is not this miracle; it is a breaking up of the legal system that is implicit 
in such a newly established dominion.45 
The comparison between the forms of dictatorship that emerge in Dictatorship 
and the concept of sovereignty advocated in Political Theology leads us to ask 
how we are to account for the religious analogies that appear in the latter. Do 
these analogies provide greater insight into the way Schmitt argues sovereignty 
functions? Or is the theological analogy designed to add weight to an argument 
about how sovereignty should function? One possible answer would be that in his 
effort to theorize the highest, underived power, Schmitt encounters a problem 
described by Lefort as that of accounting for ‘a difference that goes beyond 
differences.’46 
In positing the possibility of an exceptional moment, Schmitt is not simply 
describing a practical resource for sovereign power in a moment of crisis; rather, 
he is asserting the possibility of an exception as a legal-logical necessity. A legal 
system is always structured so as to appear as a closed totality with both a 
founding moment (even if this moment is a mythical, as opposed to empirical, 
event) and with a finite set of laws that apply within a limited territory. 
Conceiving a political entity as temporally and spatially bounded implies 
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exteriority, both a temporal exterior (that is, the form of political organization 
that existed prior to the state’s existence in the territory now occupied by the 
state) and a spatial exterior (the existence of groups outside the state’s sphere of 
control that may threaten the latter either economically or militarily).47 But 
insofar as a legal system has these temporal and spatial limits, and insofar as ‘the 
norm requires a homogenous medium,’ there remains a possibility that the state 
will encounter an empirical situation that cannot be accommodated by existing 
laws.48 Exteriority therefore logically entails the possibility of an unprecedented 
situation, one that may require a suspension of law, while the sovereign is simply 
the agent who has the competence to suspend the law.49 As such, Schmitt’s use of 
theological analogies for political concepts can be viewed as part of a rhetorical 
strategy which, to quote Lefort, ‘[dramatizes] the relations that human beings 
establish with something that goes beyond empirical time and the space within 
which they establish relations with one another.’50 
A legal-positivist approach would be to create legislation that would define 
in advance the conditions for a situation’s exceptional status and prescribe a set 
of actions to take whereas, for Schmitt, an exception is by definition that which 
cannot be accounted for in advance. Put another way, insofar as a legal system 
asserts itself as fully constituted, as a self-contained normative network, it 
necessarily posits the existence of an extra-legal space. The ability to defuse the 
crisis from within existing legal parameters constitutes a proof that an 
exceptional moment has not been encountered. In his Dictatorship, Schmitt 
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describes commissary dictatorship as a legal institution used to resolve a crisis 
within a given time-frame: 
The dictator, who was appointed by the consul at the Senate’s request, had the task 
of dissolving the dangerous situation by reason of which he had been nominated 
either by waging war or by squashing uproar from within. […] The dictator was 
nominated for six months, but, whenever he had accomplished his mission, he 
stepped down before his official time of resignation — at least according to a 
commendable custom in early republican times.51 
In contrast, the defining feature of Political Theology is the argument that the 
individual who acts and the scope for their action are both generated through a 
single decisive act, one that, as Schmitt argues, ‘emanates from nothingness.’52 
This is why in Political Theology Schmitt considers the miracle to be an 
appropriate analogy for the sovereign decision.53 A miracle is conceivable when 
one views the natural world as a complete self-contained system existing in 
relation to an outside or beyond, inhabited by a transcendent deity. When natural 
processes are momentarily suspended, when a divine cause has led to a terrestrial 
effect, one can say that a miracle has occurred. 
And yet this conception of the miracle, based on a strong opposition 
between the material and the spiritual, is not the only one available. Bonnie Honig 
has convincing shown how the notion of the miracle that arises in the works of 
Franz Rosenzweig can assist a more democratic reading of Schmitt’s theory of 
sovereignty: ‘For Rosenzweig, miracle is not a ruptural divine decision; that is a 
remnant of earlier theologies and the by-product of their rationalization (in which 
miracle is that which must be expelled from a rational theology) […] miracle is an 
ambiguous sign that thrusts upon humans the responsibility to receive it.’54 
Rosenzweig’s notion of the miracle has import for political theory precisely 
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because it describes a transformation that fundamentally involves humans. A 
traditional Augustinian formulation of the miracle holds God to be the performer 
of miracles, positioning humans as passively bearing witness to the divine Act. It 
relies on a strong dualism insofar as the boundary between the divine and the 
mundane is only occasionally breached. When breaches occur, they arise as an 
act of God and do not require any special participation or pre-existing disposition 
on the part of the human witnesses. In stark contrast, Rosenzweig’s miracle 
points to ‘popular receptivity and immanence’.55 Miracle no longer emerges from 
an ethereal beyond, but it hinges on the earth-bound activity of those who will 
receive it as miracle. The daily practices which are the hallmark of devoutness: 
prayer, worship, and the study of sacred texts help prepare the individual for the 
miracle. The miracle is structured less as divine command and more as an 
invitation to be taken up or a sign to be interpreted and acted on. For Honig, then, 
we can certainly agree with Schmitt that the model of the decision is a miracle, 
with the all-important caveat that the metaphor of the miracle has the character 
of Rosenzweig’s miraculous.56 It is a miracle that is ambiguous as to its origins, 
requiring as much from the believer as from God. 
Honig’s rereading of Schmitt via Rosenzweig is undoubtedly a valuable 
and convincing contribution to the scholarship on Schmitt’s decision. 
Nonetheless, there is a sense in which, insofar as we accept the Rosenzweigian 
miracle as the appropriate metaphor for the Schmittian decision, we have already 
accepted the core proposition of a materialist reading of Schmitt. If the sovereign 
is unable to simply command, if sovereign will does not automatically exteriorize 
its will in the decision, this implies that sovereignty is not concentrated in a 
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particular agent, but is in fact diffused throughout the body politic. Below, I will 
suggest an amendment to Honig’s Rosenzweigian political theology which takes 




Presupposing the Grundnorm 
The issue of a legitimate ground for sovereign power can be also approached 
through the idea of an original foundation or Constitution. Hans Kelsen’s General 
Theory of Law and State represents a significant effort in this direction. Kelsen 
aims at an account in which law is regarded as a complete system capable of 
absorbing its founding moment without excess or remainder. Each norm is 
derived from higher order norms and these higher order norms in turn refer back 
to a constitutional pact between members of the state. This ability to regulate its 
own creation, to include its foundation as one of its internal moments, is 
considered to be a ‘peculiarity of law which is of utmost theoretical importance.’57 
Instead of positing a sovereign decision as the basis for the validity of law, Kelsen 
argues that any given system of law refers back to a basic norm:  
If we ask why the constitution is valid, perhaps we come upon an older constitution. 
Ultimately we reach some constitution that is the first historically and that was laid 
down by an individual usurper or by some kind of assembly. […] That the first 
constitution is a binding legal norm is presupposed, and the formulation of the 
presupposition is the basic norm of this legal order.58 
The legal order that derives from the basic norm consists of laws that ‘remain 
valid as long as they have not been invalidated in the way which the legal order 
itself determines.’59 This, argues Kelsen, ‘is the principle of legitimacy.’60 
Elsewhere Kelsen states: ‘The ultimate hypothesis of positivism is the norm 
authorizing the historically first legislator. The whole function of this basic norm 
is to confer law-creating power on the act of the first legislator and all the other 
acts based on this first act.’61 The quotations above provide a succinct indication 
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of the disagreement between Schmitt and Kelsen. For Kelsen, a legal order can 
dissolve itself only from within, that is, by means that are already specified in law. 
In contrast, in Political Theology Schmitt argues that the decision comes from a 
trans-juridical outside and need not refer to any existing positive law.62 Schmitt 
points to the tautology implied by a positively given founding moment in Kelsen’s 
theory of law: 
Words such as order, system and unity are only circumscriptions of the same 
postulate, which must demonstrate how it can be fulfilled in its purity. It has to be 
shown how a system can arise on the foundation of a “constitution” (which is either 
a further tautological circumspection of the “unity” or a brutal socio-political 
reality).63  
The paradox both Schmitt and Kelsen grapple with can be stated as follows: in 
order for the foundation to be legitimate, it must be included in the system of law 
that it founds. However, if it is included in this way one can no longer view it as 
properly foundational. Kelsen seeks to sidestep this issue by arguing that, from 
the perspective of an existent legal order, the basic norm can simply be 
presupposed. The tautology noted by Schmitt consists in the way in which the 
legal order itself retroactively legitimates the gesture which founds it. One can 
apply Derrida’s insight here: the authority of the signatories of the constitution is 
not coterminous with the act of signing itself but can only come about as an effect 
of the act of signing, ‘in a sort of fabulous retroactivity.’64 A genuine foundation 
has no antecedent principle to appeal to; instead, it receives legitimacy from the 
order it inaugurates, from the political community who presuppose its legitimacy. 
The logic of retroactive legitimation in Kelsen’s theory is brought to the 
fore in his remarks on the legitimacy of a revolutionary act. The relevant passage 
is worth quoting at length: 
                                                   
62 Schmitt, Political Theology, pp. 31–32. 
63 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 20. 
64 Derrida, ‘Declarations of Independence’, p. 10. 
157 
 
It is just the phenomenon of revolution which clearly shows the significance of the 
basic norm. Suppose that a group of individuals attempt to seize power by force, in 
order to remove the legitimate government in a hitherto monarchic State, and to 
introduce a republican form of government. If they succeed, if the old order ceases, 
and the new order begins to be efficacious, because the individuals whose behavior 
the new order regulates actually behave, by and large, in conformity with the new 
order, then this order is considered as a valid order. It is now according to this new 
order that the behavior of individuals is interpreted as legal or illegal. But this means 
that the new basic norm is presupposed. It is no longer the norm according to which 
the old monarchical constitution is valid, but a norm according to which the new 
republican constitution is valid, a norm endowing the revolutionary government 
with legal authority. If the revolutionaries fail, if the order they have tried to establish 
remains inefficacious, then, on the other hand, their undertaking is interpreted, not 
as a legal, a law-creating act, as the establishment of a constitution, but as an illegal 
act, as the crime of treason, and this according to the old monarchic constitution and 
its specific basic norm.65 
There is clearly something amiss here. For a theorist who is ostensibly concerned 
with demonstrating that a legal system can be conceived as a single, enclosed 
totality, Kelsen’s account of revolutionary action seems to suggest a moment of 
ambiguity concerning the genesis of his basic norm. In committing to overthrow 
a ‘hitherto monarchic State,’ Kelsen’s revolutionaries commit an apparently 
treasonous act. Nonetheless, as Kelsen admits, the status of this act as treasonous 
is not decided prior to acting, nor through the act itself; instead, the act receives 
its status from ‘the individuals whose behaviour the new order regulates.’66 The 
revolutionaries’ status as founders of a new republic (as opposed to traitors or 
usurpers) and the validity of the new order which their activity inaugurates are 
decided by the individuals belonging to the state. But this decision does not take 
the form of a choice between two alternatives since the very possibility of such a 
choice would presuppose a meta-political position from which to judge each 
alternative (monarchy or republic) on its respective merits. In this scenario, the 
republican position would have effectively already been validated since the 
proper functioning of the ancien régime requires that it totalize the political field, 
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that there is no position from which one can judge its relative merits compared 
with republicanism. 
Deciding the status of the revolutionary act, is it not possible to detect the 
same logic in Derrida’s account of the ‘successful’ revolution? Derrida outlines his 
position in the following quotation: 
A ‘successful’ revolution, the ‘successful foundation of a state’ […] will produce après 
coup what it was destined in advance to produce, namely, proper interpretive models 
to read in return, to give sense, necessity and above all legitimacy to the violence that 
has produced, among others, the interpretive model in question, that is, the 
discourse of its self-legitimation.67 
Kelsen’s condition for the legitimacy of a new, post-revolutionary regime is that 
it is able to successfully regulate the behaviour of its citizens. The unexpected 
common ground between Kelsen and Derrida concerns the après coup efficacy of 
the revolutionary act. In either case, the indeterminacy of the revolutionary act 
can only be settled after concrete steps have been taken and a new foundation has 
been posited. Crucially, this does not mean revolutions are illegitimate or unjust, 
but rather, since they refer to political foundations, revolutions involve a 
momentary suspension of the oppositions and categories which would enable 
judgements to be made. Revolution thus indicates a shift, as Eric Santner argues 
apropos revelation, at the level of syntax: ‘Revelation is thus not so much the 
positing of an alternative and competing standard of value as an intervention into 
the very syntax by which values are determined and to which we are bound in our 
life with values’.68 The revelation or revolution designates a position from which 
a subject could rework the very schema according to which their values are 
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organised.69 That is to say, during such a revolutionary/revelatory moment, one 
is thrown out of the inertia of normality so as to adopt a new position or commit 
oneself to a new task. This insight allows us to segue directly back into our 
discussion of Kelsen’s revolutionary act which must also rely on a change of 
disposition on behalf of members of the state. If the revolutionary act is effective, 
it will result in a subjective change in the citizenry such that the latter will be 
receptive to government by the new republican founders, and if this change 
occurs, then the revolutionary act is not merely effective but also legitimate. It is 
vital to note that arriving at legitimacy in this way prevents us from viewing 
Kelsen’s theory of law as delivering a positivist, internally consistent legal 
framework. On the contrary, as Kalyvas argues, the basic norm, while validating 
all inferior norms, ‘is itself unauthorized, a ‘hypothetical foundation’, a mental 
presupposition that does not describe a real, existing ground’.70 The validity of 
the basic norm relies only on its efficacy, that is, on the extent to which it can 
serve as a foundation for a legal system that its subjects actually perceive as 
legitimate and obey. Kalyvas outlines the crux of the problem that arises here:  
Validity would ultimately refer to nothing more than the efficacy of certain actors to 
impose a new basic norm. […] Kelsen reluctantly acknowledged that, when it comes 
to historical reality, the basic norm, though a logical presupposition, might well have 
emanated from the naked subjective will of an individual or a group of individuals 
who had the force to overthrow the previous basic norm and impose a new one. This 
elaboration suggests that the basic norm might be nothing more than the expression 
of an arbitrary, subjective act’.71 
Kelsen ultimately fails to fully purify his theory of law since his account of the 
revolutionary act introduces a split notion of validity: norms are valid insofar as 
they are consistent with a basic norm and yet this basic norm is itself validated by 
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its efficacy, that is, by its ability to compel obedience. As soon as one begins to 
conceive legitimacy as generated in this way, the concept itself is destabilized; 
legitimacy no longer expresses a universal standard, but is simply the temporary 
effect of particular human actions and their consequences. Kelsen’s positivism 
thus cannot be sustained since it cannot submit a universal criterion for the 
validity of norms.  
Framing Kelsen’s theory of a revolutionary act in this way brings us 
unexpectedly close to a Schmittian position.72 As has been outlined already, 
Schmitt posits a unique entity with a trans-juridical capacity which allows the 
suspension of the legal order. It is the status of this act, the sovereign decision, 
that represents the vital kernel of Schmitt’s political theory; however, it is also 
precisely the structure of this act that marks the point of convergence between 
Kelsen’s liberal-constitutional theory of law and Schmitt’s ‘decisionist’ 
alternative. In his Political Theology Schmitt refers to the sovereign decision as 
an issue of competence.73 The state of exception is arrived at through a 
declaration by a competent political entity. Nonetheless, an ambiguity surfaces at 
this point concerning the locus of sovereignty during normal politics: is 
sovereignty always anchored in a determinate individual or group only to become 
visible through a declaration of exceptional circumstances, or alternatively, is the 
status of sovereignty indeterminate in principle prior to such a declaration?74 
George Schwab seems to take the former position in his introduction to Political 
Theology, arguing that the exceptional moment is one in which sovereign power 
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‘reveals itself.’75 In a similar vein, Kalyvas holds that during normal periods the 
locus of power is ‘invisible.’76 Neumann takes a stronger position in this direction, 
stating that, ‘the study of […] emergency situations will yield valuable hints as to 
where political power actually resides in “normal” periods.’77 The key reproach to 
be levelled at Schwab, Kalyvas, and Neumann is that their positions presuppose 
a metahistorical vantage point from which one could observe sovereignty 
throughout both periods of normal and exceptional politics. Sovereign power is 
hypostatized in a model of authority mistakes the symbolic for the concrete. If the 
sovereign is already in existence only to be revealed through the exception, we no 
longer have a sovereign who can be truly responsive to circumstances and the 
issue of competence is no longer central. But the more interesting feature of 
Schmitt’s formulation is that it shows how sovereignty can be thought of as 
constituted through (as opposed to being revealed by) the declaration of an 
exceptional set of circumstances. The point is well made by Michael Marder in his 
analysis of Schmitt’s ontology of the will: 
[P]olitical will and the sovereign qua sovereign come about as a result of the decision 
on the exception; that is to say, they do not precede the moment of the decision but 
are decided into existence in this very moment. The production of the sovereign and 
of the will by the decision is a self-production, in that, in the absence of any 
transcendental supports, the sovereign is decided into existence by him- or herself, 
by the act of sovereignty, which, from the standpoint of the legal order, is null and 
groundless.78 
There is no invisible sovereign-in-waiting prior to the crisis; during normal 
periods political life functions well enough through institutions, legal structures, 
and the observance of precedents. It may be supposed that sovereignty exists in 
some particular political agent, but this supposition is ultimately baseless given 
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that the locus of sovereignty can never be verified except by way of a decision. In 
this sense the Schmittian sovereign, much like the well-known emperor from 
Hans Christian Andersen’s fairy tale, is naked at the decisive moment. Lacking 
any transcendental or objective guarantees, the sovereign decision originates 
from a position of profound uncertainty. Contra Schmitt, the sovereign is not 
unilaterally able to ‘clothe himself,’ instead, he relies on his subjects to 
presuppose his clothing for him, that is, to recognize him as the ultimate locus of 
authority. It is not that the people recognize a sovereign who was hidden or 
invisible prior to his declaration, but rather sovereign status is fixed to a 
particular political actor through the people’s very act of recognition.79 Kam 
Shapiro should thus be supported in her claim that, ‘Every grouping not only 
carries protopolitical intensities but can also be a site of decision’.80 Questions 
regarding the locus of sovereignty during periods of normal politics miss the way 
in which sovereignty, as a quality belonging to a particular agent, is itself 
constituted (or better still, as I will argue below, reflexively determined) through 
the decision on a state of exception. 
There are two implications of this ambiguity which are pertinent to our 
discussion of a radical democratic moment in Schmittian political theory. The 
first has been already proposed by Kalyvas who argues that a basic norm, ‘is valid 
not in the sense of a logical-transcendental presupposition but rather because it 
has emanated from those directly affected by it, that is, from the constituent 
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decision of the sovereign people’.81 For Kalyvas, the fact that Schmitt’s theory 
constantly refers to an individual, personified, sovereign does not prevent us from 
reading sovereignty as, in a moment of profound crisis, reinvested among the 
subjects of the state. It is a reading which finds ample support in Schmitt’s 
Constitutional Theory.82 A state of exception would thus be understood as a break 
with the previous order such that the legitimacy of its institutions is abrogated 
and sovereignty again resides with the people.83 A further democratic reading of 
Schmittian theory can nonetheless be added as a supplement to Kalyvas’s 
position. Once we view sovereignty as a competency emerging in a particular 
historical situation rather than as prescribed by a law, certain important 
implications follow. As we have seen in Kelsen’s passage on revolutionary action, 
a competency definition of sovereignty in turn relies on a moment of recognition 
by those who would be obliged to obey.84 Given that, for Schmitt, sovereignty is 
not immutably vested in any particular political entity but depends instead on the 
origin of a decision made in concrete circumstances, there is no reason to assume 
prior to a declaration of a state of exception that any individual or group could 
more competently decide on exceptional circumstances.85 In fact, the competence 
of the individual or group to actually make a decision is determined in precisely 
the same way as in Kelsen: through the recognition of those to whom the decision 
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applies. It is a consequence of Schmitt’s position not lost on Wetters who cites the 
link between Schmitt and Weber on this point: 
Schmitt’s theory of legitimacy is clearly derived from Max Weber. […] Weber’s three 
forms of legitimation are, famously, legal, traditional, and charismatic. Weber 
defines all these forms in terms of the chances that orders will be followed 
obediently; the emphasis on ‘chance’ makes a difference. Schmitt, for example, does 
not speak of the chances that the sovereign will be able to effectuate a decision about 
the state of exception (even though this is in a sense what must be at stake).86 
Despite Wetters’s tentative tone, this remark, which appears as a footnote, strikes 
at the heart of Schmitt’s notion of sovereignty. An abrogation of the political order 
and the suspension of law by a sovereign must always involve the participation of 
the group of citizens who actually comprise the state. A declaration of an 
exceptional situation thus always takes the form of an appeal to a specific political 
grouping. Exceptional politics cannot be unilaterally imposed because the 
competence (or incompetence) of the sovereign is not itself purely a consequence 
of a sovereign decision. Instead, the sovereign declaration is made from a position 
of uncertainty with regard to the locus of sovereignty. That is to say, while the 
sovereign may be the one who decides on the state of exception, his decision must 
always take the form of a wager that his declaration will be recognised as a 
sovereign decision. Pushing this line of thought further, we can even argue that 
sovereignty is ascribed retroactively depending on the citizens who, when 
confronted with a declaration of exceptional circumstances, can treat the proto-
sovereign individual either as an actual sovereign, or alternatively, as a lunatic or 
imposter whose declarations are meaningless. Far from an omnipotent, God-like 
lawgiver, the Schmittian sovereign is a mad gambler whose pretence to 
sovereignty is structurally identical to the claims made by Kelsen’s revolutionary 
insurgents. 
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A further illustration of this aspect of Schmitt’s thought can be found in a 
passage of a speech made by Mussolini in 1922 quoted by Schmitt in The Crisis 
of Parliamentary Democracy: ‘we have created a myth, this myth is a belief, a 
noble enthusiasm; it does not need to be a reality, it is a striving and a hope, belief 
and courage. Our myth is the nation, the great nation which we want to make a 
concrete reality for ourselves’.87 As Victoria Kahn is right to point out, Mussolini’s 
myth of the nation does not need to be true—its status as myth is openly 
admitted—for its efficacy depends on the extent to which it ‘mobilises the 
masses’.88 Throughout Political Theology Schmitt presents the decision as self-
sufficient, as an independently determining gesture, but in order to arrive at a full 
account of the decision one must note the moment of reflexive determination 
whereby the decision receives validation from a given political community. The 
Schmittian decision, like Mussolini’s myth of the nation, has the status of pure 
assertion. There is no guarantee that it will produce a substantial change since it 
does not address citizens on the basis of their capacity to reason, but on the level 
of belief and passion. 
The distinction is also noted by Paul W. Kahn who contrasts successful and 
unsuccessful revolutions: ‘A successful revolution establishes its own value by 
creating its own truth. An unsuccessful revolution loses the right even to claim 
the title of “revolution”’.89 Kahn’s remark, which ostensibly refers to the status of 
a political event as revolutionary, applies equally to the Schmittian exception. In 
Kelsen, the reflexive determination of legitimacy in a revolutionary situation is 
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made explicit, whereas in Schmitt, it is the logical corollary of his particular 
formulation of the decision. Nonetheless, in either case, to follow each theory to 
its conclusion is to find oneself confronted with a hidden democratic kernel: the 
act/decision must be supplemented by a moment of democratic recognition and 
a certain ideological shift which detotalises the political field, revealing a 
naturalized legal system to rest on a contingent point of departure. Kalyvas is 
supportive of this admittedly counter-intuitive reading of Schmitt and Kelsen, 
arguing that it is not Schmitt whose theory of law suffers from a normative deficit, 
but the liberal-constitutionalist Kelsen: ‘By developing the idea of the sovereign 
popular will as the only legitimate source of a modern democratic political order, 
Schmitt is better positioned for renewing the normative dimension of the 
democratic ideal’.90 Although I follow Kalyvas in his identification of a democratic 
moment in Schmitt, it is perhaps less a point of distinction between Kelsen and 
Schmitt than a point of convergence. Kelsen is quite clear on the role of the 
popular sovereign will in determining the success and, importantly, the 
legitimacy of a revolutionary act. As he notes in the passage cited above, it is the 
citizens themselves who validate the new order by virtue of their behaving in 
conformity with its laws.91 It is for this reason that I depart from Kalyvas when he 
claims that: ‘whereas for [Schmitt and Kelsen] this initial moment of the norm-
giving act is beyond legality, for Schmitt it is not beyond legitimacy’.92 Kalyvas is 
implying that a norm-giving act is beyond legitimacy for Kelsen, however, 
Kelsen’s statements on the legitimacy of revolutionary acts suggest an alternative 
reading: rather than arguing that a revolutionary seizure of power is always extra-
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legal and illegitimate, Kelsen’s point is that the revolutionary act is strictly 
indeterminate. Its legitimacy will only be decided from a future position, once its 
efficacy has been demonstrated.93 
At this point, a potential objection must be dealt with. In any political 
situation there are not only apparent concentrations of power but also 
concentrations of technologies enabling the use of force. What use is the notion 
of reflexive determination if the weaponry present in a given territory is 
distributed only among certain political actors? If there is an individual more 
capable than anyone else of mobilising force, is this person not effectively a 
sovereign figure regardless of whether they are recognised as such? Faced with 
such an objection, the crucial point to make is that the recourse to the use of force 
itself signals a situation’s political openness. Insofar as a political grouping fails 
to obey spontaneously, insofar as violence is required to shore up sovereign 
domination, we are no longer dealing with normal politics but with the openness, 
uncertainty, and exceptionality of the political. Once we are at a stage where the 
state is openly carrying out acts of violence against its political opponents, the 
crucial moment has already past—the state is no longer recognised as the 
legitimate bearer of authority, but only as one actor in an open political struggle. 
To put this another way, violence is the hallmark of reflexive indetermination—a 
moment of non-recognition resulting in the sudden rupture of the political space. 
Of course, we should not discount the use of force and the presence of unequally 
distributed technologies, however, for our purposes the more interesting aspect 
is the anterior moment at which it is still unclear whether force will be used. 
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The notion of a reflexively determined sovereign decision also has a 
bearing on how we should view Schmitt’s idea of acclamation. Recall that in his 
Constitutional Theory Schmitt argues against voting in favour of the acclamation 
of the collectively assembled people at a public rally. His justification for this is 
that voting only expresses an individual’s opinion as a private citizen whereas 
acclamation expresses the endorsement of the body politic itself with a single 
voice. Schmitt explains how acclamation functions in the following quotation: 
‘[The people] can acclaim in that they express their consent or disapproval by a 
simple calling out, calling higher or lower, celebrating a leader or suggestion, 
honouring the king or some other person, or denying the acclamation by silence 
or complaining’.94 Now, acclamation conceived in this way is entirely compatible 
with, but not identical to, the notion of a reflexively determined decision 
elaborated above. Acclamation is the objective correlate, or the outward signal, of 
an internal event—the event of the recognition of authority). Acclamation has a 
political impact insofar as it indicates to the sovereign that, at least at this 
particular moment, he has authority to rule. And yet the very fact that the 
sovereign is acclaimed in this way presupposes an antecedent event, one that is 
internal and perspectival as opposed to objective. The acclaim of the people relies 
on a more fundamental transformation which must have already taken place: the 
people’s recognition of the sovereign is the silent forerunner, the real genesis of 
sovereignty, which gives rise to subsequent expressions of acclaim. 
Viewing sovereign power as reflexively determined has important 
implications for the possibility of narrativising moments of radical political 
change. In the same way that the transition from an imagined ‘state of nature’ to 
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political life cannot be rendered as chronologically consistent, the reflexive 
determination of sovereign authority cannot be thought as a linear process. As we 
have seen, when we subject the sovereign decision to proper scrutiny, we find that 
this ‘decision’ is nothing but a declaration, a claim to possess power, rather than 
an assertion of an already existing power. The crucial point here is that in the 
event that the people (or some non-sovereign actor) does indeed recognize the 
claim, it is not simply that the sovereign gains power through this recognition, 
but rather that the declaration itself is suddenly transformed into a decision. But 
why is this retroaction required by the notion of reflexive determination? 
Precisely because if the sovereign were transparently to receive his sovereign 
status from a non-sovereign actor, this would put him in a relation subordination 
to this actor. His power would be derived from another such that, instead of being 
the highest authority, he would only be a delegate of another higher power. It is 
therefore vital that the mechanism that generates the sovereign qua constituted 
power, remains opaque. If the people themselves were to be fully conscious of 
their role in recognizing sovereign power as legitimate, this would make 
constituted power impossible.  
We can arrive at the same conclusions by considering the other side of the 
Schmittian exception, that is, the state of normality that characterises the periods 
of political life between intermittent crises. If the sovereign is defined as the 
individual who decides upon a state of exception, are we not also obliged to 
recognise the obverse of this proposition, namely, that the citizens of the state, 
during un-exceptional politics, decide on a state of normality? That is to say, in 
order for normal politics to continue, it is enough that the citizens of the state 
presuppose a situation in which the application of law is not arbitrary but is 
consistent with certain pre-given principles. From this perspective, again, it is 
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clear that a normal situation is only actually suspended if individual citizens cease 
to presuppose normality. Schmitt himself seems to be aware of this difficulty and 
addresses the notion of a presupposed normal situation in the following passage: 
‘The norm requires a homogeneous medium. This effective normal situation is 
not a mere “superficial presupposition” that a jurist can ignore; that situation 
belongs precisely to its immanent validity.’95 The crux of the issue is whether a 
situation can be considered normal because of its immanent validity, or whether 
a normal situation is produced by the citizen’s presuppositions. For Kelsen, the 
validity of the basic norm is grounded in the fact that it is presupposed. If it ceases 
to be presupposed, the normal situation that is anchored in the validity of the 
basic norm dissolves. Alternatively, for Schmitt, the existence of a normal 
situation is a sovereign prerogative. A legal framework is only valid if a normal 
situation exists and the sovereign is the individual who decides ‘whether this 
normal situation actually exists.’96 Nonetheless, if we accept Marder’s point that 
the sovereign comes into being only with the decision, and moreover, if it is 
possible to view the sovereign as reflexively determined in the sense I have argued 
for above, it follows that a would-be-sovereign cannot unilaterally suspend 
normal politics. The efficacy of his decision requires a corresponding 
reconfiguration of the presuppositions of the people who constitute the state. 
Failure in this regard does not mark the sovereign as incompetent; this would be 
a contradiction in terms since competence is itself the defining feature of 
sovereignty.97 Instead, a ‘decision’ which fails to initiate a change in individual 
citizens’ presuppositions is a political ‘non-event’. This is the hidden dependency 
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which marks the relationship between sovereign and citizenry which Schmitt’s 
rhetorical invocation of theology is designed to obfuscate.  
These reflections provide greater clarity on the issue of Schmitt’s political 
theology. As already mentioned, Hans Blumenberg has argued that in his 
suggestion of an indivisible link between theological concepts and the concepts of 
modern political theology, Schmitt performs an unsupported manoeuvre 
whereby the metaphorical use of theological concepts is invested with a literal 
substance.98 Hammill takes up this thread, arguing that “Blumenberg’s point is 
to show that Schmitt justifies a political argument through a metaphor that he 
treats as if it were real.”99 Based on the account provided above, it is now possible 
to go further. The metaphor of the miracle serves Schmitt precisely because he 
wants to present the sovereign decision as self-sufficient, as a gesture which does 
not require ‘argumentative substantiation’ since it has ‘autonomous value’.100 If 
the sovereign is conceived as a secularized God-figure with the sovereign decision 
as a structural analogy to the miracle, it becomes tempting to view the decisive 
production of a state of exception as occurring ex nihilo. A miracle, conceived in 
the traditional Augustinian sense, does not require anything from humans, it 
does not even require their presence; a miracle turns humans into passive 
observers whose role is only to bear witness while their witnessing does not 
determine the status of the miracle qua miracle. By presenting the decision in 
terms of a miracle, Schmitt obfuscates the moment of reflexive determination of 
sovereign status which constitutes the radical democratic kernel of his argument. 
This disavowed aspect of Schmitt’s thought is not only found in his reflections on 
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the popular constitution-making power in Constitutional Theory but also in his 
Political Theology. Concealed behind Schmitt’s statements that the decision is 
analogous to a miracle is a more problematic assertion that the decision must be 
viewed as a miracle and this rhetorical injunction functions as a prohibition on 
thinking through Schmittian decisionism to its radical democratic conclusions. 
It is vital to grasp the implications of this revised Schmittian decision for 
our broader discussion of temporal complexity and the narrativisation of 
moments of radical political change. The implication of reading the decision as a 
miracle is that our narrativisation of the transition from normal to exceptional 
politics ends up containing a moment of scission in which, by virtue of a sovereign 
decision, everything suddenly changes. The narrative implications of a reflexively 
determined decision are entirely different. Instead of a sudden rupture, we are 
confronted with the retroactive efficacy of the people’s recognition of the 
sovereign. At the time of his announcement of a state of exception, the sovereign’s 
status is undecidable; but once this announcement has been recognised as 
emanating from a sovereign, the past itself is overdetermined such that the 
undecidable declaration becomes a unilateral sovereign decision. It can always be 
argued that the real locus of power is the people themselves (or whichever non-
sovereign actor recognises the declaration as legitimate) but this argument 
misses the point for the following reason: the mechanism of reflexive 
determination depends on the people’s misrecognition of the extent of their own 
participation. If the people were to become aware that it was only by virtue of 
their recognition that sovereign power could be ascribed, this would undermine 
in advance any pretence to sovereignty from a particular political actor. Even if 
any claim to sovereignty ultimately hinges on the recognition of non-sovereign 
actors, as soon as one seeks to narrativise the passage from normal to exceptional 
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politics one is also required to view the sovereign’s declaration/decision as the 
‘decisive moment’ as opposed to the people’s recognition. Viewing the latter as 
determining the former would entail the immediate undoing of constituted 
sovereignty itself. 
We have already seen how the first, crucial deviation from a strictly 
Schmittian political theology has been made by Honig through her deployment 
of Rosenzweig’s concept of the miracle. Rather than miracle as abrupt 
intervention, Rosenzweig views the miracle as requiring responsibility on the part 
of the believer. By substituting Rosenzweig’s miracle for Schmitt’s, Honig 
provides a valuable first step towards a radical democratic reading of the 
Schmittian sovereign decision. As Honig puts it:  
If the Rosenzweigian miracle rather than the Schmittian one is the metaphor's 
ground (the decision is like the miracle, yes, but it is like Rosenzweig's miracle not 
Schmitt's), we see that ‘decision’ in terms of popular orientations to the decision, its 
uptake, its impact, the plural, iterative effects and chains of actions begun by it, and 
its success, or not, in staging an encounter between a people and sovereign or 
prophetic powers that (as with their prophecy at Meribah) could be the people’s own 
powers. From this angle of vision, the decision testifies to an unsettling encounter 
with that which disrupts the binary of ordinary-extraordinary. Sovereignty looks 
more contestable than in Schmitt and Agamben, more democratic, more fraught, 
more fragile.101 
Honig points to the status of sovereignty as contestable, fraught and fragile—both 
the sovereign claim and the popular responsibility for receiving the claim are 
implicated in the passage of the decision. In contrast, the argument I have set out 
above pushes further in this direction than Honig is willing to travel. Reflexive 
determination does not mean that sovereignty is contestable; it carries the 
stronger suggestion that sovereignty is directly constituted through a moment of 
popular recognition. So long as the metaphor of the miracle is retained, the 
implied paradigm of sovereign decision-making will be one that views 
sovereignty as prior to, and separated from, everyday political activity. Only a 
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strict, unflinching materialism allows us to account for both sovereignty’s 
immanent genesis and its apparent transcendence. 
Understanding sovereign power as legitimated through a moment of 
reflexive determination also allows us to address a problematic outlined by 
Lefort: 
The theorist who analyses politics in terms of power relations cannot but ask himself 
how and why they stabilize in any given configuration in such a way that the 
dominant power does not have to exercise its authority openly […] how and why they 
appear to be legitimate and in accordance with the nature of things. Apparently, 
then, this problem is how to account for the internalization of domination.102 
The gesture through which legitimacy is fixed to a given political entity is not fully 
conscious to the actors involved; instead, it is the shift in the political 
community’s presuppositions concerning the centre of power. Not only does such 
a shift not require an open exercise of authority through a display of power, but 
such a display would already be a signal that various mechanisms of ideological 
capture had failed and that the citizenry do not spontaneously identify the (proto-
)sovereign as legitimate.103 Moreover, the ‘internalization of domination’ must be 
unconscious (or if not unconscious, then instantly forgotten, which would 
amount to the same thing). If it were not unconscious, political subjects would be 
able to recall the moment at which they voluntarily and consciously accepted 
power as anchored in a certain political entity with the implication that they 
would retain awareness of the sense in which their constitutive power (their 
priority vis-à-vis the sovereign) serves as the bedrock of political legitimacy. 
In arguing for an appreciation of a radical democratic moment in Schmitt’s 
political theology, I take an opposing view to Jeffrey W. Robbins who argues that 
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a progressive political theology must be one that has rid itself of the stain of 
Schmittian decisionism. Robbins outlines his position as follows: ‘it is my 
argument that Schmitt – and more specifically, his employment of political 
theology in opposition to democratic theory and practice – is the chief obstacle to 
political theology realizing its own radically democratic potential’.104 While I 
recognise both the broad common ground between Robbins’s project and my own 
(given that we are both ultimately concerned with the elaboration of a radical 
democratic, emancipatory politics), there are important distinctions between our 
respective approaches which need to be addressed. In the first instance, the 
charge of decisionism has all-too-often been employed as a pejorative term 
suggesting a latent fascist tendency or an unhealthy fascination with political 
violence. Robbins adopts this position, labelling Schmitt’s work as irredeemably 
decisionist so as to pass more quickly to a counterposition which would avoid 
proto-fascist tendencies. The stigma associated with Schmitt’s ‘decisionism’ has 
functioned as an impediment to further theoretical enquiry such that, in 
Robbins’s volume (which defines itself as an investigation into Schmitt’s 
employment of political theology), there are precious few references to Schmitt’s 
key texts. Instead, Schmitt’s alignment of God and sovereign is accepted without 
question and Robbins is left to stage a confrontation between Schmitt’s 
omnipotent sovereign and Hardt and Negri’s multitude. The alternative approach 
I have outlined above may provide a remedy. Instead of denouncing the 
Schmittian variant of theologico-political thought as an aberration, the more 
productive approach is to explore how decisionism itself falls apart when 
subjected to proper scrutiny. We have seen above how Schmitt’s ‘decisive 
                                                   
104 Jeffrey W. Robbins, Radical Democracy and Political Theology (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 2011), p. 15. 
176 
 
moment’, the moment at which sovereignty actualises itself through a decision, 
must rely on a moment of reflexive determination. Schmitt’s unilateral decider is 
a logical fallacy supported by a rhetorical edifice of theological tropes. This has 
been argued from the perspective of Kelsen’s legal theory which posits non-
sovereign actors (the demos, the masses) as capable of determining, through their 
behaviour, the sovereign status of a revolutionary party. The vital passage here is 
as follows: ‘if the old order ceases, and the new order begins to be efficacious, 
because the individuals whose behaviour the new order regulates actually behave, 
by and large, in conformity with the new order, then this order is considered as a 
valid order’.105 Likewise, for a Schmittian Sovereign the decision is an empty, 
meaningless gesture unless it is supplemented by a moment of recognition from 
non-sovereign actors. Having established the reflexively determined sovereign as 
a tenable interpretation of Schmittian thought, the task below will be to bolster 
this interpretation via a series of collisions between Schmitt’s ontology (a non-
positivist, self-grounding act of will) and corresponding Derridean and Laclauian 
remarks on the status of the foundation and the concept of the decision. Our 
particular interest will be in the quasi-transcendental status of the founding 
gesture that constitutes a new political community and its implications for the 
representability of the political Event. The thread that connects Schmitt to 
Derrida and Laclau is, on my reading, twofold. First, where Schmitt’s proto-
sovereign decision-maker always acts under initial conditions of uncertainty with 
respect to the outcome of his or her act, in Derrida and Laclau, uncertainty is at 
its most concentrated during the revolutionary passage. In both cases, political 
actors are required to decide under conditions of profound risk so as to bring 
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about a political transformation which will retroactively alter the status of their 
deed. Second, in both cases the act/decision is not representable from within the 
political space it gives rise to. 
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The Democratic a priori and Quasi-Transcendental Foundations 
Marder’s Groundless Existence provides an account of Schmitt’s notion of 
political ‘will’ from which his definition of sovereignty is derived: ‘Schmitt’s “will” 
is, merely, power in its actuality, an always already exteriorized expression of 
political existence, while power is an appellation for the effectivity of the will, 
which is not a withdrawn, noumenal cause but an active intervention in a given 
state of affairs’.106 ‘Will’ is not something curtailed or compromised from within; 
it is the unified pre-given source from which power emanates. Moreover, on 
Marder’s reading, ‘will’ is existentially present as the origin of a command.107 
Considering will in this way leads to the conclusions reached by Marder on the 
self-production or self-grounding of sovereignty based on an act of will. As has 
been mentioned above, Marder presents the hypothesis that, ‘political will and 
the sovereign qua sovereign come about as a result of the decision on the 
exception’.108 If sovereignty can be established through an act which is not 
vulnerable to external challenges, if the sole ‘ground’ for sovereignty is its own 
auto-posited ground, such a sovereign would be, in the moment it decides itself 
into existence, a self-determining or autonomous entity. Although the fully 
autonomous sovereign subject has already been challenged through the notion of 
reflexive determination, it is possible to raise a further objection based on 
Laclau’s identification of a tension pertaining to the concept of autonomy itself. 
In his New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time Laclau describes autonomy 
as the site of an insoluble tension: 
If an entity was totally autonomous, it would mean that it was totally self-
determined. But in that case the concept of autonomy would be completely 
redundant (what, exactly, would it be autonomous from?) On the other hand, if 
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autonomy was totally inexistent, the social entity in question would be completely 
determined. It would not, however, be something separate from that which 
determines it and the unsplittable ensemble of the determinant and the determined 
would obviously be self-determined. As can be seen, the notions of total 
determination and total autonomy are absolute equivalents. The concept of 
autonomy is only useful – or rather, meaningful – when neither of the two extremes 
(equivalents) is achieved.109 
If sovereignty were able to unilaterally actualise itself in a single, unimpeded 
gesture, we would be dealing with notion of sovereignty endowed with full 
autonomy. It is this logic that informs the Hobbesian image of the Leviathan—a 
single entity which cannot be separated from the individuals that comprise it. 
Strictly speaking, there is no representation in Hobbes; instead, the covenant 
produces ‘more than Consent, or Concord; [the Sovereign] is a reall Unitie of 
them all, in one and the same Person’.110 Here, Hobbes conforms to Laclau’s logic 
of pure autonomy. If the sovereign is to be absolutely autonomous, he will then 
be identical to the multitude of political subjects over which he governs. Absolute 
autonomy leads to ‘reall Unitie’ by way of logical necessity. 
With respect to Schmitt, Laclau’s logic applies to the specific moment at 
which a state of exception is decided upon and at which, as I have argued above, 
a sovereign comes into existence. If, during periods of normal politics, law 
provides a check on the autonomy of all members of the political community, 
during the state of exception the sovereign occupies the position of law and his 
will acquires the force of law. A Schmittian sovereign thus occupies one pole of 
the aporia outlined by Laclau. Such a sovereign is able to directly will itself into 
being, but since this implies a moment of absolute autonomy we are also forced 
by the logic of Laclau’s formulation to view the entire socio-political ensemble as 
a single self-determining entity. To put this another way, if we assume that there 
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is no countervailing pressure from the demos and that the auto-generation of 
sovereign authority occurs frictionlessly, then it becomes impossible to view the 
demos as a separate entity from the sovereign. Both sovereign and demos are 
united as a single acting entity. It is thus not merely the sovereign who is 
implicated in the decision, but the entire social body. It is precisely at the most 
radical limit of Laclau’s heteronomy/autonomy nexus that the poles collapse into 
one another and we see the co-implication of the various political elements in the 
very gesture through which sovereignty is crystallised. What we discover in 
Laclau is additional ballast for a moment of reflexive determination which I have 
sought to advance as an essential, but previously ignored, aspect of the 
Schmittian sovereign’s self-grounding act as we find it in Political Theology. The 
act by which sovereignty grounds itself cannot be thought as such unless we also 
include the political grouping over whom the sovereign will be effective. It is an 
aspect I consider to be a democratic a priori in the sense that it designates the 
necessary implication of the entire political community in any act seeking to 
reconfigure the boundaries of the normative space set out in the original contract 
or constitution. Attempts at reconfiguration are always minimally reliant on the 
willingness, or acquiescence, of the population. The appearance of sovereign 
power is not an essential quality of an individual, but emerges from the 
imbrication of the constituents of the body politic as per the famous image of the 
Hobbesian sovereign whose immensity is an effect of the accumulation of the 
individual citizens comprising him.111 
As has been shown above, the proper strategy with respect to Schmitt’s 
‘decisionism’ is not to denounce it unequivocally as symptomatic of his fascist 
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sympathies, but rather to show how one can arrive at a politically progressive 
position precisely by following the practical and logical implications of Schmitt’s 
statements on the decision. Through such a strategy it becomes possible to read 
Schmitt against the grain, thereby identifying the unassimilable democratic 
kernel lodged at the centre of the Schmittian theoretical edifice. The most 
valuable feature of Schmitt’s project for our purposes is the way he conceives an 
exit from a normal political situation. Since Schmitt’s theory does not present any 
criteria as to where sovereignty should emanate from, and since we have no way 
of deciding in advance who might be a candidate for sovereignty, it follows that 
the decision to suspend normal politics can in principle emerge from anywhere.  
We have noted above that the process of reflexive determination forces us 
to think through the retroactive efficacy of the recognition of sovereignty by a 
non-sovereign actor. This dynamic can be elucidated through reference to 
Derrida’s account of the American Declaration of Independence. In his 
‘Declarations of Independence’, Derrida makes the following observation:  
The ‘we’ of the declaration speaks ‘in the name of the people’. But this people does 
not yet exist. [...] If it gives birth to itself, as free and independent subject, as possible 
signer [of the Declaration], this can hold only in the act of the signature. The 
signature invents the signer. This signer can only authorize him- or herself to sign 
once he or she has come to the end, if one can say this, of his or her own signature, 
in a sort of fabulous retroactivity.112 
The problem Derrida notes is that the conditions required for the event of signing 
to take place are only logically conceivable as an effect of the event. There is no 
pre-existing norm which could authorise the signers prior to the act of signing 
since it is only by virtue of their signature that they exist as a political entity. This 
forces us to view their signature as retroactively altering the status of the act of 
signing. It is not so much that the signers are unable to sign the contract, but 
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rather that they cannot be authorised to do so. Just as we saw with the proto-
sovereign declarer in Schmitt, Derrida’s founder’s act is illegitimate in the 
moment of its performance. 
In both Schmitt and Derrida we find a founding event containing a 
moment which resists chronological exposition.113 As soon as one attempts to 
construct a complete chronological ordering one encounters a paradox. This is 
because, as Ricoeur argues in his Time and Narrative, every attempt to render 
pasts events as an intelligible narrative automatically supplies a logic of 
emplotment: ‘[The plot of a narrative] “grasps together” and integrates into one 
whole and complete story multiple and scattered events, thereby schematizing 
the intelligible signification attached to narrative taken as a whole’.114 This 
‘grasping together’ reduces the contingency of the events that are being narrated 
and subordinates the succession of events to certain logical connections. For 
example, if event A serves as the condition of event B, A must occur before B. 
Moreover, one cannot then say that A both serves as the condition for, and is 
caused by, event B since this collapses the sequence proper to narrative time. As 
soon as one disobeys this temporal logic of narrative development one ends up 
compromising the intelligibility of the narrative itself. For Ricoeur this indicates 
a transcultural mimetic link between time and narrative:  
[B]etween the activity of narrating a story and the temporal character of human 
experience there exists a correlation that is not merely accidental but that presents a 
transcultural form of necessity. To put it another way, time becomes human to the 
extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode, and narrative attains its full 
meaning when it becomes a condition of temporal experience.115 
                                                   
113 This is akin to what E. E. Berns refers to as the ‘constitutive lack of completeness […] a fold, 
an empty place, a dislocation’. E. E. Berns, ‘Decision, Hegemony and Law: Derrida and Laclau’, 
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114 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, trans. by Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer 
(London: University of Chicago Press, 1984), I, p. x. 
115 Ricoeur, I, p. 52. 
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An obstacle to successful narrativisation would be an event which was both 
required by the narrative and impossible to situate within it. Such an event would 
entail a failure in the successive ordering proper to narrative and, indeed, it is 
precisely such failed ordering that we find in Schmitt and Derrida which the latter 
terms the moment’s ‘mystique’.116 There is a sense that no amount of additional 
knowledge will allow for a proper ordering of the narrative elements, that there is 
an inherent resistance to narrativisation. Moreover, this resistance does not only 
occur when thinking through real examples of political discontinuity (the 
Declaration of Independence, the French Revolution, and so on) but can also be 
detected in speculative anthropological accounts (such as we saw with Rousseau 
and Hobbes in the previous chapter) aiming to account for the foundation of 
politics or society. 
A similar logic applies to both Schmitt’s sovereign decision and to 
Derrida’s founding act. Since a revolution involves a re-foundation, a momentary 
reactivation of the state of openness which characterised the original instituting 
act, it must also, in some sense, authorise itself. As Derrida argues: 
A ‘successful’ revolution, the ‘successful foundation of a state’ (in somewhat the same 
sense that one speaks of a ‘felicitous performative speech act’) will produce après 
coup what it was already destined in advance to produce, namely, proper interpretive 
models to read in return, to give sense, necessity and above all legitimacy to the 
violence that has produced, among others, the interpretive model in question, that 
is, the discourse of its self-legitimation.117 
The phrase ‘discourse of self-legitimation’ is crucial here. It is clear enough that 
for a revolutionary movement to be successful, it must draw impetus from a 
discourse that legitimises its activity. But it is equally clear that such a discourse 
must also be produced by this very activity. This is a problem insofar as a 
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legitimating discourse needs to be anchored in a ground or founding truth which 
goes beyond it. If a revolutionary gesture were transparently self-grounding there 
would be no way it could appear to be legitimate, not even to the revolutionary 
actors themselves, since the very logic of legitimation requires an immutable 
legitimating bedrock which is external to, and unaffected by, that upon which it 
confers legitimacy. A pure decisionism would involve a transparently self-
grounding act. In contrast, if a revolutionary act can be considered self-grounding 
in a way that is opaque to the actors involved, this may allow us to conceptualise 
radical political transformations which do not encounter the problems of pure 
decisionism. 
In contradistinction to a pure decisionism, I argue that Derrida formulates 
a notion of revolutionary action which involves a quasi-transcendental gesture 
where this ‘quasi’ serves to indicate, as Marchart argues, ‘that all transcendental 
conditions will always emerge out of particular empirico-historical 
conjunctures.’118 The quasi-transcendental operation thus consists in a 
misrecognition which casts one’s own historically conditioned claim as a trans-
historical postulate. This is evident in the following passage in which Derrida 
refers to the moment of a new political order’s institution: 
Here we ‘touch’ without touching this extraordinary paradox: the inaccessible 
transcendence of the law before which and prior to which ‘man’ stands fast only 
appears infinitely transcendent and thus theological to the extent that, so near to 
him, it depends only on him, on the performative act by which he institutes it: the 
law is transcendent, violent and non-violent, because it depends only on who is 
before it - and so prior to it, and who produces it, founds it, authorizes it in an 
absolute performative whose presence escapes him.119 
Although there are points at which Derrida seems to cast law as transcending 
human activity, the proper task is to emphasise Derrida’s claim that law appears 
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as transcendent to man precisely because it is ‘so near to him’. Insofar as the very 
notion of legitimacy demands a distance between the particular act and the 
ground that legitimates it, the revolutionary act must perform a double 
manoeuvre that both launches a re-articulation of the concepts of freedom, 
justice, and equality, as well as positing a transcendental ground which serves to 
legitimise this re-articulation. Crucially, this posited ground, in order to perform 
its legitimating function, must be perceived as immutable by the revolutionaries 
themselves even while it originates from their own activity. We are thus able to 
introduce a minimal, but all important, distance between pure decisionism and 
the decision associated with a quasi-transcendental gesture. In the case of pure 
decisionism, the content of the decision is transparent to the decider. There is no 
standard against which the decision could be held except the will of this individual 
since it transparently originates with their own act. In contrast, a quasi-
transcendental decision includes both a particular content that is decided upon 
and a new standard against which this content will be measured. But even though 
this new standard issues directly from the revolutionaries’ activity, the experience 
of the production of the new standard is not recoverable after the event as a freely 
willed act. Attempting to retrospectively plot the revolutionary transformation as 
a consistent narrative therefore necessarily results in failure; instead of 
recapturing the decisive moment between the build-up and the aftermath, the 
moment at which things ‘really happened’, we always encounter a moment of 
circularity (or unrepresentability) insofar as the evental change requires its result 
to serve as its precondition. In contrast, if the identification of the moment of 
transformation were possible, this would be a sure sign that one were no longer 
within the political order established by the founding act. 
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Laclau finds an analogy to the moment of political origin in debates 
concerning the status of zero in relation to the order of number: ‘Everything turns 
around the role of the zero. The zero is, we are told, something radically 
heterogeneous with the order of number. The order of number, however, cannot 
constitute itself without reference to the zero. It is, in this sense, a supplement to 
the system which, nonetheless, is necessary for constituting it.’120 Zero is required 
in order to ground the system of number. If it is possible to conceive of plurality, 
it must also be possible to conceive of a total subtraction, and yet after this 
subtraction we would be left with zero, a term which is not representable in terms 
of plurality but which is nonetheless logically required as soon as we begin to 
think number as a system. Without the term ‘zero’ we would have no expression 
for the absence of quantity and would be left in the absurd position of describing 
absence in terms of a tendency towards infinite scarcity. However, the price of 
this use of zero is the introduction of heterogeneity into the order of number: 
‘With respect to the system, the zero is an undecidable tension between 
internality and externality - but an internality that does not exclude 
heterogeneity. The zero, in the second place, is ‘innommable’, unnameable; but 
at the same time it produces effects, it closes the system, even at the price of 
making it hopelessly heterogeneous.’121 Moreover, Laclau points out that ‘zero’, 
despite naming the absence of number, must be represented as number, always 
appearing in the guise of a ‘one’. 
This feature of the analogy between the order of number and the founding 
act that constitutes a political order allows us to segue into a discussion 
concerning an issue we have touched upon in various places above: that of 
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representability. Constituting the order of number depends on the inclusion of an 
element, the zero, which is heterogeneous with respect to the order of number 
and therefore not representable within that order. The representation of the 
absence of number is therefore both necessary and impossible, requiring a 
subjective gesture Laclau refers to as a ‘tropological substitution.’122 The 
equivalent of the tropological substitution in the political arena would be, for 
Laclau, the hegemonic operation which fills formally empty notions of freedom, 
justice, equality, and so on, with their particular content. Laclau notes that a 
certain repression accompanies the origin, leading to a moment of 
unrepresentability: ‘Insofar as an act of institution has been successful, a 
‘forgetting of the origins’ tends to occur: the system of possible alternatives tends 
to vanish and the traces of the original contingency to fade. In this way, the 
instituted tends to assume the form of mere objective presence’.123 As this 
quotation indicates, Laclau’s point is that each founding moment includes a 
gesture of exclusion through which alternative historical trajectories are ruled 
out. Moreover, the revolutionaries must transcendentalize (that is, posit as 
transcendental instead of empirical) the ground which will then serve to 
legitimate their activity. It is this aspect of the subject’s revolutionary activity 
which leads Laclau to a definition of the subject as ‘the distance between the 
undecidable structure and the decision’.124 The act is hegemonic in the sense that 
it excludes possible alternatives, but it is quasi-transcendental in the sense that it 
obscures its own site of origin. If the hegemonic operation could be transparently 
fixed to the willed activity of the revolutionary subjects themselves, their political 
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endeavours would be self-grounding in a decisionistic sense that would 
undermine any claim to legitimacy; only insofar as it is also quasi-transcendental 
are we able to preserve its radical status without slipping into a decisionistic 
position. To clarify this last point, both decisionistic and quasi-transcendental 
perspectives on the act recognise that it is self-grounding, however, while for 
decisionism the act grounds itself in a way that is transparent to the actor 
concerned, a quasi-transcendental act (or, indeed, a reflexively determined 
sovereign decision) involves a gesture which is necessarily opaque. 
Reflexive determination does not mean that non-sovereign actors can 
actively choose whether the proto-sovereign decider is actually a sovereign; 
instead, recognition is pre-reflective, occurring as a spontaneous response to 
declarations emanating from the site where sovereign competence seems to 
reside. The formulation of a response (taking the form of an endorsement, or 
complicity, or resistance) by non-sovereign entities to a sovereign declaration 
indicates that we are already beyond the point at which determination occurs 
since the proto-sovereign declarer would now have been recognised as one to 
whom endorsement, complicity, or resistance may be due. One can see how 
Laclau’s notion of constitutive distortion might be deployed here. Precisely 
insofar as the moment of reflexive determination is not an active decision, and 
insofar as it is not recoverable as a free act after the event, it can be viewed as an 
instance of constitutive distortion. Laclau provides the following exposition: 
It is certainly inherent to all distortion that a 'primary' meaning is presented under 
a 'false' light. The operation this presentation involves - concealment, deformation, 
or whatever - is something that we can leave indeterminate for the time being. What 
is essential to distortion is, first, that a primary meaning is presented as something 
different from what it is, and, second, that the distortive operation - not only its 
results - has to be somehow visible. This last point is crucial: if the distortive 
operation does not leave any traces in its result, it will succeed in constituting a new 
meaning. But what we are dealing with is a constitutive distortion. That is, we are 
both positing an original meaning (as is required by distortion) and withdrawing it 
(for the distortion is constitutive). In that case, the only logical possibility of pulling 
together these two apparently antinomic dimensions is if the original meaning is 
189 
 
illusory and the distortive operation consists precisely in creating that illusion - that 
is, projecting into something that is essentially divided the illusion of a fullness and 
self-transparency that it lacks.125 
It will be clear by now that one of the overarching themes of this thesis involves 
the idea of distortion, in particular, distortions arising in our narrative or 
theoretical account of political origins. Laclau’s notion of constitutive distortion 
can yield important insights in this regard. When looking at distortions arising 
from narratives of political origins, our spontaneous response might be, as Laclau 
suggests, to presuppose an original, undistorted narrative which would be 
rendered accessible through additional scrutiny. The problem that emerges, as 
we have seen, is that as soon as we try to recapture this undistorted content the 
result becomes ethically unacceptable to us. Faced with this impasse, one can 
either accept the ethical vacuity of political foundations (every attempt to 
constitute a political space is simply a decisionistic imposition in spite of any 
apparently ethical program), or one can positively re-assert the necessity of the 
distortion as essential to the founding moment in its ethical/normative 
dimension. As should be clear, I am advocating the latter position. Viewing 
narratives of founding moments as comprising a constitutive distortion means 
that there can be no recourse to platitudes on the objective meaning of the 
founding event. To take the example of the proto-sovereign declaration, the 
declaration itself has no objective meaning which could exceed or stabilise the 
political field as a whole; on the contrary, the declaration’s overdetermination by 
the recognition of a non-sovereign entity must lead us to the conclusion that the 
declaration itself is essentially undecidable. Not only does it receive its meaning 
from an outside source, but this meaning can never be fully stabilized but will 
always be exposed to the possibility of overdetermination. If the closure of the 
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political field is impossible, every operation that aims at closure will necessarily 
suffer from deformations, and it is precisely such deformations that arise in 
narrative efforts to grasp the passage between political orders.126 
The key conclusion of the arguments presented above is that one can arrive 
at an account of political change from a radical materialist perspective. Such a 
perspective avoids both theologically derived concepts since, as we have seen 
above, there is no necessary structural resemblance between political 
transformations and miracles, and a reductionist, vulgar materialism which 
would eradicate the possibility of radical change itself. The reading of Schmitt’s 
Political Theology I have proposed above precludes the possibility of a 
(theologically informed) pure decisionism, arguing instead for a reflexively 
determined decision in which the demos are perforce implicated. Reading 
Schmitt in this way allows us to reintroduce the constituent power of the people 
so long as this power is not viewed as the property of a conscious, self-identical 
agent and so long as the moment of constituent power remains beyond the reach 
of narrative. Temporal complexity (the impossibility of chronological ordering) 
in both narrative and theoretical accounts of radical political change is the 
necessary correlate of political action viewed from a radical materialist position.
                                                   





Alain Badiou’s Divided Event 
‘The truth will set you free. But not until it’s finished with you.’ 
 





The fundamental imperative for philosophy, as understood by Alain Badiou, is to 
rigorously and systematically think through the immanent emergence of newness 
from a historical situation.1 Throughout his corpus, from his early collaborations 
with Sylvain Lazarus to his ground-breaking Being and Event, Badiou has sought 
to elaborate a philosophical system marrying an uncompromising materialism 
with a compelling advocacy of the real existence of truths. It is a project which 
sets Badiou against the tide of postmodern thought, a tradition Badiou regards as 
the most recent contribution to an anti-philosophical tendency that prioritizes an 
intuitive, as opposed to conceptual, access to ‘what there is’. For anti-philosophy, 
one cannot make propositional statements about the ‘stuff’ of reality; anti-
philosophical ontologies necessarily fails insofar as some vital dimension (such 
as Kierkegaard’s subjective inwardness; Nietzsche’s Life; Deleuze’s animality) 
eludes its grasp. In contrast, Badiou understands ontology as fundamental to any 
philosophical project; one’s ontological position (even if this position is simply 
one that avoids ontological propositions) will be a determining factor in all other 
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areas of one’s philosophy. This is particularly true for Badiou whose arche-
ontological statement is that mathematics is ontology and that set theory in 
particular discloses the laws of being qua being.2 Occasionally Badiou even 
explicitly frames the opposition between philosophy and anti-philosophy as 
reducible to the question of whether mathematics can allow us to formulate 
ontological propositions. If we affirm that it can, this would also allow us to also 
conclude that ‘being is not necessarily foreclosed to all proposition’.3 From this 
ontological foundation, Badiou embarks on a philosophical project that avoids 
relying on a theologically derived reassertion of the One whilst setting out a 
refined, non-reductive concept of the subject. 
As an attempt to think newness from the perspective of an atheistic 
ontology, Badiou’s work is clearly relevant to this enquiry given our interest the 
possibility of the emergence of newness and the occurrence of radical 
transformations. In Kierkegaard, the ‘new thing’ is a subjective insight which 
serves to ground a new commitment. Likewise, in Hobbes and Rousseau, we 
noted the impossibility of an incremental passage from an imagined ‘state of 
nature’ to political life; the new political human and the social contract emerge 
together in a way that resists chronological ordering. The previous chapter asked 
whether thinking through the notion of foundation, and especially political 
foundations, drives thought towards a paradigm that reproduces theological 
structures. Our reading of Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen, and Ernesto Laclau 
provided a way of viewing political events as both emerging immanently from 
human activity whilst nonetheless irrecuperable as such. Themes of temporality, 
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transformation, and subjective activity/passivity have served as guiding 
coordinates for our discussion. As such, even if Badiou’s use of set theory 
distinguishes him from the thinkers discussed in previous chapters, his 
importance as an interlocutor in philosophical debates concerning political 
change will emerge clearly in what follows. 
The urgency of thinking through the possible emergence of newness is 
compounded by the current state of philosophy, which Badiou characterises in 
terms of ‘malaise’ and ‘depletion’.4 Urging philosophy to ‘break with historicism’, 
Badiou argues that philosophy’s current predicament involves an entanglement 
with sophistry such that the two become indistinguishable. ‘Sophists’, for Badiou, 
‘are those for whom the fundamental opposition is not between truth and error, 
or errancy, but between speech and silence, that is, between that which can be 
said and that which it is impossible to say’.5 The philosopher undertakes to think 
rigorously the possibility of truth whereas the sophist claims there is no truth, 
only conventions, rules, discourse, and so on.6 The definition of philosophy which 
Badiou takes to be a ‘historical invariant’ is thus that ‘the central category of any 
possible philosophy is the category of truth.’7 This does not mean philosophy 
gives rise to truths. There are four conditions or registers within which truths 
emerge (Politics, Love, Art, and Science) but philosophy is not among them; 
rather, philosophy is the effort to think the formal characteristics of operations 
that produce or seize truths from within these four conditions.8 ‘Seizure’, as we 
will see, is a vital but difficult notion here. This is because truths are not available 
to sense. They cannot be experienced, but rather, they are both the vanishing 
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6 Badiou, Conditions, p. 8. 
7 Badiou, Conditions, p. 8. 
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point of reference for a subject’s ‘seizing’ as well as that ‘by which [the subject] is 
seized’.9 Whether we will be able to successfully reconcile these dichotomic 
aspects of truth’s seizure remains to be seen.  
Thinking newness philosophically will turn out not to be a neutral 
endeavour. The ‘newness’ Badiou describes, far from being conceived simply in 
terms of addition, is to be thought of as an Idea which instigates a new 
perspective. This is how we should understand the claim made in Badiou’s Second 
Manifesto for Philosophy that ‘The ultimate philosophical theme is that of the 
Idea’.10 Philosophy declares the interrelation, even the identity of life and the Idea 
for the living subject. We are thus dealing with a philosophy fundamentally 
concerned with the notion of commitment. Without too much distortion, one can 
translate this into Kierkegaardian terminology and argue that the key purpose of 
philosophy is to think through the passage from the aesthetic (a life pursuing 
small pleasures and fleeting moments of satisfaction) through the ethical, to the 
religious. While Badiou, as a materialist, would resist framing commitment in 
terms of religiosity, there is a clear parallel to be made between Badiou’s 
committed subject who gives up his own concerns and interests for the sake of an 
absolute task, and the Kierkegaardian individual who is ‘sensately and psychically 
qualified in immediacy [but who] has his [telos] in the universal […] it is his 
ethical task continually to express himself in this, to annul his singularity in order 
to become the universal’.11 For both thinkers, newness and commitment to the 
new are fundamental themes. The distinction is that, for Badiou, philosophy 
declares the indiscernibility of life and Idea, whereas Kierkegaard’s anti-
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philosophical orientation (anti-philosophical, that is, according to Badiou’s 
understanding of philosophy’s task) is a response to the Danish Hegelian 
‘systematisers’ for whom there is no space for real existing individuals and no 
requirement for the idea of an absolute commitment. 
In keeping with the approach developed in previous chapters, this chapter 
will not attempt to provide a complete overview of Badiou’s philosophy. Rather, 
it examines how Badiou’s theory advances, inflects, and questions our enquiry 
into the complex temporalities involved in thinking through the moment of 
political change. The chapter is split into three sections. First, I provide a concise 
summary of Badiou’s ontology focusing on its origins in set theory. This analysis 
serves as a springboard for a discussion of the most pertinent aspects of Badiou’s 
philosophical enterprise for our enquiry.12  The second section analyses these 
aspects, looking at the tandem concepts of the event and subject with a view to 
extracting the implied understanding of temporality entailed by an ‘evental’ 
philosophy of history. The question of the role of the subject is central here. Given 
that events give rise to subjects, it is important to consider the extent to which a 
subject is active or passive vis-à-vis the occurrence of an event. In the case of a 
passive subject who bears witness to the evental occurrence, we are left with a 
politically impotent theory likely to give rise to quietism as well as a notion of the 
event as emanating from an inaccessible beyond (a reversion to theological 
thinking by Badiou’s own standards).13 In contrast, if we are dealing with an 
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active subject who produces events, do we not return to an excessively voluntarist 
notion of the subject aligned with that of decisionism? I will argue that this 
dichotomy can only be avoided if we are willing to risk an interpretation of Badiou 
which asserts temporal heterogeneity. That is to say, both quietism and 
decisionism are artefacts of a linear temporal model of transformation. Once 
transformation is characterised in terms of circularity, we are able to formulate 
the event in such a way that outflanks charges of both decisionism and quietism. 
Finally, the third part of this chapter investigates some of the intersections 
between thinkers already discussed and Badiou. We have already seen how the 
pre-contractual ‘subject’ of Rousseau’s state of nature cannot be thought capable 
of instigating the foundation of a political community without the aid of the 
legislator. Does this enable us to conclude with Christopher Watkin that 
Rousseau’s ‘social contract is an event in Badiou’s sense’ insofar as it ‘is not 
guided or circumscribed by the facts of the situation within which it is 
proclaimed’?14 And if so, are we also to follow Hallward’s identification of the 
legislator as a Badiouian subject?15 Mobilising Badiou’s innovative approach to 
political change can yield important insights when applied to the paradoxes 
associated with change and newness that have emerged from my analysis of 
Kierkegaard, Hobbes, Rousseau, Schmitt, and Laclau. In the following reading of 
the concepts of the subject and the event, we will work towards a clearer 
understanding of Badiou’s contribution to a tradition of thought concerned with 
developing an uncompromisingly materialist account of the recrudescence of the 
New. My contention is that the Badiouian account of the emergence of newness 
relies on a temporal model that requires a moment of narrative failure in a 
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manner similar to that which appears in Kierkegaard, Hobbes, Rousseau, and 
Schmitt. The Badiouian Event is shown to be composed of two conceptually 
distinct moments (Adrian Johnston calls these ‘event1’ and ‘event2’) while these 
moments themselves prove to be resistant to narrative ordering. Just as in 
Rousseau, an effect is required to serve as the precondition for its cause. If the 
architecture of Badiouian philosophy contains much that distinguishes him from 
the thinkers considered in previous chapters, the ultimate insight he arrives at 
reproduces a similar paradox concerning the narrativisation of radical political 
change. 
 Given that Badiou has devoted several volumes to his exposition of the 
ontological import of set theory, it will be difficult to deal with the topic 
comprehensively in the limited space we have here. Moreover, for the sake of 
clarity, I will introduce set theory via analogies and examples as opposed to 
reproducing the algebraic demonstrations provided by Badiou in Being and 
Event and Number and Numbers. While this strategy risks losing some of the 
rigor and subtlety of Badiou’s own investigations, it is justifiable given that our 
task is not to engage directly with the proposed metaontological value of set 




Set Theoretic Ontology 
In Being and Event, Badiou stresses the vital role of set theory for his 
philosophical project: ‘Set theory sheds light on the fecund frontier between the 
whole/parts relation and the one/multiple relation; because, at base, it 
suppresses both of them. The multiple—whose concept thinks without defining 
its signification—for a post-Cantorian is neither supported by the existence of the 
one nor unfolded as an organic totality’.16 Set theory thus allows thought to 
engage with being qua being without positing either an upper limit (everything, 
the Whole) or a lower limit (some indivisible elementary particle or fundamental 
substance). Badiou is then able to develop his idea of ‘actual infinity’—that is, a 
laicized, material/natural infinity more often designated ‘pure multiplicity’—as 
opposed to the infinite and transcendent God presiding over a material realm 
characterized by finitude. 
To see how this works, consider Hallward’s remark that set theory’s 
fundamental proposition is that it is possible regard any collection of elements 
(objects, concepts, units of any description) as a single, discrete entity.17 Elements 
are defined only by virtue of their belonging to a particular set, and each element 
of a given set is a set in its own right. Now, consider a mundane set: the words on 
this page.  We now deal with both a set (the words on this page) the elements (the 
words themselves) but also a series of subsets such as all the words on this page 
beginning with ‘t’, all the words with more than four letters, and so on. It is 
important to grasp the distinction between the elements that belong to the set 
which, in this case, are finite, and the subsets which are included in the set. 
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Belonging (of elements to sets) and inclusion (of subsets in sets) are entirely 
different modes of relation and their difference has important implications. That 
an element belongs to a set is the condition of the presentation of that element, 
which is to say that elements only exist insofar as they belong to a set. With 
respect to inclusion, it would be possible to come up with a lengthy list of subsets 
of a given set (such as the words on this page). We might then go further and posit 
a set of all these subsets. This would be the power-set. As Badiou puts it: ‘The 
power-set axiom posits that this second count, this metastructure, always exists 
if the first count, or presentative structure, exists’.18 Crucially for Badiou, this 
‘power set’ would be larger than the original set. Not only would there be a vast 
variety of different imaginable sets (words beginning with ‘t’, words with more 
than four letters, words that begin a sentence, words inside an arbitrarily drawn 
circle on the page, and so on) but the elements contained in the original set would 
be contained many times over in the various the subsets. In the case of finite sets, 
the power set (the set of all the subsets) is measurable. As Hallward informs us, 
‘given a finite set with n elements, the number of its subsets or parts is 2 to the 
power of n. […] A set with nine members has 512 (i.e., 29) parts.’19 Moreover, there 
is a sense in which the power-set ‘completes’ the initial set. As a metastructure 
comprising all possible combinations of elements, it gathers together all the ‘sub-
compositions of internal multiples’.20 
There is a distinction to be made between approaches to set theory which 
are based on an intensional selection process and an extensional selection 
process.21 For axiomatic set theory, we are dealing with extensionality. That 
                                                   
18 Badiou, Being and Event, p. 83. 
19 Hallward, p. 89. 
20 Badiou, Being and Event, p. 83. 
21 Hallward, pp. 85–86; Mary Tiles, The Philosophy of Set Theory: An Introduction to Cantor’s 
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means that the only consideration in the determination of a set is the elements of 
the set. An intensional principle of selection would require some concept or pre-
given criterion for the determination of an element’s belonging to a set. This 
would mean recognising some necessity, some guiding constraint on what (or 
indeed who) can belong to a set. Extensionality, in contrast, recognises the 
contingency of belonging. An extensional conception of set would allow us to 
arbitrarily select a collection of words, letters, or sentences, and call this 
collection a set.22 This would be prohibited by an intensional principle of 
selection. 
Let us briefly return and add emphasis to a point made above. The 
elements in the set are presented, which is to say, they exist insofar as they belong 
to a set. We can also take any subset and point to the existence of the elements of 
that set. Presentation is therefore defined by Badiou as ‘multiple being as it is 
effectively deployed’.23 Re-presentation is something quite different from 
presentation. It is the ‘mode of counting, or of structuration, proper to the state 
of the situation’.24 Elements of a set, simply by virtue of belonging to a set, are 
presented. Subsets (sometimes called ‘parts’) are only re-presented if they are 
counted by the state of the situation. As we have said, the number of subsets is 
excessive with respect to the number of elements. In fact, in historical situations, 
the number of subsets would be innumerable, meaning that it would be 
impossible to represent all subsets. 
Why is this distinction between belonging and inclusion so important? If 
we accept the absolute distinction between the initial set and the power-set of all 
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the subsets within this set, and moreover, if we deduce with Badiou that ‘inclusion 
is in irremediable excess of belonging’, this will allow us to understand Badiou’s 
specific notion of ‘knowledge’ and the connected but thoroughly distinct notion 
of ‘truth’.25 Knowledge refers to the set’s classified and re-presented subsets. 
Since the collection of a set’s subsets is vastly greater than the sum of its elements, 
knowledge is inevitably doomed to a partial re-presentation, a re-presentation 
that captures some, but not all, of the subsets. To refer back to our example of the 
set of the words on this page, knowledge would be the effort to classify each 
possible subset such that the entire power-set were exhaustively categorized. This 
would be achievable since there are a finite number of words on the page and 
therefore a finite number of combinations of words that could be grouped 
together. But in human situations the situation is far more complex. The elements 
in a given set may be infinite or may be hard to determine. So, for instance, if we 
were to ask for the power-set of all the objects on this page, we would be dealing 
with one in which the elements are far more difficult to delimit. Words, 
punctuation, letters, the curves and lines that constitute the letters, and so on, 
could all be considered elements (and, indeed, sets in their own right). The size 
of the set thus depends on what we mean by object, what will be counted-as-one. 
Once this is established, we have a consistent multiplicity of ‘many-ones’ and 
knowledge is the necessarily incomplete organization and classification of these 
ones into subsets.  
The idea of the count as a gesture that produces a count-as-one (a 
presented element) allows us to explore another vital concept: that of the void. In 
Being and Event, Badiou makes the counter-intuitive claim that ‘void’ is the 
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proper name of being. This initially appears as an odd statement given that we 
have already characterised being in terms of sets, elements, subsets, and so on, 
all of which give the impression of a unicity which seems to jar with the term void. 
So how does Badiou account for this discrepancy? He begins by noting that the 
structure of a situation (the presented multiple) is split into ‘consistency (the 
composition of ones) and inconsistency (the inertia of the domain)’.26 Now, 
because only that which is counted in a situation is presented in that situation, 
we can also deduce, following Badiou, that ‘nothing is presentable in a situation 
otherwise than under the effect of structure’.27 Every element of a set is a count-
for-one with respect to the set. It is also a set in its own right with respect to the 
elements that comprise it. In equating being with the void, Badiou is performing 
a logical operation along the following lines: 
1) Every set is a set insofar as it is comprised of elements. 
2) Every element is a count-for-one. 
3) Prior to the count-for-one, the one is not. 
Badiou is very careful not to positivise, as a kind of raw matter or primordial 
substance, this ‘prior to’ since this would be precisely the counting operation that 
would produce a ‘count-as-one’, thus bringing that which is supposed to be prior 
to a situation into a situation and cancelling its status as remainder. The difficulty 
is described as follows: 
[I]f, in the immanence of a situation, its inconsistency does not come to light, 
nevertheless, its count-as-one being an operation itself indicates that the one is a 
result. Insofar as the one is a result, by necessity ‘something’ of the multiple does not 
absolutely coincide with the result. To be sure, there is no antecedence of the 
multiple which would give rise to presentation because the latter is always already-
structured such that there is only oneness or consistent multiples. But this ‘there is’ 
leaves a remainder: the law in which it is deployed is discernible as operation. And 
although there is never anything other—in a situation—than the result (everything, 
in the situation, is counted), what thereby results marks out, before the operation, a 
must-be-counted. It is the latter which causes the structured presentation to waver 
towards the phantom of inconsistency.28 
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It is precisely this phantom of inconsistency which stands for that remainder left 
out by the count. Of course, inconsistency could never be properly included in a 
situation. It is conceived instead as a phantom, having no positive existence prior 
to the count but nonetheless serving as ‘the base’ from which counting operations 
begin.29 
There is a further layer of structuration Badiou introduces in Being and 
Event. We have stated already that once we begin with an ontology informed by 
set theory, we can go on to describe being in terms of elements, sets, subsets, and 
so on. But we then saw how the oneness of these elements, sets, and subsets is 
only a result of a counting-for-one, that the consistent multiplicity of the 
presented is the emergence of oneness from a prior inconsistent multiplicity (or 
void) about which nothing can be said except that it is, or is composed of, nothing. 
Badiou contends that inconsistency threatens Oneness by virtue of the fact that 
the very claim that, ‘“there is Oneness” transparently reveals the very operation 
from which the result results’.30 Structuration is not enough; instead, the 
consistency of a given multiplicity requires ‘that all structure be doubled by a 
metastructure which secures [consistent multiplicity] against any fixation of the 
void’.31 The metastructure is therefore that which counts-as-one the subsets (also 
called sub-multiples) and thereby includes them in the situation. Since it was the 
excess of subsets over elements and the impossibility of their exhaustive inclusion 
that threatened consistent multiplicity with the decoherence of the void, the 
count effected by the metastructure ‘guarantees that the one holds for inclusion, 
just as the initial structure holds for belonging’.32 
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The metastructuration of a situation’s subsets provides the coordinates of 
what can be known about the situation. A situation is rendered intelligible 
through a metastructural gesture which counts-for-one its subsets and delimiting 
the inconsistent multiple. Everything that is knowable or demonstrable about a 
situation is included in the count-for-one. In contrast, the inconsistent multiple, 
that which is left out of, or prior to, the count, cannot be approached in terms of 
knowledge. An encounter with inconsistent multiplicity is, for Badiou, an 
encounter with a truth. ‘Truth’ in Being and Event is a term closely connected 
with two others, the ‘indiscernible’ and the ‘generic’, both of which express the 
notion that a truth’s emergence cannot be deduced from any part (the term ‘part’ 
here is to be understood as Badiou’s gloss for the mathematical term ‘subset’) of 
a situation. In either case, truth as generic/indiscernible is that which ‘makes a 
hole in knowledge’.33 
It is worth pausing here for a moment to introduce a topic that will be 
discussed in greater detail below. The direction of action here is from truth to 
knowledge. In the sentence, ‘truth is that which makes a hole in knowledge’, 
‘truth’ is the subject acting upon ‘knowledge’ which is the object.34 This is 
important because it represents an early occurrence of ambiguity that will be 
played out throughout Badiou’s subsequent works and which has a direct bearing 
on some of the guiding questions of this thesis. Put simply, we are interested in 
whether Badiouian truths have an operational capacity of their own (as the 
previously quoted passage would seem to suggest) or whether a truth requires an 
actor, i.e. an individual or collective human subject. One of the primary objectives 
of this chapter is to appraise Badiou’s position on this key question. 
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Before looking at Badiou’s concepts of event and subject in more detail, it 
is worth asking whether Badiou’s propositions about the philosophical 
implications of set theory are really sustainable. In recent years some scholars 
have sought to interrogate Badiou’s notorious claim that mathematics is 
ontology. Among these interrogations is Nirenberg and Nirenberg’s article from 
2011, ‘Badiou’s Number: A Critique of Mathematics as Ontology’.35 The 
Nirenbergs’ article is a useful point of reference for our purposes because it forms 
an attempt to scrutinise, and ultimately dismantle, Badiou’s claims concerning 
set theory from the perspective of a ‘working mathematician’. For the sake of 
brevity, we will limit ourselves to an analysis of the most serious challenge 
presented by the Nirenbergs as opposed to running through all the arguments 
presented in the article. This challenge is raised against Badiou’s central claim 
that ‘mathematics is ontology’36 and is expressed by the Nirenbergs’ as follows: 
‘the axioms of set theory themselves dictate strict limitations on the kinds of 
objects they can and cannot be applied to. Any rigorous attempt to base an 
ontology upon them will entail such a drastic loss of life and experience that the 
result can never amount to an ontology in any humanly meaningful sense’.37 This 
is demonstrated via a thought experiment involving two bottles, one containing 
caustic soda and one containing muriatic acid. The Nirenberg’s rightly point out 
that if these two bottles are considered to be sets containing elements (the 
molecules comprising the two substances) it will be difficult to arrive at a state in 
which we have new set comprising the elements (contents) of each set (bottle).38 
Clearly, one cannot fault the Nirenberg’s knowledge of chemistry, however, the 
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36 Badiou, Being and Event, p. 4. 
37 Nirenberg and Nirenberg, ‘Badiou’s Number’, p. 586. 
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demonstration does not present a problem for Badiou’s position vis-à-vis 
mathematics as ontology. This is because the demonstration already takes an 
illegitimate step in drawing an equivalence (which Badiou does not draw) 
between an actually existing physical object and a mathematical concept. The 
Nirenberg’s then mistakenly assume that a set containing both caustic soda and 
muriatic acid would have to be a new bottle (which would presumably entail 
mixing the two substances) when in fact, because set is a mathematical concept, 
we  can simply take as a set the two separate bottles and their distinct, unmixed 
contents. As we said above, Badiou draws on a version of set theory that operates 
according to principles of extensionality. We can regard elements as belonging to 
a set without reference to any principle of inclusion. As such, the elements (in this 
case, the contents of each bottle) do not need to be mixed, moved, or interfered 
with in any way.  
To avoid the inaccurate conclusions of the Nirenbergs, we should pay close 
attention to what Badiou actually says about mathematics and ontology. His 
thesis, as we have seen, is that mathematics is ontology as opposed to the actual 
stuff of reality, but perhaps more precisely one could say that Badiou’s real task 
is to establish what he calls the ‘meta-ontological’ thesis that mathematics serves 
as a discourse of ontology.39 Indeed, mathematics can serve as a discourse of 
ontology for the very reason that it is indifferent to its object. Within set theory it 
does not matter what is being counted; all that matters is an entity’s status as 
either belonging to, or included in, a set. Badiou is thus able to study being 
without reference to empirically existing objects such that, contrary to the 
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Nirenbergs’ reading, Badiou’s ontology is strictly objectless—not even 
mathematical objects are recognised since mathematics ‘presents nothing’.40 
There is a further issue concerning Badiou’s proposition that mathematics 
is ontology that must be addressed before we move on to a discussion of the 
concepts that emerge from his philosophical system. As Hallward has noted, a 
vital aspect of Badiou’s ontology is his unshakable commitment to an ‘axiomatic 
orientation’.41 An axiom in mathematics is an unreasoned first principle from 
which one can deduce a series of logical consequences. Not only is set theory 
founded upon a series of axiomatic assertions, but Badiou’s employment of set 
theory in his philosophical project stems from his own axiomatic first principle, 
‘that of the non-being of the one’.42 The criticism that one often sees made against 
Badiou concerns the status of this principle. The Nirenbergs, for example, state 
that their first goal, ‘will be to demonstrate that Badiou’s set theoretical models 
are at best a priori commitments rather than necessary truths of the set theory 
within which they are made.’43 Likewise, François Laruelle has questioned 
whether the foundational thesis ‘mathematics = ontology’ can be anything more 
than an auto-founding materialist thesis.44 Here, the act of auto-foundation is 
said to lead to decisionism and arbitrariness in its effort to flatten the (idealist) 
positing subject in to a materialist vision of reality.45 The extent to which Badiou 
succeeds in his endeavour is not the central concern here since, if one accepts 
Badiou’s meta-ontological axiom, it is because one also accepts axioms as valid 
foundations and this very acceptance would necessarily be formulated as an 
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axiom. This is also why those critics that seek to unveil the auto-founding moment 
in Badiou’s philosophy are knocking on an open door; Badiou explicitly frames 
his ontology as axiomatic: ‘Obliged to think the pure multiple without recourse to 
the One, ontology is necessarily axiomatic’.46 The philosophy he derives from set-
theoretic foundations repeatedly returns to the idea of an auto-foundation or an 
unsupported decision. Nonetheless, the idea of auto-foundation provides a key 
thematic connection between Badiou’s project and theories discussed in previous 
chapters. It is worth keeping this connection in mind as we begin to investigate 
some of the key concepts that emerge from Badiou’s philosophy. In particular, 
our interest will be in the emergence of temporal complexity in attempts to 
narrativise an auto-founding moment. 
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The Event and the Intervention 
Perhaps the arche-concept of Badiou’s entire corpus is that of the ‘event’. If, as 
has been mentioned above, Badiou is interested in the idea of the emergence of 
newness, the event is precisely the occurrence of the new within an ostensibly 
stable historical situation. An event, however, occurs at a particular point within 
a situation, and Badiou calls this point the ‘evental site’. The evental site is 
designated as an ‘abnormal multiple’ and is ‘a multiple such that none of its 
elements are presented in the situation’.47 It now becomes clear why the 
distinction between ‘belonging’ and ‘inclusion’ outlined above is so significant. 
The evental site is included in the situation qua multiple, and yet none of the 
elements belonging to the evental site belong to the situation. For example, if we 
imagine the situation of the people in the United Kingdom we can think of many 
different ways of grouping those people (according to gender, ethnicity, 
education, whether they have a criminal record, whether they have a driver’s 
license, and so on). Each of these groups is included in the situation and each of 
their elements (which are individual people) belong both to the part (e.g. people 
with criminal records) and the situation (people in the United Kingdom). The 
evental site in our example would be a group who are included as a part of the 
situation but whose individual constituents are not counted as elements of the 
situation. An example often favoured by Badiou and his adherents would be 
illegal immigrants. In the situation ‘people in the United Kingdom’ there is a 
group or part ‘illegal immigrants’ which is recognised as included in the situation, 
but each member of this group is left uncounted. They have no official status 
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within the situation. Thus, illegal immigrants in the United Kingdom are ‘a 
multiple such that none of its elements are presented in the situation’.48 
The evental site is considered to be on the ‘edge of the void’ since it is ‘the 
minimal effect of structure which can be conceived’ and insofar as, from the 
perspective of the situation, ‘one cannot think the under-side of their presented 
being’.49 In every historical situation there is a certain limit to the structure 
imposed by the count. This limit is an evental site and can be identified and 
localized. Badiou further contends that the kind of limit one can regard as an 
evental site can only occur in historical situations; natural situations, in contrast, 
do not give rise to evental sites and are therefore incapable of producing events.50 
That is not to say that in historical situations evental sites give rise to events by 
way of necessity. There is nothing necessary about the occurrence of an event. In 
fact, in a discursive twist that will be important in the discussion that follows, 
Badiou claims, ‘a site is only “evental” insofar as it is retroactively qualified as 
such by the occurrence of an event’.51 This initial appearance of retroactive 
qualification is an early indication that we are not dealing with a linear temporal 
continuum within which events occur; but rather that the occurrence of an event 
has a decisive impact not only on the future of a situation (the course of history is 
momentarily derailed in order to continue on a new trajectory) but its impact also 
extends to a reconfiguration of the past. 
To fully understand what is meant by the term event in Badiou’s 
philosophy, it is useful to turn to the classic and oft cited example from Being and 
Event, that of the French Revolution: 
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One could certainly say that the event ‘the French Revolution’ forms a one out of 
everything which makes up its site; that is, France between 1789 and, let’s say, 1794. 
There you’ll find the electors of the General Estates, the peasants of the Great Fear, 
the sans-culottes of the towns, the members of the Convention, the Jacobin clubs, 
the soldiers of the draft […] The historian ends up including in the event ‘the French 
Revolution’ everything delivered by the epoch as traces and facts. This approach, 
however—which is the inventory of all the elements of the site—may well lead to the 
one of the event being undone to the point of being no more than the forever infinite 
numbering of the gestures, things and words that co-existed with it. The halting point 
for this dissemination is the mode in which the Revolution is a central term of the 
Revolution itself; that is, the manner in which the conscience of the times—and the 
retroactive intervention of our own—filters the entire site through the one of its 
evental qualification.52 
Now let us refer back to Badiou’s definition of the event: ‘the event is a one-
multiple made up of, on the one hand, all the multiples which belong to its site, 
and on the other hand the event itself’.53 The example of the French Revolution 
corresponds to Badiou’s definition insofar as the Revolution qua event includes a 
whole host of parts and groupings but also includes, as an empirical occurrence, 
an interpretive gesture which constituted these parts and groups as the one-
multiple event: the French Revolution. Self-belonging thus proves to be an 
essential attribute of the event, or even, as Badiou argues in Being and Event, 
self-belonging is ‘constitutive’ of the event’s status qua event.54 
Badiou argues that an event is not recognised as existent by ontology since 
the latter ‘does not allow the existence, or the counting as one of sets in its 
axiomatic, of multiples which belong to themselves’.55 The axiom of foundation 
posits that, ‘within an existing one-multiple, there always exists a multiple 
presented by it such that this multiple is on the edge of the void relative to the 
initial multiple’.56 A one-multiple (or set) is therefore founded if it contains 
multiples (or subsets) whose elements are not included in the initial one-
multiple. An example can help illustrate this point: if one were to take the one-
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multiple of ‘all wooden things’ one would have an enormous collection of 
furniture, trees, twigs, and so forth, each of which could be disassembled or 
broken down into pieces which comprise them. But we can only continue 
disassembling for so long before we end up with single cells of wood which are in 
turn composed of non-wood substances (cellulose, hemicellulose, and lignin). 
These single wood cells would be the element that ‘founds’ the set. An 
investigation of the contents of the set would not ‘bottom out’ in an infinitely 
ongoing dissection of the substances composing tiny pieces of wood, instead, such 
an investigation would come up against a hard boundary—the wooden element 
which is composed of non-wooden elements. Now comes a manoeuvre which is 
crucial for Badiou’s notion of event: an investigation into an event, insofar as it is 
a one-multiple of itself and everything that belongs to itself, cannot ‘bottom out’ 
in the usual way described above. To illustrate, let’s assume that we are no longer 
investigating the contents of the set of wooden things, but everything contained 
in the set of wooden things. Clearly, we are still dealing with the set of wooden 
things, but now rather than only limiting ourselves to the wooden things in this 
set, we are faced with an infinity of elements and subsets, some of which are wood 
and some of which are the non-wood constituents of wood. From these 
deductions, Badiou draws the following conclusion: ‘The axiom of foundation de-
limits being by the prohibition of the event. It thus brings forth that-which-is-
not-being-qua-being as a point of impossibility of the discourse on being-qua-
being, and it exhibits its signifying emblem: the multiple such as it presents itself, 
in the brilliance, in which being is abolished, of the mark-of-one’.57 This is a 
controversial point for those Badiou refers to as ‘working mathematicians’ since 
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Badiou seems to be simultaneously adopting a particular elaboration of set theory 
(ZFC) only then to attempt to derive concepts which require us to strategically 
disregard of one of its axioms—the axiom of foundation—since an event is 
precisely an unfounded multiple.58 The various claims and counter-claims 
concerning this controversy need not detain us here.59 Instead, suffice it to say 
that Badiou does not strictly adhere to ZFC set theory and but that it is an open 
question as to whether the discrepancies between Badiou’s version of set theory 
and ZFC set theory actually represent fatal weaknesses in Badiou’s philosophy. 
Badiou’s definition of the event as a one-multiple of the multiples 
belonging to its site and itself leads to further consequences that need to be 
considered here. Since, as we noted above, the identification of multiples 
belonging to the event is endless due to the event’s violation of the axiom of 
foundation, there is no way to exhaustively account for the event’s occurrence by 
way of such a process of identification. An important characteristic of the event is 
therefore that it leads to two distinct hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that ‘the 
event belongs to the situation. That from the standpoint of the situation, being 
presented, it is’.60 The second hypothesis is that ‘the event does not belong to the 
situation’.61 Crucially for Badiou, there is no meta-position from which one can 
actually demonstrate the event’s existence. The event may be ‘localized within 
presentation’ but it is never ‘presented as such’.62 And since the event is never 
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presented, no demonstration of its occurrence is possible; rather, the existence of 
the event depends on an interpretive intervention which simply posits the event’s 
having occurred. The importance of this notion of ‘intervention’ cannot be 
understated. It is defined as, ‘any procedure by which a multiple is recognized as 
an event’ and is often used in conjunction with two other closely connected but 
distinct terms: wager and decision. As will be shown below, the act of 
intervention, whether conceived as a wager or as a decision, is crucial to Badiou’s 
project and highly pertinent to our enquiry.63 
In ‘Meditation Twenty’ of Being and Event, Badiou provides some 
important clarifications concerning the relationship between an interpretive 
intervention and an event: ‘Since it is of the very essence of the event to be a 
multiple whose belonging to the situation is undecidable, deciding that it belongs 
to the situation is a wager […] No doubt, the consequences of the decision will 
become known, but it will not be possible to return back prior to the event in order 
to tie those consequences to some founded origin’.64 Here Badiou points to the 
sense in which an event includes an ‘auto-annulment of its own meaning’.65 That 
is to say, although there is some real, in principle identifiable, occurrence that 
provokes an intervention, this in no way allows us to view this ‘real occurrence’ 
as exhausting the meaning of the event. No sooner has some occurrence provoked 
an intervention than the occurrence itself dissipates in ‘the uniformity of multiple 
presentation’.66 An intervention is therefore required for the event to have any 
status at all. It consists both in the recognition of a multiple’s evental form and a 
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decision that this multiple belongs to the situation. These two distinct acts 
comprising an intervention are considered to be ‘impossible to separate’.67 
Moreover, the latter component of this two-fold act includes a sub-component 
referred to as ‘nomination’. In order to decide that a previously unpresented 
multiple belongs to the situation, one requires a new term to express this 
multiple. Nomination is thus to be seen as a resource for expressing something 
that was previously inexpressible within the situation: ‘The initial operation of an 
intervention is to make a name out of an unpresented element of the site to 
qualify the event whose site is the site’.68 A question arises here with respect to 
what the concept event actually designates. Is the event the real occurrence which 
sets things in motion and leads to interventions, nominations, and so forth? Or is 
‘event’ the term we apply retrospectively to the whole process once we have 
reached the end? Badiou does not shirk from the radical conclusion that neither 
of these alternatives is to be endorsed as the designated content of the term 
‘event’. On the contrary, Badiou states that, ‘an event is an interval rather than a 
term: it establishes itself, in the interventional retroaction, between the empty 
anonymity bordered on by the site, and the addition of a name’.69 Note that the 
term interval can be understood both in a chronological sense, as a break in time, 
as well as the spatial distancing implied by a void demarcated by a boundary. This 
ambiguity is rooted in an undecidability concerning the anachronological 
unfolding of the event. As we have mentioned in passing above, the evental 
occurrence cannot be retrospectively viewed as having emerged at a specific time 
in a specific place. It has a ‘site’, but this site is defined by a set of criteria 
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developed out of Badiou’s set theoretic ontology; the site cannot be easily located 
either spatially or temporally and it may in fact even be a retroactive projection 
emerging after an event.70 
At this point in Being and Event, Badiou notes a paradox which brings him 
into contact with the philosophers and theorists whose works we have addressed 
in previous chapters. The paradox concerns the events emergence as involving a 
re-doubling or circularity:  
It seems that the event, as interventional placement-in-circulation of its name, can 
only be authorized on the basis of that other event, equally void for structure, which 
is the intervention itself.// There is actually no other recourse against this circle than 
that of splitting the point at which it rejoins itself. It is certain that the event alone, 
aleatory figure of non-being, founds the possibility of intervention. It is just as 
certain that if no intervention puts it into circulation within the situation on the basis 
of an extraction of elements from the site, then, lacking any being, radically 
subtracted from the count-as-one, the event does not exist.71 
Let us recap Badiou’s argument here. First, an intervention is only possible once 
an event has taken place since without the event as a referent, the intervention 
has nothing to affirm. Nonetheless, it is also the case that the event’s existence 
directly hinges on the intervention itself since, without an intervention, an event 
would be reabsorbed by the structure and thereby lose its status as an event. Now, 
a few pages prior to this quotation, Badiou had called the event an ‘interval’, 
whereas here the event is described in terms of a redoubled occurrence. That is 
to say, we are no longer identifying the event with a gap but with the motion of 
an intervention that circles this gap. Badiou’s own oscillation between event qua 
gap and event as an occurrence retroactively qualified by an interpretive 
intervention can be understood as an attempt to include in his philosophy the 
possibility of a non-decisionistic decision. That is to say, the intervention must 
provide the condition for an event without producing the event by way of 
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necessity. This interpretation finds further support in statements that rule out the 
possibility of a ‘hero’ of the event.72 Badiou is well aware that the moment the 
event can simply be ‘decided’ into existence, all is lost. The figure of an 
omnipotent decider would cause Badiou’s philosophy to collapse into a parody of 
Schmittian decisionism (that is, the very same decisionism shown to incur fatal 
practical and logical weaknesses), one that would not be able to distinguish in any 
theoretically rigorous way between the progressive politics of the event Badiou 
aims at, and a fascistic absolute voluntarism. The redoubled event, or the event 
as interval, seem to be two alternative strategies designed to outflank the 
decisionist charge. Determining whether this point does enough to move beyond 
pure voluntarism will depend on our appraisal of the issue of temporality in 
Badiou’s thought as a whole—a task that will be embarked upon below. 
                                                   




Although the possibility of evental occurrences is vital to Badiou’s work, it is in 
fact far more important to understand what events produce, what emerges from 
them, and the changes they effect in a situation. On this point, it is necessary to 
introduce a distinction between ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’. The former is instigated 
by an event, produced by fidelity to the event, and is indiscernible. The latter 
concerns situations and its operations include discernment and classification.73 
Badiou presents us with the following statement regarding the procedure of 
establishing a truth: ‘The general idea is to consider that a truth groups together 
all the terms of the situation which are positively connected to the event’.74 This 
grouping is not predetermined by the existing situation; if it were, the post-
evental truth procedure would be reducible to knowledge and we would not have 
an event, but only a mere historical occurrence. The grouping together of the 
terms of the situation according to their connection with the event is performed 
by an ‘operator of connection’.75 The operator of connection is to be understood 
at this stage as a kind of witness to the event (one that Badiou will later 
reintroduce as the ‘subject’ of the event) whose task is to conduct a series of 
enquiries into the status of the situation from the perspective of the event. These 
enquiries determine the consequences of the event for the situation and the 
process of conducting these enquiries is what Badiou terms a ‘generic truth 
procedure’ where the term generic is roughly equivalent to the term 
‘indiscernible’. Ed Pluth offers a welcome clarification: 
In a few words, this is what a faithful subjectivity always does - it is engaged in the 
construction of a new present: a construction whose process and end result Badiou 
also calls a truth. Such is what Badiou has in mind when he writes of the human 
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capacity to be seized by an eternal truth. A truth is in large part defined by the way 
in which its construction contests the reigning present not simply with a critique, but 
with the actual presence of an alternative within that present itself. This alternative 
scrambles the situation in question: it redraws relations among members or 
inhabitants of that situation.76 
The emergence of a truth via a truth procedure is thus not merely the addition of 
one more identifiable term to the situation; it is rather a far more radical change 
in the mode of organisation of the present. Pluth’s outline of a truth as a 
construction of a new present seems to point us in the direction of political 
events—once a revolutionary event occurs, one cannot take up a neutral position 
or seek to simply continue life as normal. The revolution produces consequences 
that cannot be ignored but can only be either faithfully supported or reacted 
against. The same holds for one of Badiou’s other situational spheres in which 
events can take place. Referring to a ‘love-event’, Badiou argues,  
Love is thus a-truth (one-truth) of the situation. I call it ‘individual’ because it 
interests no-one apart from the individuals in question. Let’s note, and this is crucial, 
that it is thus for them that the one-truth produced by their love is an indiscernible 
part of their existence; since the others do not share in the situation which I am 
speaking of. An-amorous-truth is un-known for those who love each other: all they 
do is produce it.  
In the same way that we cannot demonstrate that a revolution has taken place 
(only that a series of occurrences, facts, and changing circumstances are 
‘revolutionary’), it is also impossible to demonstrate being-in-love; rather, one is 
aware of relating to another person in a new way and this awareness has a 
profound effect on one’s values, needs, aspirations, and so on. 
A truth’s indiscernibility is not accidental but necessary. If it were possible 
to identify a truth, this would mean the state already had resources it could deploy 
to accommodate the truth and its consequences. Bruno Besana is right to identify 
Badiouian truths as excessive with respect to the situation they emerge from: ‘a 
truth cannot appear as a normal part of the situation, but only as a dramatic 
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rupture with the latter’.77 If this were not the case, we would no longer be dealing 
with a novelty or an alternative present, but merely with a further elaboration and 
extension of the pre-existing situation. The indiscernibility of truths also leads us 
to the conclusion that from the perspective of the subject, ‘there are no criteria 
for deciding whether or not the event is: a pure anomaly; an accident arising from 
another situation; or a strange product of the situation itself’.78 The task of one 
who bears witness to an event is to affirm the truth of the event while 
acknowledging that there are no firm grounds from which such an affirmation 
could be sustained. Badiou’s motto for this kind of affirmation is ‘Love what you 
will never believe twice’—a rather opaque way of saying that the most important 
commitments are not experienced, at the moment of their genesis, as 
autonomous decisions. Moreover, such commitments are not undermined by 
changing circumstances; instead, the test of a real conviction is that one remains 
convinced even when the good reasons for being so no longer apply, or even when, 
as Pluth notes, we end up acting in ways that are risky or seem to go against our 
more directly tangible interests.79 
Understanding the truth as indiscernible has implications for how we view 
emancipatory politics. Such a politics can never emerge purely from an analysis 
of the situation since a normal political situation stabilises itself precisely through 
its conditioning and delimiting of the political spectrum. This means that from 
within normal politics, the most incremental, marginal progressive agenda could 
acquire the epithet ‘radical’ without in any way threatening the status quo. An 
Evental politics does not originate in relation to the State (the normal political 
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situation) but emerges in conjunction with a fleeting occurrence at its outermost 
border. With respect to the participant engaging in this new radical political 
program, the beginning of the emancipatory project will not be felt as a 
considered and intentional response to a political demand; rather, it is felt as 
somehow always having been. As Badiou puts it in his Conditions: 
‘[Emancipatory politics] can therefore only ever presuppose its own existence. 
The question of existence here cannot be formulated except from the vantage 
point of a pre-existence […] Emancipatory politics is not observed; it is 
encountered’.80 This is an important aspect of Badiou’s thought for our purposes. 
It expresses something that we will deal with more thoroughly below, namely, the 
dynamic associated with a subjective change that is sudden and spontaneous as 
well as being utterly transformative. From Badiou’s point of view, one is either 
fully immersed in normal politics, or one is separated from it; there is no stable 
passage from one to the other. This means that from the subject who experiences 
themselves as committed to an emancipatory project, the moment of insight that 
generated the commitment cannot be easily located; it is simply presupposed as 
having already occurred. 
 We have seen above that truth cannot be stated in in terms of knowledge.81 
This is not such a controversial point; Heidegger in particular is credited by 
Badiou with having convincingly shown that truth is inaccessible in the form of a 
judgement or proposition.82 The far more radical step is to propose a tenable form 
for truth, as Badiou does in his claim, ‘We must conceive of a truth both as the 
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construction of a fidelity to an event, and as the generic potency of a 
transformation of a domain of knowledge’.83 To attempt to render this truth in 
propositional terms is always a dead-end resulting from a confusion of truth and 
knowledge. But it does not follow from the argument that truth and knowledge 
are distinct that there is no relation between truth and knowledge; in fact, truth 
has a transformative effect on knowledge since, if its consequences are followed 
through, it necessarily leads to profound changes in the state of the situation. For 
example, in politics, after the event of the French Revolution, fundamental 
political concepts such as ‘the people’ or ‘the king’ began to mean something 
thoroughly different. Likewise, after an amorous event, the affected couple view 
their past and future, their values and aspirations as totally transformed. The 
truth has an anticipatory dimension which involves the affirmation and 
projection of its intended result. For the French Revolution, this would be the full 
realisation of liberty, equality, and fraternity; for the loving couple, it would be 
expressed by the phrase ‘I will always love you’ which serves to anticipate the 
hypothesis of the ‘truth of integral love’.84  
An important addition to the constellation of concepts (Event, Subject, 
Truth) is that of the Idea. In his Second Manifesto for Philosophy, Badiou 
outlines his notion of the Idea as follows: ‘I name “Idea” that upon which an 
individual’s representation of the world, including her- or himself, is based once 
s/he is bound to the faithful subject type through incorporation within the 
process of a truth […] the idea is the mediation between the individual and the 
Subject of a truth’.85 Idea signals the individual’s participation in, or 
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experimentation with, universality. It is knowledge that their project, which is the 
unfolding of a truth, has universal validity while being entirely anchored in 
material particularity.86 This leads Badiou to describe Ideation in terms of a 
commitment, discipline, or resolve that cannot be easily ignored but can be 
betrayed or abandoned. Ideation is the reorganization of an individual’s life in 
accordance with the truth they have experienced. The imperative of an Evental 
politics is to act in accordance with an Idea whereas the everyday activity of 
politics in our post-political age ‘de-bars the Idea’ and encourages us to ‘act in the 
absence of Idea’.87 
We have already seen how Badiou admits that his theory of the event gives 
rise to a circular model of emergence. With respect to the occurrence of an event, 
one finds a circular movement between the event proper and the intervention that 
names it since while the former serves as a precondition for the latter, the 
intervention is also required in order to qualify the event qua event. Without an 
intervention, the event cannot exist.88 The situation becomes more complex when 
Badiou begins to invoke various tropes which directly invite us to view the process 
as unfolding in time. Consider the following passage:  
The ultimate effect of an evental caesura, and of an intervention from which the 
introduction into circulation of a supernumerary name proceeds, would thus be that 
the truth of a situation, with this caesura as its principle, forces the situation to 
accommodate it: to extend itself to the point at which this truth—primitively no 
more than a part, a representation—attains belonging, thereby becoming a 
presentation. The trajectory of the faithful generic procedure and its passage to 
infinity transform the ontological status of a truth: they do so by changing the 
situation ‘by force’ […] A truth would force the situation to dispose itself such that 
this truth—at the outset anonymously counted as one by the state alone, pure 
indistinct excess over the presented multiplicities—be finally recognized as a term, 
and as internal.89 
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We are told that the event is accompanied by a caesura—a break in time—and that 
its initial occurrence subsequently ‘forces the situation to accommodate it’. The 
faithful generic procedure moves along a certain trajectory, ‘changing the 
situation “by force”’. But some important and potentially troubling questions 
emerge here. The most pressing of these is the question of who or what is 
motivating the ‘trajectory of the faithful generic procedure’? If we agree with 
Badiou that the occurrence of the event is utterly contingent, that it violates the 
principle of sufficient reason, it is nonetheless legitimate to ask what determines 
whether this event will change the situation. As Oliver Feltham notes, there is a 
tension between, on the one hand, Badiou’s principled aversion to any idea of a 
unified agent of change, and on the other, the sense that there is something at 
work in the unfolding of a truth procedure. If we reject the first option, we end up 
with a kind of automated truth procedure that simply runs by itself without any 
need for human commitment or faithfulness (both of which are terms Badiou 
often uses to describe the relation between an event and a subject). But if we 
accept that there is some agent behind the generic truth procedure, additional 
difficulties emerge. Not only does the idea of a subject qua agent go against 
Badiou’s explicit statements on his understanding of the subject, it would also be 
vulnerable to the Nietzschean argument that there is no doer behind the deed and 
that any experiential basis for asserting a subject qua agent is a mere 
epiphenomenal residue of a deeper, single substrate (i.e. will to power).90 
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The tension between voluntarism and automatism in Badiou’s work 
resurfaces in the secondary literature. Advocating a strong voluntarist 
interpretation, one that Badiou either warns against or categorically refutes on 
several occasions, Calcagno argues, ‘Interventions are subjective decisions that 
give us events’91 and that moreover, ‘A subject becomes fuller as a subject 
(subjectivation) by intervening in certain situations’.92 While Calcagno does not 
provide us with the line of reasoning that led him to this position, it may be worth 
reconstructing the textual evidence that could account for it. Recall that for 
Badiou, although the event precedes the subject, without a subjective 
intervention the event itself has no being. This does mean that, in a sense, the 
being of the event as well as any subsequent transformation in a situation depend 
on its being taken up by a subject. One could therefore reason, as Calcagno seems 
to, that the intervention produces the event since without an intervention, we 
have no event. So where is the problem here? As we saw above, the subject cannot 
pre-exist the event because the event serves as the pre-condition for a subject to 
emerge through fidelity to a generic truth procedure.93 Any reading that asserts 
the existence of a subject prior to the event would certainly lead to a decisionist 
position for which events are directly willed into being. The distinction to be made 
here is between the event itself which Badiou describes as ‘a nothing – just a sort 
of illumination’94 one that is ‘not the result of a decision’95 and the naming of the 
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event which, in Being and Event at least, is described as a matter of deciding.96 
Calcagno’s error is to miss this distinction and conflate the decision to name the 
event with the event itself resulting in an inaccurate and excessively decisionist 
reading of Badiou. 
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The Subject and its Nomination 
In some of his most recent comments on the thorny issue of the evental 
occurrence and its entanglement with a subjective intervention, Badiou indicates 
that the paradox of the event should be seen as a secondary concern in relation to 
its consequences. In an interview with Bruno Bosteels, for example, Badiou 
complains of often being read ‘askew’ in such a way that focuses on the event over 
the situation: ‘I don’t think that we can grasp completely what a trajectory of truth 
is in a situation without the hypothesis of the absolute, or radical, arrival of an 
event, not the transcendence or the entrenchment of the event itself’.97 Now, to 
be clear, it may well be the case that an emphasis on the event over the situation 
has a tendency to produce misreadings, nor it is it necessarily problematic to say 
that some crucial dimension of the event is suspended from view—indeed, this is 
precisely what Badiou calls the event’s indiscernibility—and yet, if we accept that 
something emerges from a situation which is irreducible to that situation, there 
is undoubtedly a requirement to provide an adequate conceptual elaboration of 
this emergence. One can accept a zero-level indiscernibility as a characteristic of 
the event only after one has pushed one’s analysis to the end so as to provide a 
convincing account of why the indiscernibility is irreducible. 
Feltham offers a counter interpretation of the Badiouian subject which 
serves to clarify matters: 
Thus in a political truth procedure a subject is not so much an agent as a series of 
meetings, tracts, protests and occupations of parliament […]. As a set of multiples 
connected to an event and encountered during the random sequence of enquiries, 
the subject falls outside the purview of ontology. Thus in Badiou’s terms, ontology 
cannot think the being of the subject, but it can think its operation, which is forcing. 
There is no separation, however, between the subject’s being as a set of multiples and 
forcing: a particular instance of forcing is what produces or unfolds that set of 
multiples. There is no room, therefore, for a part of the being of the subject that might 
be the source of forcing: in other words, there is no separate agent of change within 
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the subject for Badiou. The subject is nothing but change as forcing […]. The subject 
is not so much an agent behind the work of change, but the work of change itself.98   
This is a significant improvement on Calcagno’s reading, not least because it finds 
support in many of Badiou’s own statements on the concept of the subject. By 
viewing the subject as ‘nothing but the change as forcing’, Feltham seems to tarry 
both the decisionist challenge and the Nietzschean critique of (subjectively 
anchored) free will mentioned above. Rather than viewing the subject as an agent 
in the process by which an event transforms a situation, ‘subject’ is simply the 
name given to the process of transformation itself. Nonetheless, there remains a 
shortcoming here, one that Feltham is aware of. In the account of the event 
offered in Being and Event, Badiou often refers to certain decisions which take 
place at the beginning of the process. That is to say, in the immediate aftermath 
of an event, decisions are being made which will determine the trajectory of the 
generic truth procedure initiated by the event. This is apparent in Badiou’s 
Infinite Thought where he writes: ‘a truth begins with an axiom of truth. It begins 
with a groundless decision – the decision to say that the event has taken place’.99 
Groundlessness would therefore seem to apply both to the emergence of the event 
and the subjective intervention which begins the process of forcing the 
consequences of the event through an act of nomination. The former has been 
described as absolutely contingent, occurring ex nihilo from within a situation but 
without any precursors in that situation. The latter is also a ‘groundless decision’, 
one that hinges on the occurrence of an event but does not presuppose a subject 
since ‘subject’ for Badiou is precisely what comes about as a result of an event and 
an intervention/nomination: ‘Les décisions (nominations, axiomes…) ne 
supposent aucun sujet, puisqu'il n'y a de sujet que dans l'effet de telles 
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décisions’.100 This leads Hallward to observe, ‘Badiou effectively reduces this 
process to an inaccessible moment of decision’.101 Likewise, Feltham comments 
in a similar vein that the ‘connection between the [nomination/intervention and 
the event] remains completely opaque’.102 The question that reasserts itself is 
whether or not this inaccessibility or opaqueness represents a weakness in 
Badiou’s thought or a necessary characteristic of radical political change. 
Ed Pluth goes further than Feltham in identifying Badiou’s ambivalence 
between the constituted subject conceived as a procedure or process of following 
through evental consequences and the constituting subject as the entity deciding 
upon and motivating this process. The difficulty arises because there is ample 
evidence for both positions in Badiou’s work. Even in the definition provided in 
Being and Event Badiou includes terms which seem to pull in different 
directions—subject is said to be a ‘finite series of enquiries’ as well as that which 
‘realizes an indiscernible, forces a decision’.103 Viewing the subject as a finite 
series of enquiries has the advantage of de-coupling ‘subject’ from the 
commonplace intuitive understanding of subject qua conscious, reflective, 
human individual. But if Badiou advocates a concept of the subject as a series of 
enquiries, it becomes difficult to see how such a subject could be capable of a 
decision. Recall that Badiou also regards the subject as ‘that which decides an 
undecidable from the standpoint of an indiscernible’.104 Moreover, in his Ethics 
Badiou states that the process of a truth stems ‘From the decision to relate 
henceforth to the situation from the perspective of its evental supplement’.105 
                                                   
100 Alain Badiou, ‘L’être, L’événement, La Militance’, Futur Antérieur, 8 (1991), 13–23 (p. 19). 
101 Hallward, p. 285. 
102 Feltham, p. 104. 
103 Badiou, Being and Event, pp. 522–523. 
104 Badiou, Being and Event, p. 407. 
105 Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, p. 41. 
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Statements such as these lead Pluth to ask ‘Would it not have been more 
consistent for Badiou to say that an inhabitant decides? How can Badiou’s subject 
– for example, as a series of artworks! – decide on anything?’106 We might opt for 
a generous interpretation here and suggest that Badiou is also hinting at a 
radically different notion of decision-making, albeit one that is not fleshed out in 
sufficient detail throughout his work. Alternatively, a less generous reading might 
claim that Badiou is engaging in a minimum amount of rhetorical obfuscation in 
order to avoid, on the one hand, a classical notion of the subject as unified, 
conscious agent, and, on the other hand, subject conceived as a dispersed 
multiple impelled by an initial evental happening but ultimately characterised by 
passivity insofar as it is incapable of deciding or ‘doing’ anything. Against both 
these positions, the remainder of this chapter will seek to present inaccessibility 
and opaqueness as constitutive of the evental decision itself.107 Subject must be 
an entity capable of deciding, striving, or indeed of failing or falling into error. 
And yet as soon as we attempt to think the role of the subject in a radically 
transformative political process, the unity of the subject qua agent breaks down. 
Such a position draws support from Adrian Johnston’s interpretation of the 
Badiouian subject which succeeds insofar as it is sensitive to the temporality of 
radical change. 
                                                   
106 Pluth, p. 127. 
107 It is important to be quite careful here not to confuse the necessary opaqueness of the 
decision on intervention with the kind of generalized opaqueness Derrida attributes to the 
event. Against Derrida, the event is not a priori lost to ‘non-knowledge’, rather a very narrowly 
defined intra-evental occurrence remains opaque without precluding a thorough delineation of 
the parameters of this opaqueness. For Derrida’s comments on the unknowability of the event, 
see Jacques Derrida, ‘A Certain Impossible Possibility of Saying the Event’, in The Late Derrida, 
ed. by W. J. T. Mitchell and Arnold I. Davidson (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007); 
Giovanna Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and 
Jacques Derrida (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2003), pp. 90–92.  
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Noting the redoubled occurrence of ungrounded events in Badiou (the 
event itself and decision/intervention that qualifies it as event), Johnston argues 
for a two-fold conception of the Badiouian event, or to put this another way, 
Badiou’s event involves two components, both of which are contingent with 
respect to the situation: ‘First there is event1. Then, there is event2. Event2 is the 
decision to acknowledge event1 as an event strictly speaking’.108 The distinction is 
an important one insofar as it takes into account the fact that there is nothing 
about the occurrence of event1 that necessitates event2 and yet, at the same time, 
event1 depends on event2 for its very existence.109 Johnston’s reading does not 
save Badiou from the charge of decisionism by itself since, regardless of the status 
of event1, the decision to intervene must be ungrounded. It follows that even if we 
accept that the new subject is posterior vis-à-vis the event, we are still obliged to 
import some unspecified transcendental agency capable of intervening. Badiou 
points to Lyotard as an early proponent of this line of questioning: ‘Lyotard asked 
me from the beginning: isn’t the naming of the event itself already fundamentally 
a form of subjectivation. And isn’t there then a second subjectivation that is under 
the condition of the name fixed by the first subjectivation? Isn’t the subject, as is 
often the case in philosophy, presupposed by its very constitution?’.110 This proto-
                                                   
108 Johnston, Badiou, Žižek, and Political Transformations, p. 73. In making a conceptual 
distinction between event1 and event2, Johnston could be seen to be imposing a linear 
chronology on the passage of change marked by the event. Avoiding this reading means 
appreciating the reciprocal relation between event1 and event2: first, no event2 without event1 
(an intervention needs to recognise some trace, some inconsistency in the situation in order for 
an event to occur), and yet equally, no event1 without event2 (the trace recognised by the 
intervention is nothing, not even a missed opportunity, without an intervention). The 
temptation of a linear reading can therefore be undercut by recognising the temporal 
entwinement of event1 and event2. 
109 Common misreadings of Badiou tend to posit the event2 as retroactively necessitating event1 
whereas the occurrence of event1 always remains undecidable in Badiou’s work. Event2 does not 
make event1 necessary, but it does make it possible. For an example of such a misreading, see: 
Oliver Harrison, ‘Revolutionary Subjectivity in Post-Marxist Thought: The Case of Laclau and 
Badiou’, Global Discourse, 2.2 (2013), 1–13 (p. 7). 
110 Hallward and others, p. 132. 
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subjective force would need to be able to perform the act of 
intervention/nomination that sets the process of transformation in motion, but 
would also need to be thought as somehow constrained or divided in order to 
avoid decisionism. Feltham offers his own solutions to Lyotard’s charge of 
decisionism, but he is less willing than Johnston to view the event as an ensemble 
composed of two discrete elements and this leads him to venture solutions to the 
issue of the pre-subjective intervener through a reiteration of Badiou’s post-
evental conception of the subject. Even when Feltham edges towards a notion of 
the subject as the locus of a decision on, or an impetus for, a series of situational 
changes, he refrains from commenting explicitly on the decisive interim between 
event1 and event2 (a distinction which is not fully fleshed out in Feltham’s 
argument) and instead notes the necessity of positing ‘the as yet unknown 
existence of something like a higher or deeper will’.111 
Before presenting a possible solution to the alleged decisionist tendency 
running through Badiou’s Being and Event, it is worth looking at a final attempt 
to resolve the question found in Bruno Bosteels Badiou and Politics. Bosteels’s 
reading of the event contains two countervailing tendencies. On the one hand, 
Bosteels argues that ‘an event […] can only be decided retroactively by way of a 
subjective intervention’, however, he also claims that the event is ‘an irruption 
that […] cannot be dissociated from the intervention of a subject’.112 While 
Bosteels is correct to note retroactivity as a key feature of our account of any 
decision a subject takes, there is nonetheless a contradiction here. Bosteels is 
telling us that an event is decided by a subjective intervention but that this 
                                                   
111 Feltham, p. 116. 
112 Bruno Bosteels, Badiou and Politics (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), pp. 161–
162; Bosteels, p. 161. 
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intervention cannot be dissociated from the event. But clearly, if we are to 
conceive an intervention as the deciding factor in producing an event, there is 
already some minimal dissociation going on at a conceptual level. That is to say 
that, conceptually, if I am to think of one event producing another, I am already 
obliged to conceive them as in some way as separate parts. One way to resolve 
this contradiction would be to introduce a further distinction between practical 
dissociation and conceptual dissociation. We can then see how practically it may 
not be possible to separate the evental occurrence (Johnston’s event1) from the 
intervention (event2), whereas conceptually such separation is not only possible 
but necessary. Indeed, since Bosteels tends to observe the conceptual separation 
of occurrence and intervention throughout Badiou and Politics, one can read his 
theory of the Badiouian event as comprising distinct components in the same 
manner as Johnston. The association or disassociation of event and intervention 
is of vital importance since the only way to avoid decisionist and quietist attacks 
on the Badiouian event is to prise apart intervention and event without 
abandoning the role of intervention wholesale. 
If the event is understood as actualized by a decision, or as the realisation 
of some pre-existing determinate potential by way of a decision, we would be 
again confronted with a decisionist paradigm of the event.113 This is, of course, 
something Bosteels is keen to avoid, as is clear in the following quotation:  
the impasse of the structure becomes visible only as a result of the retroactive effect 
of a subject’s intervention. This intervention, though, should not be seen as a purely 
self-authorizing act or a sovereign decision, which would mark the possibility of an 
absolute beginning as a kind of primordial or grand event […] [the event] is not an 
absolute ex nihilo creation but a production that starts out from the edges of the 
concrete void that is proper to this situation and to this situation alone. […] This does 
not mean that the event already lies hidden as a sleeping potential within the 
                                                   
113 My challenge against Bosteels is not that his defence of Badiou fails because Badiou is, in fact, 
a decisionist, but rather that a stronger defence against the decisionist charge can be made on 
the basis of the arguments I made in the previous chapter apropos Schmitt’s alleged decisionism 
and by remaining sensitive to the temporality of the event. 
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situation at hand, ready to be actualized, for only an intervention loyal to the event 
retroactively defines the site of this event as such in the first place.114 
Let us briefly clarify Bosteels argument here. First, we have the argument that the 
structural impasse becomes visible as a result of a subjective intervention. This 
intervention cannot, however, be viewed as performed by an agent since Badiou 
does not offer us a theory of ‘agency’, but of the subject. Finally, it is an 
intervention that defines the site of the event in the first place. ‘Intervention’, on 
Bosteels’s reading, turns out to be a slippery term, appearing everywhere it needs 
to in order to ensure the passage of the event. Intervention both renders the 
impasse in structure visible as well as defining the evental site. Moreover, given 
that this intervention is often framed as an act of deciding, there seem to be 
compelling reasons to view the role of intervention in the production of events as 
obeying a decisionistic logic within Bosteels account. To set out the issue in 
simple terms, Bosteels fails to untangle the central problematic of the relation 
between event as occurrence and event as intervention. Laying too much 
emphasis on the event as occurrence leads to quietism as would-be subjects 
patiently await the event; whereas focusing on the role of the subjective 
intervention in generating the event opens Badiou up to charges of decisionism 
(as well as requiring a concept of the pre-evental intervener that his theory lacks). 
Bosteels is no doubt correct to note that the intervention, ‘takes the form of a 
looping or bootstrapping mechanism by which a subject comes to open up a 
minimal gap within its own conditions of existence’, and yet without a thorough 
interrogation of the source of impetus behind this intervention or the 
implications of this ‘bootstrapping mechanism’, we cannot arrive at a reading of 
Badiou that escapes both quietism and voluntarism. 
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There is a way in which Johnston’s event1/event2 dyad can be deployed in 
order to provide a way of thinking the Badiouian event that avoids decisionism 
and quietism, however, in order to show this we need to first briefly return to 
some of the arguments made in the previous chapter apropos Schmitt’s alleged 
absolute ‘decisionism’ of the omnipotent sovereign.115 Schmitt’s Political 
Theology is often cited as the most irredeemably decisionist of his political 
writings.116 In that text, Schmitt advocates a notion of sovereignty that is ascribed 
to the agent capable of making a decision upon the suspension of law in an 
exceptional moment. That is to say, in times of profound crisis, it is legitimate for 
the sovereign to decide to suspend law and act in any way they see fit in order to 
bring an end to the crisis or threat. I argued in the previous chapter that recent 
scholarship on Schmitt’s ontology require us to rethink this alleged ‘decisionism’. 
In particular, I argued in support of Michael Marder that the sovereign does not 
pre-exist the decision but is in fact generated as a result of the decision. 
Moreover, since Schmitt’s idea of sovereignty is conceived in terms of competence 
(the sovereign is simply the entity competent to decide, not an agent with a pre-
defined executive remit), in principle, the sovereign can emerge from anywhere 
within the political field. Sovereignty is indeed determined via a decision in some 
sense, but in the moment of deciding the proto-sovereign individual has no 
objective guarantees that his or her declaration will result in an actual 
confirmation of their status as sovereign. Sovereignty is therefore reflexively 
determined insofar as there is a requirement for at least one non-sovereign entity 
to recognise the claim to sovereignty as valid. I therefore depart from Marder 
                                                   
115 I am here making an assumption that I feel to be fairly uncontroversial, namely, that when 
commentators accuse Badiou of decisionism, they have in mind the kind of decisionism Schmitt 
seeks to advance in his Political Theology. I have shown in the previous chapter how this kind of 
decisionism can be unraveled by challenging the presupposed omnipotence of the sovereign. 
116 See, for example: Cristi, pp. 108–116. 
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when he claims that ‘Schmitt’s “will” is, merely, power in its actuality, an always 
already exteriorized expression of political existence’.117 Instead, the 
exteriorization of will comes about through recognition on the part of a non-
sovereign subject.118  Lack of recognition does not undo an individual’s status as 
sovereign, rather, the more radical conclusion is that sovereignty is brought about 
retroactively as a result of an intervention it has no control over. Moreover, this 
intervention cannot be thought of as a decision in the traditional sense of the 
term; rather, it is a spontaneous response which is not experienced as an act of 
deciding but as the activity that precedes any decision-making and sets the 
parameters for the kind of decision that can be made. One decides between 
options; one cannot decide which options to recognise as such.119 
The notion of ‘recognition’ set out in the previous chapter with respect to 
Schmitt’s state of exception serves us well in our analysis of a non-decisionistic 
reading of Badiou. A basic tenet of a decisionist position is the existence of a 
deciding agent who pre-exists the moment of decision and whose decision is not 
constrained or conditioned by any extraneous factors. In addition, there are no 
normative criteria by which one can evaluate the decision; the only criterion that 
can be applied is whether or not this decision corresponds fully with the will of 
the decision-maker. We saw with Schmitt how the sovereign decision is not fully 
decisionist insofar as the decision takes the form of a declaration which becomes 
a decision once it has been recognised by at least one non-sovereign actor. The 
                                                   
117 Marder, Groundless Existence, p. 131. 
118For an illuminating account of the role of recognition in relation to the genesis of authority, 
see: Kojève, p. 34. 
119 It is worth mentioning that the notion of recognition I use here can be viewed as resembling 
the Kierkegaardian notion of a qualitative transition. Jamie M. Ferreira’s reading is exemplary 
here. Ferreira argues, ‘It is crucial to realise at the outset that a qualitative transition does not 
necessarily have to be brought about by a direct decision’, and again, ‘[Kierkegaard] 
distinguishes between ‘freedom of choice’ and ‘true freedom’ […] the latter is compatible with 
there being, in some meaningful sense, ‘no choice’”. Ferreira, pp. 34, 37. 
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proto-sovereign, by virtue of the declaration, attempts to force the recognition of 
his sovereign status, but this status is only achieved once recognition takes place. 
The declaration thus takes the form of a wager that sovereign status will have 
been confirmed by virtue of the transformation effected by the declaration. 
Without recognition from non-sovereign actors, it is not simply that sovereign 
status dissolves, but rather that it is never in fact ascribed. When analysing 
Badiou’s ‘event’, one detects strong similarities. It is quite wrong to imagine that 
event1 occurs independently of event2 and that, regardless of the consequences, 
there can be an event1 even if it is not followed by an event2 to decide that it has 
indeed occurred; on the contrary, the lack of event2 retroactively erases event1. 
Event1 corresponds to the proto-sovereign declaration in Schmitt while event2 
corresponds to the moment of recognition on the part of non-sovereign actors. 
We can defend Badiou against charges of decisionism by noting that at no stage 
do we have a single, unified subject deciding in an unconstrained, unilateral way. 
Event2, which might conceivably be the decisionist moment in Badiou, is far 
closer to the idea of ‘recognition’ I have outlined above than it is to a decision 
insofar as ‘subject’ as the agent which pursues the consequences of an event only 
comes into being in the event’s aftermath, not in the vanishing interim between 
event1 and event2. Even when Badiou uses the term decision, it is clear that the 
kind of decision he is aiming at is closer to a perspectival shift than a decision 
proper and, as such, might more accurately be termed ‘recognition’.120 To put this 
in other words, the radical conclusion one must draw from Badiou’s philosophy 
                                                   
120 Take, for example, the following quotation: ‘From which ‘decision’, then, stems the process of 
a truth? From the decision to relate henceforth to the situation from the perspective of its 
evental supplement.’ Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, p. 41. And again, 
in Metapolitics, we find a more direct identification between ‘recognition’ and ‘decision’: ‘[an 
event’s] recognition as event is simply at one with the political decision’. Alain Badiou, 
Metapolitics, trans. by Jason Barker (London: Verso, 2005), p. 23. 
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of the event is that event2 retroactively serves as the possibility condition of event1 
such that event1 will not have been without event2. The content of the moment of 
recognition (event2) corresponds to the logic of the future anterior. It is, on one 
level, a recognition that an event has occurred, as well as a decision that, from 
this occurrence, certain consequences must follow. As such, the previously 
troubling alignment between Badiou and Schmitt turns out to be less dangerous 
and more conceptually productive than many of Badiou’s commentators have 
realised.121 One does not need to rescue Badiou from decisionism; instead, by 
submitting the Schmittian variant of decisionism to thorough and careful 
analysis, it becomes clear that the very idea of an omnipotent decider cannot be 
sustained.  
While there are clearly good reasons to pursue a comparison between 
Schmitt and Badiou, it is important to point out the limits of such an approach. 
First and foremost, even though both the ‘event’ and the ‘decision on the 
exception’ contain a moment of circularity which impels the movement to a new 
situation, they are nonetheless acts which accomplish different kinds of change. 
Put another way, they are transformations which work in different directions. For 
Badiou, the key change is from a closed situation, fully articulated in terms of 
knowledge, to a situation including a newly formed subject advancing the 
revolutionary consequences of a truth. In contrast, Schmitt’s state of exception, 
inaugurated by a (reflexively determined) sovereign decision is more likely to be 
a counter-revolutionary measure, a measure aiming at closure instead of 
                                                   
121 Incidentally this is not the only potentially productive comparison between Badiou and 
Schmitt. In Theory of Contradiction, Badiou clarifies his notion of class struggle in a way that is 
unmistakably reminiscent of Schmitt’s existential antagonism between friend and enemy: ‘A 
class does not preexist before the class struggle. To exist means to be oppressed. The existence 
of a term is entirely given in its contradictory correlation with the other term of the scission’. 
Alain Badiou, Théorie de La Contradiction (Paris: François Maspero, 1975), p. 70. Cited in: 
Bruno Bosteels, Badiou and Politics (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2011), p. 153. 
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openness.122 Schmitt’s sovereign is supposed to resolve a ‘case of extreme peril’ 
and aims more at the re-institution of order than explosive revolutionary 
openness.123 Moreover, when one scrutinises a Schmittian sovereign decision 
according to Johnston’s event1/event2 dyad, one notices additional differences. 
Whereas in Badiou event1 is a ‘pure occurrence’, one that vacillates between 
existence and inexistence until it is nominated by way of a subjective intervention, 
the correlate of event1 in Schmitt (the proto-sovereign declaration) is not merely 
an occurrence but an act, albeit an act which may or may not emanate from a 
sovereign. We can thus see how the comparison between Schmitt and Badiou 
illuminates the formal distinction between events that end a period of political 
instability and those which aim at order and closure. While neither can be 
regarded as decisionist in the strict sense of the term (given that neither is rooted 
in and fully determined by a single act of a unified pre-existing subject), the 
distinction between event1 as act (Schmitt) and event1 as occurrence (Badiou) 
may also allow us to establish the formal distinction between 
progressive/revolutionary and conservative/reactionary events. 
The question that follows from this comparison between Schmitt and 
Badiou is one that also concerns Johnston—namely, what is it about the 
occurrence of event1 that precipitates an intervention (event2)? The solution in 
Schmitt is no doubt the proto-sovereign’s ability to conjure up a certain affective 
response in his or her subjects. The regalia that accompany royalty function as a 
display of power producing an affective response which, in turn, predisposes the 
                                                   
122 Although there are reasons to suspect Badiou would be wary of the comparison I make here, 
we  can nonetheless detect a certain ambivalence in his idea of the relationship between 
sovereignty and the event. For example, Badiou certainly regards the event as a kind of 
exception, albeit a kind of exception that undermines power as opposed to bolstering it. See: 
Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, Philosophy in the Present, ed. by Peter Engelmann, trans. by 
Peter Thomas and Alberto Toscano (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), p. 12. 
123 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 6. 
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people to treat the monarch as a sovereign. Of course, there is nothing about the 
signs and emblems of royalty which actually determine subjects’ recognition of 
sovereign status; rather, the King’s regalia function to increase the likelihood of 
spontaneous obedience by virtue of a common understanding that they are a 
visual correlate of power. Likewise, the interim between event1 and event2, could 
be understood as the space of a pre-reflective act of recognition (given that, as we 
have seen, it cannot be the site of a decision124) triggering the spontaneous 
condensation of a proto-subjective force into a unified deciding entity. That is to 
say that although there is no decision between event1 and event2, there is an act 
of recognition which effects a reorganisation of a proto-subjective force into a 
subject in the strictly Badiouian sense. After the event (which we are here 
regarding as comprising both event1 and event2) there is a subject capable of 
deciding, however, this decision-making power of the post-evental subject can 
only determine the subject’s fidelity to the event, not the occurrence of the event 
itself—having recognised the event, the subject is in a position to decide whether 
to follow its consequences or to behave as if nothing has really changed. 
How exactly is this ‘proto-subject’ that arises between event1 and event2 to 
be understood? Johnston provides a neat summary of the problem: 
What is being called for here is a metapsychological investigation into the affective, 
libidinal, and identificatory features of the pre-evental human psyche with an eye to 
discerning what, within these features partly tied to what could be designated as a 
sort of  ‘constitution’ or ‘nature,’ harbours the possibility for a readiness or 
responsiveness to the transformative effects of evental interpellations.125 
Johnston is entirely correct to point to the question of the ‘pre-evental human 
psyche’ as a vital avenue for enquiry. Investigating the question of the pre-evental 
                                                   
124 Even Johnston should be reproached for his use of the term ‘decision’ to characterise event2; 
event1 must be recognised as opposed to ‘decided upon’ if we are to arrive at a non-decisionist 
reading of Badiou. Johnston, Badiou, Žižek, and Political Transformations, p. 73. 
125 Johnston, Badiou, Žižek, and Political Transformations, p. 79. 
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subject will be a guiding thread in the final chapter of this thesis. At this stage, 
however, it is worth noting the way in which Laclau’s trio of related concepts—
misrecognition, structural dislocation, and constitutive distortion pertain to the 
idea of a pre-subjective state or proto-subject which is absent in Badiou’s thought. 
My argument here is that a comparison between Badiou and Laclau’s respective 
notions of the subject may shed some light on the pre-evental breach in Badiou. 
It is a comparison motivated by the shared concern in each thinker to develop a 
theoretical account of the emergence of possibility, not in the Aristotelian sense 
of the actualisation of latent potentials, but rather, possibility at a further remove, 
as Badiou puts it (adopting a Kierkegaardian formulation), the ‘creation of new 
possibilities […] at the level of the possibility of possibilities’.126 
 
 
                                                   
126 Alain Badiou, The Communist Hypothesis (London: Verso, 2010), p. 243. 
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Laclau, Badiou, and the Intra-/Post-Evental Subject 
Given that we have already looked at the Badiouian concept of the subject in some 
detail, let us begin our comparison between Badiou and Laclau with a definition 
of the subject according to Laclau: 
Subject equals the pure from of the structure’s dislocation, of its ineradicable 
distance from itself. An examination of the subject’s forms of presence in the 
structure must therefore be an exploration of contingency’s discursive forms of 
presence in the field of objectivity - or more precisely, the ways in which objectivity 
is subverted by contingency. Or in a third formulation, which amounts to the same, 
it must analyse the emergence of the subject as a result of the collapse of 
objectivity.127 
There are several important points to draw from this quotation. Firstly, we have 
the subject defined as ‘the pure form of the structure’s dislocation’. By structure 
we are simply to understand that which is given for a certain regime of 
signification, i.e. that which can be represented. However, for Laclau, 
structuration has a limit such that it can never be fully represented, and this 
‘ineradicable distance’ is the subversion of structure (objectivity, the 
representable) by contingency. Finally, the ‘third formulation’ posits subject as ‘a 
result of the collapse of objectivity’. Superficially, this might appear quite close to 
a Badiouian definition. After all, Badiou’s subject can, in some sense be regarded 
as arising from the abrupt collapse of a situation. In addition, both Laclau and 
Badiou point to the existence of a degree of negativity or non-closure which allows 
for some kind of change to occur. In Badiou this change is, of course, the event 
that accompanies the emergence of a subject faithful to a truth. For Laclau, in 
contrast, there is no sharp boundary between transformative events and the 
structure. The subject understood as the dislocation of structure correlates to the 
ever present undecidability that characterises a given political system, that is, the 
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impossibility of structure’s totalization which is in turn a result of the ‘contingent 
nature of all objectivity’.128 
Another point of comparison between Laclau and Badiou can be made in 
relation to the concept of the decision. Both Laclau and Badiou are clearly 
thinkers whose concept of the subject is somehow related to the concept of the 
decision. We have seen with Badiou that this decision cannot simply be the point 
of origin for an event since this would automatically result in decisionism. There 
is a notion of intervention in Badiou which may well be structurally reminiscent 
of a decision, and yet, as I have argued, the intervention is best conceived in terms 
of recognition as opposed to decision since decision implies a pre-given agent 
whereas recognition, as spontaneous, pre-reflective, and un-willed, does not 
require a pre-formed agent in the same way. Now, turning to Laclau, it is quite 
clear that ‘decision’ plays a more prominent role in relation to the subject. Having 
convincingly argued for the constitutive nature of antagonism resulting in the 
undecidability of structure, Laclau argues,  
If the undecidability lies in the structure as such, then any decision developing one 
of its possibilities will be contingent, that is external to the structure, in the sense 
that it is not determined by that particular structure, even though it may be made 
possible by it. But secondly, the agent of that contingent decision must be 
considered, not as an entity separate from the structure, but constituted in relation 
to it.129 
Laclau goes on to characterize the relation between subject and structure as one 
of ‘partial autonomy’: 
It is also clear that if, on the one hand, the subject is not external to the structure, on 
the other it becomes partially autonomous from it to the extent that it constitutes the 
locus of a decision not determined by it. But this means: a) that the subject is nothing 
but this distance between the undecidable structure and the decision; b) that 
ontologically speaking, the decision has the character of a ground which is as primary 
as the structure on which it is based, since it is not determined by the latter, and c) 
that if the decision is one between structural undecidables, taking a decision can only 
mean repressing possible alternatives that are not carried out.130 
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‘Decision’, for Laclau, is simply an inaugural structuring gesture. To say that 
decision has the character of a ground is the same as saying that there can be no 
definitive ground for the political, that every political structuration emerges from 
a partially autonomous decision, and that it is only by way of a process of 
sedimentation that one contingent decision begins to appear as if its durability 
were due to an underlying necessity. Moreover, for Laclau, the result of a decision 
is always the ‘eclipse of the subject’.131 Regardless of the relative success of the 
repression of possible alternatives, the overall effect of a decision having taken 
place is the closure of the distance between structure and decision, which as we 
have seen is identical to the subject. Of course, this does not mean that 
undecidability is only a transient state of affairs; rather, Laclau points to the ‘work 
of “myth”’ as that of suturing the dislocated space.132 ‘Subject’ is, in this sense, 
that which mediates the mythical representation of dislocated elements and the 
new dominant structural objectivity. 
The key distinction to be made, therefore, between Badiouian and 
Laclauian notions of the subject concerns its temporal extension. For Laclau, 
subject persists in the distance between the undecidability of structure and a 
decision. But what is the signal of the undecidability of structure if not an event? 
And likewise, although we have sought to reconceive event2 in terms of 
recognition as opposed to decision, is it not equally apparent that Laclau’s 
‘decision’ which marks the ‘eclipse of the subject’ performs a similar structural 
function to Badiou’s ‘intervention’ which registers the evental occurrence as an 
event?133 The complementarity between Laclau and Badiou allows us to see how 
                                                   
131 Laclau, New Reflections, p. 61. 
132 Laclau, New Reflections, p. 61. 
133 Laclau, New Reflections, p. 61. 
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‘subject’ is itself the puncturing of a normal situation which nonetheless, for each 
thinker, emerges at a different stage in the process. Badiou’s subject is thoroughly 
post-evental. Regardless of whether we conceive subject as the sum of the 
consequences of an event, or as the agent who unfolds these consequences, there 
can be no subject prior to the event. The proto-subjective force that both Feltham 
and Johnston identify (notwithstanding their different terminologies) is what we 
might view as a kind of blind spot in Being and Event, a non-ontologizable 
remainder whose appearance seems coincident with its disappearance. In 
contrast, the Laclauian subject correlates precisely with this remainder. Here, 
subject is the unrepresentable, and strictly achronological, interim between (to 
reapply Johnston’s dyad) event1 and event2. If event1 corresponds to the ‘collapse 
of objectivity’ (i.e. the revealing of a situation’s contingent foundation), subject 
corresponds to the dislocated space itself as well as the contingent decision that 
grounds a new order. Subject for Laclau is co-extensive with the unrepresentable 
distance between two distinct objective orders as well as the operator that brings 
the new order into being, whereas for Badiou, subject is primarily the long 
process of drawing out consequences and maintaining fidelity. 
Reading Badiou and Laclau in tandem allows us to return to some of the 
guiding questions of the thesis. One such question concerns the problems 
encountered when describing a revolutionary transformation in terms of a 
chronological narrative. We saw in previous chapters how thinkers of the social 
contract tradition either attempted to reduce the impact of narrative 
discontinuity through means of rhetorical obfuscation (Hobbes) or by condensing 
the contingent moment onto an external figure (Rousseau). These attempts are 
based on an underlying imperative to render the past intelligible, and, as we know 
from Ricoeur, the effort to understand the past always requires us to supply a 
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logic of emplotment such that each action has a set of motivations, is carried out 
with certain intentions, and has consequences. Moreover, as Jonathan Culler 
notes, ‘the analyst must assume there is a real or proper temporal order, that the 
events in fact occurred either simultaneously or successively’.134 The very act of 
narrativisation posits a series of actions and events which are to be treated as an 
external referent to be captured by narrative. But since we are dealing with 
actions undergone by human subjects, there is an additional level of interpretive 
activity which can only be incompletely captured by narrative and which may also 
be suspended from the conscious reflection of individual actors themselves. The 
central point made in the previous chapter is that this unconscious dimension 
may well be a necessary feature of human political affairs. If the collection of 
political actors on the brink of recognising a proto-sovereign were to experience 
their own participation in the constitutive act, this would change the status of 
their act from recognition to decision and the proto-sovereign would be viewed 
merely as a hysterical madman or unsuccessful pretender. Moreover, if the people 
were somehow aware of their power to recognise the sovereign into existence, this 
would also imply their consciousness of their own status as the highest, underived 
power. The people’s awareness of their constitutent power (to unconsciously 
recognise a sovereign claim as legitimate) automatically suspends the efficacy of 
any sovereign claim and instead reforms the people as constituted (as opposed to 
constituent) power. Turning to Badiou, it appears that the event must also be 
non-narrativizable for similar reasons. The event cannot be the work of a 
conscious subject (since this would lead to decisionism) but nor can it be a mere 
product of circumstances. This means that from the perspective of an attempt to 
                                                   
134 Culler, p. 171. 
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narrativise the event in terms of a broader account of a passage from old to new, 
there is always a missing link, a point at which a relatively mundane situation 
suddenly escalates so as to produce effects which cannot be accounted for through 
reference to their causes. For Schmitt, Laclau, Rousseau, and Badiou, we see an 
effort to think (perhaps reluctantly in the case of Schmitt) a moment that is 
necessarily opaque, that gives rise to radical changes precisely because it is 
opaque. 
Ricoeur’s reflections in Time and Narrative offer some support to the 
position set out above. Although humans experience their own temporal 
existence in terms of an always-present moment of ‘now’, the counterpart to this 
experience is an originary point from which time can be measured, a point that 
establishes a calendrical succession within which the ‘now’ of the present can be 
situated. But the price paid is that the originary moment itself can never be fully 
included in narrative except as either a disconcerting hiatus or breach. The 
moment that establishes a new era is unintelligible because it cannot be included 
in the narrative totality of the historical period it inaugurates.135 This allows us to 
understand more fully the issue of subjective engagement in Badiou. As we have 
seen above, much like Kierkegaard’s ‘gaze of worldly sagacity’, the disengaged 
spectator is unable to fully appreciate the evental occurrence. To such a spectator, 
the event simply appears to be a chaotic intrusion—nothing ends or begins, there 
are perhaps minor disturbances, but they can be fully understood in terms of the 
elements of the situation. Clearly, for this spectator, the event’s vital dimension 
remains invisible. But if we accept Badiou’s reasoning, we should also add that it 
                                                   
135 For more on this point, see: William C. Dowling, Ricoeur on Time and Narrative: An 




is equally invisible from the perspective of the engaged subject given that insofar 
as the event inaugurates a new era, the originary moment of foundation cannot 
be narrativised as an element within that era conceived as a totality. It is because 
the event is unintelligible that it cannot be demonstrated but must simply be 
posited. 
What has Badiou contributed to our investigation into the political 
significance of narrative time and discontinuity? In the first instance, Badiou’s set 
theoretic ontology is a decisive move beyond politico-theological thought. That is 
to say, we no longer need to deploy a thinly veiled theological paradigm to 
describe political activity. The extent to which one finds Badiou’s position 
convincing will depend on whether one accepts the axiomatic assertions which 
ground his ontology. Nonetheless, part of the achievement of Badiou’s philosophy 
resides in its boldness as well as its unrelenting drive towards internal 
consistency. There is a sense in which, once the initial assertions of Being and 
Event are accepted, the rest of the argument unfurls in an unassailable, unbroken 
strand of reasoning. And yet the other (deeply unphilosophical) strength of 
Badiou’s work is that it seems to resonate intuitively with how humans actually 
experience their engagement during certain kinds of endeavor, how they can 
suddenly be taken up by a project, devoting their energies to it with a passionate 
resolve that exceeds understanding. Indeed, one can argue that this is the 
ultimate task for materialism today—to think through the possibility of the kind 
of subjective commitment that is capable of unlimited expenditure, of remaining 
committed long after the original reasons for committing have ceased to be 
compelling. Apropos this kind of commitment, it is worth recalling the passage in 
Montesquieu’s On the Spirit of the Laws in which we are told of the effect of an 
oath on a virtuous people. Montesquieu writes:  
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Such was the influence of an oath among those people that nothing bound them more 
strongly to the laws. They often did more for the observance of an oath than they 
would ever have performed for the thirst of glory or for the love of their country.// 
When Quintus Cincinnatus, the consul, wanted to raise an army in the city against 
the Æqui and the Volsci, the tribunes opposed him. “Well,” said he, “let all those who 
have taken an oath to the consul of the preceding year march under my banner.” In 
vain did the tribunes cry out that this oath was no longer binding, and that when they 
took it Quintus was but a private person: the people were more religious than those 
who pretended to direct them; they would not listen to the distinctions or 
equivocations of the tribunes.136 
The unconditional investment here is not in the particular oath but on the idea of 
what it means to take an oath. This is important because a particular oath is 
something one directly decides to make, but what makes an oath binding is not 
the decision to take the oath, but rather the pre-existing disposition towards oaths 
which leads the subject to treat them as binding. It is precisely the emergence of 
such a disposition that Badiou is seeking to understand in Being and Event. The 
task of this chapter has been to scrutinize a particular aspect of Badiou’s project, 
or more precisely, to ask what exactly prevents us from inscribing the change 
Badiou calls ‘event’ in a continuum of historical actions and events. As has been 
argued, the impediment to the event’s chronological inscription inheres in the 
retroaction that characterizes the relationship between subject and event, that in 
a sense, one requires something very much like a subject to name the event which 
brings subject proper into being. It is a paradox that bears a close structural 
affinity to Schmitt’s ‘sovereign decision’ (notwithstanding the sense in which they 
work in opposite directions, as I draw attention to above) as well as being 
reminiscent of the subject of the social contract who appears in both Hobbes and 
Rousseau, and is precisely a subject who must precede their own genesis. 
Moreover, in each case, we see an attempt to theorise a radical change in 
subjective disposition which correlates to a transformation in the external 
                                                   
136 Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, ed. 
& trans. by Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, and Harold Samuel Stone (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 122. 
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political order, and yet crucially, this is a change that is only effective insofar as it 
remains inaccessible to narrative—as soon as one can account for the shift in 
terms of a stable, continuous narrative, the quality of the transformation itself 
changes.137
                                                   
137 By way of illustration, recall the earlier example apropos Schmitt’s sovereign. As soon as the 
constitutive power of subjects (in terms of their capacity to ‘recognise’, and thereby generate, 
sovereign status) is included in their own understanding of the genesis of sovereignty, one can 
no longer regard the sovereignty as inhering in the King; instead, the King becomes a mere 
delegate of the people who are themselves the site of real power. 
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Chapter Five  
 
Transcendental Materialism in Žižek and Johnston 
‘There is no real direction here, neither lines of power nor 
cooperation. Decisions are never really made – at best they 
manage to emerge, from a chaos of peeves, whims, hallucinations 
and all around assholery.’ 
  
- Thomas Pynchon 
 
 
Each of the preceding chapters can be viewed as variations on a single argument, 
namely, that in our effort to account for political foundations, we encounter a 
resistance to narrativisation that is worthy of philosophical investigation. Put 
another way, the founding act which gives rise to a political community, or the act 
that mediates the transition between one constituted order and the next, cannot 
itself be successfully included in a stable narrative of the passage from old to new. 
At the decisive moment, chronological exposition slips into circularity and 
insoluble aporias are encountered as narrative passes through the distorted space 
of revolutionary action. As has been argued, this should be understood as an a 
priori unintelligibility, one that emerges both in empirical analysis as well as 
speculative anthropologies.1 
The narrative distortion associated with a constitutive act appears in one 
of two ways.2 Either it is represented as a gap or break in time, described by 
Arendt as the ‘legendary hiatus between old and new’, or it reveals itself as a 
moment of circularity or retroaction whereby, in order to complete the passage 
                                                   
1 Here I am referring to the ‘speculative anthropologies’ of Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau discussed previously in the second chapter.  
2 Laclau, Rhetorical Foundations, p. 15. 
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from the old political order to the new, we must import certain features from the 
future into the past. A key example of this latter form of distortion can be found 
in the figure of Rousseau’s legislator who must appear exactly where (or rather, 
when) he is needed but where it is nonetheless impossible for him to be. We have 
seen how the notion of a quasi-transcendental gesture might allow us to conceive 
of an act that, so to speak, covers its tracks, impeding the resulting political 
subject’s subsequent narrativisation. Such a gesture is no doubt performed by 
some agent, and yet crucially, the political subject’s involvement qua agent is not 
recoverable après coup; instead, the act’s quasi-transcendental status signals that 
it is a moment of founding which emanates from concrete political action, but 
which nonetheless loses its efficacy if it is not perceived as transcending mundane 
earthly human activity. 
The current chapter will seek to investigate the aforementioned issues in 
greater depth through the works of Slavoj Žižek and, to a lesser extent, Adrian 
Johnston, each of whom have drawn upon a diverse array of sources (most 
notably German Idealism and Lacanian psychoanalysis) in order to pioneer a 
transcendental materialist theory of subjectivity.3 Of course, it will not be possible 
to provide a comprehensive account of either Žižek or Johnston’s work here; 
instead, the task of this final chapter will be to scrutinize the features of a 
transcendental materialist position on subjectivity and action. While both Žižek 
and Johnston have tended to view transcendental materialism as a theory of 
subjectivity strictu sensu, our task will be to focus on its implications for our 
                                                   
3 There are numerous other contemporary thinkers who are also contributing to a tradition of 
philosophical reflection on the possibility of the immanent genesis of transcendence. Worthy of 
mention here are Catherine Malabou, whose interpretation of Hegelian philosophy in light of 
recent neuroscientific discoveries points in a similar direction to Johnston’s work, and Michael 
O’Neill Burns whose recent monograph Kierkegaard and the Matter of Philosophy: A 
Fractured Dialectic presents a transcendental materialist account of Kierkegaard’s philosophy. 
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understanding of history, temporality, and political change. To that end, I will 
seek to perform a transcendental materialist reading of Hobbes and Rousseau, 
showing first how Hobbes’s account falls short insofar as it fails to provide scope 
for contingent, undetermined human action and, subsequently, how these 
shortcomings are resolved in Rousseau whose notion of human nature ultimately 
proves compatible with a Žižekian/Johnstonian ontology. 
Distilling Žižek and Johnston’s respective contribution to political theory 
will allow us to bolster and extend the readings of thinkers under discussion in 
previous chapters. The aporetic impermeability of transformative moments is 
held by Johnston and Žižek to be firmly located at an ontological, as opposed to 
merely epistemological, level. If we were dealing with a resistance to analysis with 
an epistemological character, this would mean that a totalising account of 
political transformations would be possible in principle, and would be achievable 
given enough data and a sufficiently refined methodology. There are compelling 
reasons to side with Žižek and Johnston in rejecting this approach. As we saw in 
Chapter 2, the aporia associated with origins appears in speculative as well as 
empirical accounts—a clear sign that we facing a deadlock that cannot be reduced 
to a question of methodology or empirical detail. Rather, as Ricoeur has argued, 
we should conclude that an event comprising a decisive break with the past will 
not be fully intelligible, but will leave a remainder, the remainder being ‘the event 
itself’.4 Human events are intelligible according to a logical grammar of time 
which requires us to view them as either simultaneous or successive with respect 
to each other. Taken together, these events must be posited as a totality from 
which the originary event is necessarily excluded; to include the originary event 
                                                   
4 Ricoeur, I, p. 222. 
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within the continuum of rectilinear time it establishes would require us to think 
of this event in terms of a set of prior conditions. We would then be then be unable 
to think this event as originary since, as Laclau succinctly puts it, ‘something is 
originary insofar as it does not need to go outside itself in order to constitute what 
it is’.5 It is from such a position that a transcendental materialist conception of 





                                                   
5 Laclau, Rhetorical Foundations, p. 15. 
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The (Im)material Subject 
According to Johnston, the key tenet of a transcendental materialist position is a 
twofold assertion that maintains both an uncompromising materialism (i.e. there 
is no other spiritual/immaterial substance which imbues human bodies with the 
magical property of subjectivity) while also showing how inert matter can give 
rise to a more-than-corporeal subjective dimension. Johnston frames this 
endeavour in the following way: ‘the choice between either a disembodied subject 
or an embodied self is a false dilemma. Cogito-like subjectivity ontogenetically 
emerges out of an originally corporeal condition as its anterior ground, although, 
once generated, this sort of subjectivity thereafter remains irreducible to its 
material sources’.6 This is not to be read as a simple reversion to straightforward 
transcendentalism. There is no higher plane transcending materiality; there is 
nothing but substance.7 And yet, equally, this is a ‘dual aspect monism’, one that 
does not entail reductivism or force us into view subjectivity as a mere 
epiphenomenal impression. The task for contemporary philosophy is to assert a 
form of transcendentalism that emerges immanently from a homogeneous 
material plane. Conceiving the genesis of subjectivity in this way, as we have 
noted, makes it possible to evade the theoretical cul-de-sac of a vulgar materialist 
reductivism with its assertion of pure, uncontaminated materiality, but it also 
allows for a compelling critique of the Deleuzian/Guattarian notion of sheer 
multiplicity, unpredictably spilling rhizomatically in every direction. Johnston 
follows Badiou here in revealing how beneath the celebration of the Deleuzian 
                                                   
6 Johnston, Žižek’s Ontology, pp. xxiiv–xxiv. 
7 In fact, the situation is more complicated than this. There is a discrepancy between Johnston’s 
materialism of a thick, inert substance which gives rise to more-than-corporeal subjectivity, and 
Žižek’s most recent arguments for a ‘dematerialized’ materialism. This divergence between 
Johnston and Žižek will be dealt with in more detail below. 
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‘mad dance’, there lies an underlying sameness.8 Multiplicity, when thought to its 
limit, ends up slipping into its opposite—a single plane of immanence from which 
nothing new can emerge.9 And finally, the cogito as a self-identical kernel, the 
locus of conscious thought and directed action (in the manner of orthodox 
readings of the German Idealist tradition) is held to be insufficient insofar as it 
entails a notion of the subject as simply posited in advance without adequately 
delving into the positing activity which gives rise to it. 
Even while Žižek has appropriated the term transcendental materialism to 
describe his own philosophical position, there is nonetheless an important 
distinction between Johnston and Žižek with regard to the consistency of this 
materialism. In Žižek’s most recent work we find a materialism that is not the 
inert density of substance Johnston holds capable of producing the more-than-
material subject, but rather a materialism of the immaterial. Žižek’s materialism 
is described as the ‘immanent materiality of the ideal order itself’ and as a 
‘materialism without matter, without the metaphysical notion of matter as a fully 
constituted substance—in dialectical materialism, matter “disappears” in a set of 
purely formal relations’.10 Having said this, it is unclear from Žižek’s arguments 
whether he intends to stake out a truly distinct position from Johnston or whether 
the distinctions are purely rhetorical. For our purposes, it is worth retaining focus 
on the broad commonalities between Žižek and Johnston’s respective intellectual 
projects. Both theorists are interested in thinking through materialism’s central 
problematic, that of ‘the rise of an eternal Idea out of the activity of people caught 
                                                   
8 Alain Badiou, Deleuze: The Clamour of Being, trans. by Louise Burchill (London: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 11; Johnston, Badiou, Žižek, and Political Transformations, p. xiii. 
9 Johnston, Žižek’s Ontology, p. xiii. 
10 Slavoj Žižek, Absolute Recoil: Towards a New Foundation of Dialectical Materialism 
(London: Verso, 2014), pp. 56, 73. 
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in a finite historical situation’.11 In addition, both assert the priority of a cut or 
rupture (drawing on the Lacanian notion of the Real) as opposed to any 
ideal/material plane. 
Transcendental materialism draws on the Lacanian notion of the split 
subject to elaborate an ontology characterized by the non-closure of substance. 
The subject is not an additional element one adds to material reality; instead, the 
subject is the site of a constitutive split between a vanishing point of negative self-
relating and a series of partial identifications. This is neatly expressed in Žižek’s 
concise statement that ‘Man is a lack which, in order to fill itself in, recognizes 
itself as something’.12 Indeed, this is the vital point of contact Žižek identifies 
between Lacan and Kant, described by Johnston as a split between ‘phenomenal 
and noumenal dimensions of subjectivity’: ‘The subject an sich that makes 
experience possible cannot itself fall, as a discrete experiential, representational 
element, within the frame of the field it opens up and sustains’.13 To be quite clear 
on this point, the subject is not in-itself this ‘noumenal’ vanishing point. 
Considering this dimension of subjectivity as ‘noumenal’ as Johnston seems to 
here is already to concede too much to an orthodox idealism.14 Subject is, on the 
contrary, the very oscillation between a pure self-relating negativity, and various 
modes of identification giving rise to a transcendental illusion, the illusion of a 
hard kernel of self-sameness. It is an illusion that correlates to the psychoanalytic 
notion, proposed by Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, of the 
                                                   
11 Žižek, Absolute Recoil: Towards a New Foundation of Dialectical Materialism, p. 73. 
12 Slavoj Žižek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009), p. 44. 
13 Johnston, Žižek’s Ontology, p. 30. 
14 Elsewhere Johnston is more careful, affixing a qualifying ‘quasi’ to the noumenal dimension of 
subjectivity. As with quasi-transcendentalism, explored at length in previous chapters, the term 
‘quasi-noumenal’ expresses the fact that while full noumenality cannot be sustained, the illusion 
of noumenality is an inevitable, constitutive aspect of subjectivity. 
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‘fundamental fantasy’—that of the ‘origin of the subject himself’.15 The insight 
here is that the ‘core’ of the subject is not pre-given, but is in fact, as hinted at 
above, a consequence of another more basic activity of ‘positing’. It is this positing 
activity which fabricates a firm ground (albeit illusory) from which the subject 
can seize itself as a self-sufficient agent and begin to act in the world. For Žižek’s 
Lacan, the idea of the ‘subject of the signifier’ expresses the ‘contentless’ status of 
the subject, the sense in which the subject has no stable objective correlate:  
there is, of course, no substantial signified content which guarantees the unity of the 
I: at this level, the subject is multiple, dispersed, and so forth – its unity is guaranteed 
only by the self-referential symbolic act, that is, ‘I’ is a purely performative entity […] 
when I designate ‘myself’ as ‘I’ – this very act of signifying adds something to the 
‘real flesh-and-blood entity’ (inclusive of the content of its mental states, desires, 
attitudes) thus designated, and the subject is that X which is added to the designated 
content by means of the act of its self-referential designation.16 
Clearly, the designation ‘I’ does not point to any particular locatable content, but 
the very illusion of a consistent content referred to as ‘I’ has its own autonomy, 
exerting downward causality (actively manipulating the world through directed 
action and entailing other ‘real world’ adjustments) such that material being and 
non-material subject engage in a reciprocal process of modification. The problem 
one encounters here is that any formal description of what the subject ‘is’ or what 
it ‘does’ can entail theoretical regressions into a self-sufficient subject-qua-agent, 
the very ‘doer behind the deed’ Nietzsche sought to debunk in his Genealogy of 
Morality.17 Even describing the subject as ‘non-material’ seems to lead to a quasi-
spiritualized subject, thus enabling precisely the dualist misreading both Žižek 
and Johnston are at pains to avoid. Against this, the subject should be viewed as 
a torsion between a self-relating negativity and various partial fixations. This 
                                                   
15 Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, ‘Fantasy and the Origins of Sexuality’, in 
Formations of Fantasy, ed. by Victor Burgin, James Donald, and Cora Kaplan (New York, NY: 
Methuen, 1986), pp. 5–34 (p. 19). 
16 Žižek, The Parallax View, pp. 244–245. 
17 Nietzsche, p. 26. 
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means that it is impossible to distil some subjective essence by removing all 
material obstacles and influences, but equally, one cannot bracket off the subject 
so as to perceive external reality as an uninterrupted, objective totality (the 
subject would inevitably be smuggled back in the form of this fantasised, 
desubstantialised gaze). 
The manoeuver performed by Žižek and Johnston is one that sidesteps 
dualism (either as a Kantian phenomena/noumena or a spirit/substance 
division) and vulgar materialism (homogeneous, continuous, material being plus 
epiphenomenal ‘illusory’ subject) so as to assert a fractured ontology, i.e. a 
materialism that is not consistent but is riven by splits, gaps, and discontinuities. 
Within Kantian philosophy, subject cannot be situated on the side of phenomena 
or noumena; instead, according to Žižek, the possibility of the subject’s thinking 
activity itself relies on a minimal, ineradicable opacity: ‘The act of “I think” is 
trans-phenomenal, it is not an object of inner experience or intuition; yet for all 
that, it is not a noumenal Thing, but rather the void of its lack’.18 There is a 
significant radicalisation of Kant underway here. From an orthodox Kantian 
perspective, the subject is inaccessible insofar as it is located within the noumenal 
field. In the same way that objects in-themselves are inaccessible to subjective 
apperception, the Kantian subject is that which is ‘recognized only through the 
thoughts that are its predicates, and about which, in abstraction, we can never 
have even the least concept’.19 The error here is that of conceiving the gulf 
between the knowing, perceiving subject and subject qua Thing capable of 
autonomous, spontaneous action as if it were of an epistemological character. 
                                                   
18 Slavoj Žižek, Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel and the Critique of Ideology (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 1993), p. 13. 
19Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ed. & trans. by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 414. 
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Therein resides the kernel of Žižek’s radically heterodox Kantian insight: ‘if I were 
to have an access to my noumenal Self, I would thereby lose the very feature 
which makes me an I of pure apperception; I would cease to be the spontaneous 
transcendental agent that constitutes reality’.20 Subject cannot thus be 
understood as an additional noumenal Thing. We move from an epistemological 
limitation to ontological deadlock as soon as we accept that access to the 
noumenal subject would entail the self-erasure of subject as such. 
This is, for Žižek, the only ontological position which can sustain human 
freedom: ‘either subjectivity is an illusion or reality is in itself (not only 
epistemologically) not-All’.21 Subject is to be identified with the rupture in the 
field of ‘objective’ reality, not as an additional element to be uncovered, but as 
discontinuity, i.e. as the non-element that both subverts efforts towards 
totalization and gives rise to the misperception of materiality as a reified 
otherness. We can supplement Žižek with Laclau here: the genesis of ‘subject’ 
arises by way of a constitutive distortion through which the pure void of self-
relating negativity misperceives itself, investing itself with a consistency that then 
gives rise to the recognizable ‘classic’ subject qua self-sufficient agent of thought 
and action. The distortive operation is not the second-order misperception of an 
original content; rather, this ‘original content’ is precisely the illusion generated 
by the distortive operation which ‘[projects] into something that is essentially 
divided the illusion of a fullness and self-transparency that it lacks’.22 
                                                   
20 Žižek, Tarrying with the Negative, p. 16. 
21 Slavoj Žižek, Organs Without Bodies: On Deleuze and Consequences (London: Routledge, 
2004), p. 103. 




Does our conceiving the subject as the result of a constitutive distortion then 
prevent us from viewing the subject as capable of autonomous action? Or, put 
another way, is the idea of an autonomous subject also the result of a 
misperception of a more fundamental heteronomy resulting from our immersion 
in a fully determined ‘chain of being’? Žižek addresses this issue in his Indivisible 
Remainder, an examination of Schellingian philosophy that defends the 
possibility of a free act through an account of the moment of beginning as the 
result of an irrecuperable, primordial deed: 
The deed, once accomplished, sinks immediately into the unfathomable depth, 
thereby acquiring its lasting character. It is the same with the will which, once 
posited at the beginning and led into the outside, immediately has to sink into the 
unconscious. […] The decision that is in any way the true beginning should not 
appear before consciousness, it should not be recalled to mind, since this, precisely, 
would amount to its recall. He who, apropos of a decision, reserves for himself the 
right to drag it again to light, will never accomplish the beginning.23 
The insight Žižek wishes to extract from Schellingian philosophy is the idea of a 
beginning that occurs with a free act which, once accomplished, is definitively and 
necessarily lost to conscious reflection.24 For Schelling, we are dealing with an 
arche-original deed—the act that gives rise to consciousness of one’s subjective 
relation to the world. There is no doer behind this deed, only a chaotic vortex, 
characterised by Žižek alternately as the ‘rotary motion of drives’ and as an 
                                                   
23 F. W. J. Schelling, Die Weltalter. Fragmente. In Den Urfassungen von 1811 Und 1813, ed. by 
Manfred Schrӧter (Munich: Biederstein, 1946), pp. 183–4; Slavoj Žižek, The Indivisible 
Remainder: On Schelling and Related Matters (London: Verso, 2007), p. 21. 
24 It is worth noting that Žižek’s reading of Schelling has been reproached from different 
quarters for its overzealous and inappropriate application of a Lacanian conceptual framework 
to Schelling’s work, and for its prentensions to ‘critical materialism’ which in fact amount to an 
‘incomplete idealism’. These debates, while deserving of scholarly attention, are considered 
peripheral to the objectives of this chapter. See:Peter Dews, ‘The Eclipse of Coincidence: Lacan, 
Merleau-Ponty, and Žižek’s Misreading of Schelling’, in Traversing the Fantasy, ed. by Geoff M. 
Boucher, Jason Glynos, and Matthew Sharpe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 197–215; Iain 
Hamilton Grant, ‘The Insufficiency of Ground: On Žižek’s Schellingianism’, in The Truth of 
Žižek, ed. by Paul Bowman and Richard Stamp (London: Continuum, 2007), pp. 82–98. 
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‘orgasm of forces’.25 Taking this vortex as the starting point, Schelling describes a 
moment of contraction, followed by a decisive cut, with the latter serving to 
institute an unstable balance. So, why must this decisive cut remain unconscious? 
Precisely because the cut is itself the primordial act of repression which 
generates the stability of the new order.26 If this act of repression were available 
to conscious recollection, this would mean that the repression itself had been 
unsuccessful and chaos would immediately resurface. As Žižek puts it, it is not 
the ‘eternal past’ that is unconscious, but rather the ‘act of Ent-Scheidung by 
means of which drives were ejected into the eternal past’.27 
To what extent are we permitted to view this act as ‘free’? Žižek repeatedly 
emphasises the contingency of the act, claiming that this act is not the outcome 
of any pre-existing dynamic. Even though his account tends to read like a 
pneumatic modelling of the original vortex, giving rise to conscious subjectivity 
through a gradual build-up of pressure ending in a sudden release, this model 
cannot be accepted insofar as it supposes the ‘release’ as the predetermined 
eventual result of the ‘vortex’. This is the criticism hit upon by Iain Hamilton 
Grant in his contribution to The Truth of Žižek. Among his concluding remarks, 
Hamilton Grant triumphantly asserts:  
‘At last we have it: the self-grounding of freedom common to all the Idealist 
philosophies, Schelling’s included, says Žižek, provides the necessary ‘subject’s 
prehistory’; to what else could it lead? How capable is Being (Seinkönnen) of 
anything other than subjectivity, and moreover, of a subjectivity narrowly conceived 
within the rubric of a freely acting self-consciousness, whatever its constitutive 
lacunae?’.28 
Hamilton Grant then goes on to admonish Žižek for arguing that the ground of 
human freedom is the inexistence of nature whereas a truly Schellingian 
                                                   
25 Žižek, The Indivisible Remainder: On Schelling and Related Matters, pp. 24, 28. 
26 Žižek, The Indivisible Remainder: On Schelling and Related Matters, p. 33. 
27 Žižek, The Indivisible Remainder: On Schelling and Related Matters, p. 33. 
28 Hamilton Grant, p. 95. 
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argument would, in contrast, claim that freedom is thoroughly rooted in nature.29 
The problem with this argument is that it misconstrues Žižek’s notion of nature. 
Of course, nature ‘exists’, however, there is a crucial distinction to be made 
between nature in so far as it exists for us, and nature in itself as an object of 
philosophical speculation. This is why we are not permitted to equate the ‘vortex 
of drives’ to nature. To do so only imports a vision of nature as it exists for us into 
the eternal past—an illegitimate manoeuvre, although no doubt a tempting one 
since it would enable us to view human subjectivity as emerging by way of 
necessity (in the manner indicated by Hamilton Grant when he asks what else 
Being could be for other than subjectivity) as opposed to simply as an utterly 
contingent event, an aberration that could just as easily not have happened at all. 
Schelling’s Weltalter seeks to provide an account of the original genesis of 
subject out of substance. In turn, Žižek claims that the expulsion of the eternal 
past via an act of primordial repression can be mapped onto the two great epochs 
of human history: ‘the pagan epoch of rotary motion […] and the Christian epoch 
of linear teleological progress’.30 Paganism is thus the primordial, eternal past, 
separated from divine Logos by the Christian event. Without wishing to discount 
this ‘application’ of Schellingian philosophy to human history, there is a far more 
telling parallel to be found between Schelling’s philosophy of beginnings and the 
Hobbesian narrative of political origins. On this reading, the ‘rotary motion of 
drives’ forms the rough equivalent of the proto-political collection of disparate, 
isolated individuals existing precariously in the Hobbesian state of nature, while 
the political community instituted by the covenant corresponds to Schelling’s 
fragile order generated by a founding act of repression. The idea of an act which, 
                                                   
29 Hamilton Grant, p. 96. 
30 Žižek, The Indivisible Remainder: On Schelling and Related Matters, p. 42. 
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in the very instant of its occurrence is immediately and irrevocably buried in an 
eternal past, dovetails with our earlier remarks on the idea of a quasi-
transcendental founding political gesture. In both cases, there is a moment of 
‘necessary forgetting’ whereby, in order to accomplish a passage from old to new, 
the act that motivates the transformation must be hidden from retrospection. We 
can detect a similar kind of forgetfulness in Hamilton Grant’s reproach against 
Žižek in which the former asks, ‘How capable is Being (Seinkönnen) of anything 
other than subjectivity?’.31 Hamilton Grant succumbs to the perspectival 
distortion which views the present as the only possible future for the past. The 
implicit claim is that Being is teleologically oriented to the production of 
subjectivity whereas in fact Being is more than capable of indefinite static inertia. 
There is a similar manoeuvre in Hobbes’s account of the passage from the state 
of nature to political life. A teleological trajectory is introduced into the state of 
nature such that political life becomes the only possible outcome. The 
contingency of the founding political deed is effaced and we are left with an 
apparently smooth progression from anarchy to order. In Hobbes, the effect of 
this effacement is the opacity of the narrative episode in which the moment of 
contractual agreement actually takes place. We find in Hobbes’s account the 
absolute contraction of all the deliberation and persuasion that one might expect 
to accompany the genesis of political life expelled from the narrative, while its 
absence is signalled with the tellingly abrupt phrase ‘This done’.32 No sooner are 
we approaching the moment of political genesis than we have already passed over 
it directly into sovereignty, law, and government. ‘This done’ marks the point of 
groundlessness, the decision that generates political life ex nihilo, producing 
                                                   
31 Hamilton Grant, p. 95. 
32 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 120. 
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order out of the constant, self-perpetuating cycle of manipulation and 
exploitation found in the state of nature. Moreover, just as for Schelling the 
originary act is the very operation that expels the foundation into an eternal past, 
so too does the Hobbesian ‘This done’ allow us to see how the passage from 
disorder to order contains a Laclauian constitutive distortion, i.e. a distortive 
gesture which does not distort an original meaning, but rather has as its primary 
effect the production of the illusion of an underlying, undistorted content.33 
                                                   
33 Laclau, Rhetorical Foundations, p. 15. 
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A Transcendental Materialist Reappraisal of the Social Contract 
The Žižekian subject thus appears to be the locus of a distortive operation which, 
on the one hand, plays a constitutive role in forming ‘objective reality’, whilst on 
the other hand, is unable to perceive reality as a consistent Whole. As soon as one 
attempts a totalising narrative, one faces both a surplus of meaning (a plethora of 
different versions or perspectives that are incommensurate with one another and 
cannot be synthesised into a higher Whole), or a narrative ridden with gaps and 
breaches. Žižek offers a notion of the subject which allows us to account for the 
unavoidable narrative distortions noted in the various thinkers considered 
throughout the previous chapters of this thesis. From Kierkegaard’s account of 
the circularity that characterises the genesis myth through Hobbes and 
Rousseau’s respective repressions and displacements, the reflexive 
determination of the Schmittian sovereign, and Badiou’s evental subject—in each 
case we are obliged to view the vital act that accomplishes the passage between 
old and new as freely undertaken while being prevented from viewing it as a 
simple choice between pre-given alternatives. The following quotation from 
Žižek’s The Ticklish Subject proposes a reading of Hegel and Kant that may serve 
to clarify matters: 
On a philosophical level, this delicate distinction allows us to grasp Hegel’s break 
with Kantian idealism. Hegel, of course, learned the lesson of Kant’s transcendental 
idealism (there is no reality prior to a subject’s ‘positing’ activity); however, he 
refused to elevate the subject into a neutral-universal agent who directly constitutes 
reality. To put it in Kantian terms: while he admitted that there is no reality without 
the subject, Hegel insisted that subjectivity is inherently ‘pathological’ (biased, 
limited to a distorting, unbalanced perspective on the Whole). Hegel’s achievement 
was thus to combine, in an unprecedented way, the ontologically constitutive 
character of the subject’s activity with the subject’s irreducible pathological bias: 
when these two features are thought together, conceived as co-dependent, we obtain 
the notion of a pathological bias constitutive of ‘reality’ itself.34 
                                                   
34 Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (London: Verso 
Books, 2008), p. 87. 
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The primordial past of the state of nature can only appear to us in distorted form 
because the founding social contract not only accomplishes the constitution of a 
political entity, but also marks our own constitution as subjects within the newly 
created political space. It is this dynamic which then introduces the ‘pathological 
bias’. Any narrative recapitulation of the past is always posited/constituted from 
our perspective, with the implication that every attempt to perceive the past ‘as it 
really was’ automatically imports characteristics of our own period into the past. 
The past ‘as it was’ is definitively lost’; all we have left is the past as it exists ‘for 
us’, that is to say, in so far as it is thinkable from our current historical situation. 
To push this interpretation in a more explicitly psychoanalytic direction, it 
is also clear that the idea of an original social contract is a perfect example of what 
Žižek, following Freud, calls a fantasmatic ‘primal scene’. This ‘primal scene’ need 
not refer to a verifiable event, nor it is even necessary for us to ‘believe’ in it; 
instead, the primal scene is simply the subject’s attempt to gain narrative 
purchase on its own origins. Thomas Brockelman makes this point in his study 
on Žižek and Heidegger, pointing out that the role of fantasy is to ‘[project] the 
social qua totality by imagining it as totalized from [a] position of 
transcendence’.35 It is the act of totalization that, by effacing the trauma of the 
origin, gives rise to a system of meaning. The irrecoverability of the origin (as we 
have already seen, one does not have any pure access to the origin without some 
degree of repression/distortion) sets the subject’s fantasmatic effort in motion, 
and yet, as Žižek argues in The Plague of Fantasies: ‘the price one pays for the 
narrative resolution [of the problem of origins] is the petitio principia of the 
temporal loop—the narrative silently presupposes as already given what it 
                                                   
35 Thomas Brockelman, Žižek and Heidegger: The Question Concerning Techno-Capitalism 
(London: Continuum, 2008), p. 56. 
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purports to reproduce’.36 Without this narrative closure, the universe of meaning 
collapses. The examples Žižek mobilises include both the myth of ‘primordial 
accumulation’—the idea that the inequalities produced by capitalism emerged 
gradually as a result of the varying degrees of effort and talent of different 
workers—and, perhaps the arche-example, the genesis story of the Old Testament 
in which man’s fallen state is attributed to an original transgression. All the key 
features of a fantasised primal scene are also present in the Hobbesian account of 
the social contract. Even though the state of nature can hardly be described as 
Edenic, its real function is to assert the inevitability of the emergence of a 
sovereign in whom power and authority are concentrated and, importantly, that 
the sovereign’s power is derived from a moment of consensus between all 
members of the nascent political community. Our own epoch is rendered 
meaningful insofar as we are able to read the passage from human pre-history to 
political life as a necessary progression rather than a strange, contingent 
aberration. Put another way, applying Žižek’s Hegelian insight to the Hobbesian 
contract reveals how the very horizon of meaning is sustained only through the 
continued exclusion of some underlying contingent event. 
Against the Hobbesian account, Žižek’s claim (no doubt informed by an 
idiosyncratic reading of Hegel) is that the passage from one ‘particular life-
context’ to another is not achieved through a flexible recognition of new means to 
secure one’s interests, but through a stubborn, excessive attachment:  
when, irrespective of circumstances, I stubbornly attach myself to some accidental 
particular feature to which I am bound by no inner necessity, this ‘pathological’ 
attachment enables me to disengage myself from immersion in my particular life-
context. That is what Hegel calls the ‘infinite right of subjectivity’: to risk everything, 
my entire substantial content, for the sake of some trifling, idiosyncratic feature that 
matters more to me than anything else.37 
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37 Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, p. 104. 
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This is one way of conceiving the actual mechanism that produces the founding 
political act. In the Hobbesian state of nature we are told that every covenant is 
doomed to fail since Hobbes’s materialism holds that each individual will always 
follow their own perceived advantage. It will always be in one’s interests to trick 
or manipulate other parties in order to secure advantage, just as it will always be 
an extremely risky strategy to be the ‘first performer’ of any contract made. Under 
such conditions, for a contract to succeed, one requires a moment of irrational, 
stubborn resolve to fulfil a certain task even when the likely outcome will be 
disadvantageous. As will now be clear, this is the crucial missing link in the 
Hobbesian narrative. The first performer’s gesture is both necessary and 
impossible within the terms of Hobbes’s account. 
For Hobbes, the ultimate load-bearing human attribute motivating the 
passage from the state of nature to political life is reason. The Hobbesian 
individual is assumed to be oriented to the rational pursuit of self-interest in all 
contexts and scenarios. As a consequence, fear can be a powerful motivator both 
prior to the contract, since fear of a ‘painful and violent death’ provides a powerful 
incentive to leave the state of nature, and afterwards, insofar as the subject’s fear 
of the sovereign ensures a measure of order that would have been impossible in 
the state of nature. Rousseau, in contrast to Hobbes, does not view the contract 
as arrived at by way of necessity; rather, it is viewed as a hypothetical solution to 
the problems described in the second Discourse. It is a position which follows 
from Rousseau’s emphasis on freedom, and not reason, as the fundamental 
human quality: ‘The principle of all action is the will of a free being. We cannot 
go beyond this. It is not the word freedom which is meaningless but the word 
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necessity’.38 We are human insofar as we have a will, not because we have the 
capacity to reason. Indeed, reason’s primary function in Rousseau is to 
strengthen and extend our freedom as opposed to the function of reason in 
Hobbes which is to secure a durable political order. The content of the notion of 
freedom in question is described by Asher Horowitz as follows: ‘Freedom consists 
in the biological endowment of a creature with relatively open instincts and 
therefore possessed of a rudimentary negativity, a rudimentary capacity to 
oppose himself to things, other ‘persons,’ to his own drives, to his own past, and 
to the objectified image of himself he constructs from his interactions with 
others.’39 Man’s negative freedom does not lead us into a new teleology in which 
humans are simply propelled forward by another essential property (freedom as 
opposed to reason); in fact, there is nothing in Rousseau’s account which 
necessitates man’s use of his faculty of negativity. The implication is that every 
historical development man undergoes as a result of his free will must be viewed 
as utterly contingent. History can no longer be conceived as progressing steadily 
towards specific outcomes as Hobbes would have it. Rousseau’s account is one 
that views history as an open ended process in which material transformations 
occur in tandem with changes in the disposition of historically acting subjects. 
Rousseau’s conception of human nature proves compatible with a 
transcendental materialist understanding of the subject. Horowitz and Inston 
have both noted the profound mutability of the human subject in Rousseau’s 
account as well as the indeterminacy of the social and political institutions 
humans create. For Horowitz, man’s ‘perfectability’ is a function of an essential 
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negativity that enables human agents to interrupt their determination by 
historical conditions. A mentioned above, it is this negative power that, on 
Horowitz’s reading, provides the ‘sine qua non of both human evolution and the 
later historical and cultural development with which the former insensibility 
merges’.40 Likwise, Inston’s reading of Rousseauian man’s perfectibility takes it 
to be, ‘a consequence of our essential indeterminacy’.41  The harmony between a 
Rousseauian conception of human nature and the transcendental materialism of 
Žižek and Johnston therefore resides in the shared notion of a subject capable 
disengaging itself from its determination by a particular life-context. This 
‘disengagement’ (which may also take the form of an excessive moment of over-
engagement) is accomplished through a free gesture Žižek refers to as an ‘act’.42 
As we will see, the concept of the act has important implications for our enquiry 
into the possibility of radical transformations and the disjointed temporality such 
transformations imply. 
                                                   
40 Horowitz, p. 72. 
41 Inston, Rousseau and Radical Democracy, p. 50. 
42 Throughout Žižek’s works, the term ‘act’ is often conflated with the term ‘event’, with acts 
sometimes being described as ‘events’ and vice versa. Moreover, the term ‘event’ in Žižek’s 
corpus is not identical to Badiou’s concept of the event even if the former is heavily influenced 
by the latter. Throughout the discussion below, I will attempt to follow Žižek’s usage as closely 
as possible. As a rough principle, it can be noted at this stage that ‘act’ generally has a more 
Lacanian inflection, while ‘event’ is more often used to refer to moments of political 
transformation. Where I discuss passages in which the two terms seem to be used 
interchangeably, I will use ‘act/event’. 
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The Act and its Vissitudes 
Žižek uses the term ‘act’ (occasionally capitalized as ‘Act’) to describe a subjective 
performance that accomplishes a radical change precisely because it does not 
bind itself to a particular predefined strategic intervention within a given horizon 
of meaning. While it should be clear at this stage that something like a Žižekian 
act is required in order to exit the state of nature, Žižek’s own reflections on the 
act tend to operate in the opposite direction—i.e. the act is not the gesture which 
inaugurates the sovereign and establishes political life; rather, it is the kind of 
activity required to overthrow a political order, to dissolve a given configuration 
of power relations. As we will see, both acts share the same structure because they 
rely on a zero-level characteristic of political legitimacy, that of the constituent 
power of the political subject. This constituent power, elaborated by thinkers such 
as John Locke, Emmanuel Sieyès, and Carl Schmitt is both the subjective capacity 
that gives rise to a political order as well as the people’s inalienable power to 
abrogate any constituted order.43 If an act can be said to perform this function, 
we are obliged to conceive it as undetermined by the order it overturns. While 
there is no doubt that ‘acts’ occur in particular historical situations, they are not 
reducible to the situation’s conditions, but rather emerge by introducing a 
measure of distance with respect to those conditions. This has led Žižek and 
others to adopt a quasi-religious register when describing the act: 
‘absolute/unconditional acts do occur, but not in the (idealist) guise of a self-
transparent gesture performed by a subject with a pure Will who fully intends 
them – they occur, on the contrary, as a totally unpredictable tuche, a miraculous 
                                                   
43 In this identification of a tradition of thought dealing with the constituent power, I am 
supported by Andreas Kalyvas, ‘Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power’, 
Constellations, 12.2 (2005). 
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event which shatters our lives’.44 The miraculous quality imputed to the act/event 
here should not mislead us—the act does not emanate from a divine beyond; it is 
rather to be viewed as a moment of ‘pure happening’, a position adopted by a 
subject without an explanatory rationale, not a consequence of ‘inner’ willed 
activity, not experienced as a choice, but equally, an event that exceeds situational 
determination. 
In his more recent works, Žižek has offered further discussion on the 
concept of the act: 
But what about the retroactivity of a gesture which (re)constitutes this past itself? 
This, perhaps, is the most succinct definition of what an authentic act is: in our 
ordinary activity, we effectively just follow the (virtual fantasmatic) coordinates of 
our identity, while an act proper involves the paradox of an actual move which 
(retroactively) changes the very virtual “transcendental” coordinates of its agent’s 
being—or, in Freudian terms, which not only changes the actuality of our world but 
also “moves its underground.” We have thus a kind of reflexive “folding back of the 
condition on to the given it was the condition for”: while the pure past is the 
transcendental condition for our acts, our acts not only create new actual reality, they 
also retroactively change this very condition.45 
The above quotation is telling insofar as it brings into focus the centrality of the 
retroactive mode of operation for our understanding of the subject’s act. We have 
already seen how an effort to scrutinize a moment of radical transformation ends 
up producing a narrative which falls short of the usual standards of intelligibility 
given that its narrative episodes cannot be ordered in a rectilinear manner. In a 
similar way, Žižek posits the retroactive reconfiguration of a situation’s 
coordinates of possibility as an inherent characteristic of the act. Human freedom 
is not the freedom to act in one’s own interest, or to make a selection from a set 
of alternatives. While I may not be able to act freely in a classical sense (my 
actions are always-already determined by pre-given natural-mechanical 
limitations and ideological constraints), insofar as I remain a subject I retain a 
                                                   
44 Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, p. 463. 
45 Slavoj Žižek, Less than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism (London: 
Verso, 2012), p. 178. 
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minimal capacity to choose which determinations are salient. My freedom thus 
consists in my ability to reject the schema of value that grounds a given field of 
choices, or as Žižek puts it, to accomplish ‘the more radical gesture of subverting 
the very structuring principle of this field’.46 A subject is capable of spontaneously 
becoming something other, of identifying with a new set of determinations and 
experiencing them as overriding imperatives. To take a commonplace example 
often invoked by Žižek, when one falls in love, the beloved suddenly becomes an 
ultimate source of value such that previously unimaginable sacrifices are now 
possible on their behalf.47 Likewise, a political act proper would be a total 
commitment which one does not experience as freely undertaken, but rather as a 
spontaneously arising inner compulsion to act in accordance with a new 
principle. 
Can such an understanding of human freedom be convincing? In order to 
arrive at an affirmative answer, some significant challenges will first need to be 
addressed. Foremost among these challenges is the tendency for Žižek’s account 
of the act to betray what Oliver Marchart regards as a ‘romantic longing for 
purity’.48 Marchart identifies the key shortcoming of the Žižekian act as its ‘all-
or-nothing’ character. Either one has a radical change that recreates the entire 
global order such that it is no longer recognisable, or one simply has ‘acting’, a 
term designating mere business-as-usual in politics, the ebb and flow of electoral 
cycles and low-key, ineffectual bouts of activism. In a similar way, Johnston 
criticises the clamour and carnage of the ‘spectacular act’.49 Both Marchart and 
                                                   
46 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Class Struggle or Postmodernism? Yes Please!’, in Contingency, Hegemony, 
Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left (London: Verso, 2000), p. 121. 
47 Žižek, Less than Nothing, p. 30. 
48 Oliver Marchart, ‘Acting and the Act: On Slavoj Žižek’s Political Ontology’, in The Truth of 
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49 Johnston, Badiou, Žižek, and Political Transformations, p. 158. 
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Johnston see practical and theoretical dangers in conceiving the act as a 
thunderous awe-inspiring break with the past. Practically speaking, if we accept 
that a total rupture is actually the minimal condition for change (since anything 
less will simply be the continuation of the old in the guise of the new), we may set 
the bar so high that change itself begins to appear to be an impossible task. This 
is referred to by Marchart as ‘cutting the link between politics and the political’ 
and the ‘hypostatization of the act’ and is certainly a feature of some of Žižek’s 
more forthright expositions of the concept of the act.50 If the political is indeed 
severed from politics, this would seem to deprive us of any means of achieving 
the kind of effective engagement that might lead to systemic change. Even fairly 
radical forms of activism can be easily dismissed as implicitly sanctioned 
expressions of dissent which may even give rise to more pernicious forms of 
complicity.51 Alternatively, on a theoretical level, Žižek’s position generates 
certain difficulties insofar as it seems to engender an irresistible slippage into 
theological rhetoric. Even if this is a danger Žižek is aware of, it seems to be one 
he actively courts by constantly imbuing the act with the aura of revelation—no 
doubt an odd strategy for someone claiming to espouse radical philosophical 
materialism. Far from enabling political engagement, conceiving act qua miracle 
encourages us to view political change as an intervention from another domain, 
something that cannot be worked towards but should rather be patiently waited 
                                                   
50 Marchart, ‘Acting and the Act: On Slavoj Žižek’s Political Ontology’, p. 104. 
51 A classic example, offered by Žižek, would be the anti-war marches in the United Kingdom 
prior to the 2003 war in Iraq. These marches were well attended and certainly indicated a 
popular objection to the invasion of Iraq. The point to note, however, is the sense in which both 
sides win: the protesters are able to absolve themselves of their feelings of complicity and 
Western guilt, while the UK Government are able to make the self-congratulatory argument that 
such protests are only possible in a liberal democracy and that by toppling Sadam Hussein, 
Iraqis themselves will be able to enjoy the same democratic freedoms. See: Slavoj Žižek, World 
Renowned Philosopher Slavoj Žižek on the Iraq War, the Bush Presidency, the War on Terror 
and More, 2012 
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for. Moreover, this theological register would then also seem inconsistent with 
some of Žižek’s favoured examples of the act. Most notably, in describing Lenin’s 
revolutionary decision to seize state power, Žižek characterizes Lenin’s stance as 
one of, throwing oneself into the paradox of the situation, seizing the opportunity 
and intervening, even if the situation was “premature”, with a wager that this 
very “premature” intervention would radically change the “objective” 
relationship.52 If the act is analogous to a miracle, this would imply it comes from 
a realm distinct from human action. The most basic way of characterising a 
miracle would be as a divine intervention in worldly processes. Viewing an act as 
‘unworldly’ in the same way as a miracle would mean that no ‘premature’ 
intervention can possibly generate it. Žižek’s account thus seems to be divided 
between claims that acts can be brought about through a kind of reckless Leninist 
wager, and an opposing position that acts are quasi-divine, occurring 
independently of human activity. The core of my immanent critique of Žižek on 
this point is simply that we do not need to resort to theological terminology in 
order to conceptualise the act. Reading the act as a miracle sets us back on a path 
that Badiou, Johnston, and Žižek, as proponents of a thoroughgoing materialism, 
should all be determined to avert. I am therefore sympathetic to Marchart’s 
exasperation with Žižek’s tendency to deviate sporadically from his own 
positions, and even to attack scholars seeking to defend positions he previously 
adhered to.53 With this in mind, I argue that an effective reading of Žižek must 
also be a selective one. There is no single, coherent position on the concept of act, 
nor indeed on many other Žižekian offerings. One must rather sift through the 
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debris of Žižek’s various revisions and interlinked theoretical projects in order to 
pick out certain promising elements.54 In the discussion of the act that follows, I 
will attempt to flesh out the concept’s political import as well as the model of 
temporality it implies. The act, as will be shown, requires us to think in terms of 
the retroactive efficacy of an effect upon its cause. To put this another way, the 
Žižekian act complicates the narrative emplotment of cause and effect insofar as 
it requires us to consider the possibility of an effect that reconfigures the situation 
such that it generates the very causal dynamic that gives rise to it.  
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Vanishing Mediators and Posited Presuppositions 
In an early text entitled For they know not what they do: Enjoyment as a political 
factor, Žižek does in fact provide a thoroughly materialist account of the 
possibility of radical political change. Here, the term ‘vanishing mediator’ is 
deployed in order to characterise the intermediate element required to think a 
transformation between two distinct historical periods. The concept itself is 
drawn from Fredric Jameson’s classic interpretation of Max Weber’s The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism in which the former argues that, for 
Weber, Protestantism represents an important mediatory stage in the transition 
to a capitalist economy. Rather than emerging organically from feudal practices, 
the rise of capitalism required a thorough-going transformation on the level of 
individual behaviours, aspirations, and beliefs. Protestantism achieved this by 
encouraging individuals to accumulate additional wealth as well as promoting the 
virtue of an ascetic, puritan life. Once the ‘ascetic-acquisitive’ attitude has been 
socially normalized, the substantial life-world of feudalism has effectively been 
left behind such that all that is required is a formal shift which registers the 
transformation as having already been accomplished. Put another way, first one 
simply has society organised according to feudal relationships; then, the 
mediating phase of the Protestant ethic which gives rise to new dispositions and 
practices, within the parameters of the old feudal form; then, finally, these 
dispositions and practices become autonomous from the Protestant ethic which 
gave rise to them, such that they are now asserted in their own right. Žižek urges 
us to read this process according to Hegel’s ‘negation of the negation’:  
the first “negation” consists in the slow, underground, invisible change of substantial 
content which, paradoxically, takes place in the name of its own form; then, once the 
form has lost its substantial right, it falls to pieces by itself – the very form of negation 
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is negated, or, to use the classic Hegelian couple, the change which took place “in 
itself” becomes “for itself”.55 
Protestantism accomplished a universalization of the Christian attitude: the 
protestant ethic means that even economic activity is also conceived as a ‘domain 
of the disclosure of God’s Grace’.56 But precisely this universalization served to 
prepare the ground for capitalist individualism whereby, instead of the ascetic-
acquisitive stance serving to indicate one’s moral stature or devoutness, 
acquisition begins to take place for its own sake. The Hegelian point Žižek wishes 
to emphasise here is that there is a minimal but all-important difference between 
medieval corporatism conceived in-itself and its invisible, subterranean erosion 
by the universalisation of the Christian attitude effected by Protestantism. 
The analysis of Protestantism as a vanishing mediator does not exhaust 
the concept’s import for our enquiry. Having established the possibility of reading 
a historical phase as a necessary mediator between two otherwise unbridgeable 
epochs, Žižek goes on to argue that this is not the only reading possible. In fact, 
one can also propose a distinct reading in which the vanishing mediator 
designates a transformation that takes no time, but rather, in the same way as the 
Badiouian event, as a moment of openness which becomes indiscernible in 
hindsight.57 Rather than conceiving a vanishing mediator as an entity or tradition 
whose emergence and disappearance are both necessary to produce a certain 
historical outcome, now the vanishing mediator is seen as having no positive 
status at all; it is rather the pure form of difference between two distinct historical 
periods that surfaces as narrative discontinuity, albeit with the vital caveat that 
this ‘difference’ is the space of a subjective act. This understanding of the 
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vanishing mediator is vital to our enquiry. Žižek introduces the topic in the 
following remark: 
This “impossible” moment of openness constitutes the moment of subjectivity: 
“subject” is a name for that unfathomable X called upon, suddenly made 
accountable, thrown into a position of responsibility, into the urgency of decision in 
such a moment of undecidability. This is the way one has to read Hegel’s proposition 
that the True is to be grasped “not only as Substance but also as Subject”: not only 
as an objective process governed by some hidden rational Necessity (even if this 
necessity assumes the Hegelian shape of the “cunning of Reason”) but also as a 
process punctuated, scanned by moments of openness/undecidability when the 
subject’s irreducibly contingent act establishes a new Necessity.58 
Historical time is not a homogeneous succession of segments through which 
evolutionary trends occur, but nor is it characterised by subjective freedom in the 
volitional sense of being able to commit to and implement new projects as and 
when they are required. Instead, we should view History as characterised by 
broad stretches of normalcy which are occasionally and unpredictably punctured 
by moments of openness.  
Andrew Gibson has already proposed an ‘intermittent’ conception of 
history based on the works of Alain Badiou, François Proust, Christian Jambet, 
Guy Lardreau, and Jacques Rancière.59 Rather than an evolutionary model of 
historical time, Gibson advocates an alternative he describes as a 
‘melancholic/ecstatic conception of history and an anti-schematics of historical 
reason’.60 Historical time is no longer a homogeneous linear continuum, but is 
prone to moments of acceleration and contraction, ephemeral bursts of 
revolutionary enthusiasm which rapidly slip back into melancholic lethargy. The 
compatibility between this ‘intermittent’ history and the vision of historical 
change presented by Žižek is quite clear. Not only do both thinkers problematize 
the idea of homogeneous successive time, but they also recognise that only a 
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rejuvenated Hegelian philosophy of history will be equal to the task of thinking 
History in terms of contingency and necessity, of frisson and inertia. Gibson 
refers to a Hegelian dialectic that, ‘secretes a flaw, the real’ and argues that, ‘it is 
precisely this flaw that one needs to think within historical reason’.61 Where 
Gibson and Žižek diverge turns out to be not on the importance of thinking 
through this flaw in the Hegelian edifice (a flaw that Žižek consistently argues is 
a core aspect of the Hegelian project), but rather on the perspectival rifts between 
observers, participants, and the backward gaze of the historian. No doubt the 
distinctions between Gibson and Žižek are a matter of nuance, but they are worth 
exploring in order to assist a more thorough exposition of the features of the 
latter’s account of historical time in For they know not what they do.  
In a vital passage, Gibson sums up his understanding of historical 
intermittency: 
Intermittency, then, would appear to define itself as a relationship between a 
seeming impasse and an alterity which interrupts it. This alterity is not already given, 
everywhere accessible, available at once, cannot be described before it appears, but 
happens, here and there, from time to time. Its arrival is unpredictable. There may 
be a means of establishing connections between its occurrences, but they cannot be 
forecast, and no logic of hindsight can account for their taking place.62    
All the core elements of Gibson’s position are presented here: unpredictability, 
the interruption of the event, and the impossibility of providing a proper account 
retrospectively. What is missing is the additional, characteristically Žižekian 
twist: it is not so much that we cannot account for the event’s having taken place, 
but rather that our accounts inevitably miss the site of our own inscription in the 
revolutionary passage. So, to take the well-worn example of the Russian 
Revolution, one can easily provide a detailed history in which all the trends and 
factors are present and weighed against each other so as to decide upon the salient 
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processes and outcomes.63 But what remains absent in such an account is the 
subjective perspective of the revolutionary actors embedded in the situation, 
seeking to bring about the very outcomes which will later be viewed as having 
been necessarily produced by objective processes. Nor is it enough to simply write 
this perspective into one’s account—the subject’s position cannot be absorbed 
après coup; it is definitively lost to hindsight. The only way to capture the 
subject’s situatedness is to stress the incommensurability between history as an 
objective series of events, and history as the contingent decisions and actions of 
committed individuals. As Žižek argues, ‘A proper Hegelian dialectical move […] 
disperses the fetish of “objective historical process” and allows us to see its 
genesis: the way the very historical Necessity sprang up as a positivization, as a 
“coagulation” of a radically contingent decision of the subjects in an open, 
undecidable situation’.64 To distinguish between Gibson’s intermittent historical 
time and Žižek’s Hegelianism requires us to think the difference between ecstatic 
time, which places emphasis on the exuberance and emotional release of a 
revolutionary moment, and the narrative effect of the perspectival shift between 
subjective engagement and the historian’s sober detachment. There is not 
necessarily a choice to be made between these different positions; in fact, we 
should note that they are entirely compatible with one another. My main point 
here is twofold: firstly, one should recognise that the two positions are not 
equivalent, that there is an additional feature in Žižek’s account, namely, the 
revolutionary subject’s inscription qua vanishing mediator. It is not enough to 
stress a heterogeneous temporality; one must also say exactly what it is about 
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certain historical moments that impedes the application of a more orthodox, 
rectilinear temporal model. Again, the distinction here is between an intermittent 
history characterized by explosive eruptions of passion whereby an affective 
surplus gives rise to moments of temporal concentration, and one characterized 
by irresolvable perspectival distortions based on one’s position vis-à-vis the 
evental change. Secondly, comparing Gibson and Žižek throws into relief the 
distinction between a transcendental materialist theory of revolutionary change 
and the latent theological tendency detectable in Gibson’s notion of 
intermittency. Ultimately, Gibson remains too close to a revolution that arrives 
in the manner of a miracle and must therefore be patiently waited for rather than 
actively brought about. 
  It will be clear at this point that the concept of the act being developed 
here is quite distinct from the concept that appears in many of Žižek’s later works 
even though both versions of the act are intended to accomplish the same scale of 
transformation. Throughout the majority of Žižek’s works, the paradigmatic case 
of an ‘act’ is Antigone’s stubborn revolt against Creon.65 In asserting her brother’s 
burial rights, Antigone ‘risks her entire social existence, defying the socio-
economic power of the City’.66 Why does this refusal serve as a paradigmatic case 
of an act for Žižek? The key trait of an act is its non-determination by the big 
Other.67 This does not simply mean resistance; as Žižek is well aware, it is entirely 
possible to engage in forms of resistance that are thoroughly situated within the 
horizon of possibility determined by the big Other. An act, in contrast, must 
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accomplish the impossible, not only subverting the big Other, but masochistically 
striking at one’s own disavowed complicity in the reproduction of the social order. 
The logic of recognition we noted in the third chapter applies here too: in order 
to accomplish a truly radical gesture worthy of the designation ‘act’, the subject 
must not simply resist the big Other (embodied by the state) but must undergo 
an inner change (occasionally described as ‘subjective destitution’) that frees 
them from the spontaneous, pre-reflective recognition of the state as that which 
is to be resisted. There are thus forms of resistance which serve to bolster power 
and forms which undermine it with greater or lesser degrees of success. 
Antigone’s refusal would be a radical example of the latter. In a relatively 
sympathetic critique of this understanding of the act, Russell Grigg has pointed 
to a possible shortcoming of the act conceived as an example of absolute freedom: 
the act of absolute freedom, as Žižek understands it, derives its essential features (its 
freedom, its gratuitousness, its criminality, its unaccountability and 
unpredictability) from the fact that it lies outside all symbolic determinations. It 
strikes me that not only does Antigone not conform to this requirement but also that 
it makes an act indistinguishable from mere whimsicality. There is no objective 
criterion and there can clearly be no appeal to any subjective features to distinguish 
an act of absolute freedom from a gratuitous act.68 
Grigg’s analysis here is fundamentally sound. Certainly, there is no ‘objective 
criterion’ that can be applied to test whether we are witnessing a genuine act or 
‘mere whimsicality’. As to the act’s ‘subjective features’, here things become more 
difficult. Firstly, it is unclear exactly what Grigg’s term ‘subjective features’ is 
supposed to refer to. It could designate the features of the situation from the 
subjective perspective of the one who is undergoing it. Or it could mean the 
situation’s objective features which indicate a subjective investment such as 
passion, revolutionary fervour, and so on. Secondly, and more importantly, is it 
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not precisely the impossibility of verifying an act from both subjective and 
objective perspectives that is the most basic property of the act itself? Žižek may 
be guilty of decoupling the act qua radical refusal from the act as an ontological 
perturbation giving rise to perspectival distortions. My contention is that it is 
possible to remedy this disjointed theory of the act by reasserting the insights 
Žižek develops in his For they know not what they do. This will also provide 
answers to some of Žižek’s vocal critics by tempering the more problematic 
features of the act without depriving it of its radicality. 
The reading of the act as a vanishing mediator answers the challenge of the 
act’s unverifiability from both subjective and objective perspectives. The 
following quotation from Žižek provides a useful starting point:  
The incompleteness of the linear causal chain is, consequently, a positive condition 
for the ‘subject effect to take place: if we were able to explain without remainder the 
advent of the subject from the positivity of some natural (or spiritual) process – to 
reconstruct the complete causal chain that led to its emergence – ‘subject’ itself 
would be cancelled. The gap, the incompatibility between cause and effect, is 
therefore irreducible, since it is constitutive of the very effect: the moment we 
establish the complete chain of causes, we lose their effect.69 
While Žižek is here referring to the genesis of the subject (i.e. the way in which a 
human organism comes to be seen as a subject with its own inscrutable thoughts 
and intentions) the point also holds for a subjective act. As soon as one reduces 
historical transformation to mere causality, subject itself is lost. One can create 
an historical account, in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason, from 
which nothing appears to be missing, but these accounts ultimately prove 
unsatisfactory. The truth of the situation is not the objective account minus the 
subjective act, nor is it the purity of the subject’s absolute deed, it is rather the 
discontinuity between the two—the fact that every objectivising narrative is 
contaminated by a subjective act just as every subjective act is automatically 
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overdetermined by the new synchronous network of meaning it inaugurates. This 
discontinuity effectively is what we regard as ‘subject’: 
One cannot reduce one perspective to another by claiming, for example, that the 
‘true’ picture is that of necessity discovered by the ‘backward view’, that freedom is 
just an illusion of the immediate agents who overlook how their activity is a mere 
wheel within a large causal mechanism; or, conversely, by embracing a kind of 
Sartreian existentialist perspective and affirming the subject’s spontaneous praxis. 
If we proceed in this way, we retain the ontological unity of the universe, whether in 
the form of substantial necessity pulling the strings behind the subject’s back or in 
the form of the subject’s autonomous activity ‘objectivizing’ itself in the substantial 
unity – what gets lost in both cases is the subject in the Lacanian sense which is not 
an autonomous power ‘positing’ the substance but precisely a name for the gap 
within substance, for the discontinuity which prevents us from conceiving the 
substance as a self-contained totality.70 
By associating the act with subject qua gap or ‘missing link’ we can begin to 
understand how to answer Grigg’s challenge apropos the potential whimsicality 
of the gesture supposed to constitute an act. The proper response is to accept that 
there is no incontrovertible, once-and-for-all distinction to be made between 
whimsicality and the seriousness of an authentic act; insofar as we are caught in 
the process of history in its unfolding, the meta-historical vantage point from 
which distinctions could be made is unavailable to us. Likewise, the agents of 
revolutionary change themselves are not in a position to make categorical claims 
about the significance of their own deeds; the meaning of their deeds remains 
open to rearticulation and it is this openness that comprises the situations 
undecidability. Johnston is thus correct to assert that, ‘acting essentially involves 
taking the risk of a gesture with no meta-level guarantee of being appropriate, 
correct, just, right, successful’.71 So from this position it becomes clear that acts 
can fail as long as we accept the additional twist that a ‘failed act’ also fails to 
qualify as an act.  Incidentally Žižek’s own answer, contained in the same volume 
as Grigg’s essay, falls short here. Žižek states in direct response to Grigg: ‘what 
                                                   
70 Žižek, For They Know Not What They Do, p. 221. 
71 Johnston, Badiou, Žižek, and Political Transformations, p. 149. 
287 
 
makes a certain move an act proper are not its inherent qualities but its structural 
place within a given symbolic network […]. This is what distinguishes an act from 
mere whimsicality’.72 It is abundantly clear from Žižek’s other works (not least 
For they know not what they do) that one cannot determine an act’s status in the 
moment of its occurrence, that it is only afterwards that one can begin to assess 
just how much has (or has not) changed. The undecidability between 
whimsicality and act cannot be overcome through reference to the act’s ‘structural 
place within a given symbolic network’ since act is precisely the vanishing 
mediator between two distinct symbolic fields. To allow the absorption of the act 
into one or other symbolic field would be precisely to undo its radical status. 
In fact, Žižek provides an example of what we might describe as a proto-
act (i.e. a historical occurrence that might have been an act, but which the passage 
of history has proven to be mere whimsicality) in his all-to-brief account of the 
proponents of a new revitalised socialism that emerged in the final years of 
‘actually existing socialism’. The highlighted historical agent here is the Neues 
Forum in the GDR: ‘groups of passionate intellectuals who “took socialism 
seriously” and were prepared to stake everything in order to destroy the 
compromised system and replace it with the utopian “third way” beyond 
capitalism and “actually existing” socialism’.73 From our perspective, this utopian 
belief that the end of actually existing socialism could give rise to a political 
formation that would be a genuine alternative to both capitalism and socialism is 
easy to dismiss as hopelessly utopian—clearly the Neues Forum served as a 
vanishing mediator, albeit one that unleashed forces which would both lead to 
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the introduction of neoliberal economic policies throughout Eastern Europe as 
well as to the corruption of the very aspirations the movement stood for. The term 
‘vanishing mediator’ is therefore an ambiguous one. It does not refer 
automatically to a successful act but can also appear as a moment of utopian 
longing soon to be overrun by historical events.74 
The act qua vanishing mediator is characterized by a further ambiguity. 
We have seen how it can be read both as a free act with dramatic consequences, 
one that restructures the field of possibilities from which it emerged, but also how 
it can be a hopeless utopian outburst with no enduring significance. Moreover, 
we have seen how, from the perspective of an engaged subject, the situation is 
thoroughly undecidable, offering no criteria for an informed assessment as to its 
meaning. There is, however, an additional problem apropos Grigg’s (and indeed, 
in various passages, Žižek’s) idea of the act as a moment of absolute freedom. As 
Žižek himself points out, if we are to really move away with the impoverished 
notion of freedom as a choice between alternatives, are we not also moving 
towards a notion of freedom experienced as necessity? From such a perspective 
we begin to see how, at the moments where things are genuinely open, when 
substantial reforms or even revolutionary overthrow may be possible, the agents 
involved do not experience themselves as acting ‘freely’ but rather as constantly 
responding to the urgency of a rapidly unfolding situation, to the shift and flux of 
circumstances that threaten to undermine their political work. It may in fact be 
the case that the ‘absolute freedom’ of the act is itself experienced as an 
unrelenting imperative which forces the subject to persist in their project even 
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when faced with certain catastrophe. The ultimate meaning of the missing link 
for Žižek is thus that it, ‘is never missing “now” – “now”, in the present time, the 
chain is always completed; it is only afterwards, when we endeavour to 
reconstruct the chain, that we discover how “something is missing”’.75  The 
‘moment of openness’, the point at which a situation’s horizon of possibilities was 
no longer definitively circumscribed, is not available directly as a conscious 
experience; instead, it appears retrospectively—when the revolutionary actors 
look back upon their work, they perceive the transition brought about in the name 
of a utopian project but nonetheless leading to a new, stable symbolic order. Here, 
freedom is not so much the ability to ‘act’, to interrupt a given order with a gesture 
that escapes reduction to situational considerations, but rather the freedom to 
decide anew on the way in which one’s act will be inscribed in the situation: ‘at its 
most elementary, [freedom] is not a free act which, out of nowhere, starts a new 
causal link, but a retroactive act of endorsing which link/sequence of necessities 
will determine me’.76 Freedom thus operates at a second remove: we experience 
ourselves as determined by circumstances when in fact the degree of purchase 
specific circumstances have upon us is the result of our own choice, albeit a choice 
made unconsciously. The same applies when one considers the paradox of love 
which is precisely a choice or decision that is never made in the present moment—
one can only state with hindsight that one’s attachment to another person has 
changed in a fundamental way.77 
We are now ready to attempt a tentative periodization of Žižek’s reflections 
on the act. In the early works (The Sublime Object of Ideology, For they know not 
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what they do) the act is conceived primarily as a perspectival distortion—we are 
never directly present as a free agent at the moment of decision. The most crucial 
decisions appear as something that simply happened to us, something we were 
forced to respond to. Subsequently, there is divergence in perspectives between 
those whose subjective engagement allows them to perceive retrospectively how 
there really was a moment of openness, a space for a radical new project, and 
those whose detachment sutures the narrative space, positivising the subject’s act 
as reducible to a linear causal chain. Žižek’s middle period reasserts the act as a 
radical transformation, but this time with a stronger theological inflection—the 
act/event is a miracle, an other-worldly intervention in human affairs.78 In Žižek’s 
most recent works, the theological tone is markedly reduced (probably under the 
influence of Johnston who has taken a more consistently materialist position on 
the act/event) and in Less than nothing the term miracle tends to appear in 
inverted commas as if to indicate that we are dealing with a rhetorical device 
rather than a concept to be taken seriously as a metaphor for the act/event. 
Moreover, Žižek explicitly warns against the danger of conflating the miracle with 
the event as this would imply an intervention from a ‘transcendental Beyond’ as 
opposed to the material, worldly activity of human subjects.79 Žižek’s extensive 
corpus then seems to move in an extended arc around the concept of the act/event 
in an effort to avoid both vulgar materialist and proto-religious deviations. 
One of the reasons it is difficult to extract a single coherent concept of the 
act from Žižek’s work is that it is often, but not always, used as if it were 
interchangeable with the term event. Žižek even goes as far as to declare that 
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Badiou is ‘the theorist of the Act’—a statement which is only possible if one reads 
‘Act’ as ‘event’.80 Clearly, there is some scope here for comparison between the 
Badiouian event and the Žižekian ‘act/event’. In the discussion that follows, we 
will look at the question of the pre-evental, that is to say, on the conditions that 
must pre-exist the event for an event to happen at all. Badiou’s anti-humanism 
consists in his dismissive position with regard to the status of the pre-evental 
human: prior to an event, there is only a ‘human animal’, part of the natural fauna 
with no enduring significance.81 It is only an event which elevates the individual 
above animality, stimulating in him the passion and resolve of an engaged 
subject. But if this is the case, if there is no real distinction between the pre-
evental human and an animal, how are we to account for the fact that only 
humans can become subjects? What is it about human nature that makes it 
predisposed to subjectivation?82 Or more generally, as Žižek puts it, ‘How must 
the domain of Being be structured so that an Event is possible within it?’.83 This 
challenge ties in neatly with a further accusation Žižek levels at Badiou, that when 
all is said and done, Badiou cannot escape a dualistic account of the relationship 
between being and event. Badiou ends up relying on the old Kantian distinction 
between phenomena and noumena, with the event conceived as a noumenal 
rupture in the phenomenal order of being. This disavowed Kantianism then 
facilitates an all-too-hasty slippage into a theological register whereby the event 
is a momentary penetration of the worldly (being) by the divine (event). 
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Žižek’s answer to these questions conveys the fundamental distinction 
between his own version of the act/event and Badiou’s event: 
The only solution here is to admit that the couple Being/Event is not exhaustive, that 
there must be a third level. Insofar as an Event is a distortion or twist of Being, is it 
not possible to think this distortion independently of (or as prior to) the Event, so 
that the “Event” ultimately names a minimal “fetishization” of the immanent 
distortion of the texture of Being into its virtual object-cause? And is not the Freudo-
Lacanian name for this distortion the drive, the death drive?84 
Rather than a rigid demarcation between nature and culture, between ‘human 
animal’ and subject, within Žižek’s schema we have a third element—‘death drive’ 
which is a name for the reciprocal subversion of nature and culture. ‘Death drive’ 
accounts for the fact that humans are not simply able to myopically achieve their 
goals in the same way as animals. Rather than simply pursuing instinct or 
inclination, humans are prone to bouts of absolute stubbornness whereby a single 
object becomes the target of an overwhelming investment. This is also brought 
out in Žižek’s discussion of the ‘undead’ as a human state—in addition to the 
standard binary alive/dead, a third possibility can be inserted to describe a form 
of activity that detaches itself from the rhythm of natural life, a persistent 
repetition which has become autonomous from its organic substrate. ‘Death 
drive’ for Žižek is not the classically Freudian notion of a will to self-destruction; 
it is rather the insistence of sheer life that continues after biological death. From 
a transcendental materialist perspective, ‘death drive’ describes the human 
animal as denaturalized (a being of language, of culture) and yet not yet 
subjectivized. As Johnston puts it, ‘Todestrieb […] is a psychoanalytic term 
referring to certain “immortal”, “metaphysical” facets of psychical being’.85 
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Death Drive, or, the Entangled Freedom of a Proto-Subject 
How can the notion of death drive help resolve some of the problems we have 
highlighted in various accounts of political transformation? Recall that in 
Badiou’s Being and Event there is a logical gap between event1 (the event as sheer 
occurrence) and event2 (the requirement for an intervention/nomination). The 
problem we noted was that in order to pass from event1 to event2, we need to be 
able to imagine a latent receptivity to the occurrence of event1 which is absent 
from, if not foreclosed by, Badiou’s ontological position.86 ‘Death drive’ may be 
theoretically productive as it allows us to conceptualise the kind of receptivity 
which would otherwise be absent from Badiou’s philosophical system. Rather 
than conceiving the pre-evental human as a mere ‘human animal’, Žižek’s notion 
of death drive enables us to conceive of a form of attachment, proceeding without 
reference to strategic objectives, which inaugurates a change in the situation but 
which does not present itself to the scrutiny of hindsight. Moreover, death drive 
would be a way to describe the non-voluntarist, but nonetheless subjective, 
propulsion that enables a passage between distinct symbolic fields. A case could 
be made for viewing Badiou’s notion of fidelity as the structural analogue of death 
drive, and yet although both death drive and fidelity name the subject’s relation 
to the event/act, it is crucial to see how they differ. Firstly, fidelity is definitively 
post-evental. One can only maintain a relation of fidelity vis-à-vis the event once 
the event1/event2 dyad is closed. Fidelity presupposes nomination and therefore 
hinges on the recognition of the event’s having already taken place.87 In contrast, 
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death drive is considered to be a pre-reflective inherent ‘unruliness’ correlating 
to a human’s non-assimilation (or incomplete assimilation) into a given symbolic 
order.88 Secondly, death drive is distinct from fidelity insofar as it expresses the 
irreducibility of the subject qua self-relating negativity to any positive set of 
historical conditions. The human subject is not the exclusive product of its 
social/political/cultural milieu, but neither is it reducible to a series of 
physiological impulses. Death drive expresses the dissonance between 
environmental and physiological determinants. It is not chosen upon, but is a 
characteristic produced by the cross-contamination of nature and culture. 
Fidelity, on the other hand, is in some sense the result of a post-evental choice—
one can choose to ignore the occurrence of the event or to not pursue its 
consequences, and yet this would still imply a recognition that an event has taken 
place, even if that event should be rejected. The form of choice here does not 
imply voluntarism since the choice is made against the background of an event’s 
having occurred—the occurrence of the event itself is not subject to a choice; it is 
only apprehended or recognised. In any case, the basic point to be grasped here 
is that, in Badiou’s Being and Event, the individual is not theorised in a way that 
would allow us to view an event and subsequent evental fidelity as possibilities. 
A Žižekian formulation of death drive allows us to add conceptual ballast 
to our reflections on the role of the vanishing mediator in a political 
transformation. 
Drive is literally a countermovement to desire; it does not strive toward impossible 
fullness and, being forced to renounce it, get stuck on a partial object as its 
remainder. Drive is quite literally the very ‘drive’ to BREAK the All of continuity in 
which we are embedded, to introduce a radical imbalance into it, and the difference 
                                                   
change in disposition on the part of an individual. Moreover, the closure of the event1/event2 
dyad does not imply a final, irrevocable closure but only a closure for a subject lasting for as 
long as that subject is still caught up in carrying out the consequences of the event. 
88 Slavoj Žižek and Markus Gabriel, Mythology, Madness and Laughter: Subjectivity in 
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between drive and desire is precisely that, in desire, this cut, this fixation onto a 
partial object, is, as it were, ‘transcendentalized’, transposed into a stand-in for the 
void of the Thing.89 
As Johnston notes, the death drive is the missing element in Badiou’s 
undialecticized pair: Being and Event.90 If an act/event is successful, it is only 
because the negative gesture of cutting oneself loose from one’s politico-historical 
conditions has been accomplished. Crucially, for the revolutionary passage to 
occur, the negative gesture must be lost to retrospection in the same manner as 
the Schellingian act of Ent-Scheidung. Johnston is therefore correct to assert the 
Žižekian ‘vanishing act’ as a valuable theoretical innovation vis-à-vis the 
(Badiouian) ‘spectacular act’.91 Žižek’s strength over Badiou (at least the Badiou 
of Being and Event) is that he identifies the unrepresentable excess 
corresponding to an act/event’s interstitial moment and roots this back into a 
concept of the subject neither fully determined by nature, nor fully domesticated 
by culture. With Badiou, the danger is not that we remain within the coordinates 
of a theological paradigm of radical change, but rather that the secularization of 
this paradigm has been too successful. That is to say, the event qua secularized 
miracle allows an all-too-direct transposition of the attributes of the miracle onto 
the event such that humans lose any involvement in the occurrence of an event. 
Even if a nomination is required for the evental occurrence to count as an Event, 
human actors are still in no position to bring about the referent of this 
nomination. The resulting predicament is one in which the dominant pre-evental 
attitude would be quietism. We would be confronted with the vision of historical 
change outlined by Gibson in which long stretches of melancholic lethargy are 
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infrequently punctured by impassioned explosions of revolutionary energy. For 
both Gibson and Badiou there is little sense in even posing the question ‘What is 
to be done?’ during pre-evental/melancholic periods—one can only play a waiting 
game, hoping for a miraculous ex nihilo occurrence that will provide us with an 
event worthy of our passion and our fidelity. At the very least, the Žižekian 
alternative recognises an elementary feature of the human psyche which gears us 
towards a radical revolutionary act. Death drive does not necessitate a 
revolutionary event, but it does provide the possibility for an evental occurrence 
without slipping into a voluntarist position. The price to be paid is that this act 
can never be represented or rendered intelligible from the perspective of the 
newly inaugurated political order. Insofar as the act/event is bound up with such 
a notion of drive, we are not dealing with an event that can be included as a 




The Uncanny Subject 
There are features of Žižek’s act/event which prove pertinent to our broader 
argument when read alongside the Schmittian sovereign’s decision. As has 
already been claimed above, the sovereign decision is not an act of omnipotence. 
It is not enough to argue, as Michael Marder does, that the sovereign decision is 
the ‘always already exteriorised’ will of the sovereign.92 Rather, the sovereign 
relies on the recognition of a political community. I have proposed the term 
‘reflexive determination’ adequately captures the sense in which the sovereign 
decision must always take the form of a declaration and is only determined as a 
decision retroactively by the response of a non-sovereign actor or group of actors. 
The sovereign is not the omnipotent wellspring of political authority; rather, 
sovereign constituted power is always secondary to popular constituent power, 
with the latter standing as the only underived power.93 The connection between 
Žižek and Schmitt concerns the act in its Leninist formulation (or at least Žižek’s 
reading of Lenin), as a wager that a premature gesture will be enough to force the 
situation such that one retroactively secures the possibility conditions with 
respect to the gesture itself: 
The Leninist stance was to take a leap, throwing oneself into the paradox of the 
situation, seizing the opportunity and intervening, even if the situation was 
‘premature’, with a wager that this very ‘premature’ intervention would radically 
change the ‘objective’ relationship of forces itself, within which the initial situation 
appeared ‘premature’—that it would undermine the very standard to which 
reference told us that the situation was ‘premature’.94  
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There is a near perfect symmetry here between the Leninist ‘premature’ act and 
the sovereign declaration. In both cases, the initial gesture takes the form of the 
wager. Just as the Leninist revolutionary does not know whether her deed will 
genuinely disrupt the socio-political order or prove to be naïve ‘acting out’, the 
Schmittian proto-sovereign has no guarantees that his declaration of the 
situation’s exceptional status will be recognised as valid by the political 
community he addresses. One can just as easily see how the would-be 
revolutionary gesture might turn out to be nothing more than a hysterical 
outburst, and likewise, how the sovereign declaration might simply be ignored or 
dismissed as the delirious ravings of a usurper. Crucially, in both cases, the status 
of the revolutionary/sovereign is determined retroactively by way of its 
recognition by non-sovereign/non-revolutionary actors. Once this recognition 
takes place, the proto-sovereign declaration is re-inscribed as sovereign decision, 
just as the revolutionary wager is transformed into a decisive act. Nonetheless, 
the two procedures are symmetrical and not identical insofar as they work in 
different directions: the sovereign decision concentrates power whereas the 
revolutionary act disperses it. For the Schmittian sovereign, a successful decision 
anchors power in an individual: we are dealing with constituted power. The 
situation unfolds in the same way as the genesis of political life as described 
within the social contract tradition. In both cases, the contingency of origins, the 
fact that numerous alternative historical trajectories are eliminated in a single 
gesture, must disappear from view in order to accomplish the instauration of a 
new historical epoch. For both Hobbes and Schmitt it is the constituent power of 
the people that is eclipsed by the constituted power of the sovereign. In contrast, 
the revolutionary gesture, if it is truly successful, must undo constituted power 
and hold open the moment of constituent power. 
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Framing the Schmittian sovereign decision in this way allows us to arrive 
at a further insight concerning the proximity of a momentary ‘recognition’ that 
transforms a situation to Althusser’s renowned theory of interpellation. Althusser 
argues that our constitution qua subject comes about through a subject’s 
recognition of himself as the addressee of a policeman’s call: “Hey, you there!”. 
In responding to the call, the individual becomes interpellated as a subject: ‘By 
this mere one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical conversion, he becomes a 
subject. Why? Because he has recognized that the hail was “really” addressed to 
him, and that “it was really him who was hailed” (and not someone else)’.95 In his 
own analysis of this feature of Althusser’s thought, Žižek argues that the real 
insight to be retained is the ‘timeless’ character of the interpellatory address. The 
recognition of the policeman’s call by a particular individual retroactively alters 
the status of the call itself such that it was always meant for him. What Žižek adds 
to this account concerns the status of the subject prior to interpellation. If the 
subject is produced by the interpellatory encounter, do we not also require some 
pre-subjective entity, an ‘uncanny subject that precedes the gesture of 
subjectivization’.96 As with Althusser, so with Schmitt, we are obliged to think 
through the status of the non-sovereign entity whose recognition both 
interpellates him as a subject of the sovereign and achieves the transubstantiation 
of a proto-sovereign to sovereign. Again, there is a similar requirement for a ‘pre-
evental’ subject in Badiou’s philosophy of the event. Just as one cannot think 
through the Schmittian sovereign without accepting the ‘vanishing mediator’ of 
the proto-sovereign individual (the individual who calls for a state of exception 
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without any guarantee that his competence to decide will be recognised), we 
cannot accept Badiou’s Event without also allowing for a vanishing form of 
individuality which serves to render the human animal receptive to the evental 
occurrence. Contra Badiou, we are not simply dealing with a spontaneous, 
unaccountable occurrence that gains the designation ‘Event’ through its 
nomination by a subject; rather, we must extend the scope of our conception of 
subjectivity in order to include the latent sensitivity to proto-evental occurrences. 
This is brought out in both Žižek and Johnston’s works, but also in Frank Ruda’s 
call for a theorisation of the ‘hypothetical subject’ or ‘anticipated subject’.97 In the 
final section of this chapter, we will address this dimension of Žižek’s work with 
reference to Kierkegaard’s notion of anxiety and the moment. 
In a statement that echoes Kierkegaard’s reflections on the appearance of 
‘the moment’, Žižek describes one characteristic of our contemporary political 
malaise: 
Progressive liberals today often complain that they would like to join a “revolution” 
(a more radical emancipatory political movement), but no matter how desperately 
they search for it, they just “don’t see it” (they don’t see anywhere in the social space 
a political agent with a will and strength to seriously engage in such activity). While 
there is a moment of truth in it, one should nonetheless also add that the very 
attitude of these liberals is in itself part of a problem: if one just waits to “see” a 
revolutionary movement, it will, of course, never arise, and one will never see it.98 
It is impossible to miss the parallel between the liberal attitude bemoaned by 
Žižek and the derided ‘gaze of worldly sagacity’ which Kierkegaard argues is 
incapable of seeing the moment: ‘[worldly sagacity] stares and stares at events 
and circumstances, calculates and calculates, thinking that it should be able to 
distil the moment out of the circumstance’.99 Žižek and Johnston’s 
                                                   
97 Frank Ruda, For Badiou: Idealism without Idealism (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 2015); Žižek, Absolute Recoil: Towards a New Foundation of Dialectical Materialism, 
pp. 78–79. 
98 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Badiou: Notes from an Ongoing Debate’, International Journal of Žižek Studies, 
Žižek and Badiou, 1.2 (2007), p. 7 <http://zizekstudies.org/index.php/ijzs/article/view/26/85>. 
99 Kierkegaard, XXIII, p. 338. 
301 
 
transcendental materialist approach draws attention to the opacity that 
characterises originary and transformative moments, further positing that this 
signals an ontological deadlock as opposed to an epistemological impediment to 
be overcome. Receptivity to the moment in Kierkegaard, and to the event in Žižek, 
requires the subject to accept the irreducible contingency that characterises 
historical transformations. In other words, for both Kierkegaard and Žižek, 
humans find themselves thrown into a world without eschaton or telos—there is 
no higher power to imbue our mundane activity with meaning or to guarantee the 
ethical character of our action, but nor are we fully embedded in a natural, 
material Whole governed by immutable causal laws. Both thinkers point to a 
fundamental openness as providing the condition for both subjective and 
historical transformation. 
The common ground between Žižek and Kierkegaard can be brought out 
through a careful reading of the following quotation: 
The system of existence [Tilværelsens System] cannot be given. Is there, then, not 
such a system? That is not at all the case. Neither is this implied in what has been 
said. Existence itself is a system—for God, but it cannot be a system for any existing 
[existerende] spirit. System and conclusiveness correspond to each other, but 
existence is the very opposite. Abstractly viewed, system and existence cannot be 
thought conjointly, because in order to think existence, systematic thought must 
think it as annulled and consequently not as existing. Existence is the spacing that 
holds apart; the systematic is the conclusiveness that combines.100 
At first glance, this passage suggests a commonplace philosophical account of the 
epistemological limitations encountered by finite beings. God, on the other hand, 
would have access to the Whole, the system in its conclusiveness, without breaks, 
discontinuities, or remainders. And yet to read Kierkegaard’s notion of God as a 
divine personality capable of viewing the system of existence in its completeness 
would force a return to a formula of faith and conversion that Kierkegaard is at 
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pains to refute. If the Whole can be thought by God, all human existence would 
be subsumed and freedom would be illusory. There would be no urgency behind 
the decision and the moment itself would be reduced to a quantitative addition 
rather than a qualitative change. The solution here (which is, again, simply a 
positive assertion of the intractability of the problem) is to note the paradoxes 
arising from Kierkegaard’s formulation. If ‘system and existence cannot be 
thought conjointly’ then God is that for which the unthinkable, the unconjoinable, 
are reconciled. But this ‘reconciliation’ is not the annulment of existence in favour 
of systematization; rather, it is the fragile unity of reciprocally subverting 
principles. ‘God’ is thus a name for human freedom thought in its paradoxical 
relation to (and not in its absorption by) the system. Kierkegaard warns against 
the idea that one can ‘serve God’ since this would seem to rest on the impression 
that God ‘has a cause, has intentions.’101 For this reason, any attempt to conclude 
the system, to approach the objective and subjective as dimensions of a single 
system, can never succeed. As we saw with Žižek’s notion of the historical subject, 
for Kierkegaard, ‘existence’ (by which we mean the existing subject) is not an 
additional element one can add to one’s elaboration of the system; rather, 
subjectivity is our name for the system’s non-closure, for the impossibility of final 
conclusiveness. Kierkegaard’s assertion that ‘existence is the spacing that holds 
apart’ is thus to be taken literally: insofar as our objectivising narrative of an 
existential event is either inconclusive or encounters unresolvable paradoxes, we 
are forced to accept that discontinuity is not a secondary effect of an event, but is 
constitutive of the event itself. 
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The interpretations offered in the most recent works on Kierkegaard 
depart from the standard view that it is simply human finitude that prevents 
access to the ‘system’ qua Whole. Given that the division between existence and 
system is irremediable, and since to think existence systematically is to think it as 
annulled (and thereby descend into paradox), the only solution is to inscribe 
paradox into existence itself. This is brought out more clearly in Kierkegaard’s 
The Sickness unto Death where God is characterised in terms of possibility: ‘since 
everything is possible for God, then God is this—that everything is possible’.102 In 
the same text, Kierkegaard urges us not to view God as an ‘externality’.103 Having 
said this, Kierkegaard’s writings contain ineluctable ambiguities apropos the 
nature of God. Despite characterizing God as ‘possibility’, Kierkegaard frequently 
refers to God in such a way that seems to anthropomorphize Him. Take the 
following passage: ‘Providence is indeed everywhere present and thus in one 
sense is the closest of all. But in another sense he is infinitely far away. That is—
he refuses to intervene forcibly, he omnipotently constrains his own omnipotence 
because it has pleased him to want to see what will become of this whole 
existence.’104 Not only is God presented as an agent with intentions capable of 
being pleased or displeased, but human existence is framed as a kind of 
entertainment. The passage speaks in favour of precisely the kind of reading we 
are attempting to dismantle—God as divine personality, passively bearing witness 
to his creation from on high. The contradiction between Kierkegaard’s notion of 
God qua possibility and God conceived as divine personality cannot be resolved 
easily. In light of this, the most promising strategy is to interpret Kierkegaard’s 
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notion of God such that it can be rendered consistent with his wider project. If 
Kierkegaard retains a dualist, spritualizing conception of the relation between 
God and the individual human, his arguments regarding possibility and human 
freedom would be undermined. Ultimately, only a transcendental materialist 
reading of Kierkegaard can open space for the form of human freedom he is 
concerned with articulating. I therefore propose, alongside Burns, Shakespeare, 
and Mooney, that Kierkegaard’s conception of God does not require a division 
between brute materiality and an ephemeral spiritual plane, but rather indicates 
fracture immanent to the material. This leads Žižek to state that only a ‘thin, 
imperceptible line separates Kierkegaard from dialectical materialism proper’.105 
And yet is it not possible that even this tentative demarcation is a step too far? 
Even though, as noted above, Kierkegaard’s various characterisations of the 
nature of God present considerable interpretive difficulties, his 
conceptualisations of temporality, possibility, and action would seem to 
anticipate Žižek and Johnston’s transcendental materialism. Žižek again: 
Kierkegaard’s theology presents the extreme point of idealism: he admits the radical 
openness and contingency of the entire field of reality, which is why the closed Whole 
can appear only as a radical Beyond, in the guise of a totally transcendent God […] 
Here we encounter the key formula: Kierkegaard’s God is strictly correlative to the 
ontological openness of reality, to our relating to reality as unfinished, ‘in becoming.’ 
‘God’ is the name for the Absolute Other against which we can measure the thorough 
contingency of reality—as such, it cannot be conceived as any kind of Substance, as 
the Supreme Thing (that would make him part of Reality, its true Ground).106 
Contra Žižek, the proper task here is to see how the materialist gesture has already 
been accomplished. Kierkegaard’s God does not correlate to the ontological 
openness of reality; God is identical with this openness. Absolute transcendence, 
pushed to its limit, re-emerges as a fracture on this side of the ontological horizon, 
as a persistent contingency that undermines systematisation. If Kierkegaard’s 
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endlessly repeated critique of Hegel focuses on the way in which the latter 
obliterates contingency from his philosophical system, Žižek’s revisionist 
approach to Hegel is an answer to this critique: The irony is that […] for 
Kierkegaard, Hegel is the systematic philosopher of the fait accompli, while, as 
we have just seen, the point of Hegelian dialectical analysis is not to reduce the 
chaotic flow of events into a deeper necessity, but to unearth the contingency of 
the rise of necessity itself—this is what it means to grasp things “in their 
becoming”’.107 
What kind of human action does this Kierkegaardian materialism enable? 
As we saw in the first chapter, rather than freedom of choice we are faced with 
freedom experienced as necessity (and yet not in-itself necessitated). The ability 
to choose invites the possibility of postponement, of adopting a sceptical attitude, 
or of balancing out arguments for and against. Moreover, it implies a self-
contained subject, detached from the choice and therefore capable of taking up a 
passive relation to it. On the contrary, Kierkegaard’s notion of freedom is 
characterised as follows: ‘freedom really is only when, in the same moment [that] 
[…] it is (freedom-of-choice), it hastens with infinite speed to bind itself 
unconditionally in the choice of submission [i.e. to the one thing necessary], the 
choice whose truth is that there can be no question of any choice’.108 It is a 
conceptualisation of freedom that is thoroughly compatible with the 
Badiouian/Žižekian event that presents itself to the subject as an overriding 
imperative. Rather than a selection between equal alternatives, the act of freedom 
is the recognition that a certain course of action must be unequivocally endorsed 
and pursued. This is also why the instant can be understood, as Elrod puts it, as 
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‘the negation of time’.109 The subject does not experience the beginning of this 
impulsion, but simply realises that he/she is already caught up in it. Time is both 
condensed into a vanishing instant (since there is no instant of decision, only the 
realisation that the decision has already been made) and shattered by an eternal 
truth. Narrative distortion (the impossibility of a full sequential recapitulation) is 
thus the consequence of an epiphanic realisation that cannot be situated within 
the temporal continuum of passing moments. On the other hand, if one makes a 
concerted effort to begin, the beginning is never accomplished: ‘The dialectic of 
beginning is quite commonplace; yet one side is forgotten—that the beginning 
must be a breaking off, and therefore it presupposes a whole line of thought in 
order to make a beginning; for if something else is not presupposed, the act 
whereby I abstract from everything is presupposed. But this I cannot do, I cannot 
get around to making a beginning since I am using all my powers in order to 
abstract from everything.’110 
A further commonality presents itself between Kierkegaard and Žižek’s 
respective positions on fate. In each thinker, fate is taken not as some pre-
ordained, immutable trajectory, but as reified product of our own deed.111 Or as 
Kierkegaard puts it, ‘a man’s choice becomes his fate. At first glance this does not 
seem even well-phrased, for if he himself chooses it, then there can be no talk 
about its becoming his fate, then it is his choice; but perhaps what he chose turns 
out to have much more in it than he thought and involves completely different 
consequences—thus it becomes his fate.’112 We experience our fate as determined 
                                                   
109 John Elrod, Being and Existence in Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Works (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 239. 
110 Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers, A-E, I, p. 355. 
111 Žižek, For They Know Not What They Do, p. 190. 
112 Kierkegaard, II, p. 70. 
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insofar as we have repressed the positing activity that gave rise to our experience 
of a particular set of determinations as binding upon us. 
One finds strong support for this reading of Kierkegaard as soon as one 
returns to the key passages on the decision. In an unmistakably Badiouian style 
avant à la lettre, Kierkegaard writes: 
In the moment of the decision of passion, where the road swings off from objective 
knowledge, it looks as if the infinite decision were thereby finished. But at the same 
moment, the existing person is in the temporal realm, and the subjective ‘how’ is 
transformed into a striving that is motivated and repeatedly refreshed by the decisive 
passion of the infinite, but is nevertheless a striving.113 
In arguing that the decision of passion is enabled in its very rejection of objective 
knowledge, Kierkegaard anticipates the familiar Badiouian insight that one 
cannot derive novelty purely through reference to an objective situation. An 
event, like the decision of passion, requires a kind of exposure to a situation’s 
internal discontinuity or contradiction, its disavowed element. The equivalent 
concept in Kierkegaard is ‘objective uncertainty’, a term indicating the 
impossibility of historical closure and systematization, which must be ‘held fast 
through appropriation with the most passionate inwardness’.114 The decision of 
passion can then be understood as a realisation that there are no objective 
guarantees, that the historical is not the purposeful unfolding of a grand design 
or system, but is continually riven with the frisson of the contingent event which 
no verstehen can sublate or absorb. 
To recap briefly, we have seen how ‘choice’ and ‘decision’ in Kierkegaard 
are problematized in a manner that resonates with Žižek and Johnston’s position. 
A valuable form of freedom is shown to be that which is experienced as the 
recognition of an urgent imperative. Nonetheless, there is still scope for ‘will’ in 
                                                   
113 Kierkegaard, The Essential Kierkegaard, p. 207. 
114 Kierkegaard, The Essential Kierkegaard, p. 207. 
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the traditional sense of agentic, volitional action within Žižek, Johnston, and 
Kierkegaard’s account. Remaining resolute in the face of objective uncertainty 
requires ‘a striving’ and this striving can no doubt be conceived as the result of a 
subject’s willed activity. What must be rejected is the notion that this same willing 
activity could generate the ‘decision of passion’ that gives rise to the process of 
striving; on the contrary, the decision of passion is entirely spontaneous. Arnold 
B. Come’s account is instructive on this issue: 
there is no way to infer with certainty what action will be taken by the agent, or 
indeed to demonstrate that there is a hidden ‘straight’, unbroken line of causal 
necessitation from presuppositions to action […] Rather, in the enactment of that 
kind of possibility which is achieved through the human individual as an agent, there 
occurs a pause, and a break or breach opens up before the agent.115 
Come is correct to focus on the trope of the breach which is recurrent in 
Kierkegaard and which expresses again our point concerning the lack of objective 
guarantees. When one experiences an historical moment as a breach that exceeds 
calculation or reasonable deduction, one is forced to confront history in its truth. 
However, the salient aspect of Kierkegaard’s thought is not the appearance of the 
breach to the subject in the moment of her immediate experience, but the 
appearance of the breach to retrospection. As will be clear by now, a guiding 
proposition of this thesis is precisely that historical openness is not limited to the 
perspective of an engaged subject, but that a radical transformation is in-itself 
irremediably distorted. From Kierkegaard’s account of the Fall in his Concept of 
Anxiety, through Hobbes and Rousseau’s respective speculations concerning the 
origins of sovereignty and Schmitt’s concept of the decision, one repeatedly finds 
a common structural motif whereby an ‘impossible’ transformation appears as a 
moment of narrative discontinuity. Kierkegaard’s importance then resides in his 
early attempt to think through, and to accept philosophically, the necessity of 
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contingency. That is to say, Kierkegaard holds that the subversion of a 
chronologically ordered retelling of a subjective transformation by a formal 
distortion is necessary insofar as this distortion is the counterpart to the subject’s 







Throughout this thesis we have been engaged in a theoretical investigation of the 
temporal character of events I have tended to describe as ‘radical political 
transformations’. I have sought to avoid the term revolution since this would only 
be a particular variant of the more general category of event I am interested in. 
The elusive origins of political life can perhaps be thought under category of 
‘radical political transformation’, but it would be inaccurate to describe these 
events as revolutions (even if revolutions may be thought of as, in some sense, 
originary). To regard an event as a revolution seems to indicate a shift from one 
political order to another whereas the founding political event would spring out 
of the primordial anarchy of humankind’s prehistory. If there is a commonality 
between the revolutionary event and the original political deed, it resides in the 
way in which the former must pass through the anarchic negativity that 
characterises the latter. For this reason, revolutions can be seen as a momentary 
collective remembrance of the original, underived power to authorise. As 
Rousseau maintained, this remains an inalienable power since the very notion of 
a political subject no longer makes sense without it.1 And yet although it is 
inalienable, it must nonetheless be forgotten or repressed in order for the passage 
from constitutive power to constituted authority to be accomplished. Below, and 
by way of conclusion, it is worth reasserting a connection that we have been 
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investigating from the beginning, namely, the connection between the term 
‘radical political transformation’ and the idea of authority. I will then provide a 
final outline of the kind of subject implied by our reflections on time, narrative, 
and the political. 
Authority, which could itself be regarded as the arche-political concept, is 
on the one hand, the property which is being transferred in any political 
transformation—for Hobbes and Rousseau, we are out of the state of nature only 
once we know who has the authority to decide, once we know whose decisions are 
to be obeyed, who is sovereign and who is subject—but equally, as soon as we 
speak of political transformations, we are speaking of a shift that is also internal 
to the political subject. Weber has highlighted this feature of authority in his 
uncharacteristically convoluted definition of the concept found in Economy and 
Society: ‘Herrschaft [Authority] will thus mean the situation in which the 
manifested will (command) of the ruler or rulers is meant to influence the 
conduct of one or more others (the ruled) and actually does influence it in such a 
way that their conduct to a socially relevant degree occurs as if the ruled had made 
the content of the command the maxim of their conduct for its very own sake.’2 
The ‘as if’ here is ‘unavoidable’ since it captures the ‘command is accepted as a 
valid norm’.3 Weber is right to note that the objective fact of obedience is not 
enough; the concept of authority must include reference to the subject’s internal 
relation to the figure of authority and the command. In a similar vein, while 
authority may appear to be bestowed, in actuality it is always effective insofar as 
its existence is presupposed by an individual or collective subject. This means that 
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the passage from one regime to another takes place both as a spectacle that is 
witnessed as well as a sudden internal shift in the subjects’ convictions as to who 
possesses authority to decide. Nonetheless, the catch here is that the transfer of 
authority can only be fully recapitulated as spectacle, i.e. in its objective 
dimension. The difference, to put it in Schmittian terms, is between the 
acclamation of an individual whose qualities and properties predispose him to 
sovereign authority, and acclamation as the objective correlate of the constitutive 
force of the collective. In the case of the former, we find a vision of sovereign 
power that is always ‘pre-constituted’, grounded in the inherent attributes of the 
individual who possesses it. Alternatively, in the case of the latter, the clamour 
and tumult of the publicly assembled crowd expresses the multitude’s 
constitutive power, the anarchic levelling of the political field which subsequently 
condenses around a figure in collective acclamation. Acclamation, on this 
reading, is the spectacular frisson that signals a political event. As has been shown 
throughout the chapters of this thesis, the subjective dimension of the 
transformation qua spectacle is not only unconscious (or more precisely, 
constitutively distorted), but cannot be brought to consciousness without either 
encountering crippling logical paradoxes or, otherwise, dissolving the 
concentration of authority in the new sovereign agent by exposing its genesis as 
grounded in the multitude’s constitutive power. 
In his unrivalled investigation of the concept of authority, Kojève offers us 
the following definition: 
All forms of (human) Authority have this in common: they make possible the exercise 
of an action that does not provoke a reaction, because those who could have reacted 
abstain from doing so consciously and voluntarily. Conversely, wherever men submit 
to an action (that they would not have effected by themselves) by consciously and 
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voluntarily renouncing their faculty to react against it, it is possible to observe the 
intervention of an Authority.4 
Such a definition can encompass every form of authority addressed throughout 
the chapters of this thesis. Clearly, the social contract would have to be regarded 
as an act that, if successful, causes individuals to ‘abstain from’ certain activities 
and ‘renounce their faculty to react against’ certain actions. Likewise, the actions 
of a revolutionary group compel behaviour in a similar way. In any of these cases, 
we are dealing with a particular individual or group whose authority resides in 
their ability to implement or maintain a political situation such as the exit from 
the state of nature, the continued security of the individuals comprising the state, 
or carry out a program for revolutionary change. Kojève goes on to note a 
distinction between the ‘birth (genesis) of an Authority’ and the ‘external signs of 
its “recognition”’.5 What is left unsaid in Kojève, but is nonetheless strongly 
implied in his account, is that the status of authority as a quality of a concrete 
political agent necessarily hinges on the subject’s apprehension of that authority. 
Authority exists as soon as it is recognised, but as we have seen this event (of 
recognition) is not a willed act. It should instead be understood as a spontaneous 
shift in disposition; the outward manifestation of this shift (acclamation, actual 
obedience, or signs of respect) is the only real indicator that there is indeed a new 
authority. These two events are conceptually distinct and remain so even if we 
concede that the first event (recognition prior to its manifestation) may occur 
unconsciously in individual political actors. For example, if having been ordered 
to perform some act by an individual I find myself obeying spontaneously, without 
reflecting on the commanding individual’s authority, I would still nonetheless not 
experience my obedience as coterminous with the genesis of that authority (for 
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then the individual’s authority would be dependent on my act, and he would in 
fact have no authority except by virtue of my obedience). Instead, I would project 
the genesis of authority backwards in time so as to enable me to perceive my 
obedient act as the mere acknowledgement of an authority already in existence. 
Once I have reached the end of the process, both my constitutive power and the 
positing/projecting activity which treats authority as already effective are 
concealed from retrospection. Kojève comes close to this insight in the following 
remark, ‘Authority (and its “recognition”) arises (spontaneously) in the 
“candidate” (who will be elected) before his election, which is nothing but a (first) 
manifestation of this already existing (that is to say, “recognised”) Authority’.6 
The key point to note here is Kojève’s use of the future anterior—to paraphrase: 
authority will have been present already once we have the manifestation of 
authority which is the external form of its recognition. We can only be sure that 
authority exists once we have witnessed the manifestation, and yet, having 
witnessed the manifestation, we must also conclude that authority was somehow 
present before, albeit from an original moment which cannot be definitively 
located. Retrospectively, the chain of events that led to the concentration of 
authority contains a break marking the site of the subject’s constituting act. 
The central conclusion of this thesis is not simply that radical political acts 
(those that involve a new genesis of authority) involve a moment of narrative 
opacity, but also that the genesis of authority necessarily operates in this way. 
Objectively speaking, we are therefore not permitted to draw a firm distinction 
between the genesis of authority by way of a sovereign decision and the actions of 
a revolutionary vanguard—in both cases, the genesis of authority lies in the 
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constitutive power of a multitude. Likewise, in both cases there is great risk, the 
debilitating uncertainty as to the outcome of one’s act, the agony of decision in the 
absence of any Grundnorm to which an appeal can be made. It is therefore a 
mistake to view the revolutionary act as inviting catastrophe by virtue of some 
inherent flaw; if the attempt to install a new political order fails in the case of 
revolutionary acts but seems more likely to succeed when imposed through a 
sovereign decision, it is due to factors that are incidental (the charisma or 
perceived strength of the would-be leader, the pre-existing disposition of the 
population, and the loyalties of the men holding the weapons) and not the 
essential mechanism through which authority is generated which, in both cases, 
is utterly contingent and necessarily includes a moment of opacity or distortion. 
From a transcendental materialist position, it becomes possible to see how 
the non-closure of the fabric of historical narrative correlates to perspectival 
difference, or, to the reflexive determination of sovereign power through its 
recognition by a subject. Transcendental materialism, as formulated by Adrian 
Johnston, provides a conceptualisation of subjectivity that is compatible with the 
arguments made above concerning authority, narrative, and temporality. 
Johnston outlines his view of the subject as follows: 
Mind (including, for present purposes, the dimensions of the subject) cannot be 
demoted to the status of pure epiphenomenon, as asserted by reductive mechanistic 
materialists. Why not? Even if dematerialized subjectivity, engendered by, among 
other things, the intervention of the signifiers of the symbolic orders, is ‘illusory,’ it 
is an illusion that nonetheless really steers cognition and comportment. […] 
Expressing this line of thought in a vaguely Hegelian style, the ‘true’ reality of 
material being (as substance) passes into the ‘false’ illusions of more-than-material 
non-being (as subject). But, through a movement of reciprocal dialectical 
modification, these illusions then pass back into their respective reality, becoming 
integral parts of it; and, at this stage, they no longer can be called illusions in the 
quotidian sense of the word (i.e., false, fictional [epi]phenomena). […] this 
movement of reciprocal dialectical modification is interminable to the extent that it 
forever fails to close the gap opened up within the material Real.7 
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The point to emphasise here is that it is precisely the ‘gap’, noted by Johnston, 
which has been the concern of the various thinkers discussed throughout this 
thesis. First, we have a situation in its sheer, material facticity. This might be the 
Hobbesian state of nature, the crisis ridden state whose existential threat requires 
a Schmittian sovereign, or the pre-subjective ‘human-animal’ who may be taken 
up in fidelity to a Badiouian event. Then, by way of an illusion (the illusion of a 
particular actor’s authority, for example), this empirical situation is changed in 
important ways: real material redistributions take place. The illusion now gains a 
life of its own, appearing more fundamental, more solid, more lasting, than 
fleeting distributions of material resources, territory, weapons, and so on. So, if 
we can reconstruct the entire process, why follow Johnston’s insistence on a ‘gap’? 
For the reason that, in order to ‘steer cognition and comportment’, illusions must 
be irreducible to their material conditions. As Johnston puts it, ‘Cogito-like 
subjectivity ontogenetically emerges out of an originally corporeal condition as its 
anterior ground, although, once generated, this sort of subjectivity thereafter 
remains irreducible to its material sources’.8 The very possibility of authority (or 
indeed, political commitment, love, or religious conversion) attests to the efficacy 
of an illusion that cannot be dissolved back into a material substratum or 
explained through reference to causal mechanisms. The autonomy of the ‘illusion’ 
vis-à-vis its material conditions forces us to accept its reality; it turns out that it is 
in fact the possibility of full and exhaustive material determination (à la 
Hobbesian ‘matter in motion’) which is illusory while ‘illusions’ (authority, 
commitment, obligation, conversion, love, and so on) have themselves become 
real. The ontogenetic emergence of subjectivity from an original corporeal 
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condition provides the model for subsequent transformations, radical 
investments, and subjective commitments. 
When Johnston insists on a ‘gap’, he refers to a failure that appears to 
emerge from methodological shortcomings but which is in fact essential rather 
than superficial or provisional. The implication is, as Žižek would put it, that the 
gap has an ontological, as opposed to merely epistemological, character—“the 
Whole is never truly Whole”.9 This means that when Kojève tells us that authority 
always emerges spontaneously, we must add that this spontaneous emergence 
cannot be represented as occupying a discrete moment in time.10 It is precisely 
the incommensurability between the pre- and post-evental, and the absence of 
any meta-historical vantage point from which these perspectives could be 
reconciled, which leads to irremediable narrative distortions. Narrative opacity is 
an essential feature of speculative, theoretical, and empirical accounts of political 
transformation.  
The notion of reflexive determination, explored in the third chapter, serves 
to describe the downward causation exerted on historical materiality (i.e. the 
distribution of resources and weapons, territorial borders and fortifications, 
bodies and barricades) by insubstantial, unobservable processes. In recognising a 
sovereign, a political community succumb to a necessary illusion; they come to 
view the power of the sovereign as the primary, ‘underived’ power and repress the 
truth of their own constitutive power. Once this illusion gains traction it not only 
has a real, material impact on the lives of political subjects, but it becomes 
naturalized, reified, and apparently real. The supposedly superficial play of 
appearances that seems to arise from hard, material facticity turns out to be 
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implicated in a process of reciprocal determination. As Marx noted long ago, a 
king is only a king insofar as he is treated as a king by his subjects.11 A king’s status 
does not depend solely on the material resources at his disposal, but on the way 
in which his power is encoded and apprehended by his subjects. From this, we 
might understand that the king can easily be displaced; all his subjects need to do 
is refuse to acknowledge his sovereignty. Alternatively, we might point out that 
the king engenders recognition by his subjects through his material resources (his 
regalia, his castles, and the spectacle of his marching troops) and that the 
subjective recognition of his power is a second-order, epiphenomenal correlate of 
his control over a concentration of these resources. The problem with each 
interpretation is that it insists on a firm boundary between the ideal and the 
material, elevating one side so as to read its opposite as illusory or derivative. In 
the first case, the agentic subject is allotted primacy over the material; in the 
second case, the dispositions, actions, and goals of the subject are relegated 
beneath matter or viewed as superficial articulations of deeper material processes, 
which amounts to the same. Lefort’s vital contribution here is to explicitly 
acknowledge the symbolic dimension of power. The apparent ‘transcendence of 
power’, to adopt Lefort’s phrase, is no doubt illusory, and yet viewed through a 
Johnstonian lens, it is precisely a ‘real’ illusion, that is to say, an illusion which 
produces real material effects.12 One cannot simply strip away the layers of 
illusion so as to arrive at a self-identical kernel of sovereign power; power is 
operative at the level of ideality while nonetheless generated immanently from a 
material ‘Real’ substratum. 
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There are practical consequences of the argument I have made throughout 
this thesis. If illusion and distortion are essential to radical political change, and 
if there are ambiguities that characterise our attempts at collective action, this 
would seem to leave politically minded citizens in a troubling situation. Faced 
with new states of emergency, sudden concentrations of power in unaccountable 
political entities, and suspensions of legal norms, what strategies can be offered 
to today’s engaged political subjects? In the first instance, to assert that illusion 
and aporia are essential features of political action both in the moment of its 
accomplishment and in its retrospective narrativisation does not necessary 
undermine the democratic ideal of free consent and participation tout court. The 
notion of reflexive determination I outlined in the third chapter of this thesis 
implies a corresponding understanding of what I have designated as the 
democratic a priori. Briefly put, there can be no unilateral assertion of 
sovereignty; rather, every declaration by which a political actor would claim 
sovereignty requires recognition by a non-sovereign actor, and eventually, by 
every individual who would be subject to the system of law the sovereign claims 
to execute.13 This does not mean that a proto-sovereign who fails to be recognised 
by the individuals he or she supposes to be his subjects has no further recourse; 
they might have technologies at their disposal which allow them to compel 
obedience. But obedience is only the objective correlate of recognition and, insofar 
as force is used, we are no longer in a properly political situation; the relation 
between proto-sovereign and would-be subjects has become a state of war. 
Following this, the task for engaged and interested political subjects is to cultivate 
                                                   
13 The term ‘non-sovereign actor’ is directed primarily at Schmitt and Hobbes and certainly 
cannot be applied in the case of Rousseau. For Rousseau, we have a kind of institutionalisation 
of the constitutive power in which each member forms a part of the sovereign. There would 
therefore be no non-sovereign actor whose recognition would be politically relevant. 
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a sceptical and perspicacious attitude towards the exercise of power, to contest 
unwarranted concentrations of power, to constantly reflect upon the locus of the 
authority their obedience presupposes. Even if a political community can never 
permanently inoculate itself against the possibility of tyrannous rule, it is 
nonetheless possible to build up a collective resistance to it. 
Our current era of political, economic, and ecological upheavals, provides 
new challenges for political theory and philosophy. If the notorious ‘End of 
History’ thesis rang true at the close of the twentieth century, it has since been 
thoroughly interrogated and dismantled. It was in 2011, against the backdrop of 
the gradual dismantling of Fukuyama’s thesis, and at a time when revolutionary 
chants echoed in city squares throughout the Arab world, that the idea for this 
thesis was conceived. The bifurcating trajectories of countries such as Tunisia, 
Egypt, and Syria contain a message for our generation—they speak of the ultimate 
contingency of political fortunes, the anarchic origins of order, and the 
constitutive power of the people. Ultimately, the revolutionary events of our 
generation awaken us to the non-closure of the political. Humans are uniquely 
and universally predisposed towards radical transformation at an individual and 
collective level. The task I have taken up in this thesis has been to identify and 
elucidate this potentiality even if it means tracing the boundaries of an aporia. To 
argue, as I have, that political life is enabled (as opposed to derailed) by distortion 
and illusion should not be taken to indicate a pessimism or cynicism about new 
political possibilities; on the contrary, the theoretical articulation of the nature 
and quality of these distortions/illusions is an endeavour that can serve to 
energise political communities. If the message of the revolutionary act is easily 
forgotten (or, strictly speaking, necessarily repressed), we should heed the 
Freudian discovery—there can be no repression without a symptom. From the 
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perspective of our own epoch in which the concretion of contemporary power 
relations has reached its apogee, and in which the era of globalised liberal-
democratic capitalism seems immutable, one can nonetheless detect a ‘return of 
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